Tort As Private Administration: Nathaniel Donahue & John Fabian Witt

Tort as Private Administration
Nathaniel Donahue* & John Fabian Witt**
Abstract
What does tort law do? This Article develops an account of the law of torts for the age of
settlement. A century ago, leading torts jurists proposed that tort doctrine’s main function was to
allocate authority between judge and jury. In the era of the disappearing trial, we propose that
tort law’s hidden function is to shape the process by which private parties settle. In particular,
core doctrines in tort help to structure and sustain the systems of private administration by which
injury claims are actually resolved. Though an observer could hardly guess it from judge-centric
theories of tort or by reading the typical reported appellate cases, repeat-play stakeholders such
as the plaintiffs’ bar, insurers, and others are developing and managing claims resolution
facilities that have turned the resolution of one-off tort claims in the United States into something
akin to aggregate litigation or a public compensation program. Hidden deep in the shadows of
the law, private administration is becoming a standard feature of torts practice with substantial
implications for the theory of tort law and litigation.
*
JD / Ph.D. candidate, Yale University, [email protected].
**
Allen H. Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Professor of History, and Head of Davenport College, Yale
University, [email protected]. Many thanks to Nora Engstrom, Cindy Estlund, Sam Issacharoff, Alexi Lahav, and
Christopher Robinette, and also to the participants in the NYU conference in October, 2018, “MDL at 50: The
Fiftieth Anniversary of Multidistrict Litigation.”
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349858

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I. A World of Private Administration

A. Defining Private Administration
B. Origins of Private Administration
C. Institutional Foundations of Private Administration
1. Party-driven claims processes
2. Contracting in claims
3. Repeat Players: Insurers and the Bar
4. Commonality
5. Numerosity
6. Settlement orientation
7. Public competitors
D. Scope of Private Administration
II. The Doctrines of Private Administration

A. Respondeat Superior
B. Collateral Source Rule and Subrogation
C. Damages
1. Make-whole
2. Actual damages
3. Lump sums
D. Reasonable Care
E. Duty and the Assault on the Citadel
F. Causation
1. Binary Causation
2. Causal link
3. Specific causation
4. Collective causation
G. Apportionment (joint liability)
H. Apportionment (settlement and contribution)
III. The Private Administration of First Order Goals

A. The Private Administration of Justice
B. The Private Administration of Efficiency
Conclusion: Legal Architecture for a Private Administration World

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What does tort law do? For decades now, the two leading accounts in the torts literature have
adopted first-order answers to this question. Let’s call this the first-order debate over American
tort law. On one view, tort law is organized around the principle of remedying wrongful losses.
Let’s call this corrective justice or civil recourse.1 On the other approach, tort law aims to
allocate social resources to their highest value users. Let’s call this the efficiency or utility-
maximizing account.2 The struggle between them has long shown signs of being tired. It is
midway through its fifth decade at the very least.3 A good measure of the debate’s exhaustion is
the increasingly prominent effort of scholars across generations to move beyond it, either by
declaring a truce or by asserting a third model for the field altogether.4
It is a shame that the first-order debate over what tort law does has dominated the scholarly
literature, because there is a second-order answer to the question, too, one that offers powerful
new illumination of the field. It is not a competitor of the first-order theories, at least not in the
first instance. Instead it is an idea about how the basic structure of tort doctrine sets in motion
the processes by which torts advances (or fails to advance) its first-order goals. The idea is that a
core function of many substantive tort doctrines is to structure and enable the private
administration of the rights and duties that the law of torts sets out. Tort doctrine, that is to say,
structures and sets in motion the process by which disputes over the rights and duties it
articulates are resolved.
We refer to this function of tort law as “private administration.” Glimmers of it can be seen in
bits and pieces of recent scholarship in torts;5 considerably more of it can be seen in the cognate
1
See section III.A infra.
2
See section III.B infra.
3
On the long history of the debate, see Guido Calabresi, Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, 1 J. TORT L.1, 1 (2007)
(“For at least the last 50 years two ways of looking at tort law have struggled for dominance.”), John C.P. Goldberg,
Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513 (2003). See also Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First Century Tort
Theories: The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L. J. 419, 419-426 (2013) (focusing on the more modern
incarnation of the debate).
4
See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L. J. 1320 (2017) (articulating a theory of tort
law as oscillating between competing conceptions of community); see also Calabresi, supra note 3, at 11
(“somewhere in that line of thought…lies a unified field theory of torts, the kind of theory to which I believe our
scholarship should increasingly turn”); Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 67 (2011) (advancing an expressive view of tort law); Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental
Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L. J. 469, 473 (2013) (“[No] single theory could explain all of tort law”); Christopher
J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329 (2007); Gary T. Schwartz,
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997); Alex
Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 611 (2017) (“our tort system operates in two modes. In some
cases, it promotes fairness and corrective justice; in others, it sets up incentives for minimizing the total cost of
accidents and accident avoidance”).
5
See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007); Dana A. Remus & Adam S.
Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV. 129 (2015); Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads
Diverge for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L. J. 543 (2013); Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation
for No Fault’s “Demise”, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom, No Fault’s Demise];Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Sunlight]; Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, Run-of-
the-Mill]; John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the
Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (2007) [hereinafter Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism]; Samuel
Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American

