CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES V. REY SUNGA, ET AL.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SUNGA, et al.

Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation,
an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide
against several suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and
Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.

Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of
the prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same
proceeding, a motion was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while
deferring the resolution of the bail petition.

Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and
Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of death, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged

HELD:

The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or

implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as
proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of
the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by
unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that
its trustworthiness becomes manifest.

As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony

of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given
unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature,
could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.

The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one
who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding housealbeit she
has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being
traced by her mother and aunt?
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a crediblewitness but
should also be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil
gave her testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to
be a witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua‘s eyes to match
the latter‘s actual physical feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability
of her testimony against all appellants. The Court thus finds her uncorroborated account
to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and
sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant
appellants‘ conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. REY SUNGA, RAMIL

LANSANG, INOCENCIO PASCUA, LITO OCTAC and LOCIL CUI @
GINALYN CUYOS, accused,
REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG and INOCENCIO PASCUA, appellants.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness

may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have
been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the
[1]

presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution
and the fate of the accused.
On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and
a high school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was found
at a coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan.
The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having
been made in a span of days, followed by the conduct of the requisite
preliminary investigation by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto
Princesa City which culminated in the filing before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Puerto Princesa City of the information for rape with homicide against
the suspects. The case was raffled to Branch 48 of the court.
Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio
Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as
accomplice the accusatory portion of the information dated September 6, 1994
reads as follows:
 xxx

That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon, at Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years
of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the
commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together
with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the
execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to
kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by
repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her
death shortly thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]

x x x.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11984.

Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty.
On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for
bail, underscoring the weakness of the Peoples evidence, there being no direct
[3]

evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his

resolution for their indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were conducted in
[4]

the course of which the prosecution, after presenting several witnesses, filed
on October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a
[5]

state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had
been complied with, and submitting her sworn statement which detailed how
[6]

her co-accused carried out the crime. The respective counsels for the other
accused opposed the motion, insisting that it could only be filed during trial on
the merits and that Locils testimony was not absolutely necessary. By Order[7]

of October 20, 1994, the trial court deferred the resolution of the bail petition
[8]

until after the prosecution had rested its case, but it granted the motion to
discharge Locil.
The accused assailed the discharge of Locil via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining
[9]
order (TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the trial of the
case. The TRO lapsed, however, without a preliminary injunction being
[10]

issued, hence, the trial of the case resumed.

Through state witness Locil, then 14 years old and an elementary school
dropout who had been living away from her parents and using the alias Ginalyn
Cuyos to evade, by her own account, her mother and aunt who were looking
[11] [12]

for her after she got pregnant (the pregnancy was later aborted), the
prosecution established the following version:
At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the
marking Ryan-Ryan from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto
Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark
on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride. Upon[13]

instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom
she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga),
repaired to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the
victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn,
then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio
Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the
tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto
Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who
held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her
waist as they dragged her to a nearby buho clumps. There, Jocelyn was made
to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As
she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang
stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her
vagina and seemed to be pumping. [14]

After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as
Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described
as one who has chinky or narrow eyes, later identified to be Pascua, kept
Jocelyn pinned down by her hands. [15]

Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along
struggled against her malefactors.[16]

After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed
the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position
and clutch her abdomen.Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang
who smashed Jocelyns head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to
fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by
the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga
and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa
City proper, leaving Jocelyns body behind. [17]

When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard
the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about
the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired
to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July
12, 1994 of Jocelyns corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone. [18]

The other prosecution witnesses provided testimonies pertaining to

circumstances after the fact.
Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver, recalled that he was on his way
home in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao at 12:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, a
day after the incident, when from a distance of about 30 meters, he saw
Lansang walking back and forth and appearing restless near the coffee
plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao where Jocelyns body was later
found on July 12, 1994. Although it was then nighttime, Devilleres had a good
look at Lansang due to the illumination provided by the electric light post under
which Lansang was situated. [19]

Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana, declared that she was among

those who saw the mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July 12, 1994 at
a coffee plantation near her place; that in the afternoon of that date and while
tending her sari-sari store, a tricycle arrived with three men on board, one of
whom, Lito Octac (Octac) alighted, leaving the two inside the tricycle who
seemed to be hiding their faces; that one of those two men inside the tricycle
inquired from her whether the discovered corpse, that of Jocelyn, was from
Barangay Caroray;that the following day, she reported to the police about the
three suspicious looking men who went to her store; and that two days later,
she was made to, as she did, identify Lansang at the police station as one of
the men who went to her store in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 and inquired
as to Jocelyns corpse. [20]

Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyns father, recounted as follows: During the wake
of his daughter at the Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a. m. of July 14, 1994
(15th day following the incident), Lansang arrived and told him as follows: Total
tayo ay magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin itong kaso at magtulungan
na lang, mayroon na akong alam na makakapagturo kung sino and may
kagagawan sa krimen. Huwag na lang nating sabihin sa mga polis. When he
asked Lansang who he was referring to, Lansang replied that he would
return. Lansang did not return, however, prompting Tan to relay to law enforcers
the statements of Lansang, his neighbor who was courting Jocelyn at the time
and with whose family his own family was in good terms. [21]

Testifying on the autopsy she conducted on Jocelyn, Dr. Ma. Carla Gallego
- Vigonte (Dr. Vigonte) affirmed the following findings in her report dated July
[22]

12, 1994:

POST-MORTEM FINDINGS

1. The cadaver was seen in advanced stage of decomposition.

2. Depressed fracture noted at the frontal bone of the skull about 2 cm anterior to the
bregma, measuring 2.5 cm in width and 3.5 cm in length, with a rounded hole at its
right side with irregular edges measuring 4 cm x 5 cm in diameter; with a linear
fracture about 2 cm in length extending from the depressed fracture up to the bregma;
linear fracture about 3 cm in length along the coronal suture, right side, extending
from the hole to the bregma.

3. Multiple linear fracture with lengths ranging from 2 cm to 5 cm, noted at the
lambdoid suture, about 2 cm right side of the lambda, extending to the right side of the
occipital and parietal bones of the skull.

PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial Hemorrhage secondary to multiple

fractures of the skull.

Dr. Vigonte opined that a blunt object or instrument like a hard wood or a rock
caused the injury noted in post-mortem finding no. 2 which was fatal, it being a
deep wound in the skull affecting its inner organ and lacerating the tissues of
the brain, thus causing hemorrhage; that for said fatal wound, the assailant was
probably at Jocelyns left side; that for the injury in post-mortem finding no. 3,
the attacker was at the back of Jocelyn; and that in light of the multiple injuries,
there were more than one perpetrator. Dr. Vigonte was, however, unable to
[23]

determine whether Jocelyn was also raped. [24]

The prosecution adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of two

supposed extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
In a sworn statement (Exhibit A) dated July 18, 1994 which was executed
[25]

before SPO2 Jose P. Janoras (SPO2 Janoras), Sunga made the following
disclosures:
At about 10:00 a. m. of the day of the incident, June 29, 1994, as he was
then at work as a tricycle dispatcher, Lansang arrived in a tricycle bearing the
marking Ryan-Ryan and invited him to accompany him in fetching Jocelyn at
the PINS. He obliged and just before reaching their destination, Locil boarded
the tricycle. At the gate of the school, Lansang talked to Jocelyn who was then
wearing the school uniform after which the two boarded the tricycle which he
(Sunga) drove to a spot at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao St. in the
Puerto Princesa City proper where the four of them (Sunga, Lansang, Locil and
Jocelyn) transferred to an owners jeep brought by Octac alias Toto. The group
then proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan at around 10:30 a. m. and at
a forested area in Sitio Tagaud, everyone alighted except for Octac. Lansang
then forcibly undressed Jocelyn and raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil
watched. After consummating his carnal desire, Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2 x
2 piece of wood on her head and successively on different parts of her
body. When Jocelyn was already dead, Locil also whacked Jocelyns body
many times. The group then headed back to the city proper, leaving Jocelyns
remains at the scene of the crime.
In accordance with their previous agreement, he (Sunga), Lansang and
Locil returned to Barangay Irawan aboard a jeep driven by Octac four days after
June 29, 1994 and took Jocelyns body for the purpose of bringing it to Jacana
in Barangay Bancao-Bancao in accordance with Lansangs wish. On their way
to Bancao-Bancao, Locil inserted a cigarette into the corpses mouth
. pinasigarilyo ni [Locil] ang bangkay upang ikubli sa maaaring makakita ang
tunay na kaanyuan ni Jocelyn Tan. At Barangay Bancao-Bancao, he (Sunga),
[26]

Lansang and Locil carried the victims body and left the same at a coffee
plantation fifty meters away from Jacana Road while Octac served as a lookout
by the roadside. On their return to the city, the four parted ways at the corner of
Rizal Avenue and Lacao Street. He (Sunga) then drove the tricycle with the
marking Ryan-Ryan with Locil aboard while Lansang and Octac remained
together at the jeep
The above sworn statement bears Sungas signature and that of his
assisting counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto Princesa
City Legal Officer.
Testifying as to the investigation he conducted upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras
recalled that he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct in the
morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman Bolos
arrived together with Sunga. The two brought Sunga inside a room and asked
him questions pertaining to Jocelyns death and after about thirty minutes,
Sunga was presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for investigation. He initially
asked Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyns death and Sunga
replied affirmatively, prompting him to inform him of his rights under custodial
interrogation. After Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer,
Sunga chose Atty. Rocamora to be his counsel from among the names of
lawyers mentioned by him (SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon fetched Atty.
Rocamora from his residence. Atty. Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga,
asking him if he wanted to give a confession and informing him of the
consequences thereof. Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with Sunga
voluntarily giving his answers to questions he (SPO2 Janoras) propounded at
the end of which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their
respective signatures on the recorded statement. [28]

The execution of Exhibit A was, during the preliminary investigation before

the Municipal Trial Court, affirmed by Sunga. Apart from acknowledging its
[29]

contents, Sunga answered the investigating judges other queries as he

implicated Lansang, Locil and Octac in the killing of Jocelyn. This time,
however, he alleged that not only Lansang but also Octac raped
Jocelyn, adding that he merely held Jocelyns hand. [30]

Subsequently or on August 3, 1994, Sunga executed another sworn

statement (Exhibit I) before Special Investigator Reynaldo O. Abordo of the
[31]

Puerto Princesa office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Exhibit I

varied in a number of respects from Exhibit A. In Exhibit I, Sunga declared that
in the morning of June 28, 1994 he already had an agreement with Lansang to
fetch Jocelyn from her school on the following day; that at 8:00 a. m. of the
following day, June 29, 1994, he, together with Lansang, Lito Octa (should be
Octac) and a certain Jun left Mendoza Park and proceeded to Irawan after
asking Locil, one Bing Manila, and a certain Josie to fetch Jocelyn at her
school; that Jun drove the tricycle back to the city proper andhe
transported their female companions including Jocelyn to Irawan; that at
Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling Jocelyn whose hands were then held by
Josie; that after Lansang and Junraped Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head
twice in accordance with his plan to kill her which plan was known to him
(Sunga), Locil, Octac and Jun; that at 1:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, Lansang,
Sunga, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyns corpse and
dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part
in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansangs
promise to give him P500.00. Exhibit I embodied a waiver by Sunga of his
right to counsel.[32]

The prosecution evidence with respect to Jocelyns familys incurring of the

amount of P11,000.00 for Jocelyns funeral expenses was admitted by the
defense.[33]

Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery
with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of
Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a
prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. While
he acknowledged knowing Octac and Pascua, he denied being in their
company on June 29, 1994 or in Lansangs. [34]

Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit A, Sunga explained the

circumstances behind his execution thereof as follows: After having been
arrested without a warrant by the police in the evening of July 15, 1994 at the
corner of Rizal and Valencia streets while picking up passengers, he was
brought to the police station where he was subjected to violence and
intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and a certain Ka Ronnie to coerce him to
pinpoint to anybody, and he involuntarily did. After being mauled and kicked, he
was made to appear before police investigator Janoras on that same night of
July 15, 1994 during which he signed the second and third pages of a three
paged affidavit embodying his questioned extrajudicial confession without the
assistance of counsel and under threats and intimidation from SPO2
Pantollano. He was later brought on July 18, 1994 to the Capitol building where
he signed the first page of his confession after which Atty. Agustin Rocamora
also signed the same. [35]

As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit I executed before the NBI, Sunga

initially affirmed having given the answers to questions propounded therein by
the NBI Investigator and having executed the confession for the purpose of
applying to become a state witness in the case. He subsequently retracted his
[36]

acknowledgement of Exhibit I as his own confession. While he admitted

[37]

having participated in the preliminary investigation at the MTCC of Puerto

Princesa City, he could not remember having given most of the statements he
made therein. [38]

The defense presented other witnesses.

Joel Esquela Mayo (Mayo), an employee of Puerto Princesa Citys crime
watchdog Bantay Puerto, declared that in the morning of July 14, 1994 he and
a co-employee Miguel Abrina (Abrina) were at Jacana in Barangay Bancao-
Bancao upon orders from their superior to be on the lookout for the possible
return thereto of the perpetrators behind Jocelyns killing; seeing Locil uneasy
as she alighted from a tricycle, they approached and asked her how she was
related to Jocelyn to which she replied that she was a friend; then Locil brought
the two to the very spot where Jocelyns remains were found and while there
she acted as if she was looking for something; Locil later commented that it was
there that Jocelyn and she had a fight; and Locil was subsequently
apprehended by the police. [39]

Abrina substantially corroborated Mayos story. [40]

 Another witness, Orlando Lacsamana (Lacsamana), a detainee at the
Puerto Princesa City jail, testified that while he was conversing with Locil, also
a detainee, on August 15, 1994, they saw Lansang being brought
inside. Lacsamana asked Locil if she knew Lansang but she denied having
known Lansang or having been her companion. [41]

Detention prisoners John Pulga (Pulga) and Jerry Galgarin (Galgarin) as

well as Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) personnel Joel
Rabanal (Rabanal) and SPO2 Conrado Guzman Rafael (SPO2
Rafael) testified as to Locils failure to correctly identify Lansang on
separate occasions.
Thus detention prisoner Pulga narrated that on July 21, 1994, he was made
to form part of a police line-up together with three other detainees; and that
when Locil was asked by the police to identify who among them was Lansang,
she pointed to him (Pulga) whom she called Ramil Lansang. [42]

Corroborating Pulgas testimony was BJMP personnel Rabanal who

brought out Pulga and the three others for the police line-up, he too alleging
that Locil indeed pointed to Pulga as Lansang. [43]

Detention prisoner Galgarin, who was detained at the 263rd Mobile Post
of the Philippine National Police on July 23, 1994, declared that he saw Locil
arrive in a police car after which Lansang and three other detainees were made
to stand in a police line-up; and that when Locil was asked to identify Lansang,
she said he was not there. [44]

SPO2 Rafael testified that while he was on duty in the aforesaid PNP Mobile
Post on August 23, 1994, Locil hesitated to identify Lansang even after the
police assured her not to be afraid. [45]

Accused-appellant Pascua disclaimed knowledge of anyone of his co-

accused prior to the June 29, 1994 incident. He denied having anything to do
with the killing or rape of Jocelyn and branded Locils account as a lie. He
claimed that he was staying with his uncle Victor de Felipe at 27 E. Burgos St.,
Puerto Princesa City from April to July 14, 1994; that while he was driving the
tricycle with the marking Ryan-Ryan for a living, he returned it to its owner on
June 27, 1994 due to engine trouble and never drove it again; that at about 8:00
a. m. of June 29, 1994, he, together with his uncle Victor De Felipe and a
carpenter, went to San Pedro also in Puerto Princesa City where he helped in
recovering materials from De Felipes demolished house thereat for use in the
latters other residence at Burgos St.; and that he was at San Pedro until 4:00
p. m. of the same day. [46]
 Continuing, Pascua declared that on July 14, 1994, he left for his stepfathers
home at Barangay Burirao of the town of Narra where he was, on July 23, 1994,
arrested without a warrant by the police on suspicion that he might have been
involved in the subject crime, he having driven for sometime the tricycle bearing
the marking Ryan-Ryan; that the apprehending policemen sought his
cooperation so he could be utilized as a witness against Lansang, even offering
him a P100,000.00 reward and his exclusion from the criminal information, but
he refused for he knew nothing about the crime; that inside a small room at the
police station in the city, he again refused to obey SPO4 Pantollanos order for
him to say certain things about the crime, thereby infuriating Pantollano who
threatened to implicate him; that while still under detention on July 24, 1994, he
was brought before Locil for identification purposes but Locil denied knowing
him; and that he did not go into hiding after June 29, 1994 for he took up a
farming course at the Palawan National Agricultural College (PNAC). [47]

Victor De Felipe corroborated his accused nephews testimony as to his

whereabouts on June 29, 1994 and his returning the tricycle two days before
the incident. Felix Mayor, De Felipes carpenter, confirmed Pascuas being with
[48]

him and De Felipe the whole day of June 29, 1994 at Barangay San Pedro to
retrieve building materials from De Felipes demolished house in the said
place.[49]

The testimony of witness Espiridion Labotoy was dispensed with when the
prosecution admitted its corroboration of Pascuas allegation that the latter
returned the tricycle to its owner on June 27, 1994. [50]

Filomena Pascua-Tesorio also corroborated her nephew Pascuas claim

that Locil did not identify him as one of those who wronged Jocelyn. And she
added that during her visit to Pascua at the police station on July 24, 1994, she
asked Locil if she was acquainted with Pascua and she replied in the negative,
saying it was her first time to see Pascua.[51]

Cesar Batin (Batin), an instructor at PNAC, attested that Pascua was

enrolled at PNAC Abo-Abo Center in Brookes point on July 18, 1994 but that
he attended classes for only about a week and resumed his studies on August
16, 1994 until October 11, 1994. Batin affirmed the certification he issued as to
Pascuas school attendance. [52]

