G.R. No.

237428, May 11, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, Respondent.
Facts:
From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning period of 20 years, Maria
Lourdes Sereno served as member of the faculty of the UP College of Law, initially as
temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to December 1991) and thereafter, as
permanent faculty member until her resignation on June 1, 2006. From 2003-2006, she was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations:
(a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG Frankfurt
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases) and such
employment continued until 2009. Of her 20 years of employment in the government
service, only eleven (11) SALNs were available on record and filed by respondent. On
August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed as Associate Justice.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant on 2012, the JBC announced
the opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice and
respondent was among the nominees. JBC then required the applicants for the Chief Justice
position to submit all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in government
service. They further stated that that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”

In a letter to the JBC, respondent stated that as her service in the government is not
continuous, she submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up to 31 December 2011.
Since she was considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government
service anew from the time of her appointment as Associate Justice. Also, considering that
most of her government records in the academe are more than fifteen years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files. Such letter dated July 23, 2012
was received by the Office of the Administrative and Financial Services and copies thereof
were received by the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the OEO. The
letter was neither examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated upon either
by the JBC En Banc or the Execom.

Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements” and on August 2012, respondent was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives for culpable
violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The
complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs
such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to
sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003.

During hearing, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs while
she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN
only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. On February 21, 2018, a letter was sent by Atty.
Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, to
initiate quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

Senators de Lima, Trillanes, et. al. intervened. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against Justices Bersamin, Peralta, Jardaleza, Tijam, and De Castro imputing
bias for testifying against the respondent on her impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.

Republic’s Contention
It contends that since the petition only disputes the respondent's eligibility to
become the Chief Justice, the Solicitor General correctly instituted the quo
warranto petition only against respondent. The Republic cites the cases of Estrada v.
Desierto and Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President
Corazon Aquino et al. where this Court took cognizance of petition for quo warranto to
oust an impeachable official. It reiterates its argument that it seeks respondent's ouster, not
on account of commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to
assume the position of Chief Justice.

As to the respondent's claim that this Court has no disciplinary authority over its
incumbent members, the Republic cites Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints
involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the Supreme
Court. It further argues that the petition is not time-barred, citing the maxim nullum tempus
occurit regi as the State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its
sovereign powers are qualified. It argues that the one-year period provided under Section
11 of Rule 66 merely applies to individuals who are claiming rights to public office, and
not to the State. To consider the instant petition as time-barred, the Republic argues, is to
force the State to spend its resources in favor of an unqualified person.

As to the question on jurisdiction, the Republic contends that the Supreme Court is
clothed with the authority to determine respondent's qualifications and eligibility to hold
the position of the Chief Justice. The determination of this issue is not political question
because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On the issue of the respondent’s eligibility to hold the position of Chief Justice, the
Republic reiterates that respondent failed to comply with the requirement of submitting
SALNs and thus has failed to prove her integrity. Further, the Republic cites respondent's
gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of SALNs was
because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALNs. This failure to file such, the
Republic contends, shows her lack of integrity.

Respondent’s Contention
Respondent contends that citing the 2010 PET Rules and the cases of Estrada v.
Desierto and Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President
Corazon Aquino et al., erroneously lumps together the Chief Justice, the President and the
Vice-President, simply because they are all impeachable officers. Respondent argues that
there are substantial distinctions between the President and Vice-President on the one hand,
and Members of the Supreme Court on the other: first, unlike Section 4, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no similar
provision with respect to the other impeachable officials, i.e., the Members of this Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the Ombudsman; and second, the
President and Vice-President are elected officials while the other impeachable officers are
appointive officials.

It is the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may be filed
before the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower court would have
effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of
the Judiciary much higher in rank. She theorizes that if a Member of the Supreme Court
can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the
Supreme Court through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

She further reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred and that the Republic
cannot rely on Agcaoili v. Suguitan because it mentioned the principle nullum temus
occurit regi only in passing, as the "general rule concerning limitation of action in quo
warranto proceedings." She avers that Agcaoili is in fact authority for the principle that
prescription will run against the State if the rule or statute clearly so provides.

As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her SALNs were in fact
found in the records of the U.P. HRDO, and she was able to retrieve copies of some of her
SALNs from the U.P. Law Center. She argues that the fact that the SALNs for certain years
are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they were not filed. U.P. was only required
to keep the SALNs for period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement, after which
the SALN may be destroyed. The fact that at least 11 of her SALNs have been found tends
to prove pattern of filing, rather than non-filing.

The burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the party who brings the action
and that based on Doblada, the Republic failed to discharge this burden.

Furthermore, she maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity" when
she applied for the position of Chief Justice is political question outside the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, which only the JBC and the President as the appointing authority
could determine. Respondent also contends that absent any challenge to her nomination
and appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC and the
President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.

Intervenor’s Argument
Intervenors raised the respondent’s argument that a quo warranto is an improper
remedy against impeachable officials who may be removed only by impeachment and the
application of the PET rules are limited only to the President and Vice-President' who are
elective, and not appointive, officials. Movant-intervenors similarly argue that the petition
is already time-barred as the cause of action arose upon respondent's appointment as Chief
Justice on August 24, 2012 or almost six (6) years ago. Furthermore, they argued that it is
not for the respondent to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by the
Constitution for members of the Judiciary; rather, the onus of determining whether or not
she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. They also posit that nowhere in the Constitution
is the submission of all prior SALNs required; instead, what is required is that all aspiring
justices of the Court must have the imprimatur of the JBC, the best proof of which is
person's inclusion in the shortlist.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether
the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as
Chief Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by

the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.

Decision:

I. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and
against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives

The Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate

forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct
resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern
over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder
or impostor to occupy a public position.
 We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the
people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public office. To
construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto
petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a "public wrong" arising from
defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy.
Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

II. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

Petition is not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription. Prescription does not

lie against the State

Jurisprudence across the United States likewise richly reflect that when the Solicitor
General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the interests of the
public is involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar. In People v. Bailey:

Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of
limitations, x x x We are of the opinion that the established rule of law, as to the statute of
limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is correctly stated in the quotations
above made and "that the attorney general may file the information on behalf of the people
at any time, and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding."

III. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice

The Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and a Nominee for the Position of

Chief Justice

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority over the JBC

The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary and such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it. On this, Justice Arturo Brion, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., offers a succinct point:

Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its
assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can,
under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed because of JBC's fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting
performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC
other functions and duties — a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely
supervisory
Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the
JBC.

The JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself when it

prescribed the qualifications absolutely required of a person to be eligible for appointment
as a Member of the Court. The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court
are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:

SECTION 7.

xxx
.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.

Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental
law is clear that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence.

Emphatically, integrity is not only a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but
is likewise a continuing requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. Canon 2 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith
in the integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware. The Code of Professional Responsibility,
equally applicable to respondent being first and foremost a lawyer, mince
no words in requiring that a lawyer shall perform his profession in a manner
compatible with the integrity of the profession, thus:

CANON 2 — A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES

AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER
COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 — A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
 Rule 2.02 — In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case,
he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if
only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 — A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 — A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 — A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 — A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attribute.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession

It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity with a goal
of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary.

In Edaño v. Judge Asdala, this Court stated that: The New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. Integrity and
impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof , are deemed essential not just in the
proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which
the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that
not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence,
integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the
people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be
circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of
justice.

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether
the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as
Chief Justice Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing
of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity

The filing a SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of a public post.

It has Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases.
 Respondent herself, in her Dissenting Opinion in Phil. Savings Bank v. Senate
Impeachment Court interprets that "failure to comply" with the law is " prima facie
evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the
public officer."

Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity

Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that a member of the

Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity means that the
applicant must have established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal
in character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and
corruption.

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by

the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. Further, Respondent’s failure to
submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established
at the time of her application.

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.

Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating

dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any claim of integrity.

The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack of
forthrightness and dishonesty committed by respondent as a government official prior to
and at the time of her application as Chief Justice. In addition to the suspicious and highly
questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the following
untruthful statements and dishonest acts (as herein elsewhere discussed) ultimately negate
respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity such as respondent’s commission
of tax evasion and her failure to secure a permit from U.P. to engage in private practice
while in government service but she did engage in private practice as shown in her PDS
and admitted in her Ad Cautelam Comment to name a few

The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court's finding that
respondent is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice
and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course.
4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer

Respondent is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of
a de facto officer. Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position
of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the
consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and
exclusion of respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the
Office of the Chief Justice.