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literatures on procedure6 and the legal profession,7 for tort’s role in private administration arises
at the intersection among these fields. Yet make no mistake: private administration has become
a central defining feature of American tort law, at least sociologically speaking. For a century,
leading torts jurists like Dean Leon Green asserted that a core function of Anglo-American tort
doctrine is to allocate decision-making responsibility between judge and jury.8 Fowler Harper,
co-author of the leading torts treatise of the middle of the twentieth century, asserted that “the
end to which all doctrines, rules and formulae current use” in torts cases was “the allocation of
work” between “judge and jury.”9 A century ago Green and Harper were right. But today the
civil trial has all but disappeared, taking with it tort doctrine’s carefully balanced roles of judge
and jury.10 In place of the civil trial exists a sprawling domain of private settlement. And in that
domain, the allocation of authority between judge and jury has been replaced by the work of
structuring the system of private administration that our tort law has, for the most part, become.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the ways in which American tort law has
come to be a law of private administration. We describe the structure of private administration,
which is partly bureaucratic, partly managerial, and partly entrepreneurial. We sketch the
conditions under which, and the institutions within which, the law gives rise to private
administration. And we outline the scope of private administration in the social world of
American tort law. Our approach here resembles that of scholars like Martha Chamallas11 and
Jennifer Wriggins,12 who have long attended to the ways in which tort doctrines function in the
Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Shocked: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos
Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925 (2002).
6
See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335 (2014); Adam S. Zimmerman,
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 512 (2011) (“class action settlement funds often resemble ‘private’ or
‘miniature’ administrative agencies”); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1105 (2010); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769 (2005) [hereinafter Erichson, Typology]; Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L. J. 381 (2000) [hereinafter Erichson, Informal
Aggregation]; Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative
Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997)
7
The considerable literature on the contingency fee is a prime example. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly
Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 653 (2003);
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633
(2013); Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down A Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 457 (1998); David A. Hyman et al, The Economics of Plaintiff-Side Personal Injury Practice, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1563.
8
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); see also KENNETH ABRAHAM, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 95-100 (4th ed.
2012).
9
Fowler V. Harper, Judge and Jury, 6 IND. L.J. 285, 285 (1931).
10
Cases are increasingly settling or being dismissed rather than going to trial. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. C-4 (2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2017.pdf; Nora Freeman Engstrom, The
Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2131-32 (2018); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial
in the United States, 122 YALE L. J. 524, 524 (2012); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the
Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 129-131 (2009) (finding tort cases to
have especially high rates of settlement); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
11
See Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J. TORT L. 39 (2018); Martha Chamallas,
The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 463 (1998).
12
See JENNIFER WRIGGINS & MARTHA CHAMALLAS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW
(2010); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 HOWARD L. J. 99, 108-110 (2005);

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actually existing social world. Accordingly, in Part II, we adopt the doctrinal strategy of Green
and Harper and account for the ways in which many of the most important doctrines in tort –
damages rules, duty rules, causation doctrines, and more – function to structure the world of
private administration. Our goal here is to offer an account of one of the crucial things that tort
doctrine does in the world and to connect the basic law of torts to the sprawling settlement
system that has grown up in its shadow.
Part III takes up the implications of private administration for leading accounts both of American
tort law and of the role of litigation in American public policy. We contend that to the extent
private administration displaces the substantive law of rights and duties in tort, it tends to
displace the normative project of corrective justice and to replace that project with an amoral
managerial system designed to advance the interests of the private parties who build and manage
it, mainly repeat-play defendants, insurance companies, and plaintiffs’ lawyers. Private
administration restructures tort rights and duties, altering such rights and duties and recreating
them in its own image. This is not to say, as we will explain, that the repair of wrongful losses
does not offer an account of the normative structure of tort doctrine in the courts; corrective
justice may, as Scott Hershovitz has recently put it, offer “a first approximation”13 of what tort
law does. We contend, however, that the first-order corrective justice project is increasingly
hedged in on many sides by the consequences of a system of private administration that is either
indifferent or outright hostile to the normative project of repairing wrongful losses. Our second-
order sociological account of tort law also complicates the efficiency view of tort. The law and
economics tradition in tort relies on judge and jury to deploy a public-regarding cost-benefit
standard. We observe that in the world of private administration, no actor stands in a position to
advance such a public-regarding project, at least not as such. Private administrators on the
defense side and the plaintiff side alike aim instead to maximize their private returns. The result
is a significant number of places in which the kinds of settlement arrangements characteristic of
the world of private administration advance private interests as against the public interest,
whether defined as insurance and loss spreading, economic efficiency, or some other policy
value.
In the Conclusion, we observe that the view of tort as private administration has significant
implications not only in the literatures on the character of tort doctrine, but also for a major
debate about the role of litigation in American public policy-making. Part of the difficulty is that
tort scholarship, like much legal scholarship more generally, has been too preoccupied with the
role of the judge.14 The literature’s thinking about tort law is unduly judge-centric; torts judges
like Shaw and Holmes, Cardozo and Lehman, Hand and Friendly, Traynor and Kaye, Calabresi
and Posner loom large. But judge-centrism is exactly the wrong focus if we want to understand
tort law in the twenty-first century, for the action in the law is in private administration outside
the courtroom. The real question for those interested in shaping and reshaping American tort law
is how second-order private administration either vindicates or obstructs tort law’s first-order
see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L. J.
1263 (2004); A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMINSM 41, 45-
66 (1989); Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 263 (1991) (mock juries award higher damages for men than women in wrongful death cases).
13
Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do? What Can It Do?, 47 VAL. L. REV. 99, 99 (2012).
14
See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).