Pascuas mother Teodora Espaola testified that she accompanied her

arrested son when he was brought by the police to Puerto Princesa City on July
23, 1994 and confirmed that the policemen offered Pascua a reward in
exchange for his admitting responsibility for the crime but that she rebuffed
them.[53]
 Lito Octac, also clinging to alibi, alleged that on the day of the incident he
was working at Pambato Forwarder loading cargoes and pieces of baggage, in
support of which he presented an entry (Exhibit 9) in his employers logbook
[54]

showing that he reported for work from 1:00 to 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. [55]

Lansang, who operated a pump boat that ferried passengers from

Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan where his parents reside, to
Barangay Bahile, Puerto Princesa City and vice-versa, declared as follows: At
about 8:30 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he met his sister Gloria Negosa in her office
at the Philippine Ports Authority for the purpose of borrowing from
her P3,000.00 which he would use to buy pieces of plywood and paint for his
boat. His sister, however, directed him to get the money from his mother who
happened to be at her office at the time and who received two PCIB checks
both dated June 29, 1994 payable to cash, one in the amount of two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos, and another in the amount of Nine Thousand Six Hundred
Sixteen (P9,616.00) pesos from Gloria. Shortly after, he and his mother went to
the PCI Bank where he, instead of his mother who did not have any
identification card and Community Tax Certificate, did the encashing (at 9:53 a.
m.) of the checks- (Exhibits 12 and 12-A). The two left the bank and proceeded
to the Palawan Poultry store from which they purchased fertilizer. Thereafter,
they bought plywood and paint at the Unico Merchandising. (An official receipt
[56]

dated June 6, 1994 of P2,206 representing the purchase price of the goods was
marked as Exhibit 11.) [57]

Continuing, Lansang declared that while his mother left to make her other
purchases, he remained at the Unico Merchandising until 12:00 noon when he
went to the house of his brothers-in-law to pick up her mothers goods. At the
said house, he briefly met a resident thereof named Ariel Bactad and then took
his mothers goods. He loaded all their purchases in a jeep bound for Barangay
Bahile from which point they were to be transported via a pump boat to his
parents home in Barangay Caruray. As his mother no longer showed up, he
was constrained to accompany his cargo aboard the jeep which departed at
1:00 p. m. and reached Barangay Bahile at 3:00 p. m. of the same day, June
29, 1994. At Barangay Bahile, he loaded the goods into his boat with the help
of the boat driver, Arnel Tulonghari. He then took lunch at the carinderia of a
certain Jerry (or Jerico) Rufano where he waited in vain for two hours for his
mother to come to Barangay Bahile. At 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Rufano
drove him to Barangay Salvacion where he got a jeepney ride on his way home
to the city proper, arriving there at about 8:30 p. m. still of the same day.
[58]

Lansang further declared that he had never been to Barangay Irawan or to

Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao. While he admitted that he, together with
one Joel Egaa, went to the Sampaton Funeral Parlor in the evening of July 13,
1994 to condole with the Tans, he denied having told Tan that he (Lansang)
knew somebody who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime. He likewise
denied asking Tan to refrain from seeking the assistance of law enforcers, he
having merely informed Tan that Sunga, with whom (he) Lansang got to be
acquainted earlier that same evening, knew Jocelyn. Finally, Lansang
disclaimed having been Jocelyns suitor for he had a live-in partner named Mary
Ann Dineros whom he intended to marry but could not do so due to his
indictment in the case at bar.
[59]

Witnesses Jerry Rufano, Arnel Tulonghari and Ariel

Bactad corroborated pertinent parts of Lansangs testimony as to his
whereabouts and activities on June 29, 1994. [60]

Joel
Egaa also affirmed having accompanied Lansang to Sampaton Funeral parlor
on the night of July 13, 1994. [61]

Melisa P. Mateo, on the other hand, testified that as a bank teller of PCI
Bank, she received and processed for encashment the two checks (Exhibit
12) from Lansang at almost 10:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, which checks as
[62]

well as Lansangs signatures and hers and other inscriptions thereon she
identified.
[63]

Edgardo Caisip declared that he was the driver of the jeepney which
Lansang rode on together with his cargo for a trip from the city proper to
Barangay Bahile from 1:00 to 3:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. Caisip added that he
already knew Lansang before that time, the Lansangs having been his usual
passengers. [64]

Finally, Freddie Gallego, a barangay councilor of Barangay Caruray,

claimed that Lansang was with him in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 on the
occasion of a birthday party in the said barangay. [65]

By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang
as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused REY SUNGA and
RAMIL LANSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime
charged and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of DEATH. Accused
INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR., is also found GUILTY as principal of the crime of Rape
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused
RAMIL LANSANG, REY SUNGA and INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR. are jointly and
severally liable to indemnify the heirs of Jocelyn Tan the sum of P150,000.00 as
moral, actual and compensatory damages with all the accessory penalties provided for
the law and to pay the costs.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused LITO OCTAC beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

It appearing that Lito Octac is detained and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos is still
under the custody of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City their release are hereby ordered
unless held for other lawful cause or causes.

The City Jail Warden of Puerto Princesa City and Chief of Jimmy Carbonell of Puerto
Princesa City, are hereby ordered to transfer immediately the bodies of accused REY
SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila pending review by the Supreme Court of this decision.

SO ORDERED. [66]

Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Sunga, Lansang and Pascua filed their respective appeal briefs.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General prays for the affirmance of
Sunga and Lansangs conviction and the modification of Pascuas conviction
such that he be also convicted for rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death.
The issues in the case boil down to:

(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in
accordance with law; and

(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial courts
questioned issuance of the order discharging Locil to become, as she did, a
state witness, this Court is satisfied that there was nothing irregular
therewith. Her discharge was ordered in the course of what originally were
hearings on the petition of the accused for bail and after the prosecution had
presented several of its witnesses and submitted Locils sworn
statement. Contrary to accuseds counsels argument that a motion for discharge
could only be filed during trial on the merits, it could be done at any stage of the
proceedings, and discharge can be effected from the filing of the information to
the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. [67]
 From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locils
discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were
satisfied:

1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;

2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;

3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except his testimony;

4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and

6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have
direct evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to establish the culpability of the
accused.
Based on Locils sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what
happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That she did not
appear to be the most guilty among the accused and that she had not been
convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude were shown, as was the
susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the time of her
discharge in view of the other evidence in the hands of the prosecution.
That the trial court ordered Locils discharge a day before the scheduled
hearing on the motion for her discharge is of no moment. The requirement of a
hearing in support of the discharge had been substantially complied with when
the trial court, during the hearings on the bail petition, already received
evidence from the prosecution including Locils sworn statement and also heard
in open court the defenses arguments in opposition thereto. A hearing did take
place but interspersed with the hearings on the bail petition. So long as the trial
court was able to receive evidence for and against the discharge, its
subsequent order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion. [68]

In fine, even if Locils discharge failed to comply with all the requirements
embodied in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony would not,
for that sole reason, be discarded or disregarded for, in the discharge of a co-
defendant, the trial court may reasonably be expected to commit error which is
not reversible, the underlying principle being that it does not affect the
competency and quality of testimony of the discharged defendant. [69]

From the prosecution evidence, the testimony of the erstwhile accused-

turned state witness Locil is the most pivotal, for it is an eyewitness account of
what transpired before and at the time of Jocelyns death. Her testimony is the
only direct evidence identifying appellants and relating in detail their specific
overt acts.
Yet like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locils
statements hook, line and sinker because in the assessment of the testimony
of a co-accused-turned state witness, the same must be received with great
caution and must be carefully scrutinized. [70]

The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed

accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-
accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof
to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated
in its material points by unimpeachable
[71]
testimony and strong
circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness
becomes manifest. [72]

Was Locils testimony corroborated in its material points by the

prosecutions other evidence? If in the affirmative, was the corroborative
evidence unimpeachable testimony and strongcircumstances to such an
extent that Locils trustworthiness becomes manifest?
Appellant Sungas two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking
were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not directly
involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he was charged, could have lent corroborative support to
[73]

Locils testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took
place. Contrary, however, to the trial courts ruling, this Court finds Sungas
admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not only against him but also against
his co-accused appellants.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed
the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right
to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be
provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right
to be informed of these rights. [74]
 The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit A -
admission before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him,
Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
In People v. Bandula, this Court made it sufficiently clear that the
[75]

independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a

special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal
officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support to the
mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,
which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his office is akin
to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigation due to conflict of interest. That Sunga chose him to be
[76]

his counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being of a
very low educational attainment, Sunga could not have possibly known the
[77]

ramifications of his choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of
law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial
interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have
been discharged.
Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty.
Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sungas rights and interests, especially
that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty.
Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have related the extent
of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station. This Court is
thus constrained to rely on the following verbatim testimony of SPO2 Janoras
which described how Atty. Rocamora assisted Sunga during the investigation:
ATTY. ENRIQUEZ (Defense Counsel) -
Q: Did not Atty. Rocamora warn you, as the investigator, that simply he is invoking his
clients right to remain silent? Did not Atty. Rocamora first confer with the accused
Rey Sunga prior to the investigation?
A: They conversed.
Q: You said a while ago that immediately upon your arrival you already started the
investigation. And now you are claiming that they had a conversation first. Which is
correct?
A: They conversed for a very short while because everybody was already there. I was
on my typewriter and they were seated just very near me (Emphasis supplied.)[78]
xxx
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel) -
Q: And you informed Atty. Rocamora that allegedly Mr. Rey Sunga wanted to confess
his alleged participation in the commission of the offense, Mr. Witness?
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so upon arrival at the police station it did not take Atty. Rocamora a long time to
confer with Rey Sunga before the alleged investigation started, as you said 6:00
oclock in the morning?
A: Yes, sir. It did not take long because they were already ready (Emphasis supplied.)[79]
xxx
COURT -
Q: Who propounded the questions to accused Rey Sunga?
A: I was the one, Your Honor.
Q: And who gave the answers?
A: Rey Sunga was the one answering me, Your Honor.
Continue.
PROSECUTOR GONZALES -
Q: And what, if any, did Atty. Agustin Rocamora do, if any, at the time these questions
were being asked Rey Sunga?
A: He instructed Rey Sunga to just answer the questions, sir (Emphasis supplied.)[80]
xxx
From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty.
Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to
giving his (Sungas) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely
acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.
Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4
Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras
does not escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present
evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands of
SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his
side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions about
Jocelyns death. At that point, Sunga was already under custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements (Italics in the original; Emphasis supplied.). Under such [81]

circumstances, this Court cannot but entertain serious misgivings as to the

admission Sunga subsequently gave to SPO2 Janoras.
 Like Exhibit A, Sungas second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit I is
inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it
on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. Although Sunga
declared in open court that he made such admission in connection with his
desire to apply as state witness which admission he later repudiated, this does
not make Exhibit I admissible. Sunga was at the time still under detention at the
NBI office and had been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994. His
desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once
due to his conviction for another crime. His admission which was done without
the benefit of counsel consisted of answers to questions propounded by the
investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral declaration of his
participation in the crime. To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an
atmosphere pervading that of a custodial investigation and necessitating the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel of Sungas choice as a
matter of right but which he had none.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may
appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of
an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the [82]

confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it

was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible. [83]

The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn

statement-Exhibit I was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not
in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express requirement of the
Constitution.[84]

Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI
and his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement- Exhibit I is
inadmissible.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the
Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly acknowledged
having executed Exhibit A and affirmed the
contentsthereof did not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one
which could be used against him and his co-appellants. Neither could his other
statements in such proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be utilized
to establish his and the other appellants guilt. For in that preliminary
investigation, Sunga again was effectively denied of his essential right to
counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed Sungas counsel de officio but just like
the assistance he extended during the execution of Exhibit A, Atty. Rocamora
utterly did nothing in defense of Sungas cause. While Sunga was being asked
by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which could and did
incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his
client from the damning nature thereof.
The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be
deemed critical stages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation
[85]

can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a

suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less
than the States processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing
those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga
was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel,
for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he was
virtually denied his right to counsel.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections; rather it means an efficientand decisive legal assistance and not
a simple perfunctory representation. As in People v. Abano where the
[86] [87]

confession by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded

as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit
Sungas. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on
material points of Sungas and Locils accounts of the incident.
As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locils
testimony. The declarations of witnesses Tan, Devilleres and Gabinete can in
no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locils account
for they relate not to the crime itself but to events thereafter.
Tans testimony that Lansang informed him that he knew someone who
could reveal the identity of Jocelyns assailants and that Lansang suggested to
him to no longer report to the police does not at all constitute incriminating
evidence, for there was no admission, express or implied, by Lansang of any
wrongdoing or criminal participation on his part. Besides, why would Lansang
suggest to Tan not to report to the police when the police early on had its hands
full in trying to solve the crime.
Dr. Vigontes affirmation of her finding of a fatal injury on Jocelyns head is
supportive only of the fact that the victim was hit with something on her head
which caused her death, but this by no means is evidence that appellants
inflicted said fatal injury.
As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not, by
and in themselves, rise to the level of circumstantial evidence which warrant
appellants conviction.
 In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two
proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical
conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances that
[88]

Lansang was seen on June 30, 1994, a day after the incident, walking back and
forth and appearing restless near the place where Jocelyns body was
eventually found; that Lansang was in the company of Octac and inquired, the
day after Jocelyns body was discovered on July 12, 1994, if Jocelyn was from
Barangay Caruray; that Lansang told Jocelyns father that he knew someone
who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime; and that Jocelyn was fatally
hit on the head by a blunt object are too fragile to lead to the inference that
Lansang and his co-appellants are liable for Jocelyns rape and slaying. These
circumstances in the scheme of things are not indubitable pieces of evidence
of a persons commission of a crime for they are susceptible of explanations
which do not necessarily speak of guilt or culpability.
Standing alone and uncorroborated, can Locils testimony serve as a basis
for appellants conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the
requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-
conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given
unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which,
by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought. An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of
[89]

Locils testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was
punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to
take note of in its decision on review.
Consider the following portions of her testimony, quoted verbatim:
COURT:
Q Do you know the name of the woman who died?
A Jocelyn Tan
ATTY. GACOTT [Private Prosecutor]:
Maybe we can use the sound system.
ATTY. GACOTT:
Q: Miss Witness, you said that you are fourteen years old. How come that you are 14
years old?
A: (Witness handing a document to counsel.)
(To the Court:)
Your Honor, the witness handed to me a birth certificate.
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel): We are requesting for the witness to speak loud
and not merely hand over certain documents.
COURT: Instruct the witness to speak louder. (Emphasis supplied.)[90]
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: Miss Witness, how many times did you attain your Grade I schooling?
A: Three times.
Q: What about your Grade II schooling?
A: Two years.
Q: How about your Grade III schooling?
A: One year.
ATTY. CRUZAT: I am already tired of requesting this Honorable Court to instruct
the witness to speak quite louder. She is just whispering to the interpreter.
COURT: You speak louder (Emphasis supplied.)[91]
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: Now, Miss Witness, where were you last June 29, 1994 at around 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon?
A: In Mendoza.
COURT -
Q: What is that Mendoza?
A: Mendoza Park.
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: During that date, do you remember any unusual thing that happened to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could you please relate to this Honorable Court what happened during that date?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CRUZAT: I may be compelled to ask this Honorable Court for a coercive
authority to declare her in contempt for repeatedly disobeying the instruction
of the Court for her to speak louder.
COURT: You speak louder, otherwise you will be cited in contempt of court.
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.[92]
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
 Q: You mean to say, Miss Witness, that this Tomboy that you are referring to went
upstairs of Mendoza Park, and once there she talked to the woman sitting there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know the name of that woman?
A: No, sir.
Q: After getting near to that woman, what did they do after that?
A: They talked, sir.
Q: Then what happened next?
ATTY. CRUZAT: This woman does not speak quite loud, Your Honor.
COURT: You talk louder (Emphasis supplied.)[93]
xxx

A scrutiny of her testimony likewise reveals a strain of improbability

ingrained therein. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she
boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to
the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with,
then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and
brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that she was
deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place
where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against
Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre. For it is contrary to
human nature and experience for those who undertake the commission of a
crime to bring a spectator thereof. A criminal would certainly take steps to evade
detection or discovery of his criminal act, to keep it from being witnessed or
known by others who might later turn against him. Yet, from Locils testimony,
appellants took the trouble of bringing her to the locus criminis so she could
bear witness to a horrible crime which appellants carried out with evident
secrecy in a remote, uninhabited place in Puerto Princesa City.
That appellants required Locils presence at the time and place of the crime
only to threaten her later against divulging what she had witnessed thus defies
comprehension.
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but should also be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. [94]

This Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who
can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a
boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and
carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?
Locils testimony on how appellants put her in a position to have direct
knowledge of their malevolent acts despite taking measures to conceal their
deeds fails to inspire belief and must, therefore, be discredited.
A serious question too abounds on Locils identification of appellant
Pascua as one of those who raped Jocelyn. She described Pascua, the man
who according to her raped the victim after appellants Lansang and Sunga did,
as having, among other things, singkit (chinky) eyes. But as Pascua did not
have singkit eyes, even the trial court was prompted to ask her if she was sure
that the third person who raped Jocelyn had singkit eyes. Thus, with the courts
[95]

approval, the defense made it of record that Pascua did not have chinky eyes,
contrary to Locils description of him. [96]

The aforementioned observations pertaining to both the weak,

incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability
with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their crime,
and the failure of her description of Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual
physical feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her
testimony against all appellants. This Court thus finds her uncorroborated
account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its
credibility and sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as
evidence to warrant appellants conviction.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well
as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the
prosecutions case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and
becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. It bears noting that the alibi
[97]

proffered by appellants, especially that by Lansang, had been corroborated.