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goals. And because private administration is one of the distinctively American ways of public
policy, the study of private administration is also vital to explaining how to vindicate first-order
public policy goals more generally.
I. The World of Private Administration
A. Defining Private Administration
Private administration is a mode of claims resolution by which private litigants and their agents
settle disputes over legal claims by recourse to privately managed systems of bureaucratic
justice. Such systems arise out of American tort law’s decentralized structure, its party-driven
character, the contractual nature of settlement, and the economies available to repeat players who
innovate in designing settlement structures. It is pervasive in American law, it is hard to find,
and it is distinctively understudied. It lives and indeed thrives in the shadows of the law.15
The scholarly literature more typically depicts the American political system as distinctively
characterized by what now goes under the name “adversarial legalism.”16 Adversarial legalism
lives in plain view. It features oppositional parties drawing attention to themselves and the
wrongs committed by their opponents. Versions of the idea that such legalism plays an
unusually large role in the U.S. have existed since Alexis de Tocqueville described the
distinctively significant role of law and courts in American democracy in the first half of the
nineteenth century.17 More recently the literature has organized itself around Robert Kagan’s
canonical definition. Kagan defines adversarial legalism as “a method of policymaking and
dispute resolution with two salient characteristics . . . formal legal contestation . . . [and] litigant
activism.”18 That is, disputes are resolved by appeals to formal legal rules and penalties and the
process is driven by the parties themselves, as opposed to government administrators. A range of
interests employ litigation in an adversarial legal system for a range of policy objectives.19
Though this system benefits from being creative and decentralized, it also has some significant
drawbacks as a form of policymaking and dispute resolution. It is inefficient, complex, costly,
punitive, and unpredictable.20
The literature conventionally imagines public administration as the alternative to legalism. In the
administrative state, bureaucratic agencies of course exist for any number of regulatory purposes.
15
C.f. Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303 (2018) (describing
the plea-bargaining regime as arising “beyond the shadow of the law”).
16
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
17
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 240 (Eduardo Nolla, ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty
Fund 2012) (1835) (“From the moment when an individual believes he sees a law of his state that harms a right…he
can refuse to obey and appeal to the federal justice system”).
18
KAGAN, supra note 16, at 9.
19
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S.; THOMAS F.
BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002);
KAGAN, supra note 16.
20
See BURKE, supra note 19, at 17-18; KAGAN, supra note 16, at 3-4.

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At the federal level alone, there are dozens or even hundreds of public agencies, depending on
how one counts.21 The Federal Trade Commission oversees the regulation of antitrust law, the
Department of Education administers federal education law, the Social Security Administration
manages old age pensions and federal disability insurance; the Department of Veterans Affairs
oversees public programs designed for former members of the military. In some areas, such as
Social Security, public institutions create administrative institutions to process large numbers of
claims.22 And when they do, they typically rely on bureaucratic rationality, centralization, and
state-driven (as opposed to litigant-driven) processes.23
But government actors are not the only ones who design bureaucracies to handle demand for
decision-making capacity. A generation ago, the pioneering economic history work of Alfred
Chandler showed why bureaucracy arose within the newly giant firms of late nineteenth-century
capitalism, the railroads chief among them.24 Even earlier, the classic scholarship on the
structure of the firm explained the conditions under which private organizations would develop
bureaucratic features.25 Private bureaucracies arise when powerful incentives arise to assemble
firms in a particular way: the dispersed shareholder model of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means,
for example, or the transaction cost models of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, or the
decentralized common property model of Elinor Ostrom.26 What is true generally for economic
activity or commons governance is also true in particular for the economic activity of parties
engaging in the purchase and sale of tort claims. Circumstances often make it worthwhile for
repeat-players in the system – repeat defendants and their lawyers, insurers, and plaintiffs’
representatives – to establish institutions for smoothing and rationalizing the settlement process.
And thus where government-created administrative institutions do not arise, private actors
sometimes create their own private administrative institutions to take advantage of efficiencies in
the processing of tort claims.
Students of aggregate litigation and mass torts will find much to recognize in this claim. The
aggregation literature in civil procedure has long dealt with institutions designed to identify
21
See DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED
STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 15 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/publication/sourcebook-united-states-executive-
agencies; Mary Whistner, Some Guidance About Federal Agencies and Guidance, 105 L. LIBR. J. 385, 386-390
(2013).
22
See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983)
(Social Security); PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY (1969) (state worker’s compensation program); Martha McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers'
Compensation "Reform", 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1998).
23
MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956-1005 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., University of California Press 1978) (1922); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND W HY THEY DO IT (1989); Jeb Barnes, In Defense of
Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared
Policy-Making Responsibility, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5 (2009). But see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE
PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 360 (2013) (“In American
government…we observe frequent departures from centralization, hierarchy, [and] instrumentally rational hiring”).
24
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
25
See, e.g., ADOL F A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS (1932), THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
26
On more recent models of collective governance, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L. J. 1197 (1984).

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efficiencies in the processing of mass tort claims. As the number of claimants rises, the much
heralded adversarialism of the American legal system often gives way under the weight of
pragmatic considerations. Litigants, lawyers, judges, and other parties involved in the litigation
typically cooperate to establish administrative bodies, often called claims resolution facilities,
capable of dispensing compensation without the acrimony, expense, and uncertainty of a formal
trial.27 The reduced uncertainty and saved time and money of such a system can be immense.
Thus, Sam Issacharoff notes that the question facing most lawyers in mass tort cases “is not
whether to proceed in the aggregate, but how to properly structure the inevitable aggregation of
these cases.”28 The material realities of litigation create new constituencies, driving repeat
players to fashion a new legal regime out of the tools provided by adversarial legalism. 29
The aggregate litigation literature addresses the more visible, higher profile versions of a
dynamic that much more pervasively structures tort adjudication. Legally-minded entrepreneurs
recognize recurring patterns and parties between cases and create mechanisms to capitalize on
these regularities. For cases emerging from a single product or accident, these institutions are
often the freestanding claims resolution facilities covered in literature on mass torts.30 Often,
however, similar fact patterns arise out of completely unrelated incidents. Attorneys and litigants
who deal with these kinds of cases can also capture the same efficiency gains if they can agree
on rules to simplify the litigation process. Entrepreneurs in these situations can establish their
own mechanisms to manage claims.31 On the defense side, large companies who face routine
lawsuits may develop legal departments to settle claims based on a selected set of heuristics.32
27
See NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 57-70; David Marcus, The Short Life and Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 1565, 1577-78 (2017); Jaime Dodge, Disaggregation Mechanisms: Mass Claims
Resolution Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L. J. 1253, 1263-264, 1271-86 (2014); Deborah R. Hensler,
Alternatives Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429 (2005); Francis E.
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2005).
28
Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1927.
29
This cooperation does not necessarily entail an alignment of interests. Sometimes plaintiffs’ attorneys who
manage a large number of claims collude with defendants, increasing the compensation across their entire portfolio
of cases at the expense of one or all of their clients. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 127-34 (2017); John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1366-384 (1995) (identifying these potential conflicts of interest in a class action
context); Myriam Giles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 103 (2006) (on the agency cost theory of attorney-client
relationships); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1394-1402 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in
Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3167 (2013) (on the “agency problems of faithless
representatives” in the context of aggregate settlements)..
30
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990); Samuel
Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV.
397 (2014); Stephanie Garlock, Start Me Up: A Portrait of Attorney Control in a Multidistrict Litigation, 12-16
(January 5, 2019) (unpublished article) (on file with authors).
31
See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1599-1602.
32
See, e.g., H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT (1970) (auto insurers); Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation Law in the
Late 19th Century, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 371-72 (1987) (railroads); Robert J. Kaczorowski, From Petitions
for Gratuities to Claims for Damages: Personal Injuries and Railroads During the Industrialization of the United
States, 57 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 261 (2017) (railroads); Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 141-48 (“corporate
settlement mills”); William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado about
Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83 (auto manufacturers).

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On the plaintiffs’ side, so-called “settlement mills” that settle large numbers of claims can play
the same role as the “wholesale lawyers” in class action lawsuits, specializing in finding victims
of certain kinds of torts and settling their claims quickly at a discount with defense-side repeat
players.33 On the insurers side, active subrogation practices can collect together large numbers
of claims. In each of these areas, cases may formally share no facts and have no clearly
identifiable class of claimants. As a result, the private administrative institutions created to
manage such cases cannot rely on the more formal mechanisms underlying other mass tort
resolutions, like settlement class actions or all-or-nothing settlements.34 However, they can still
use promises of speed and certainty as well as sheer economies of scale to get individual litigants
to acquiesce to the arrangement. Under such a regime, going rates, rules of recovery, and
procedural rights are typically part of an ongoing negotiation between repeat players in the
system.35
These changing dynamics of negotiation alter how claims are valued in at least two ways. First,
population-level heuristics replace individualized claim valuations. Repeat players typically
agree on certain relevant types of fact patterns and sort claims into categories based on their
relevant facts.36 Damages are often assessed using a grid that assigns values based on a
claimant’s category. This process homogenizes previously disparate claims and allows for the
speedy dispensation of large portfolios of cases on both sides. Second, private administration
changes the institutions responsible for valuing claims. Moving cases into private administrative
bodies delegates much of the individual-level claims valuation to agents within the private
bureaucracy. Privatization makes a difference. Over time, such repeat players often develop
going rates for certain fact patterns, eventually indexing their valuations to previous settlements,
not to trials.37 Going rates may not be consistent. There is little transparency in the private
claims process. Research on the question, as well as informal conversation with participants,
suggests that settlement values often vary between institutions or even between evaluators at the
same facility.38 Privatization may speed legal processes. But it also moves private lawmaking
into opaque backrooms. And it substitutes forms of market accountability for the political
accountability of public administration. Both forms of accountability have their flaws, of course.
Individual litigants within a market-based system, for instance, may not be able to access the
33
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5 (settlement mills); Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 298, 313 (1996) (wholesale
lawyers).
34
An all-or-nothing settlement is when a defendant refuses to settle with any of a group of plaintiffs unless all or
nearly all of the plaintiffs agree to the settlement. Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1948-52 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble With All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010).
35
Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1610-14; ROSS, supra note 32.
36
Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 124 (2012)
(describing the negotiated rules of recovery in mass settlements generally); Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 30, at
412 (describing the “categories of claims” paid by the Deepwater Horizon class settlement).
37
See, e.g., Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 137 (corporate settlement mills “offer non-individualized
remedies”); Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5, at 1490 (claims valued by reference to past
settlements); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 98;
Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (2017).
38
See notes 119-121, infra and accompanying text (describing the inconsistency of settlement values).