In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants alibi, the prosecution
still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused
and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution
having failed to discharge its burden, appellants presumed innocence remains
and must thus be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua
in Criminal Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED and said appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause
the IMMEDIATE RELEASE of the appellants from custody, unless they are
being held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision of the date appellants were actually
released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Gaffud
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Bernardino Gaffud
Ponente: C.J. Puno

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. was found guilty of two (2)

counts of murder for killing Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador by
means of fire. Evidence for the prosecution presented the following:

1) That on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador, while on his way to
the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador, heard two gunshots and
thereafter saw the house of his uncle burning. He saw three persons
within the vicinity of the burning house, one of whom he identified as
appellant Gaffud, Jr.
2) That Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at about 8:00 PM that
evening, heard successive gunshots and saw the deceased’s house
burning.
3) That prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado Ballang saw the
appellant a few meters away from the house of the deceased.
4) That earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel
Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, went to the house of the
appellant to inquire about her husband’s share in the construction of the
barangay hall. Dominga also related that had earlier filed a complaint
against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.

In his appeal, the appellant argued that the court failed to rule and
resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, despite the fact that there was
no proof as to what overt acts he committed which would constitute the
crime of murder.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2)
separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.
HELD:
1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule is that in the absence
of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. In the case at bar,
however, direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the
victims was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.
Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no longer essential for the conviction of
accused-appellant.

2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime, although two or more
crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The burning the
house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and
his daughter, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of
double murder. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime.
DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

For review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 finding the
accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double
murder and sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the Decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.

The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:

Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with

two John Does were indicted for Double Murder for the killing of Manuel
Salvador and Analyn Salvador, under the following Information:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino

Gaffud, Jr. and two (2) JOHN DOES of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
 That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton,
Barangay Wasid, Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and motivated by long standing grudge,
after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means
of fire, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and
burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador which caused their
instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Records)

It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were
killed when the house they were staying in located at Sitio Biton,
Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while they were
inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr.
as one of the arsonists.

Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to

appear despite being subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for double
murder by means of fire be filed against herein appellant and two John
Does, (p.14, Records).

When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a

plea of Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records), paving the way for his trial.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr.,
namely Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and
mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel Salvador,
Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan
Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the
investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who conducted the
autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador.

Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10,
1994, Orly Salvador was on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel
Salvador to fetch the latter as they were going to attend a wedding at the
nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he
saw the house of his uncle burning. Because of the glow emanating
therefrom, he saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning
house. He saw them hurriedly leaving the place towards the direction of
the Cagayan river. One of the three was holding a flashlight, whom he
identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the two other
persons. After the house was burned, Orly went towards the barangay hall
to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was there, but he met Brangay Captain
Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay
hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred
remains of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10,
1995, pp. 3-8)

Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud,

Jr. on the fateful day at around 6:30 PM, along the riverbank, a few meters
away from the house of Manuel Salvador.When Potado asked what he was
doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was looking for his boat. However, Potado
knew that the appellant did not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado
left to attend the wedding party being held at the barangay hall. (TSN,
November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)

Dan Dangpals testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to
the nature of the testimony he would have given, which tended to show
that sometime at about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening, while inside his
house, he heard successive gunshots, and when he went out of his house,
he saw the deceaseds house burning about 200 meters away. He heard
persons laughing and saw the light of a flashlight and persons moving
away from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. (TSN,
February 24, 1997; Exhibit D, p. 8, Records)

Dominga Salvadors testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud,

Jr. was their neighbor. In the morning of May 10, 1994, she went to the
house of the appellant to see him about her husbands share in the
construction of the barangay hall, which was contracted to the
appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go to her house that afternoon
to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband. Thereafter, she
went home, and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her
husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter Analyn. Later that night, she
was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for hilot, (TSN, July 4,
1995, pp. 3-15). In her sinumpaang salaysay, offered in evidence as
Exhibit A, Dominga also related that she had earlier filed a complaint in
the barangay against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.

SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the

killing of Manuel and Analyn Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead bodies
hanging from a Melina tree. They were put there so that they would not
be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the victims had a fractured
head, while the other had a wound on the side. Pictures of the victims
including the scene of the incident were taken by them. Among those
interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997,
pp. 2-7).

Dr. Teodomiro Hufanas testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127,
Records) in view of the defense counsels admission of the contents of his
Autopsy Report on Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit C), which reads in pertinent
part:
FINDINGS

-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large)

protruding from the abdomen.

-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter

on the burned hand.

-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to

the body, probably gunshot wound.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

-CREMATION (Burned)

REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female

For the appellants defense, the defense presented the appellant

himself. His defense of alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita Gaffud
and in-law Balbino Bravo.

Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified

that the approximate time of the burning of the victims house, he was at
home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo and Rufina Bravo, who was
there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo talked. At
around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from
the other side of the Cagayan River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the
house of the Bravos. They did not mind the blaze, and instead went to
sleep. The next morning, they heard news about somebody being burned,
and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the
incident. Thats where he found that his pare Manuel Salvador and his
daughter were burned in their house. After seeing the dead bodies,
appellant went home. He went back later, and was even designated by the
Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was
forced to evacuate his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe
was forcing him to testify against someone but he didnt want to. He was
 told that something might happen to his family if he didnt leave,
(TSN, June 3, 2002).

The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by

the testimony of his wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino Bravo,
both of whom testified that on May 10, 1994, the accused was at his
residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed there the whole
night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).

Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial,
she talked to Dominga Salvador about the settlement of the case and even
offered a certain amount for the said purpose, (TSN, March 10, 2002, p.
12).[3]

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two
(2) counts of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two (2) counts of murder and hereby
sentences him as follows, to wit:

a) Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;

b) Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;

c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:

c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for

each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as death indemnities;

c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count

or a total of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) as moral damages;

c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each

count or a total of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;

c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal

damages;
 and

c-5) Costs.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[4]

As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review. In his Appellants Brief,[5] accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in: (i)
failing to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, as the information
charged him with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime; and
(ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and also despite
the fact that there was no proof whatsoever as to what overt act he committed which
would constitute the crime of murder.

The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per
Resolution[6] of this Court dated August 24, 2004, in accordance with the ruling
in People v. Mateo.[7] In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA held that the lack
of discussion of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused
in the decision of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime of
murder, since the charge that he was a principal performer in the killing of the
victims was spelled out in the Information[8] filed against him.[9] Moreover, in the
absence of conspiracy, each of the malefactors is liable only for the act committed
by him.[10] As to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
CA held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established accused-appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] Accordingly, the CA affirmed the Decision of the
RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of double murder, with
the following modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED,
although the decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in that:
The accused Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of the
complex crime of double murder, and is hereby sentenced to the supreme
penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of the
victims: (1) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim, as civil indemnity
for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each
 victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as nominal damages plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, the case was elevated to this Court for
review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove
conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the
accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.[13] In the case at bar, however,
we hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims,
Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance is not
essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.

On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a quo that
the evidence proffered by the prosecution, although circumstantial in nature, leads
to the conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of the act resulting in the
death of the victims.

It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if

(i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[14]

In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:

(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few
minutes before the crime was committed. Captain Potado Bollang
testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the riverbank, about 100
meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro, allegedly looking
for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that accused-appellant
did not own one.[15]
 (ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near
the house of the victims at the time it was on fire. Accused-appellant
was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the three men he saw about 5
meters from the house of his uncle, Manuel Salvador, while it was
burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on his way towards
the said house. He also saw appellant fleeing with the other malefactors,
while holding a flashlight.[16] His testimony was corroborated by the
admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal who said that he heard two gunshots
while he was at his home, which was near that of the victims. When he
went out, he also heard men laughing, and saw them fleeing from the
burning house, illumined by a flashlight.[17]

(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident

without giving any help to his kumpare Manuel Salvador and the
latters daughter, Analyn.Orly Salvador testified that he saw accused-
appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the burning house of the
victim, going towards the direction of the river.[18]

(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the

complaint filed by Manuel Salvadors wife, Dominga Salvador, and the
fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some money. Dominga Salvador
testified that she had filed a complaint against accused-appellant and his
brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering her pig. Aside from
this, in the morning of the same fateful day, she went to the house of
accused-appellant aiming to collect her husbands share in the profits for
the construction of the barangay hall they had built, but the accused-
appellant only told her that he and his in-law would see her husband later
that day.[19]

These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the

conclusion that accused-appellant was responsible for the killing of the victims by
means of burning them inside their house.

Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the

convincing evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants defense of denial and
alibi must fail:
 The Court finds incredible appellants story that after seeing the
blaze across his house, he merely slept with his in-laws without
investigating. The Court finds it against human nature for one to sleep
soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 metes from ones house, even
though the blaze is occurring across a river. Also, appellant muse know,
after seeing the location of the blaze, that the house of his pare, or close
friend, was in danger, and his natural reaction at least was to verify the
object of the conflagration. Appellants story that he only slept soundly
after seeing the blaze is therefore unbelievable, and taints the credibility
of his alibi.

Another telling factor on the appellants defense is his flight. Appellant

admitted that in his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino
after he was investigated at the Municipal Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p.
19). Appellant said he fled because of threats from the Ilongots. However,
appellant said it never entered his mind to report the threats on
him. Appellants explanation fails to convince. It bears stressing that
appellant fled right after being investigated and questioned by police
authorities, and during the time that the preliminary investigation of the
case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time
for him to defend his innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant
was arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a remote barangay by the
elements of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is
consistently held as and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA
601 [1998]). There is no showing why such conclusion should not be
made in this case.[20]

We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two

(2) separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:

ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex
crime.[21]

There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime,
or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second
is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.[22]

The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the
death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct
acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.[23]

In the landmark case People v. Guillen,[24] the Court held that the single act
of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another person
and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murders. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a
person is killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty
for the crime committed is death, the maximum penalty for murder, which is the
graver offense.

More recently, in People v. Carpo et al.,[25] we held that the single act of
hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons
and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and
attempted murder. Also, in People v. Comadre,[26] we held:

The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal

Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused
by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may

quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses,
yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a
 single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the
offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity.

In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-

appellant burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of
killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in their deaths
resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC,
murder is committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for
murder was death, when the case was pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed
the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder instead of the two death
penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view, however, of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines), we reduce the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.[27]

Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by the
CA for the death of the victims from P100,000 or P50,000 for each victim,
to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[28]

As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award

by the RTC of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each
victim.

By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes

aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken
advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring
the offender's immunity from capture.[29] In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated
nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by
accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan. Evidence shows that accused-appellant
waited for nighttime to consummate his plan. It should be noted that accused-
appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The
fact that he brought with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit
the crime in darkness.
 We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of P100,000,
or P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief and sorrow suffered by the heirs of
the victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal damages in the amount
of P10,000 for the value of the burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC
and affirmed by the CA.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision of

the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED

to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000,
or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.

SO ORDERED.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly
based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental
rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power
of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully,
unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
 In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized
as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum
in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and
it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malumprohibitum.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in sewhich requires proof ofcriminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinousoffense implies that it is
amalum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve actswhich are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully andcriminally” by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder isa malum in se.1

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights
and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it
behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web
of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple
shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between
the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to
preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes
to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,

enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which
it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c)
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch
of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that
the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.
 If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature
are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions
of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law
will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain
of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental
law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination

or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,

MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none -
that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of
the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May

1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the
same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
 REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a
series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With
more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible
to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]
 In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision
of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law
is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the
law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of
which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and
elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed,
and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges
three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in

the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt
or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of
a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9

October 1990
 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but
the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations
and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved
beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder(underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need
to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused
in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to
at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the
very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined
in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion
is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of
a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and
it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can
avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder
xxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction
for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed
and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really
so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially
if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient
to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in
Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme
or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal

Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be

deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more
and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926
Criminal Case Digest:
Digested Cases

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered
the yard of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without
violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took, with intent to
gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8
belonging to Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued
at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft,
on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned,
the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer
the penalty of three years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen
roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused
appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned
upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly
by agreement of the parties approved by the court.
Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.
Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the
unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being
modified by the accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two
distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which determines the existence
of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize
two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging
to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only
one crime of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.

PEOPLE v. DE LEON

GR No. 124297; Feb 21, 2001

Accused-appellant was charge and convicted of several counts of the crime of rape
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

HELD:

GUILTY. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not necessary for the information to
allege the exact date and the time of the commission of the crime is such is not an
essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of the commission is
not an essential element. The delay in reporting the crime committed can also be
attributed to the tender age of the victim and the moral ascendancy of the accused
over the victim. Oftentimes, a rape victim’s actions are moved by fear rather than by
reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to report the crime immediately is not
indicative of fabrication. Also, victims are not expected to recall the exact and
accurate account of their traumatic experiences. However, accused cannot be
sentenced to death because the information against him failed to allege victim¹s
minority and her relationship to the accused. RA 7659 enumerates the circumstances
that justify the imposition of the death penalty. Consistent with the accused¹s right to
be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, these
circumstances must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
information and proven during the trial. Accused is guilty only of simple rape and
sentenced only to reclusion perpetua on each count of rape.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 197546 March 23, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the conviction for the crime of Murder of accused-appellants BAYANI DE LEON
(Bayani), ANTONIO DE LEON (Antonio), DANILO DE LEON (Danilo), and YOYONG DE LEON
(Yoyong) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),1 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-113990, which
Decision2 was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals.

The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under an Information which
reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence and/or intimidation against [sic] person, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the following manner, to wit: on the date
and place aforementioned, while victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A. Bonifacio
Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law,
accused pursuant to their conspiracy armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver
rob EMILIO A. PRASMO and took and carried away ₱7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason
or on the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ personal violence upon EMILIOA. PRASMO
by then and there shooting and hacking the victim with the use of said weapons, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.3

When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty except accused Antonio.
Thus, the RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is concerned.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Erlinda A. Prasmo (Erlinda), wife of the victim, Emilio Prasmo (Emilio),
who testified that on 2 March 2002, while they were walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on
their way to RP Market, the accused-appellants, who are siblings, blocked their way. Accused-
appellant Danilo, armed with a "sumpak", suddenly hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant
Antonio, who was armed with a "samurai", hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead
pipe at the right back portion of his legs and middle back portion of his torso. Accused-appellant
Danilo then took Emilio’s money in the amount of ₱7,000.00 and thereafter aimed the "sumpak" at
the lower portion of Emilio’s chest and fired the same, causing Emilio to slump on the ground.
Accused-appellant Yoyong also hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the back of the neck and middle portion
of his back.
As accused-appellants attacked and mauled Emilio, Erlinda, seeing her husband sprawled
motionless on the ground, shouted for help, but nobody dared to help because accused-appellant
Bayani, armed with a gun, was shouting "walang lalapit". The accused-appellants immediately left
and Emilio was brought to the FEU Fairview Hospital, where Emilio died.

Gina Prasmo, Emilio’s daughter, testified that at the time of the incident, she was at their house
when she was informed of the news. She immediately went to the hospital where she learned that
her father was already dead.

The testimony of Dr. Editha Martinez, a medico-legal officer of the Medico-Legal Division, Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with because she was
not the one who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Emilio, but nevertheless, she identified
such documents as Medico-Legal Report, Autopsy Report, Sketch of the head showing contusion,
anatomical sketch showing the gunshot wound on the right portion of the chest, and the anatomical
sketch of Emilio.

Evidence of the Defense

Carmelita de Leon (Carmelita), sister of the accused-appellants, testified that on the evening of 1
March 2002, she was at her house when her brothers, accused-appellants Danilo and Antonio,
arrived. Upon observing that the heads of Antonio and Danilo were bleeding, she was informed that
Emilio and his son, Edgardo Prasmo (Edgardo), attacked and mauled them, which caused their
injuries. They reported the incident to a "tanod" in the barangay hall, Julio Batingaw, who told them
to return in the afternoon so they could have a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo. When they
returned, Emilio and Edgardo did not appear.

In the evening, at around 7 o’clock, fifteen (15) men carrying firearms, who included Jerry and
Edgar, sons of Emilio, stormed her house looking for accused-appellants and threatened to kill her if
she will not disclose their whereabouts. To support her testimony, the defense offered in evidence
the medical certificates for the injuries sustained by accused-appellants Antonio and Danilo dated 1
March 2002 and the entry in the barangay blotter book dated 2 March 2002,about the mauling of
accused-appellants Antonio and Danilo.

The accused-appellants gave their testimonies that follow:

Jose de Leon, also known as Yoyong, was at the house of his brother-in-law, Willie Bandong, in
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to discuss the schedule of the "pabasa". He stayed there between
8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening. Danilo, at that time, was with his mother in Pugad Lawin in
Quezon City, to accompany his mother in doing her work as a "manghihilot". They left Pugad Lawin
between 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening and went home. Bayani, a police civilian agent, at the
night of the crime, was at the Police Station No. 5 in Fairview, Quezon City, talking to a police officer.

Antonio, in the morning of 2 March 2002, went to the barangayhall with his mother, Carmelita, and
accused-appellant Danilo, to file a complaint against Emilio and Emilio’s son, Edgardo, due to the
mauling incident the previous evening. In the barangayhall, they were told to return in the afternoon
so they could have a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo. They returned as told. Emilio and Edgardo
did not.

On the way home, accused-appellant Antonio met Emilio, Erlinda, and Gina, Emilio’s daughter,
walking along A. Bonifacio Street. Emilio, upon seeing Antonio, immediately opened his jacket and
tried to pull "something" out. Antonio then instantlytried to grab that "something" from Emilio. While
grappling for the possession of that "something", which turned out to be a "sumpak", it fired.
Bernaly Aguilar, while on her way to the market in Sta. Lucia, witnessed a fight involving accused-
appellant Antonio and another man, who were grappling for the possession over a "bakal". After
walking a few meters away from the incident, she heard a shot.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the accused-appellants, Erlinda is not a credible witness and that her testimony is
barren of probative value for having grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies, as opposed to
accused-appellant Antonio’s testimony which supposedly established the presence of all the
essential requisites of self-defense. Accused-appellants referred to the inconsistency between
Erlinda’s court testimony and her Sinumpaang Salaysay. In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, she
identified accused-appellant Antonio as the one who fired the "sumpak" at the lower chest of Emilio
and took Erlinda’s money. However, during her direct examination, she testified that it was accused-
appellant Danilo who shot Emilio with a "sumpak" and thereafter, took his wallet.