March 2019
information needed to figure out how much their claim is worth and may have limited
opportunity to weigh in on any deliberations that might occur.39
Aggregating the process of valuing claims has distributive implications as well. Bargaining
conventions such as the rule calculating nonpecuniary damages as “three times specials” shape
settlement values.40 Other rules of thumb, such as the common practice of awarding settlements
to those who are rear ended in automobile cases introduce substantive new liability rules.41 But
more subtly, the process of homogenizing claims for settlement en masse alters the distribution
of compensation within a given run of claims. Claims homogenization typically involves the
discarding of certain pieces of information and indexing around a few aspects of any given
claim. Private administration thus redistributes value among the class of claims.42 Most often,
the homogenization of private administration redistributes from high-value claims to low value
claims.43 And finally, because the agents of private administration – insurers, repeat-play
defendants, and high-volume plaintiffs’ lawyers – bargain across portfolios, individual claimants
will often see the value of their claims altered in pursuit of the maximum aggregate value across
a given portfolio of claims.44
And here’s the striking thing: for nearly two centuries American tort doctrine has been shaping
and usually fostering and facilitating the process by which these forms of private administration
have come about.
B. Origins of Private Administration
Forms of private administration arose almost simultaneously with the beginning of modern tort
law. For nearly a half-century now, scholars have located the origins of modern tort law in the
39
See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 155-58; Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 5; Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven
D. Maloney, Justice Is Hard, Let’s Go Shopping: Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New Aggregate
Settlement Regime, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 541-42 (2009) (Noting how the Vioxx settlement will be distributed
by a “secret formula”).
40
Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 787 (1995) (“it is a common settlement practice to compute pain-and-
suffering damages…as some multiple of the…related financial expenses incurred by the plaintiff”).
41
See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5, at 1529-42; see also note 238, infra (on how private
administrators create new rules).
42
See Rony Kishinevsky, Note, Damage Averaging—How the System Harms High-Value Claims, 95 TEX. L. REV.
1143, 1146 (2017).
43
In the words of Michael Saks, this “pattern of overcompensation at the lower end of the range and
undercompensation at the higher end is so well replicated that it qualifies as one of the major empirical phenomena
of tort litigation ready for theoretical attention.” Michael J. Saks, Do We Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1147, 1218 (1992). Admittedly, jury awards also tend
to undercompensate large damages. See Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. Van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries
in Medical Malpractice, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 133 (1991).
44
See Burch, supra note 29, at 127-32 (plaintiffs do not get their “peace premium”); Issacharoff & Witt, supra note
5, at 1592-93 (describing how plaintiffs’ side claims brokers and insurers considered the full run of their portfolios
when settling cases).
10

March 2019
middle of the nineteenth century.45 For one thing, the legal forms of the modern tort cause of
action emerged out of the procedural thicket of the medieval forms of action in this period.46 But
just as significantly, the modern social practice of tort claims and repeat players developed as
well. Causes of action by employees against employers and passengers against railroads
introduced for the first time the basic structure of modern litigation’s repeat players.47 Historians
haven’t found the first tort settlement. They almost certainly never will.
Already by the second half of the nineteenth century, the social practice of tort in the United
States substantially involved private settlement. Courts readily enforced tort settlements,
deeming them ordinary contracts settling private concerns.48 A separate line of cases cast serious
doubt on the settlement of actions in which a private plaintiff pursued a public interest.49 And a
few cases fit into a narrow exception for incapacity to enter a contract at the time of the
settlement was made.50 But with great speed, the enforceability of settlements became a central
feature of torts practice in the United States.
Courts went to great lengths to uphold private resolutions to tort claims. Enforcement
followed even where the injury was substantial and the settlement paltry,51 and even where
the plaintiff alleged that that the settlement was induced by fraudulent representations about
the likelihood the plaintiff would prevail at trial.52 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held in 1842 that the discovery of subsequent facts altering the value of the claim did not
change the enforceability of a settlement.53 By 1884 it was settled law in Missouri and
45
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409 (1973) (“[F]or the 19th century, it is harder to
think of a body of new judge-made law more striking than tort law.”); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC, CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 22-42 (2004)
[hereinafter WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC]. But see JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,
RECOGNIZING WRONGS 25-37 (forthcoming 2019) (tracing the principle of civil recourse theory to the Founding
Era).
46
ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (2d ed. 1994).
47
Compare CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 331-47 (1993) with
Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 651-53, 673 (1989)
48
Sanford v. Huxford, 32 Mich. 313, 319–20 (1875); Taylor v. Galland, 3 Greene 17, 26 (1851) (“[T]he parties to
the agreement were plaintiff and defendant in action at law; they had a right to compromise and put an end to the
litigation pending between them.”); Lake Erie & W. RR v. Sellman, 51 Ill. App. 617, 620 (Ill. App. 1893); Reid v.
Hibbard, 6 Wis. 175, 193 (1858); Hays v. Lusk, 2 Rawle 24, 26 (Pa. 1829) (“Agreements are not to be set aside on
slight grounds”).
49
Moore v. Adams, 8 Ohio 372 (1838) (frowning on the settlement of claims in which a plaintiff represented a public
interest, but even there upholding them where the consideration had already changed hands by refusing to
intervene).
50
Citizens Street Railway Co. v. Horton, 48 N.E. 22, 23 (Ind. App. 1897).
51
Johnson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 77 N.W. 476 (Iowa 1898)
52
Johnson, 77 N.W. at 477-78 (alleging that railroad’s lawyer induced settlement by falsely asserting that the
plaintiff had no case). As a general matter of law, however, plaintiffs and defendants could rescind tort settlements
that were fraudulently induced. See Obert v. Landa, 59 Tex. 475 (1883) (defendant may sue plaintiff if he settles a
case under grossly fraudulent pretenses); note Error! Bookmark not defined., infra and accompanying text
(fraudulent settlements are voidable by plaintiffs).
53
Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 270, 276 (1842) (“An agreement so made is upon a substantial
consideration; and why should it not be enforced?”).
11

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elsewhere that compromise of even a doubtful claim was valid.54 The Indiana Supreme Court
insisted on strict pleading requirements for parties seeking to disown settlement contracts: it
rebuffed a plaintiff who alleged that the railroad had taken advantage of him when he was non
compos mentis after the accident on the ground that his pleading included neither an allegation
that he was no longer mentally disabled, nor that he had subsequently rejected the
settlement.55
Upholding settlement contracts represented a crucial commitment to the private resolution of tort
claims, and no private actor played a larger role in the early days of tort than the American
railroad. The business historian Alfred Chandler wrote decades ago that railroads led the way in
developing modern managerial systems in the modern business firm.56 They did the same in the
management of tort claims, too. Before long, railroads in particular dedicated substantial
resources to handling personal injury claims effectively, which almost always meant
inexpensively. Sometimes this entailed the creation of internal offices dedicated to managing
claims.57 Other railroads relied on outside counsel.58 Either way, the railroads pioneered the
management of personal injury costs.59
Private administration offered real advantages to the railroad manager. Significantly, from
virtually the very start of the modern era in tort, the private management of personal injury costs
entailed considerations beyond the purely legal. Legal historian Robert Kaczorowski’s important
new study suggests, as he puts it, that mid-century railroads organized their employment
practices around a “moral dimension” that produced compensation, at least in modest amounts,
above and beyond tort liability.60 Kaczorowski’s “moral dimension” was an early form of
private administration. Railroad managers – who cited “the good will of the public” and the
“interest” of the firm – adopted a collective, long-term relationship with the run of injury claims
arising out of their businesses.61
By the turn of the twentieth century, business archives reveal, informal settlement of claims, with
its mix of settlement contracts and occasional interested benevolence, was maturing into systems
of private administration.62 As the 19th century wore on, large employers like textile mills
developed more elaborate and formal mechanisms for resolving tort claims. Sometimes this
meant working closely with repeat-play claimant-side representatives to bring some semblance
of peace to the entire class of claims.63 Sometimes it meant formal accident compensation
54
Rinehart v. Bills, 80 Mo. 534, 538 (1884); see also 1 Par. Cont. 438, s. 4 (6th ed. 1873)
55
Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Herr, 35 N.E. 556, 557 (Ind. 1893).
56
CHANDLER, supra note 24, at 79-205.
57
See BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD
REVOLUTION 1865-1920, 105 (2001) (on the creation of “claims departments”); Kaczorowski, supra note 32, at 295-
96.
58
See WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH 38
(1999). And sometimes, railroads relied on both, hiring local council to prevent them from working for the
opposition, while handling much of the actual legal work internally. Id, at 43-44.
59
See JAMES W. ELY, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 211-224 (2001).
60
Kaczorowski, supra note 32, at 268-71.
61
See Id. at, 267-68
62
See Id., at 292 (“informal, decentralized, and . . . haphazard”).
63
See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5.
12

March 2019
programs by which employees traded their right to sue up front in return for the promise of
compensation in the event of injury.64 (These ex ante contractual waivers of the right to sue were
not enforced as reliably as ex post settlement contracts were.65) The participants in the late
nineteenth-century accident crisis experimented with a whole host of programs.66 But typically
they shared certain key features: in place of individualized treatment they moved to take cases in
bulk and to treat them with systems.
With the advent of union representation, the plaintiffs’ bar, and the rise of a variety of claimants’
representatives, repeat-players appeared on both sides of accident claims. And with the rise of
repeat players, the structure of claims settlement changed. Repeat players, unlike one-shot
participants in the tort system, have reasons to take a systemic view of the claims as opposed to
an individualized view. Ongoing relationships between the repeat players, often combined with
the sheer number of claims67 in the United States’ exceptionally dangerous era of
industrialization,68 pressed claims settlement practices to adopt an aggregate structure. By the
1890s, the Illinois Central Railroad was processing around 2000 injury and death claims each
year.69 At this scale, railroad administrators sacrificed individualized inquiry to what one New
Haven line manager called a “general rule” and what Kaczorowski calls “standardization of
procedures and formal rules.”70 As the numbers grew, claim value became not only a reflection
of the merits, but also a function each claim’s situatedness in a portfolio of claims, which
defendants had an incentive to resolve, and which repeat-play plaintiffs’ representatives could
bundle and settle en masse.
The culmination of generations of efforts at private administration in the work accident domain
was workers’ compensation laws. The workers’ compensation statutes, enacted in every state in
the country beginning in the 1910s, formalized for work accidents what virtually private and
more-or-less decentralized mechanisms had been trying to achieve for half a century and
more.71The statutes created programs that dealt with injuries at work in bulk. Gone was the
pretense of individualized inquiry. Gone was the searching analysis of the relative fault of the
parties. In the place of individualized evaluations came a one-size-fits-all rule of compensation,
with the benefit levels pegged to state average wages.72
If workers’ compensation statutes brought closure to generations of efforts toward private