Accused-appellants further argued that Erlinda could not have mistaken Danilo for Antonio, because
she knew them both as they reside six (6) houses away from the house of the Prasmos and that
accused-appellant Antonio has a distinctive feature — having a cleft palate or is "ngongo".

The RTC rejected accused-appellants’ contentions. According to the RTC, Erlinda’s narration of the
incident is clear and convincing. While her testimony has some inconsistencies, they refer only to
collateral and minor matters, which do not detract from the probative value of her testimony.

The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery,
abuse of strength absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery:4

These requisites are obviously present in this case considering that the evidence shows that after
Danilo suddenly fired at Emilio’s lower portion of the chest accused Antonio and Yoyong ganged up
on Emilio, with Antonio hitting him with a lead pipe on the right back portion of his legs and in the
middle back torso and hacking him with a samurai, and accused Yoyong hitting also (sic) him with a
lead pipe on the right back leg and middle portion of his back. Said action of the four (4) accused
rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself.5

However, citing People v. Nimo,6 the RTC ruled that because robbery was not duly established, it
cannot convict accused-appellants for robbery with homicide. It relied on the principle that in order to
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing
itself.7 Thus, as opposed to the Information which charged the accused-appellants of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder by conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE
LEON and YOYONG DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided by law
and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the late EMILIO PRASMO the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants. Contrary to the accused-
appellants’ contention that the trial court committed a reversible error when it gave credence to
Erlinda’s testimony, the Court of Appeals considered Erlinda’s recollection of the events as direct,
positive and convincing manner, unshaken by a tedious and grueling cross-examination.9

With regard to the crime charged, the Court of Appeals agreed that the accused-appellants are guilty
of the crime of Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne by the records, the only intent of
the accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The "accused-appellants had an axe to grind against
Emilio x x x. The means used by the accused-appellants as well as the nature and number of
wounds - debilitating, fatal and multiple – inflicted by appellants on the deceased manifestly revealed
their design to kill him. The robbery committed by appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the moment
or [was] a mere afterthought."10

Also, the Court of Appeals found accused-appellant Danilo guilty of Robbery for unlawfully divesting
Emilio of ₱7,000.00, which it considered as an action independent of and outside the original design
to murder Emilio. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision dated May 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto with the added MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Danilo de Leon is
also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under Article 293 and
penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and seven (7) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered to return to the heirs
of Emilio Prasmo the cash of ₱7,000.00, representing the amount he took from said victim.11

Now, before the Court on automatic review, accused-appellants contend, by way of assignment of
errors, that the appellate court gravely erred when:

1. it gave full credence to the inconsistent testimony of the alleged eyewitness Erlinda
Prasmo; and

2. it disregarded the self-defense interposed by Antonio De Leon and the denial and alibi
interposed by Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong, all surnamed De Leon.12

Our Ruling

The accused-appellants’ attempt to discredit Erlinda’s testimony must fail. Inconsistencies between
the declaration of the affiant in her sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness;13 it is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. In fact, contrary to the defense’s
claim, discrepancies erase suspicion that the witness was rehearsed or that the testimony was
fabricated. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, despite minor inconsistencies, Erlinda’s
narration revealed each and every detail of the incident, which gave no impression whatsoever that
her testimony is a mere fabrication. As we already enunciated in previous rulings, "[i]t is a matter of
judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
greater weight."14

Before us is a reversed trial. As one of the accused-appellants, Antonio, pleaded self-defense, he

admitted authorship of the crime. At this juncture, the burden of proof is upon the accused-appellants
to prove with clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself,15 which the defense
failed to discharge.
Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner,
which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not
suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.16

Applying the aforesaid legal precept, Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his jacket while he
was three (3) to four (4) meters away from accused-appellant Antonio cannot amount to unlawful
aggression. Neither can the act of pulling "something" out amount to physical force or actual use of
weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude. Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s account of the
incident is truthful, that Emilio had motive to kill accused-appellant Antonio, giving accused-appellant
reasonable grounds to believe that his life and limb was in danger, and that the "something" was
indeed a "sumpak", it can hardly be recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-
defense.17 There is no showing that accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the act of pulling
"something" out. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must be noted that appellant
never said that Emilio aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or at least made an attempt to shoot
him".18 The threat on accused-appellant Antonio’s life is more imagined than real. As we already held
in a catena of cases, the act of pulling "something" out cannot constitute unlawful aggression.19

Accused-appellant Antonio cannot allege that it was Emilio who instigated the incident; that Emilio’s
fate was brought about by his own actuations. There is no sufficient provocation, nay, provocation at
all in the act of pulling "something" out.

Contrary to accused-appellant Antonio’s contention that he acted in self-defense, the Medico-Legal

Report No. M-685-02 dated 12 March 2002 proved otherwise. As borne by the records, Emilio
sustained numerous wounds, including the fatal gunshot wound in the chest, which belie accused-
appellants’ defense that Antonio was alone at the scene of the crime and acted in self-defense. The
Medico-Legal Report No. M-685-02 dated 12 March 2002 revealed that the victim sustained the
following multiple injuries:

HEAD AND NECK:

1. Lacerated wound, right parietal region, measuring 4 x 3 cm, 7 cm from the mid-sagittal
line.

2. Contusion, right mandibular region, measuring 11 x 2 cm, 7 cm from the anterior midline.

3. Contusion, nasal region, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm, along the anterior midline.

4. Hematoma, left parietal region, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline.

5. Contusion, left cheek, measuring 11 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline.

6. Contusion, left lateral neck region, measuring 6 x 3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline.

7. Lacerated wound, occipital region, measuring 5 x 1.8 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.

8. There is a scalp hematoma at the right parieto-occipital region.

9. There are subdural, sub arachnoid hemorrhages at the right celebrum.

 10. The right parietal bone is fractured.

TRUNK AND ABDOMEN:

1. Gunshot wound, right chest, measuring 2.6 cm x 2.3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline,
112 cm from the right heel, directed posteriorwards, downwards, and slightly lateralwards,
fracturing the 6th and 7th ribs, lacerating the lower lobe of the right lung, diaphragm, right
lobe of the liver with the deformed plastic wad embedded, right kidney with 2 lead pellets
found embedded and the aorta with 3 pellets embedded thereat and 2 lead pellets found at
the right thoracic cavity.

2. Contusion, right shoulder region, measuring 12 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the posterior midline.

3. Abrasion, right shoulder region, measuring 3.5 x 2 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline.

4. Contusion, left shoulder region, measuring 4 x 2 cm, 6 cm from the posterior midline.

EXTREMITIES:

1. Contusion, left elbow, measuring 8 x 2 cm, 5 cm medial to its posterior midline.

2. Abrasion, dorsal aspect of the left hand, measuring 0.6 x 0.3 cm, 3 cm medial to its
posterior midline.20

As we already held, the nature and location of wounds are considered important indicators which
disprove a plea of self-defense.21 A perusal of the evidence would depict the presence of a deliberate
onslaught against Emilio. The means used by accused-appellants as shown by the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by Emilio are so much more than sufficient to repel or prevent any
alleged attack of Emilio against accused-appellant Antonio. Evidently, the accused-appellants’ intent
to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by Emilio. The wounds
sustained by Emilio indubitably reveal that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a
homicidal aggression on the part of accused-appellants.22 Double Jeopardy

The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. According to the RTC, contrary
to the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder because the
prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo,23 ratiocinated
that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found
all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with
regard to the crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found
accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery. We find that the appellate court erred for
violating the constitutional right of Danilo against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
1âwphi1

punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.24
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.25

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid
Information for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted
Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from
which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery
was not proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of
robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the
crime of robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence
or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused
of the same crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person "twice x x x in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."26As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery
based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy.27 A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even
an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial
court28 due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes.29 The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the
acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE
LEON are hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are
ordered to pay Emilio Prasmo's heirs the following amounts: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for Emilio
Prasmo's death, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
 This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming
with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of

January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline
boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees
of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were
on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said
gasoline station.[3]

Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to
the drivers side in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he
could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there
were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up P50.00
worth of diesel in the gas tank.After doing this, he returned the key to the
driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle
would not start.[4] Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While
Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned
at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the
same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were
armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.[5]

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,[6] while Eduardo Zulueta
was directed to go near the Car Wash Section.[7] At that instance, guns were poked
at them.[8]
 Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took
the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the companion
of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.[9]

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took
the money worth P3,000.00.[10] Those four robbers were also the ones who shot
Edralin Macahis in the stomach.[11] Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.[12]

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his
companions immediately leave the place.[13] The robbers boarded the same vehicle
and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.[14] When the robbers left, Eduardo
Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took
her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the
stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin
Macahis to the hospital.[15] Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the
gunshot wound.[16]

The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers
who poked a gun at him.[17]

However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the

house of his Tita Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her
canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked
permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's
cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant to the
terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian
Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo
asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to hitch a ride on his
vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other
passengers in the said vehicle.[18]
 When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight,
he was not allowed to do so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join
them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he woke
up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other
passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do
anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots,
Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded
towards Marikina. On their way, they were followed by policemen who fired at
them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the
vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions
leaving him behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.[19]

As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with

Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias Rey, an alias Jonard, an
alias Precie, and an alias Renato, which read as:

Criminal Case No. 4747

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality

of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring
and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C.
Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash
earnings worth P3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex
Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed
with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4748

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of

San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating , together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring
and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the
Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
 a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at P1,500.00
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at P2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at P500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at P150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at P175.00

to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of P4,325.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused while armed
with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4749

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality

of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring
and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge
shotgun with serial number 13265 valued at P12,000.00 owned by Alert
and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its
General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said
Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid
amount of P12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian
Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4750

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality

of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring
and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a
gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:

a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for

one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued
at P2,000.00

b) Cash money worth P50.00

to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P2,050.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed
with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.
 Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C.

Natividad,[20] then officer-in-charge of Energex Gasoline Station where the incident
took place; Edito Macahis,[21] a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin
Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,[22] a gasoline boy of the same gas station;
Eduardo Zulueta,[23] also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and Alberto
Quintos,[24] general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the
deceased security guard was employed.

The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely:

Catherine Homo,[25] a cousin of appellant and the appellant[26] himself.

On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[27] convicting

appellant beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges against him, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de

Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec.
1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted
in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-
large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the
penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance;
to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad and
represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of P3,000.00 as
compensatory damages and to pay the costs;
 2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon
y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of
P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in
conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large,
and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of
Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the
costs;

3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon

y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D.
1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in
conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large,
and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of
Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify
the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; to pay P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen
service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the costs;
4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon
y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D.
1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in
conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large,
and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of
Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay
Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the amount of P2,050.00 as
 compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no
longer possible and to pay the costs.

As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have,

to date, remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against them
and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without
prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.

As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,

Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and are still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the
archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification
and apprehension of the said accused.

SO ORDERED.

The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21,

[28]
2004, in conformity with the Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87
entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this
Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to
promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the
Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are
elevated to this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
 The CA, on June 29, 2007,[29] affirmed with modification, the Decision of the
RTC, with the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
of only one count.

Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24

June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby
reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,[30] the penalty
imposed being reclusion perpetua.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its
Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the Supplemental Brief[31] dated February 4,
2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a
supplemental brief.

Appellant filed a Manifestation[32] on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-

pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.

Appellant, in his Brief,[33] assigned the following errors:

I
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A
CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME AND
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE
METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.

The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,[34] insisted that all the elements of the crime
and the appellant's participation in the crime had been established.

Appellant, in his Reply Brief,[35] argued that the penalty should not be
death, but only reclusion perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged with
specificity.

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against
or any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,
or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
 In People v. De Jesus,[36] this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of
robbery with homicide, thus:

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution

is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or

intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.[37]
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.[38] The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life.[39] The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken
into consideration.[40] There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident;

or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery
with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder,
parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of

violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact of asportation
has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused
 is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in
court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown
away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.[41] The
prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen
or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual
amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment, because the
motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value
involved.[42]

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of

robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be
held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing,
unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.[43]

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the

commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not
of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with
homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited
and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the
conspiracy once it has materialized.[44]

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the

occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As
long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter
crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.

From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was
indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that
their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such
robbery, a homicide was committed. The question now is whether there was
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to
appellant's argument.
 If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The
prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses
were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the
robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who
poked a gun at him, thus:

Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked
their guns at you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon.
Court whether those two (2) persons who poked their guns at you were
(sic) present now?

A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by

the name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON when asked.)

Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash
or not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon
was guarding you?

A: His gun was poked at me, sir.

Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside
from that?
 A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

Q: What else, Mr. Witness?

A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.

Q: Who hit you with a gun?

A: His other companion, sir.[46]

Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:

Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash

section and hit him, was he also armed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?

A: Also .38 caliber, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and
ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly point to him?

A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name
of Marlon Albert de Leon).[47]

Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission
of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part
in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and
different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective.[48] Once
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, [49] since all
the conspirators are principals.

As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be

disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial courts findings on
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect
the result of the case.[50]

For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the

robbery. However, his presence during the commission of the crime was well-
established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was
merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof.[51] Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt
act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery
from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value.Courts generally view the
defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an
accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-
serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various
aspects of the crime committed.[52]

Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of
one count of robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there
are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As
decided[53] by the Court of Appeals:
 A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single
crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal
resolution.[54] Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime
committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.[55]

In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only
to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That they did;
and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of
the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from
these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one
criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or
series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by
an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.[56] This can be
said of the case at hand.

Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,[57] wherein

the robbery that took place in several houses belonging to different
persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as
separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of
the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the
Solicitor General argued that the [appellant] had committed eight different
robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and different acts of
spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons.[58] The
Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that the perpetrated acts were not
entirely distinct and unconnected from one another.[59] Thus, the single
offense or crime.

Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The
decision[60] merely states that, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence
of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion
perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both
indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one
aggravating circumstance.[61] It must be remembered that the Informations filed with
the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm.
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A.
No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a generic
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by
this Court in Palaganas v. People:[62]

Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply

to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the
effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but
it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the
trial in order to be appreciated.[63] Moreover, it can be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those

which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty
to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article
160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It
does not change the character of the offense charged.[64] It must always
be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during
the trial in order to be appreciated.[65] Moreover, it cannot be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.

It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of

generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same
except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special
aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
 Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there
is also an aggravating circumstance provided for
under Presidential Decree No. 1866,[66] as amended by Republic Act No.
8294,[67] which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of

an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that

such provision is silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying.[68] Thus, it
ruled that when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor
of the accused.[69] Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more
favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase
the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that
the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only
as a generic aggravating circumstance.[70] This interpretation is
erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with the passage
of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm
in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.[71] Republic Act
No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the
commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be
designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

In another case,[72] this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the firearm.[73] In the
said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro
Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs
recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a .30
carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was
also established that the same appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence,
this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that
the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although
jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere
testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be
established. The prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to
prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the
use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.

Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the
heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P12,000.00
as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer
possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven
during the trial. Hence, this Court's rulings[74] on temperate damages apply, thus:

In People vs. Abrazaldo,[75] we laid down the doctrine that where

the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be
determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them,
temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000[76] This
doctrine specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of
funeral expenses was presented in the trial court. However, in instances
where actual expenses amounting to less than P25,000 are proved
during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more
recent case of People vs. Villanueva[77] which modified the Abrazaldo
doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of
temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages
of a lesser amount. To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair
because the victims heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual
 damages of an amount less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation
than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now
be entitled to P25,000 temperate damages.[78]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of
the victim, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to the other civil
indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95320 September 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-
appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Geomer C. Delfin for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J:p

In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in the Regional
Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad
Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with the
complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in
Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of
 this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden stools, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime and
superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the offense, assault, attack and hit one
POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR., an agent of person in authority while in the
actual performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter several injuries on
the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of
said Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity,
his heirs have suffered and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral
and exemplary damages.

That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final
judgment of the crime of homicide.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the victim but
interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf, while Patria Lacao and
Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused, Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao
III, were not apprehended and have remained at large.

The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at the trial, are
as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness Mila
Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake of her
aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio,
Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-
storey house and the events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game
where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him,
was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and threatened
Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-in-law of
Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then went inside
the house wielding his knife and causing the other guests to panic.

It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify the
people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand holding that knife.
Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the latter's
mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar
Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other
son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla,
rushed inside the house and surrounded the victim.

The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As the
attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he later slumped on the
floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued stabbing the latter as
he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?"
Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go."
Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.2

All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution witness,
unshaken and unaffected by the gruelling cross-examination to which she was subjected. In the
process she categorically identified the three appellants then present in the courtroom, as well as the
knives and the stools used against the victim in the commission of the crime. Ample and credible
corroboration was afforded by the straightforward testimonies of two other eyewitnesses, Isabel
Llorente3 and the victim's widow, Nelfa Inocencio,4 who were admittedly present at the scene and the
time of the bloody incident.

After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medico-legal officer and
rural health physician, the following autopsy report was submitted and thereafter admitted in
evidence:

PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G.

INOCENCIO, JR. DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at 4:30 AM

1. Rigor mortis — present.

2. Livor mortis — present.

3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head,
superficial.

4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going posters-inferiorly
reaching the anterior pericardium.

5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right, going
posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.

6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going
posters-superiorly hitting the liver.

7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly
reaching the right lung.

8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going media-
superiorly reaching the right lung.

9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the posterior
elbow.

10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medio-inferiorly
reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.

11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going antero-
inferiorly reaching the left lung.

12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left,
superficial, reaching the scapula.

13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region,
superficial, reaching the body of the scapula.

14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the rib.
 15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the
underlying muscles.