administration in work accidents, other fields such as passenger injuries, automobile accidents,
64
WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 113-17.
65
Id., at 68; Charles McCurdy, The Liberty of Contract Regime, in HARRY N. SCHEIBER ED., THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1998).
66
Further examples include employer-sponsored hospitals (Friedman, supra note 32, at 372-73), and worker-side
mutual benefit associations, see JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF CAPITALISM
AND RISK IN AMERICA 191-230 (2012); WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 103-25.
67
For docket counts, see RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY,
1870-1910 (1992); Friedman, supra note 32; Frank W. Munger, Commercial Litigation in West Virginia State and
Federal Courts 1870-1940, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 322 (1986).
68
WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 22-42.
69
Kaczorowski, supra note 32, at 308.
70
Id., at 313-14.
71
See WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 103-51.
72
See Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen’s Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. REV. 206, 206 (1951).
13

March 2019
and slip-and-falls remained in the common law framework.73 The story of many domains in tort
in the twentieth century is the story of enterprising repeat-players on the defense and the
plaintiffs’ sides identifying ways to take advantage of the same scale economies that employers
first pioneered in work accidents. The workers’ compensation bar’s trade association, the
National Association of Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys, began developing strategies for
doing small-scale aggregation in common law tort litigation.74 Member lawyers began collecting
portfolios of claims against certain defendants, developing routinized methods for trying
particular kinds of cases and evaluating damages.75
In automobile injuries, the project of processing claims at scale and in the aggregate was so
successful that it held at bay a generation of efforts to adopt auto injury reform.76 And it should
be no surprise that in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s aggregate tort litigation exploded onto the scene in
American law.77 The big cases of the era – asbestos,78 Agent Orange,79 tobacco,80 and more –
were the results of terrible scourges, to be sure. But such cases moved forward as they did
because the ground had been prepared by nearly a century of decentralized private
administration. The treatment of personal injuries at scale had been quietly going on for decades
before the era of mass torts brought it into the open.
C. Institutional foundations of private administration
Private administration in American tort law arises in a marketplace. But it does not arise
spontaneously. Instead, its particular American form is contingent. It is made possible by at
least two interconnected legal premises. And it rests on at least five social conditions. The two
legal premises are (1) a party-driven claims process, with litigant discretion over decisions to
commence and end a tort claim, and (2) state enforcement of contracting in claims, ranging from
the simple settlement contract to the contingent fee, subrogation, and litigation finance. The five
73
Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293,
294 (2018).
74
JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS 268-71 (2007) [hereinafter WITT, PATRIOTS AND
COSMOPOLITANS]; see also Joseph A. Page, Roscoe Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal Injury Bar: The Tale of
an Odd Coupling, 26 T. M. COOLEY L REV. 637 (2009).
75
WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS, supra note 74 at 271-75.
76
Engstrom, No Fault’s Demise, supra note 5.
77
See generally, JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995); David Marcus, The Short Life and Long
Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (2017); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature
Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:
The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999).
78
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re
Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005); STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A
NEW LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE (2001), https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB362z0.html.
79
See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 517 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2008); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL (1987).
80
See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672
So.2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN
TOBACCO POLITICS (2001).
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important social conditions are (3) repeat-play actors on both sides, including insurers and the
plaintiffs’ bar; (4) commonality among classes of claims, (5) numerosity of classes of claims, (6)
settlement orientation of the relevant parties, and (7) the absence of competing forms of public
administration, which might otherwise crowd-out private forms.
1. Party-driven claims processes
American tort law’s allocation of near total control over the trajectory of a tort claim is a critical
premise for the project of private administration. Such control is not inevitable.81 German
judges, for instance, famously exercise considerably more power over the trajectory of a case
than American judges do.82 Japanese judges are even empowered to tell both parties their likely
judgement, thus driving them to settle on the judge’s terms.83
The fact that in American law, individuals and their lawyers are in formally charge of initiating
and closing out their own claims with little outside interference means they may decide how and
on what basis to proceed, guided to be sure by the considerable influence of their attorneys.84
Party discretion creates agents with the legal capacity to pursue and discharge claims. By
contrast, in a world where public officials had substantial power over claims, it would be
substantially harder (almost by definition) to establish a private resolution of a claim. But
because claimsholders and defendants are empowered to drive litigation outside the supervision
of state officials, they are empowered to build mechanisms and institutions with which to clear
the market and settle claims.
Most importantly, parties with the formal discretionary authority to resolve their own claims are
parties formally empowered to contract over their claims.
2. Contracting in Claims
Not only are parties vested with the discretion to move ahead with their claims as they see fit,
they are empowered to sell their claims in a variety of different ways. As we shall see in this
subsection, some ways of selling claims (some of them relatively new and increasingly
81
Even within the American legal system, judges may sometimes intercede to prevent settlements they view as
unfair or which impede on the interests of third parties. Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and
Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56 (1999); Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing
an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 319, 328-349 (2011).
82
See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (1985); Basil S.
Markesinis, Litigation-Mania in England, Germany and the USA: Are We So Very Different?, 49 CAMBRIDGE L. J.
233, 252-253 (1990) (on German inquisitorialism and court encouragement of settlements).
83
See Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP.
L. 709, 731 (2005). Consider also the Japanese practice of “Benron-ken-Wakai,” in which judges and lawyers
combine oral arguments and settlement negotiations, often collaborating to pressure clients into settlement. Koichi
Miki, Roles of Judges and Attorneys Under the Non-Sanction Scheme in Japanese Civil Procedure, 27 HASTINGS
INT. & COMP. L. REV. 31, 35 (2003); Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 568-
69 (2001).
84
See Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018).
15