16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the
underlying muscles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS.5

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the crime charged,
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as actual damages, plus P100,000.00 as
moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.6

In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BALTAZAR

LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT UPON AN
AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF ARTICLES
248 AND 148 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, As
AMENDED, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCES EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM
P/CPL JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)
FOR HIS DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES; PLUS P100,000.00 MORAL
DAMAGES AND TO PAY THE COST OF THE SUIT.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED
THE DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO BY ALL ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND
TRINIDAD MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE
NOT PERFORMED OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY FOR MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT COOPERATION IS NOT
ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE A PARTY TO A CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND
PATRIA LACAO NOT HAVING CONSPIRED WITH BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING
 THE VICTIM JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. TREACHERY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AGAINST
THEM.

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.7

The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since Cpl.
Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire. Said appellant allegedly grabbed
the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5) times.8

The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi. Their
version is that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went
to the wake at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about 9:30 A.M., they went home but
Baltazar, Sr. was left behind.9 Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and
Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College.10

The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the victim
and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying circumstance.11 This
circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence,12 the onus probandi having shifted
to him.

Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from the medico-
legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, that the cause of death was
hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds,13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It
cannot now be denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the
limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim.
In fact, from the eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was already
slumped prone and helpless.

Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior to the
stabbing, fired his gun at the former but the gun did not fire. This subterfuge is refuted by the
unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from his
waistband,14 and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the deceased.15 Significantly, this
story of appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was never corroborated by any evidence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be
no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person
injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to
repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have no basis.16

We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets recovered from the
gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired. Had the gun been fired, the base of at
least one bullet would have been impressed in the center by the corresponding indentation caused
by the impact thereon by the firing pin of the revolver when the trigger is pulled. The absence of such
physical evidence further sustains the holding of the trial court that even the first element of self-
defense has not been proved despite said appellant's protestations.
Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the prosecution
witnesses as the ones who hit the victim with stools several times while the other three (3) male
accused were stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense, Patria and Trinidad sought
refuge in the impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we have to impress on appellants once
again the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it
must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of positive
identification of the accused by eyewitnesses, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress.17

The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively
identified by all the eyewitnesses for the prosecution who were without any motive to falsely testify
and implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused inside the courtroom as the
perpetrators of the crime. Their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are self-
serving and feeble attempts to disprove complicity and to which the court gives scant
consideration."18 Indeed, the participatory acts of said appellants having been testified to so clearly in
detail by three (3) eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi would be an
evidential travesty.

Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the crime occurred
was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should
be normally accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near relative because
these witnesses usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. Moreover, the trial court gave
credence to the prosecution's identification of the appellants as the culprits. Subject to exceptions
which do not obtain in this case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having
seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.19

The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants
acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison in attacking the victim.
True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primary of the
meeting of minds and, generally, complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the
community of purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance
of the act of assaulting the deceased.20 However, conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty
as the crime itself.21 The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a
finding of conspiracy,22 that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.23

At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on

the part of the conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill Cpl. Inocencio. A dispassionate
appraisal of the facts readily reveals, however, that the attack on the victim originated spontaneously
from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his
other son, Baltazar Lacao III, immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives,
whereupon the two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk by hitting the victim with stools.

The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four coming
instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that
their actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. It does not even appear that
there was a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on Cpl. Inocencio, much less is
there even an intimation that they had such a murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto.
The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated,
rules out the existence of a conspiracy.
As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the
nature of their individual participations in the felonious act.24 It is understood, however, that whatever
liabilities may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III are not concluded by the
dispositions herein nor shall they be bound by the discussions in this opinion on their putative
participations in the crime charged.

Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
we agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently proven by the evidence. It is
elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.25

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly
released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that the victim
was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting without
prior agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were
independently performed on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the
commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim
might have resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants, the use of
superior strength being absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime of
homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor.26 The lower court properly considered
recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a
recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.27 This
aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.

With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the
execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the commission
of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.28 Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the
principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold
them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.29

The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or against herein appellants.
With the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court correctly sentenced
appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad
Lacao Mansilla are hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present
policy on the matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for P40,000.00 and appellants
Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00, subject to the provisions of Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Dumlao v. Court of Appeals (114 SCRA 247 [1982])

Facts:

A hole at the end of a bridge caused the death of P’s parents. Dumlao, the CityEngineer of Davao,
as charged ith negligence in not repairing the road here theaccident occurred, and in not
su!ciently arning the public of the ha"ards of the road.Dumlao is not personally liable for damages.
Damages are recoverable only from the City of Davao per Article #$%& of the Civil Code, hich
does not include the city o!cials forpurposes of liability for damages to persons caused by defective
public or's.(ssue:)

Held: A public o!cial is only personally liable for hatever damage he caused by his actdone ith
maliceor bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority. Dumlao as sued in his o!cial capacity, ith
noimputation of malice or bad faith. )ere, the road repair is o ed to the public in general, notto
P’sparents personally

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39172 May 31, 1982

SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FLORANTE, PACIFICO, LEO, ANGELES,
CHRISTOPHER, JEAN, LAURA, HANNIBAL and ROMULUS minors and all surnamed
CERVANTES ELIZALDE, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner was one of the defendants in this suit for damages filed by private respondent in the Court
of First Instance of Davao resulting from a vehicular accident. The other defendants, Hermanos de
Yap and the City of Davao, did not appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao holding all defendants, including petitioner herein,
liable jointly and severally in the total sum of P61,395.00, by way of damages in favor of private
respondents.

The relevant facts as found by the respondent court are recited in its decision as follows:

On February 28, 1964, about 11:30 in the night, Isauro Elizalde accompanied by his
wife Hanidena Elizalde, while driving s jeep southwards from Davao City, thru
Talomo Bridge, suddenly and unexpectedly came upon a hole on the south end of
said bridge right on his way, about 1 meter in diameter and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by
boulders, thus blocking his lane. To avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly to the left
side of the road where he was confronted by a steep embankment. He swerved his
 jeep back to the right to get into his lane after passing the boulders and the
destroyed portion of the road (sketch Exh. "A") but he collided with the truck of
defendant Hermanos de Yap driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who came from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Isauro Elizalde died on the spot in his
jeep while his wife who was found on the road, severely injured but was still alive,
died soon after in the hospital.

The left end of the truck's fender was bent while the portion of its left hood just below
the front headlight and its edge just above the left front wheel were slightly dented.
The jeep which was enveloped in flames from the incident was badly damaged. The
road where the two vehicles collided is a straight one and judging from the sketch
made by the police investigator (Exh. "A") both drivers could have noticed each other
even when they were yet far from each other. The same sketch also shows that the
jeep had already passed the boulders and the destroyed portion of the road and was
way beyond such hazards when the collision took place.

By reason of this incident, the plaintiffs as heirs of both deceased sued the
Hermanos de Yap but the suit was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to prosecute.
However, same plaintiffs filed the present complaint on May 16, 1966, which, aside
from the original defendant, now includes the City of Davao and City Engineer
Samuel Dumlao alleging that while Hermanos de Yap was negligent not only
because its driver operated their truck carelessly, recklessly, and negligently, but
also because it was itself negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees,
the City of Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao were also negligent in not
repairing the road where the accident took place and in not taking the necessary
precautions to warn the public of the hazards on said road, thereby causing the
collision which resulted in the destruction of the jeep and also in the death of its
occupants. 1

Petitioner seeks to be relieved from liability on grounds he has indicated in the following issues
which he raised in the present petition:

1. The allegations in the complaint being to the effect that petitioner Samuel Dumlao
was sued in his official capacity for being the City Engineer, may respondent court
correctly hold that he was sued in his personal capacity?;

2. No evidence having been adduced or found that petitioner acted in bad faith or
was guilty of gross negligence in connection with his official duties, may respondent
court hold him personally liable in this action?; and

3. Republic Act 4354 having no provision for retroactivity, may the said law be
applied to deprive petitioner of his property by giving said statute retroactive effect? 2

His assignment of errors are as follows:

1. Respondent court erred in holding that private respondents, as set forth in their
complaint, sued petitioner in his personal capacity because the allegations therein
clearly state that he was sued in his official capacity as City Engineer;

2. The law is clear that in the absence of bad faith or gross negligence, a public
official may not be held personally liable for any act or omission in connection with
the discharge of his duties, therefore, respondent court gravely erred on this point;
 3. Respondent court erred in applying Republic Act 4354 retroactively against the
petitioner. 3

In discussing the above assignment of errors, he first cites the provision of Article 2189 of the Civil Code
as properly serving the basis of the liability of the City of Davao, which does not include that of any of city
officials. This proposition is quite clear from the language of the cited provision and needs no further
elaboration to show its validity. The aforecited provision reads:

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of
the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control
or supervision.

Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, 4 or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 5 The question, therefore, is whether petitioner
did act in any of the manner aforesaid.

Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not
sued in his personal capacity, but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged
against him in the complaint, much less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court made no
such finding of malice or bad faith.

Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to
say that petitioner was sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act
of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his official duties.
Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven.

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that from the complaint itself, no sufficient cause of action was
alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to provide a basis for imposing on petitioner the liability as has
been declared against him jointly with his co-defendants, the City of Davao and Hermanos de Yap,
by the trial court. The latter defendants must have already satisfied the judgment against them, for
they no longer took appeal from the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, and the private
respondents did not bother to file their brief in this instant proceedings, for they did not even ask for
extension of time to do so if they had any desire to file the appellees' brief.

There remains the only question of whether Section 5 of R. A. No. 4354 under which the respondent
Court of Appeals found petitioner properly included as a defendant whom it considered sued in his
private capacity, was properly applied by said Court. In its own words, the Court of Appeals (Second
Division) said that "the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Act 4354) which took effect on June
19, 1965, cannot retroact to effect (sic) a case that occurred on February 28, 1964." But surprisingly,
the same Court went on to say: "Moreover, in the case of defendant City Engineer Samuel Dumlao,
his inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3 thereof is in his private capacity and
conforms with the provision of Section 5 of Act 4354." This very patent inconsistency may well be
said to reflect how infirm is the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as petitioner, who
incidentally has long retired, is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the decision appealed from is reversed insofar as
petitioner Samuel Dumlao is concerned, who is accordingly declared without liability for damages as
sought in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5042 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (Annex D to
Petition). No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014

FACTS:

On December 24, 1997, at about 10PM, Alexander Flojo was fetching water below his rented house
at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga Street, Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo de Guzman,
brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista, hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what
Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized by saying, “pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at
around 12:00 to 12:15AM, Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water
into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face
and chest. Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his
body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately
loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to Mandaluyong Medical Center.
Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. He
stayed in the emergency room for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor
of the hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected to further medical examination. Alexander
sustained two stab wounds. One was on the zygoma, left side which was about 1 cm long. The other
wound was on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal
clavicular line measuring about 2 cm. It penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung which needed the
insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to the victim’s attending physician,
Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death
without timely medical intervention. The accused denied having stabbed Alexander. According to
him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a
motorcycle. He accidently Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him.
He felt insulted and a fistfight ensued between them. They rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit
Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face. The RTC convicted Alfredo de
Guzman, Jr. of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day prision correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
prision mayor as maximum. De Guzman was further ordered to pay the private complainant
compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the actual and pecuniary loss
suffered by the victim as duly proven. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. The contention of the petitioner that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, according to the CA, was SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Candelaria. De Leon, A. De Leon, M.
Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Navarez. Ongoco. Sison. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. 1 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests bereft of merit. The appellate court did
not give credence to the appeal that de Guzman’s intent to kill was not established and that the
injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during the fist
fight between them and he did not inflict the stab wounds insisting that another person could have
inflicted the same to the victim. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitoner’s conviction. The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide (YES)

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the RTC and the CA with modification as to the
penalty imposed upon the petitioner. The elements of frustrated homicide are: 1) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; 2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and 3) none of
the qualifying circumstances for murder is present. In as much as the RTC and CA found none of the
qualifying circumstances in murder to be present, the SC immediately ascertained the presence of
the two other elements. The petitioner adamantly denied that intent to kill was present during the
fistfight between him and Alexander. He claimed that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintained that he only inflicted minor abrasions and stab
wounds that the victim appeared ho have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious
physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently established. He averred that such intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide, and that the crime is homicide
only if the intent to kill is completely shown. The essential element in frustrated or attempted
homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and
then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations. The Supreme Court concurred with the
findings of the RTC and the CA that intent to kill was present. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission
that the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or
as the result of a fistfight between them.

BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender.
Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical
injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and external
acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by
the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated

on September 27, 2006,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo
under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-
MD.[2]

Antecedents

The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o'clock in the evening,
Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his
rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when
suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land
lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander
informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to
Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about
two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down
and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo
suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face
and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the

left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino
that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his
motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical
Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered
medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room
of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the
second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital
where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on
the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper
left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal
clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic)
wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which
resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the
insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr.
Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could
have caused Alexander's death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn,
July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to

him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander
who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit
Alexander's back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him.
He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on
the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from
the latter's face.[3]
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the

court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the
absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant

compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the
crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by
Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during the
fistfight between them; that he did not inflict the stab wounds, insisting
that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had
caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be
accordingly found guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[5]
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on May 2,
2007.[6]
 Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

frustrated homicide?

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.[7] Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the
qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we
immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the
fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened
emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he
maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab
wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable
only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary
element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently
established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and
that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of

the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must
allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.[8] Intent to kill, being a
state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,[9] we considered
the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1)
the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before,
during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of
the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of
the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries
on the victim.[10]

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was
present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner's submission, the
wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the
heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically,
one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioner's attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such
wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of
intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander's
chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed
all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of

the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander's testimony. It
is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy
witness sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline
finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the victim
himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost
always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency
of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the
face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter committed
the crime.[11] Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner's mere denial of
the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical
evidence corroborating Alexander's statements. Under the circumstances,
we can only affirm the petitioner's conviction for frustrated homicide.
The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the
indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"[12] fixed by the RTC erroneous despite
the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on
the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.[13] The
maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] frustrated
homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion
temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present,
however, prision mayor in its medium period from eight years and one day
to 10 years is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day
of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not
within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct
indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of
P14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."[15] We need to revise
such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and
relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,[16] we emphatically declared
to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when
convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on
the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover
civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We explained why in the following
manner:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have
the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas
did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no
hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal,
has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter
of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting
reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the
established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless
they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It
cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and
obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice
and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should
prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law
require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties
will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in
manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They
should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in
order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement
of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.[17]
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries
because the offender committed violence that nearly took away the victim's
life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission."[18] Indeed, Article 2219,
(1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes
resulting in physical injuries.[19] Towards that end, the Court, upon its
appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award
of moral damages.[20] In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil
indemnity of P30,000.00.[21] Both of these awards did not require
allegation and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall

earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision
until full payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman,
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE,
and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years
of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to
Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of
P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of
6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Jose

De Guzman
45 SCAD 173 – Criminal Law – Continuing Crimes – Fencing is not a continuing crime
In 1985, a robbery was committed in Quezon City where jewelries worth millions were stolen.
The said jewelries were later found in the possession of a certain Danilo Alcantara in his
house in Antipolo, Rizal.
Subsequently, a Quezon City prosecutor filed an information against Alcantara for violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law. The criminal case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Alcantara filed a motion to quash the said information on the ground that the QC-RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Jose De Guzman ruled in favor of Alcantara.
The Solicitor General argued that what the judge did was wrong because the crime of fencing
is a continuing crime; that an ingredient of the crime, that is, the robbery, happened in Quezon
City, hence, Quezon City courts have jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fencing is a continuing crime.
HELD: No. A “continuing crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In this case, there are actually
two separate crimes which are robbery and fencing. They are independent of each other. The
law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or
theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order
that it can be consummated. Alcantara should be prosecuted in Antipolo because that’s where
the crime of fencing was allegedly committed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA
ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Is the crime of “fencing” a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information
therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the
property, unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired?
The above query is the sole issue in this Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
People of the Philippines, praying for the reversal, annulment and setting aside of the Order
of 28 February 1986 1 of the respondent Judge, who has ruled in the negative, as well as his
Order, dated 21 March 1986, 2 denying the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner prays
that the respondent Judge be directed to assume jurisdiction over, and to proceed with the
trial of, the criminal case.
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L.
Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos
were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the perpetrators
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed thereat as Criminal Case
No. G.R. No. 42078. 3
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1612, otherwise known as the “Anti-Fencing Law,” was also filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein
respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose
possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal. 4
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the accused [now private respondents],
issued the now questioned order of 28 February 1986, viz:
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash, filed by the accused thru counsel, praying that the
information filed against both accused be quashed, on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction to try the offense charged. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per police
investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason, Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct from that of Robbery. The
accused claims, likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court within which
territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
The Prosecution filed an opposition thereto, alleging among others, that there is nothing in
the law which prohibits the filing of a case of fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the
principal offense of robbery was committed. The prosecution claims further, that the
consideration in the enactment of PD 1612 was to impose a heavier penalty on persons who
profit by the effects of the crimes robbery or theft.
On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all criminal prosecutions, the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the Municipality or Province wherein the offense
was committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place. 5
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court, and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the
Municipality or Province where the offense took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have
jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without prejudice to the filing of the
corresponding action against the accused in the Court having proper jurisdiction.
The private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the court’s order of 21
March 1986.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the
commission of robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information therefor filed
in said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
and the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise jurisdiction thereover constitutes
a serious error of law and a grave abuse of discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a
“continuing offense.” He explains that the Anti-Fencing Law has been enacted for the purpose
of imposing a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of the crime of robbery
or theft, no longer merely as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code, but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.
In People vs. Ledesma, 6 we said:
. . . A “continuous crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the
actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts each of which,
although of a delictual character merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular
delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is called a “delito continuado.” For it to exist there
should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal
provision infringed upon or violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two
or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means
of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. 7 “Fencing”,
upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell,
or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft. 8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing
does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have
been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the
crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be
consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by
means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is
inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which
presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable
likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted. 9
We are not unaware of a number of instances 10 when the Court would allow a change of
venue in criminal cases “whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are
serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction
over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of
justice.” 11 Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling circumstances,
nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in its questioned
orders.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the
orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BALEROS, JR. VS. PEOPLE 483 SCRA 10Parties Involved

Renato “Chito” Baleros, Jr. as petitionerPeople as respondent

Facts

Early morning of Dec. 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by a smell of chemical on apiece of cloth pressed
on her face. She struggled to break free but his attacker waspinning her down, holding her tightly. When
her right hand finally got free, shegrabbed and squeezed the sex organ of his attacker. The man let her
go, enablingMarilou to seek help from her maid and classmates living nearby.An investigation was
conducted in which the evidences pointed to Chito as theattacker. The RTC thus found Chito guilty for
attempted rape and ordered him tosuffer an indeterminate sentence (from prision correccional as
minimum to prisionmayor as maximum) and to pay Malou PHP 50,000.Chito made an appeal to the CA
only to be denied. He moved for a reconsiderationbut to no avail. He thus made an appeal to the SC
arguing that:

1.

There was not enough evidence to find him guilty of the crime2.Prosecution failed to satisfy all
requisites for conviction

3.

Circumstances relied on to convict him were unreliable, inconclusive andcontradictory.4.There was no

motive.5.The awarding of damages to complainant was improper and unjustified.6.In failing to
appreciate in his favour the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not
been met, he should be acquittedon the basis that the offense charged has not been proved
beyondreasonable doubt.

Issues

1.

Whether the evidence adduced by prosecution has established beyondreasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape2.Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
RTC findingpetitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape

Held

1.

No. The court’s decision was merely based on speculations.

2.

Yes. SC reversed and modifies the decision of the CA, acquitting Chito of attempted rape. He is
adjudged guilty of light coercion and is ordered toserve 30 days of arresto mayor and pay PHP 200.

Doctrine/Ratio

Art. 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge orintercourse with a woman
under any of the following circumstances:1.By using force or intimidation2.When woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious3.When woman is under 12 years of age or dementedArt. 6 of the RPC
defines attempted rape when offender commences the commissionof rape directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution whichshould produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other thanhis own spontaneous desistance. The attempt which RPC punishes is the act
that has logical connection to the crimethat should it have been successful, the attempt would lead to
the consummation of rape. However, there was no carnal knowledge in the case. The pressing of
achemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou did not necessarily constitute an overtact of rape.
Moreover, the petitioner did not commence any act that was indicativeof an intent to rape Malou. The
petitioner was fully clothed; there was no attempt toneither undress her nor touch her private part.In
the crime of rape, penetration is an essential requisite. Therefore for anattempted rape, accused must
have commenced the act of penetrating but forsome cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetrationwas not completed. Thus petitioner’s act of lying on top of her, embracing
andkissing her or touching her private part do not constitute rape or attempted rape

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal
of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as
reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO)
guilty of attempted rape.3

The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with
attempted rape reads as follow:

That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of
Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of
her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said
acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.

Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not

Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private
complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel
Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the
decision of the CA, established the following facts:

Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", …) along A.H. Lacson
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania
(Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.

In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in
front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.

Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on
the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with
cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting
off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this …the opportunity
presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.

The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over
the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid.,
p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle
was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while
that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He … was wearing a t-shirt and
shorts … Original Records, p. 355).

To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo
Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.

It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue … (TSN,
July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left opened,
another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going
through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills
which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).

xxx xxx xxx

Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate …, was friendly until
a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita"
(TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).

Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in
the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of
the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST
Medicine and Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas”
(TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being
leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph
Bernard Africa was in the room.

He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G
Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security
guard’s logbook …:

"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter from
our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant
this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here

(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."

(Exhibit "A-2")

That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by Joseph
Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….

xxx xxx xxx

Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by the
time CHITO’s knocking on the door woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival
at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the
knock at the door ….

Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he
let the latter in. …. It was at around 3 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up
again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ….

xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was shown by Bernard the open
window through which the intruder supposedly passed.

xxx xxx xxx

Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to
CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being
allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.

CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in
Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if
the others were there. xxx.

People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They likewise invited CHITO
and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….

An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon of
December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo
Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not
belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the authorities,
Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found
(TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their
unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw
the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the
latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).

In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-shirt
with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3)
white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).

Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the
handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s because CHITO had lent the very same one to him ….
The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief
he saw CHITO used at least once in December.

That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what consisted
mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s testimony.

xxx xxx xxx.

The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared to
be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian,
Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along
with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where Renato had
seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato
know what the contents of the bag were.

xxx xxx xxx.

The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M.
Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory
examination on the specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit
"E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

xxx xxx xxx:

1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:

xxx xxx xxx

Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.

2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following:

Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.

Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.

Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above stated
specimens.

FINDINGS:

Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:

Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.

Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.

CONCLUSION:

Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)

For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied committing
the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different
version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as culled from the same
decision of the appellate court:

In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With Robert Chan and Alberto
Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to
him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.

From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong tagalog
over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas,
Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the
entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of
their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.

The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon after, … the four (4)
presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the
pool. xxx.

xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he was
dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-
shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .

Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol TAU
Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left
the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and
proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray
traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at
room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day ….

At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch, approached.
Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26).
S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry …. xxx.

S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10)
minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).

CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie window
and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, … approached him and
even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried
to open the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to
Joseph while knocking at the door.

It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at last answered the door.
Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went
inside the bedroom. CHITO , …changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same
short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).

At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He was already in his school
uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter
why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and to
just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not able to
identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.

Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building …. When two (2)
CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman
Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306….

xxx xxx xxx

The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and the
two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.

When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and talked to
him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.

xxx xxx xxx

Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to undergo
physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital ….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were
physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ….

xxx xxx xxx

CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him by
Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock
in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when
he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it
there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out on
the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were
his.

The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag
which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the
fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when
he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN,
June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and
brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not
aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the
first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag
late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.

Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo
and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr.
Duran’s place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping
the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in saying that CHITO was
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the time they
parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified
seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open the
door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes
after the dunking party held in her father’s house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was
Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed
that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth
on which it is applied.9

On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape
and accordingly sentencing him, thus:

WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape
as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as
Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 17271.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed
the trial court’s judgment of conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a quo, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed
resolution of March 31, 1999.12

Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -

1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape
imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense
charged.

2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence

since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.

3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are unreliable,
inconclusive and contradictory.

4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.

5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award was
improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
 6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and that
moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that the
offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA erred
in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape.

After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence, the
Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct
evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on
the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification.
A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may
still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for
instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which
forms part of circumstantial evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort
to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret
and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all
circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence
may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if –

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial evidence,
which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads
to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.

We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of the
petitioner as such intruder:

Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room of
MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress
to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph
Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-
shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though
it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be
something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.

From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief
stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a
white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these
items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the
handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes
first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-
soaked cloth had been pressed.

This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.

The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face the piece of cloth
soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the
performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that
petitioner’s actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be
any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he
attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that
if petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force
or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the
aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16

Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in
People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation."
Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as
where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act
in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.18

There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the
present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt
act of rape.
1avv phil.net

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.19

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to
sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It
cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part
to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the
complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would
have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:

The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual
organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is
an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked
glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this
case, her unconsciousness.20

At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule
on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof
required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21

In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted rape,
pointing out that:

xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for
there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual
organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts,
inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and
detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually
commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx.

Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:

xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus
criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere
holding of the feet is attempted rape.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of
any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he
forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial,
Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having
struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts
committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute
unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner
was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the
information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly
observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or
compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any
human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly
annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond
cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.

The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from ₱5.00 to ₱200.00 or both.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING
petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged
GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine
of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILLIAM TIU y LIU AND

EDGARDO DE PAZ y DANAO, appellants.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Appellants William Tiu y Liu and Edgardo De Paz y Danao were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City with violating Section 15,
[1]

Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both were found guilty of the
offense charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
solidarily to pay the mandatory conjunctive penalty of a fine
of P1,000,000. The convictions are now up for review before the Court.
[2]

The Prosecutions Version of the Facts

 The testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Benedicto R. Tupil, P/Insp.
[3]

Julieto Culili, P/Insp. Julius Mana and P/Insp. Isidro Cario, are as follows:
[4] [5] [6]

On June 26, 1998, at about 2:30 p.m., police officers Tupil, Culili and Mana
were on alert duty at the Philippine National Police Narcotics Group, Special
Operations Division (SOD) situated in Camp Crame, Quezon City when a
confidential informant (CI) walked in and reported that he had knowledge of two
persons, going by the names William and Edgar, who were engaged in the
selling and/or delivering of large volumes of shabu in Metro Manila. The CI
disclosed that Edgar promised him a commission if he can find a good buyer
for their available stocks of shabu.
After interrogating the CI and evaluating the information given, Mana
instructed the CI to contact Edgar and to arrange the purchase of 2 kilos
of shabu. At about 7:30 p.m., the CI returned, claiming that he closed a deal
with Edgar for the purchase of 2 kilos of shabu for P1,000,000. The exchange
would take place between 5:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., the next day, at the 7-11
convenience store parking area located in Bayan-Bayan
Ave., Concepcion, Marikina City.
A team was immediately formed comprising of Tupil, to act as the poseur-
buyer, Culili and a certain P/Insp. Carlito Dimalanta, to give backup support,
and six other police officers, to provide the perimeter security. The buy-bust
money was also prepared using six pieces of marked P1,000 bills that were
placed on top of ten bundles of boodle money and contained inside a paper
[7]

bag. Thereafter, the police officers proceeded to the target area. In route, they
dropped by the Eastern Police District Station to coordinate the buy-bust
operation to avoid a misencounter with the local police.
The police officers arrived in the target area at around 3:30 a.m. Tupil and
the CI parked their vehicle in the parking lot of 7-11, while Culili and Dimalanta
took positions in front of a Meralco building some 10 to 15 meters away. The
rest of the team stayed at a nearby gasoline station, about 20 meters away from
7-11.
At around 6:30 a.m., a metallic green Toyota Corolla XL, with license plate
UHE 156, arrived carrying on board the two appellants. De Paz first approached
Tupil and the CI. The CI immediately introduced Tupil to De Paz by saying Siya
iyong interasadong bumili ng shabu. De Paz, in turn, requested to see the
money, whereupon Tupil went to the car to retrieve the paper bag. Tupil then
took out a bundle of boodle money and flashed it in front of De Paz. Satisfied,
De Paz left to fetch Tiu who was, during all this time, waiting inside the Toyota
Corolla. When De Paz returned with Tiu, the latter was carrying a black shoulder
bag. Tiu handed the black bag over to Tupil saying Pare, ito iyong order nyo na
bato. Dalawang kilo yan. After receiving the black bag, Tupil handed over to De
Paz the paper bag containing the boodle money. As he was doing so, Tupil
executed the prearranged signal by removing the cap he was wearing.
Thereafter, Tupil identified himself as a police officer and grabbed Tiu. De Paz
managed to run away at first, but was immediately caught by Dimalanta and
Culili.

The Appellants Version of the Facts

Appellants claim that the buy-bust operation never took place. Instead, they
depicted an elaborate frame-up perpetrated by the police. Gathered from the
testimonies of appellants and
[8]
witnesses Lorna Perez, Nerio
[9]

Cercado, Eduardo
[10]
Balamiento, Tessie
[11]
Lesiguez, Carmelita
[12]

Villanueva, and Erna Boadilla, the whole incident transpired as follows:

[13] [14]

On June 26, 1998, Lorna Perez, the common-law wife of Tiu, was in route
to Manila on board Tius Mitsubishi Lancer GRS, with license plate WLT 111,
driven by Nerio Cercado. She had just left Olongapo City, where she had a
medical check-up. Somewhere in Sta. Cruz, Pampanga, their vehicle was
stopped by armed men who introduced themselves as narcotics policemen
stationed in Olongapo City. The policemen accused them of riding in a hot car
and told them that they must be brought to Camp Crame. Because the men
were armed, Perez and Cercado had no choice but to go to Camp Crame.
Upon arrival in Camp Crame at about 8:00 p.m., Perez and Cercado were
interrogated by Dimalanta, Culili, Tupil and Mana regarding the whereabouts of
Tiu. Both replied that Tiu resides in Marikina and that he may already be home.
The police officers then proceeded to Tius house with Perez and Cercado. After
seeing that Tiu was not yet home, the police officers decided to wait for him.
Tiu arrived at around 5:30 a.m. the following day, accompanied by De Paz.
He just came from an all-night card game in the house of De Pazs brother. As
they entered the gate, the police officers immediately drew their weapons and
ordered them to lie on the ground. One police officer told Tiu that their superior,
Director Acop, is very mad at him because of false rumors Tiu was allegedly
spreading against Director Acop in Olongapo City. Tiu, De Paz, Perez and
Cercado were thereafter brought to Camp Crame.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., the police brought Tiu and Perez back
to Marikina because the police wanted Tiu to get in touch with a certain Paul
Chua. When he was unable to contact Paul Chua, they were taken back
to Camp Crame. The following day, around 8:00 p.m., Director Acop arrived.
Upon seeing Tiu, Director Acop took off his shoes and used them to hit Tiu.
Director Acop also punched and kicked Tiu, telling him Putang ina mo William,
kung anu-ano ang pinagsasabi mo sa Olongapo. Siniraan mo ako at pinag
taguan mo pa kami.
Subsequently, the police officers offered to release Perez, Cercado and the
Mitsubishi Lancer for P270,000. Tiu managed to raise the money and it was
brought in by Perezs father early the next morning on June 28, 1998. Thus,
Perez and Cercado were set free and the vehicle released. However, Tiu and
De Paz were brought before the Marikina Prosecutors Office for inquest
proceedings.
Appellants filed separate briefs. In Tius brief, the following alleged errors
were assigned:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE

TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME INDICATES IMPROBABILITIES.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENGAGES IN GIVING UNDUE

WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE
THE EXISTENCE OF CLEAR, POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
EFFECTIVELY CONTROVERTING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

De Paz, in his brief, assigns the following errors for consideration:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WHICH LED TO THE CAPTURE OF
WILLIAM TIU AND EDGARDO DE PAZ.
 II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT WILLIAM TIU

AND EDGARDO DE PAZ WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO IN AN
ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION BY A TEAM HEADED BY P/CHIEF
INSPECTOR JULIUS CESAR V. MANA AT THE SEVEN-ELEVEN (7-11)
CONVENIENCE STORE LOCATED AT BAYAN-BAYANAN AVENUE,
CONCEPCION MARIKINA CITY AT AROUND 6:20 IN THE MORNING OF
JUNE 27, 1998 DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENSE THAT THERE WAS NO BUY-BUST OPERATION IN THE
AFORESAID DATE AND PLACE AND THAT WILLIAM TIU AND EDGARDO
DE PAZ WERE ARRESTED IN TIUS RESIDENCE AT 72 ISRAEL STREET,
GREENHEIGHTS NAGKA, MARIKINA CITY.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDGARDO DE PAZ HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Simply put, both appellants are asking the Court to rule that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Ruling

The Court understands the importance of buy-bust operations as an

effective method, sanctioned by law, of apprehending drug peddlers. At the [15]

same time, it is aware that it is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion

and abuse. As the Court declared in People v. Ale:
[16] [17]

[W]e cannot close our eyes to the many reports of evidence being planted on unwary
persons either for extorting money or exacting personal vengeance. By the very nature
of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin
can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy
that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great.

For this reason, the Court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases. [18]

The elements necessary successfully to prosecute an accused for the illegal

sale of shabu are: 1) Identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. To prove that these elements were present in the case at bar, the
[19]

prosecution relies on the testimony of the poseur-buyer, Tupil. The four other
witnesses who testified for the prosecution were incompetent to testify on these
facts. Culili, who witnessed the incident from some 15 meters away, was only
able to testify on the movements of appellants, Tupil and the CI, but could not
precisely testify as to the fact of the sale. Mana, on the other hand, testified on
the preparations conducted prior to the buy-bust operation, while Cario merely
reported that the drug samples given to him for testing were positive for shabu.
In short, the prosecutions case crucially depends on the strength of the
testimony of Tupil.
While the Court concedes that a single, trustworthy and credible witness
could be sufficient to convict an accused, it does not hold true in this
[20]

case. Tupils credibility has been seriously eroded by the fact that, in another
drug-related criminal case, he was found to have framed-up the accused therein
for illegal sale of shabu. The decision in that case, rendered by [21]

the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City and presented by appellants as part of
their evidence, speaks volumes of the character of Tupil and his co-narcotics
[22]

agents. The pertinent portion of the Pasay City trial courts decision is quoted
therein, as follows:

The prosecution avers that, when the accused arrived, at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon,
on March 15, 1998, in the parking lot of the Heritage Hotel, he and the informant had
a brief conversation and that, thereafter, the informant and the accused proceeded to
the car of Savellano, in the parking lot, boarded the car and, once inside the car, the
sale transaction was forged with the Accused turning over the shabu to Bungay and
the latter showing the buy-money to the Accused. However, the VHS videotape taken,
with the cameras at the entrance door of the hotel, inscrutably shows that, as the
Accused waited in the driveway of the hotel, he was forcibly taken by armed male
persons and forcibly boarded in a car which then sped off towards the direction
of Makati City. This is graphically shown in the VHS video shown to the Court, in the
presence of the Accused and the Prosecutor. There was no transaction forged by the
Accused and the informant and Bungay at all. The Accused was brazenly abducted
from the driveway of the hotel and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City

Eventually, the accused therein, Philip Sy, was acquitted and criminal
charges were brought by the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
against Tupil and the other policemen involved in the frame-up. When cross-
examined by the defense, Tupil readily admitted having taken part in the phony
buy-bust operation against Philip Sy and that he even testified therein as a
prosecution witness. It having been indubitably shown that Tupil has had a
history of framing-up suspects, not to mention his having given false testimony,
the Court cannot give credence to his testimony in this case.
The Court also notes from the decision of the Pasay City trial court that
prosecution witnesses Culili and Mana were also part of the plot to frame-up
Philip Sy. Their credibility are, consequently, similarly questionable.
While the defense of frame-up can be easily fabricated, this claim assumes
importance when it is shown that the apprehending officers, who were also the
prosecutions witnesses, have a penchant for framing innocent people or, in our
colorful vernacular, committing HULIDAP. Under the circumstances, a cloud
[23]

of doubt, arising from the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses, attends
the finding of guilt against appellants.
Moreover, to corroborate their claim that no buy-bust operation occurred,
appellants were able to present disinterested witnesses who had no personal
or business relationship with them:
Tessie Lesiguiez is a balut and cigarette vendor who sells her wares just
beside the 7-11 convenient store, where the alleged buy-bust operation
occurred. She testified that she was at her post from the evening of June 26,
1998 until 7:30 a.m. of June 27, 1998 and that, during the entire time, she did
not witness any buy-bust operation.
Carmelita Villanueva is another vendor who has a stall beside 7-11. She
testified that she tended her stall selling viands between 6:30 a.m. and 8:00
a.m. of June 27, 1998 and that she does not recall any unusual incident that
happened at that time.
Erna Boadilla is a next-door neighbor of Tiu. She testified that she is
usually awake by 5:00 a.m. to prepare breakfast for her husband. She said that
in the morning of June 27, 1998, she heard their dogs barking, prompting her
to peep through their window. From her vantage point, she saw 5 or 6 armed
men accosting Tiu who was, thereafter, boarded inside a car.
In criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds that the guilt of
[24]

appellants herein has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as measured
by the required moral certainty for conviction. While there has been no strong
proof that appellants were indeed framed-up, in criminal cases the overriding
consideration is not whether the Court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Considering the shady
[25]

credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and the evidence presented by

appellants, the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been
overcome.
 WHEREFORE, decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City,
Branch 272, in Criminal Case No. 98-593-D-MK, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellants are ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 138060 September 1, 2004WILLIAM TIU, doin b!"ine"" !nder t#e n$me $nd "t%&e o' ()*Ro! #
Rider",( $nd +IRGILI T- LAS I/AS

petitioners, vs.

-)R A. ARRI-SGA) , -N AMIN N) R, S-RGI -)RAN $nd ILI IN- -

NI SUR-T5 AN) INSURAN -,IN .,

respondents.

ALL- , SR.,

J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision of the
Court of Appeals a rming withmodi cation the Decision of the Regional Trial CourtCe u Cit! for
reachof contract of carriage, damages and attorne!"s fees, and the Resolutionden!ing the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

A TS7

At a out #$%$$ p.m. of &arch #5, #'(), the cargo truc* mar*ed +Condor ollow -loc*s and eneral
&erchandise+ earing plate num er -/01)5was loaded with rewood in -ogo, Ce u and left for
Ce u Cit!.

2pon reaching 3itio Aggies, /o lacion, Compostela, Ce u, ust as thetruc* passed over a ridge,
one of its rear tires e ploded. The driver,3ergio /edrano, then par*ed along the right side of the
national highwa!and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcani6ed at a near ! shop,a out )$$
meters awa!.

•
/edrano left his helper, 7ose &itante, 7r. to *eep watch over the stalledvehicle, and instructed the latter
to place a spare tire si fathomsawa! ehind the stalled truc* to serve as a warning for
oncomingvehicles. The truc*"s tail lights were also left on. 8t was a out #9%$$ a.m.,&arch #1, #'().

At a out 4%45 a.m., D" Rough Riders passenger us with plate num er/-/0)94 driven ! :irgilio Te
;aspi<as was cruising along the nationalhighwa! of 3itio Aggies, /o lacion, Compostela, Ce u. The
passenger us was also ound for Ce u Cit!, and had come from &a!a,Daan anta!an, Ce u.
Among its passengers were the 3pouses /edro A.Arriesgado and =elisa /epito Arriesgado, who were
seated at the rightside of the us, a out three >?@ or four >4@ places from the front seat.

As the us was approaching the ridge, ;aspi<as saw the stalled truc*,which was then a out 95
meters awa!.

e applied the rea*s and triedto swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truc*. -ut it was too late the
us rammed into the truc*"s left rear. The impact damaged the right sideof the us and left several
passengers in ured. /edro Arriesgado lostconsciousness and suBered a fracture in his right colles. is
wife, =elisa,was rought to the Danao Cit! ospital. 3he was later transferred to the3outhern 8sland
&edical Center where she died shortl! thereafter.

Respondent /edro A. Arriesgado then led a complaint for reach of contract of carriage, damages
and attorne!"s fees efore the Regional Trial Court of Ce u Cit! against the petitioners, D" Rough
Riders usoperator illiam Tiu and his driver, :irgilio Te ;aspi<as on &a! 9), #'(). The respondent alleged
that the passenger us in uestion was cruisingat a fast and high speed along the national road, and
that petitioner;aspi<as did not ta*e precautionar! measures to avoid the accident.

The petitioners, for their part, led a Third0/art! Complaint on August9#, #'() against the following%

respondent /hilippine /hoeni 3uret! and 8nsurance, 8nc. >//388@,petitioner Tiu"s insurer
o

respondent -en amin Condor, the registered owner of the cargotruc*

and respondent 3ergio /edrano, the driver of the truc*.

The! alleged that petitioner ;aspi<as was negotiating the uphill clim along the national highwa! of
3itio Aggies, /o lacion, Compostela, in amoderate and normal speed. 8t was further alleged that the
truc* waspar*ed in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of thehighwa!, and that no
earl! warning device was displa!ed. /etitioner;aspi<as promptl! applied the ra*es and swerved to the
left to avoidhitting the truc* head0on, ut despite his eBorts to avoid damage topropert! and ph!sical
in uries on the passengers, the right side portionof the us hit the cargo truc*"s left rear. The
petitioners further alleged,thus%

That the cargo truc* is owned and registered in the name of thethird0part! defendant -en amin
Condor and was left unattended ! its driver 3ergio /edrano, one of the third0part! defendants, atthe
time of the incident

That third0part! defendant 3ergio /edrano, as driver of the cargotruc* +Condor ollow -loc*s E
eneral &erchandise,+ wasrec*lessl! and imprudentl! par*ed along the national highwa! of Compostela,
Ce u during the vehicular accident in uestion, andthird0part! defendant -en amin Condor, as the
registered ownerof the cargo truc* who failed to e ercise due diligence in theselection and supervision
of third0part! defendant 3ergio/edrano, are ointl! and severall! lia le to the third0part!plaintiBs for
whatever lia ilit! that ma! e ad udged against saidthird0part! plaintiBs or are directl! lia le of
>sic@ the allegeddeath of plaintiB"s wife

8ntended to show rec*less imprudence on the part of the third0part! defendants, the third0part!
plaintiBs here ! declare thatduring the vehicular accident in uestion, third0part! defendantwas clearl!
violating 3ection ?4, par. >g@ of the ;and Transportation and Tra c Code

o
That the aforesaid passenger us, owned and operated ! third0part! plaintiB illiam Tiu, is covered
! a common carrierlia ilit! insurance with Certi cate of Cover issued ! /hilippine/hoeni 3uret!
and 8nsurance, 8nc., Ce u Cit! -ranch, in favor of third0part! plaintiB illiam Tiu which covers the
period from 7ul!99, #'(1 to 7ul! 99, #'() and that the said insurance coveragewas valid, inding and su
sisting during the time of theaforementioned incident

Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case
was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending
among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of
the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority.

Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the
resolution of the case.

Held:
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently
favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and
by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the
proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
Ortega
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997

Lessons Applicable: Indeterminate Sentence Law

Laws Applicable: Art. 4 RPC

FACTS:
• October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay (courting Raquel Ortega), Ariel Caranto,
Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking
spree with gin and finger foods.
• October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were already drank
joined them.
• October 16, 1992 midnight: Andre answering a call of nature went to the back portion of the
house and Benjamin followed him. Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre “Don’t, help me!”
(Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)
• Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down being
stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamin’s father while Diosdado called Romeo to pacify
his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the well.
They dropped stones to Andre’s body to weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell
anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his conscience bothered him
so he told his mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to the crime scene.
• NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:
o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds, contributory
o 13 stab wounds
o stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper left armpit and left chest wall- front
o stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the
body – back
• Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called
“tawas” on his sick daughter and stayed home after
• Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through the room of his sister
Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his sister was. When he answered he didn’t
know, Andre punched him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him,
hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm
and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came, seized the
knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran towards the direction of the well. Then, he
tended his wound in the lips and armpit and slept.
• RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength
committed murder

ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.

HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal
• If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities. If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported
the matter to the police authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times
successively, completely ignoring Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that Andre was
choking him while being stabbed.
• Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage
of such superiority – none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 5’4”
• Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by “any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.”
o The essential requisites
1. the intended act is felonious – assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to the well
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery
3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts (praeter
intentionem) – still alive and was drowned to death
• a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill
• Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
 ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions
of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
• The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in
the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116736. July 24, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN

ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN
DOE, accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL
GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more
serious than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally intended to
conceal and to bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be
held liable as a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the
said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such
concealment and burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia
can not be held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed to allege
such death through drowning in the Information. Neither may said appellant be
held liable as an accessory due to his relationship with the principal killer,
Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.

Statement of the Case

This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision, dated February 9, 1994
[1]

written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio, finding them guilty of murder.

[2]

Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an

Information dated October 19, 1992, as follows:
[3]

That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable
cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior
strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed
weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY
y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Accused John Doe was then at
[4] [5]

large. After trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the questioned
[6]

Decision. The dispositive portion reads: [7]

WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel

Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the
Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00
for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity
of P50,000.00.
 The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo
P. Velicaria who took over from the Public Attorneys Office as counsel for the
[8]

accused.

The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as

follows:
[9]

Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about

5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto,
Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the
compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined
them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went
to the back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed
him and later they [referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard
the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo
ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and
[they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay
who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a
long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr.,
the father of accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega
in the place where they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to
pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the
stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted
Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and
dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet
in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay
inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody
of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go
home. That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortegas house. That
upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what
he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and
reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police
Station and some police officers went with them to the crime scene. That
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were
brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the incident to his mother
on the night he witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. That on October 15,
1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay,
Romeo Ortega, Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree
and he joined them. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia
were not yet in the place. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight
and 12:30 a.m. That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell
fish. That he met the victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that
occasion. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia joined them
at about 11:00 p.m. That there was no altercation between Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and Andre Mar Masangkay, during the
drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m. Andre Mar Masangkay answered
the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That he cannot see
Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they were having the drinking
session. That he did not see what happened to Andre Mar Masangkay. That he
only heard Masangkay asking for help. That accused Manuel Garcia was still
in the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was asking for help. That
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia are his friends and neighbors. That
when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for help, he and Ariel
Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and saw Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on
top of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That Andre Mar
Masangkay was lying down with his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. on top stabbing the former. That he did not see any injuries on Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. That he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin,
Jr. That he did not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Masangkay. That he knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel
Ortega. That Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar Masangkay
when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.That there was no trouble that
occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado
Quitlong is his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in
the morning, he was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the
stabbing incident that occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is
living. That he relayed the information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a
police team under police officer Param accompanied them to the place. That
he asked the police officers to verify if there is a body of person inside the
well. That the well was covered with stones and he asked the police officers to
seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove the stones inside the well. That
after the stones were removed, the body of the victim was found inside the
well. That the lifeless body was pulled out from the well. That the body has
several stab wounds. That he came to know the victim as Andre Mar
Masangkay. That two men were arrested by the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well
with several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was
drinking with the victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call
of nature.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October
16, 1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur
Highway. That he prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head
and body indicating the location of the stab wounds. That the cause of death is
multiple stab wounds, contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That
there were 13 stab wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of the body, 2
at the back and there were contused abrasions around the neck and on the left
arm. There was stab wound at the left side of the neck. That the contused
abrasion could be produced by cord or wire or rope. That there is (an) incised
wound on the left forearm.That the stab wounds which were backward
downward of the body involved the lungs. That the victim was in front of the
assailant. That the stab wound on the upper left shoulder was caused when the
assailant was in front of the victim. That the assailant was in front of the
victim when the stab wound near the upper left armpit was inflicted as well as
the stab wound on the left chest wall. That the stab wound on the back left side
of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the body may be
produced when the assailant was at the back of the victim. That the assailant
was in front of the victim when the stab wound[s] on the left elbow and left
arm were inflicted. That the large airway is filled with muddy particles
indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy
particles. The heart is filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or
decreased of blood. The lungs is filled with water or muddy particles. The
brain is pale due to loss of blood.The stomach is one half filled with muddy
particles which could [have been] taken in when submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of
the victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. That
it is possible that the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both [referring to
participants] were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was
on top. That he cannot tell the number of the assailants.

Evidence for the Appellants

 Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15,
1992, he and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter,
Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. He left the hospital at seven o clock
in the morning, went home, changed his clothes and went to work. After office
[10]

hours, he and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of
work. After drinking beer, they left at eight o clock in the evening and headed
home. En route, they chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre
Mar Masangkay, who invited them to join their own drinking spree. Thereupon,
Appellant Garcias wife came and asked him to go home because their daughter
was still sick. To alleviate his daughters illness, he fetched his mother-in-law
who performed a ritual called tawas. After the ritual, he remained at home and
attended to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police
officers at six o clock in the morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her
husband. She however added two other participants in the drinking session
aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay,
namely, a Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. [11]

Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of

Appellant Manuel Garcia. According to him, between eleven and twelve o
[12]

clock in the evening, Masangkay left the drinking session. Thirty (30) minutes
after Masangkay left, he also left the drinking place to urinate. He went behind
[13]

the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his sister
Raquel. He ignored Masangkay and continued urinating. After he was through,
[14]

Masangkay approached him and asked where his sister was. He answered that
he did not know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the
mouth, an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his
back. When he was about to stand up, Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed
him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Masangkay then
gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move,
Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed, grabbed
Masangkays right hand which was holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest
the knife from Masangkay and, with it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times
successively, in the left chest and in the middle of the stomach. When the
stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being
hit. Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the
[15]

well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his injured left armpit and
lips. Then, he slept.
When he woke up at six o clock the following morning, he saw police officers
in front of his house. Taking him with them, the lawmen proceeded to the
well. From the railroad tracks where he was asked to sit, he saw the police
officers lift the body of a dead person from the well. He came to know the
identity of the dead person only after the body was taken to the police
headquarters. [16]

The Trial Courts Discussion

The trial court explained its basis for appellants conviction as follows: [17]

The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr., Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping
the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the
deep well filled with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the
well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the community of design to
finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre
Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee and/or defend himself against the
three malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength
were in attendance. The crime committed by the accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound
may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence (People
vs. Yu, 80 SCRA 382 (1977)).
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused
(m)ust reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount
of P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of the deceased.

The Issues

In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following: [18]

I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the basis of
the prosecutions evidence that at the time both accused and one
Romeo Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from where he
succumbed due to stab wounds and brought and drop said body of
Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew Masangkay
was still alive at the time his body was dropped in the well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not acquitting
the latter of the crime charged; and
 IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega Jr. is
guilty only of homicide alone.

On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the
People, we believe that the question to be resolved could be simplified thus: What are
the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?

The Courts Ruling

We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of

homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.

First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega

The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting

narrations. The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime
and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the
defense, on the other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which of
the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the
trial court held:
[19]

The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their
witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their
behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of
the prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness
Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is
reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the
accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the
police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he
will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. x x x
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses
demeanor and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest
respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case,
his assessment of credibility must be respected. [20]
 In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no
reason to reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration
[21]

of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It

is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full
credence.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on
the unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free
himself from Masangkays grip, he went home, treated his injuries and
slept. This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortegas
[22]

version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter
to the police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his
rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after
someone was stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that
Diosdado Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively,
completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr. who was grappling with
Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that
Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the
alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong. The natural tendency of a person
[23]

under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a defenseless

third person.

Murder or Homicide?

Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength

were alleged in the information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse
of superior strength.
We disagree with the trial courts finding. Abuse of superior strength requires
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such
superiority. It must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force
that was manifestly out of proportion to the means available to the victims
defense. In this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition
[24]

and weapon of the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event. [25]

In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about

Appellant Ortegas availment of force excessively out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the victim to defend himself. Quitlong described the
assault made by Appellant Ortega as follows: [26]

ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a drinking spree with
Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a stabbing incident?
A It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon we were drinking in the
house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr., because the house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. and
the house of his son Benjamin Ortega, Jr. are near each other.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel
Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said place?
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto y Ducay, Roberto
San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at that time?
A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. arrived drunk
and joined the group?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A While we were there together and we were drinking ... (interrupted by Atty. Altuna)
Q Who is that we?
A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega,
Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew Masangkay. Andrew Masangkay answer
to a call of nature and went to the back portion of the house, and Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. followed him where he was.
Q What happened next?
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said Huwag, tulungan nyo ako.
Q From whom did you hear this utterance?
A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to answer a call of nature and
after you heard huwag, tulungan nyo ako coming from the mouth of the late Andrew
Masangkay, what happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew Masangkay and he was
stabbing Andrew Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the stabbing was done telling
us the particular position of the late Andrew Masangkay and how Benjamin Ortega,
Jr proceeded with the stabbing against the late victim, Andrew Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:
 (At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up, then Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. was nakakabayo and with his right hand with closed fist holding the weapon, he
was thrusting this weapon on the body of the victim, he was making downward and
upward motion thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times.

It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas

Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall. There was no
[27]

testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and the victim were
already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony
and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength.Hence,
Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.

Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia

Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court is based on
mere assumption and conjecture x x x. Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that
[28]

the large airway was filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was
alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean that
such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still
alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, Nilubayan lang nang
saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr. Thus, the
prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already dead when he was lifted
and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an
accessory. [29]

We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this
provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily
caused by the actors wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the
body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The
offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although [30]

Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when
he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the
direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense
is worse than that intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the
victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that
the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of
drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically
[31]

demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victims airway, lungs and
stomach. This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal
[32]

officer, quoted below: [33]

ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion of Exhibit N, beginning
with tracheo-bronchial tree, that is sentence immediately after paragraph 10, 2.5
cms. Will you please explain this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly get this particular material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles could be inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no inhaling or the taking or
receiving of muddy particles at that time, the person is still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at the anterior surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?
A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of blood going to the
heart.
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning?
A Yes, sir.
Q Next point is the lungs?
A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs?
A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or muddy particles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or asphyxia, the lungs
have been damaged per your Report?
 A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is this?
A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss of blood.
Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab wound which is number
13?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the last one, under the particular point hemothorax?
A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood that accumulate at the
thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with granular materials?
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said particular portion of the
body?
A Could be muddy particles.
Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by asphyxia? Am I correct?
A Its due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru the stab wounds.
Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the muddy particles now came in, in
that particular portion of the body and caused admixing of granular materials?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions, will you please explain
the same?
A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated inside the abdomen.
Q And what could have cause the same?
A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen.
Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please explain the same?
A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in water.
Q What is the take in?
A Muddy particles.
Q And he was still alive at that time?
A Yes, sir. (Underscoring supplied)

A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following

medical findings may show that drowning is the cause of death: [34]

1. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the

victim. The clenching of the hands is a manifestation
of cadaveric spasm in the effort of the victim to save himself from
drowning.
 2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the lungs
(edema aquosum).
3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents corresponding to
the medium where the body was recovered.
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage found in the
medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear.
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. It
was proven that his airpassage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was
filled with muddy particles which were residues at the bottom of the well. Even
his stomach was half-filled with such muddy particles. The unrebutted
testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these muddy particles were
ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the victim died of drowning
inside the well.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter
intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this
paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original
intent to kill.
[35]

In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable
as principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles
barring his conviction, even as an accessory as prayed for by appellants
counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of
attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the
different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA The
prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the
stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility
relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting
drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that
an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in
the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right. Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution
[36]

explicitly guarantees the following:

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
 counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
In People vs. Pailano, this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for
[37]

rape on a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious where the

information charged the accused of sexual assault by using force or
intimidation, thus:
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime
through the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the
trial that the complainant was a mental retardate.Its purpose in doing so is not
clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground
that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such
conviction could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as
worded. This described the offense as having been committed by Antonio
Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by means of violence and
intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age,
against her will. No mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita
while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason -- and not through
force and intimidation, which was the method alleged -- would have violated
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.[Article IV, Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec.
14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can
prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of
a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course,
available to the herein accused-appellant.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with
rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been
alleged in the criminal complaint against him.In the case of People vs. Montes,
[fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a
person held responsible for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have
raped, as the crime he was accused of -- and acquitted -- was not homicide but
rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil.
 114] where the accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds held
by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by
means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was
not alleged in the information. The Court said such conviction would violate
the Bill of Rights.
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide
through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia
assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order to prevent its
discovery, he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined
under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that
Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the latters sister,
[38]

Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from
[39]

criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees
with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
On the other hand, the next preceding article provides:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life
of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.
 Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal
accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting
provision of the Revised Penal Code.This Court is thus mandated by law to
acquit him.

Penalty and Damages

The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00

from P35,000.00. The former amount was proven both by documentary
evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim. Of the
[40]

expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can give credence only to
those that are supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death of the victim. However, in line with
[41]

current jurisprudence, Appellant Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the
[42]

deceased in the sum of P50,000.00. Indemnity requires no proof other than the
fact of death and appellants responsibility therefor.
[43]

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant
Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal
is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of
homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay
the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual
damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED. His immediate release
from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid
cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANTE
ILAGAN, appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99, convicting appellant
Dante Ilagan of Qualified Rape and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death and to pay the offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the sums of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages. [1]

The information for Rape against appellant reads:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1998, in the municipality of Norzagaray,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter Mylene Ilagan, 16 years old, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law. [2]

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the

charge. Thereafter, the trial of the case ensued.
[3]

The facts of the case as established by the prosecution are as follows:

The offended party, Mylene Ilagan, lived with her father, appellant Dante
Ilagan, and her siblings at Barangay Bulalo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Her mother,
Marietta, had gone off to live with another man. [4]

On May 18, 1998, Mylenes elder sister went with her paternal grandmother,
Nenita Ilagan, to Meycauayan to attend the birthday celebration of their eldest
sister. Later that evening, while Mylene was asleep beside her other siblings,
accused woke her up and told her that they would sleep in her grandmother
Nenitas house, located some fifteen meters away, leaving behind her other
[5]

siblings in their own house.

At 3:00 in the morning of the following day, while Mylene was asleep, she
was awakened by someone taking off her shorts and panties. She saw
appellant, naked from the waist down, lying on top of her. Appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina, causing her pain. She was unable to cry for fear that
appellant might kill her since he had threatened to kill her before. Appellant
stopped the sexual intrusion when a substance, which looked like phlegm,
came out of his penis. He then got up and went to the kitchen to boil some
water. He told Mylene to watch the pot and left the house. [6]

On December 10, 1998, while appellant was in Quezon Province, Mylene

mustered the courage to tell her friend, Jocelyn, about the sexual assault by her
father. They went to the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), which brought Mylene to the Norzagaray Police where she gave her
sworn statement. Thereafter, she was brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Provincial Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan for physical
examination. [7]

Dr. Manuel Aves, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who examined Mylene,
found multiple healed deep lacerations on her hymen. He concluded that
Mylene was a non-virgin at the time of the examination on December 15, 1998. [8]
 On the same date, Mylene filed a complaint for Rape against appellant
before the Norzagaray Municipal Trial Court. [9]

In his defense, appellant denied the charges and claimed that he was in
Alabang, Muntinlupa City on the date that the alleged rape was committed,
working at a project for Nipponville Home Gallery. Moreover, as a furniture
worker, he stayed in Manila for several days and went home to Bulacan only on
weekends. He alleged that Mylene had several boyfriends, and presented in
[10]

court purported love letters sent by Mylene to Larry and Rudy, as well as letters
she received from her male suitors, namely, Boy Bicol, Dondon Hernandez,
Rab and Orly. Her grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, and sister, Judith, corroborated
[11]

appellants testimony. They alleged that appellant frequently scolded Mylene for
coming home late, and surmised that this may be the reason why she filed
charges against her father. [12]

On June 9, 2000, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, ALL PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court resolves that the

prosecution has successfully undertaken his burden to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, accused Dante Ilagan is hereby found
GUILTY of the crime of RAPE from having violated the provisions of Article 266-B
in relation to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the
presence of aggravating circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent of the victim in this case, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.

One final word. The Court treats the imposition of the capital punishment upon the
hereby accused as an unpleasant, if not an unenviable task. Nonetheless, the burden
becomes lighter as we ponder on what the Supreme Court stated with regard to a case
of Rape of this nature. Thus: incestuous relations are abhorrent to the nature of man,
not only to civilized men, but also to semi-civilized and barbarous people x x x and
when a man perpetrates his lascivious desires on his own direct relative, he descends
to a level lower than that of a beast. (People vs. Mandap, 244 SCRA 457)

Lastly, the accused is also ordered to indemnify Mylene Ilagan the sum of P75,000.00
and further amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. [13]

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

 I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MYLENE
ILAGAN.[14]

Well-entrenched is the rule that a conviction for rape may be made even on
the testimony of the victim herself, as long as such testimony is credible. It is [15]

likewise settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that she had been raped, and if her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the
victims testimony. A rape victim would not publicly disclose that she had been
raped and undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial if her motive
was not to bring to justice the person who abused her. [16]

Consequently, the issues in a rape case boil down to the credibility of the
victim. In assessing her credibility, courts are guided by the following principles:
(1) As accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution, and;
(3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
can not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. [17]

In the case at bar, complainant recounted her harrowing experience in the

hands of appellant in this wise:
Q: My question is, where were you on May 1998 at around 3 oclock early in the morning?
A: I was in the house of my grandmother, sir. My father asked me to undress and remove
my panty.
Q: You said that you were then at the house of your grandmother, what is the name of
your grandmother?
A: Her name is Aida Ilagan , sir.
Q: Where is this house located?
A: Near our house in Norzagaray, Bulacan, sir.
Q: What is the exact place in Norzagay where your lolas house is located?
A: Bulalo, Norzagaray, sir.
Q: Who were with you in the house of your lola at that time?
 A: My father, sir.
Q: What about your lola?
A: She was in Meycauayan, Bulacan, sir together with my ate.
Q: How about your other siblings? Where were they at that time?
A: They were in our house, sir.
Q: Why did you decide to sleep at the house of your lola?
A: I was sleeping there in our house, but my father asked me to go with him and sleep
at the house of my lola because nobody was there, sir.
Q: After your panty was removed by your father, what happened next?
A: I was molested (ginalaw), sir.
Q: Tell me exactly what do you mean by ginalaw?
A: He placed his body on top of me and inserted his private organ on my private organ,
sir.
Q: You said your clothes and panty were removed by your father. Are you saying that
you were totally naked when your father placed on top of you?
Court:
By the way, did the witness say that it was not only her panty but also her clothes
were removed?
Q: Just to clarify this, your honor. What was removed by your father from your body?
A: My shorts and panty, sir.
Court:
Was it your father or yourself who removed your shorts and panty?
A: My father, your honor.
Court: Proceed.
Q: What were you wearing on your upper apparel?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What did you feel when your father inserted his private organ into yours?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: How long did your father placed himself on top of you?
A: Half an hour, sir.
Q: While your father was on top of you, what was he doing?
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my private organ, sir.
Q: Did you feel anything from the private organ of your father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that, that you felt came out from the private organ if your father?
A: As if phlegm (sipon), sir.[18]

The aforequoted testimony of the victim is marked by spontaneity, honesty,

and sincerity. When the testimony of the victim is simple and straightforward,
the same must be given full faith and credit. A young girls revelation that she
[19]
had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination
and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give
out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere
concoction. It is highly inconceivable for a daughter to publicly accuse her father
of rape if it were not true. Indeed, it is highly against human nature to fabricate
a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor,
especially when her charge could mean the death of her own father. [20]

Appellant claims that the victims failure to resist the assault and the delay
in reporting the case to the authorities are sufficient to impair her credibility. We
disagree. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation
is exercised upon the victim herself. As held in People v. Las Pinas, Jr., the [21]

test is whether the intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the
victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the
threat would be carried out. When resistance would be futile, offering none at
all does not amount to consent to sexual assault. The law does not impose upon
a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.
Anent the delay in reporting the case to the authorities, suffice it to state that
delay and the initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on
her virtue is neither unknown or uncommon. Rape is a traumatic experience,
[22]

and the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while. Oftentimes, the victim
would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private, rather than reveal her
shame to the world or risk the rapists carrying out his threat to harm her. [23]

We find no sufficient basis for disregarding, let alone overturning, the factual
assessment made by the court a quo. Once again, we must reiterate the
familiar rule that the task of taking on the issue of credibility is a function properly
lodged with the trial court, whose findings are entitled to great weight and
accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter
the conviction of the appellant. There is no such fact of substance and value
[24]

in this case.
Premised on the complainants testimony, there is sufficient foundation to
conclude that appellant succeeded by force in having carnal knowledge of her
own daughter on May 19, 1998. Against this backdrop of evidence and in stark
contrast to complainants convincing recital of facts is appellants defense of
denial and alibi. An intrinsically weak defense, denial must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability in order to merit credibility. It is a
negative self-serving assertion that has no weight in law if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. Since denial and alibi are so easy to concoct
[25]
and fabricate, the same cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. [26]

The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirement of
time and place must be strictly met. It is, therefore, incumbent upon appellant
[27]

to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the commission
of the offense charged, he was in a place other than the situs criminis or
immediate vicinity thereof, such that it was physically impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged. [28]

Thus, appellants alibi and denial must necessarily fail. The defense of denial
and alibi per se, if not substantiated by sufficient evidence, can not in any way
diminish the credibility of the complainant or the weight of her testimony.
The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, state:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxx xxx xxx.

ART. 266-B. Penalties.

xxx xxx xxx.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
 xxx xxx xxx.
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More
importantly, they must be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime
of Rape and warrant the imposition of the death penalty. [29]

Hence, in addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating

circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information, it must be
established with certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age
or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be
stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and
final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital
offense aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. [30]

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate or
similar authentic document, such as the school records or baptismal certificate
of the victim to prove her age. Thus, the age of the victim cannot be determined
with utmost certainty. In People v. Pruna, it was held:
[31]

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of

the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the age of the victim by any of
the means set forth above, appellant can only be found guilty of Simple Rape
and the death penalty imposed on him by the trial court shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the trial court
should accordingly be reduced to P50,000.00. The amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity is mandatory only in cases involving qualified rape where the
death penalty is imposed. In cases of simple rape, the amount of civil indemnity
shall be P50,000.00. As regards the award of moral damages, the same
[32]

should likewise be reduced to P50,000.00, consistently with controlling

jurisprudence. Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of
pleading or proof. [33]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Regional Trial

Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99, finding
appellant Dante Ilagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay the private offended party,
Mylene Ilagan, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

GEMMA ILAGAN et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 522 SCRA 699

(2007)
Deceit and damage are the essential elements of estafa. Gemma Ilagan issued four post
dated checks to Jazshirt Trading, which is owned by petitioner Aldwyn Sy. Jaime Tan, on
the other hand, is the general manager of Jazshirt. Tan and Sy endorsed the checks to
Rosita Tan for the purposes of changing to cash, relying on the assurance of Ilagan that
the checks are backed by sufficient funds. On the day of maturity of the checks, the first
three checks were dishonored due to “Account Closed.” The fourth check was dishonored
due to “Drawn Against Insufficiency of Funds‖. Rosita Tan then filed 3 complaints of
violation of B.P. 22 on Ilagan, Sy, and Jaime Tan. Ilagan admitted issuing the post-dated
checks payable to Jazshirt Trading. She contends that she was unable to re-sell the goods;
hence, she returned them to Jazshirt Trading, hoping to recover the checks. Sy and Jaime
Tan contend that they never knew that the checks do not have sufficient funds and claims
that they were only included by Rosita Tan on the complaint because of a family dispute.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an endorser of a check, who believed in good faith that the check is backed
by sufficient sureties, can be held liable for B.P. 22

HELD:

Deceit and damage are the essential elements of estafa. Deceit to constitute estafa under
Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code must be the efficient cause of the defraudation.
There must be concomitance: the issuance of the check should be the means to obtain
money or property from the payer. By Rosita‘s own admission, she and petitioner Tan
had, prior to the transaction in question, been engaged in “rediscounting” or
“discounting” transactions for four (4) years in which she charged interests which varied
because she sourced the cash for the purpose from different persons. Given the admitted
previous 4-year period of “rediscounting” transactions between Rosita and petitioner
Tan, if he indeed assured her that the checks in question would be sufficiently funded on
maturity, the same was unnecessary to convince her to change them with cash. Any such
assurance was not the efficient cause which induced Rosita to change the checks with
cash. It is in this light that this Court credits the disclaimer of petitioner Sy of having gone
with petitioner Tan to Rosita‘s house to negotiate the checks and assure her that they
would be sufficiently funded on maturity.

Intod V. CA 1992
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs

• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held
liable for any crime
SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA (G.R. No.
103119 October 21, 1992)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)

Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.
Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other
armed men, went to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom.
Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by
his son-in-law and his family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted. Petioner raised the case to CA but the same
affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for an
impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1)
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2)
there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does
not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing
intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other
words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act
which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together
with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
Advertisements

INTOD VS. CA G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Ponente: Campus, Jr., J.

FACTS:

February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise,
he would also be killed.

About 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's
bedroom but there was no one in the room.

Palangpanagn was in another city but her home is occupied by his son-in-law and his family.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnessess.

RTC and CA: convicted Intod of attempted murder

ISSUE:

Whether or not Intod is guilty attempted murder

HELD:

NO. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime—
an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal
tendencies. There must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to
those circumstances where: (1) The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law; (2) There is no intention to perform the physical act; (3) There is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control
prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed
them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility
on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The
factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and JOVENTINO GARCES, defendants-
appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang for plaintiff-appellee.
Potenciano Villegas, Jr. as counsel de officio for defendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance
of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces.

On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates
of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the following crimes:

Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and

theft;

Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;

Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

Joventino — robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited

Garces house.

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with bladed
weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson
locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in
stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who
had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising
prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they
handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal
and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a
week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:

The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:

That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned
accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their
corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed
instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon
him serious injuries which caused his death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1)
recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them
with two or more prior convictions.

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo proceeded to
receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of
the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating
circumstances of recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes to
which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and
Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or more
offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of
the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the crime to
murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged
while serving the penalty imposed upon them for previous offenses as regards all the
accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all
of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino
Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately.
For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused. For this circumstance to exist, it is
necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from the commission of
the offense by a considerable length of time, during which period the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity.1

Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual
slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill
Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that
sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their
evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid
they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and
obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation.

Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh.
J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed in a
manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense, with
resultant incapability of the victim to offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength
would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be considered as absorbed
in treachery.2

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation becomes a mere generic
aggravating circumstance4 which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A
qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the
author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed for
said crime.5

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly
considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were
undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its
effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.6

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and
circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the
court a quo.

It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties
because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom
it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were
yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder.
Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr.,
counsel de officio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the judgment a
quo.

It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty
to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub,
Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim,
Regino Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,7 to be paid jointly and severally by the four
accused. Costs de officio.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee, JJ.,concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.