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sophisticated) facilitate the private aggregation of claims on which private administration thrives.
But we start with the simplest form of sale: the standard settlement contract.
It is, of course, not inevitable that courts will deem settlement contracts enforceable. Even a
regime that allows substantial party discretion over the prosecution of a claim need not have the
kind of formally free access to settlement that American law vests in its claimsholders. Indeed,
the law’s willingness to enforce agreements not to sue emerged over time: state and federal
courts were not always comfortable allowing people to contract away their claims in advance of
adjudication.85 Alienation of tort claims by settlement contract is the very heart of private
administration. Absent such alienability, it would be much more difficult to construct private
administrative systems for settling claims. The enforcement of settlement contracts thus forms
the legal foundation of private administration. It allows private administrators to rest assured that
they will be able to streamline and rationalize the process of tort claims.
The combination of party-driven litigation and litigant discretion, on the one hand, with the
ability to contract around litigation via settlement, on the other, effectively creates a market in
legal claims. But contracts of settlement are only one way which parties may contract over their
claims. A second form of contracting in claims powerfully shapes private administration in
American tort law as well: contracting for ownership stakes in the claim.
The most famous such contract is the contingent fee contract. This arrangement, too, has not
always been enforceable in American law. Many American jurisdictions in the early nineteenth
century viewed contingent fees as champertous and thus prohibited. Only toward the end of the
century did these prohibitions give way to the pressure of a growing number of indigent victims
of industrial accidents, to demands for justice among the injured, and to the practical difficulty of
regulating lawyers’ fees.86 But since then, the contingent fee contract has allowed plaintiffs to
use equity in their claim to gain the services of repeat-play lawyers in the tort claims market.
Less remarked upon, but just as important, the class of specialist plaintiffs personal injury
lawyers would very likely not exist but for the contingent fee arrangement. Contingent fees
create the opportunity to become a plaintiff’s-side repeat-player with expertise in the tort claims
marketplace. Such repeat-player plaintiff’s lawyers markedly increase the capacity of the parties
to reach settlement. 87 Moreover, they have powerful incentives to assemble portfolios of tort
claims such that they, too, like the repeat-play defendants and insurers on the other side, have an
interest in developing streamlined systems for clearing the market in unliquidated tort claims.88
85
See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 201-07 (1977).
86
See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37
UCLA L. REV. 29, 35-39 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595,
597-599 (1993).
87
Catherine T. Harris et al., Does Being A Repeat Player Make a Difference? The Impact of Attorney Experience
and Case-Picking on the Outcome of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 253,
259 (2008); Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Federal
Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002).
88
Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 65, 82 (2003) (“contingency fee lawyers assemble portfolios of cases”); Witt, Private Bureaucratic
Legalism, supra note 5, at 267-78.
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Creativity of the market in and around tort claims has invented further contracts for ownership
stakes, too. Subrogation arrangements in insurance policies are a classic form. An insurer
whose obligations on a policy are triggered by a tortious harm may be subrogated by the
insurance contract to part or all of its insured’s tort claim. The insurer essentially takes an
ownership or equity interest in the claim to recoup its policy obligations.89 In doing so, the
insurer creates yet another repeat-play participant on the plaintiff’s side of the tort claim
equation: another party with an interest in streamlined aggregate systems for resolving such
claims.
Newer forms of litigation finance have built on contingency contracts and subrogation claims to
take contracting in claims to new heights. Litigation finance entails third-party investors taking
stakes in inchoate tort claims, either as equity or as debt.90 Such stakes further displace the one-
shot tort claimant with sophisticated repeat-players who have less interest in the individualized
resolutions of any one run-of-the-mill tort claim and more interest in systems of private
administration that maximize value over the run of claims.91
3. Repeat Players: Insurers and the Bar
A few key actors play a disproportionate role in private administration. Liability insurers were
one of the first institutions of private tort claim administration; they are the quintessential private
administrative institutions. Their business model rests on the law of large numbers. Insurers are
statistically certain to face a substantial number of tort claims. As a result, insurers will tend to
develop strategies for managing claims in such a way as to minimize the total cost of claims over
the entire claims population, subject to the constraint of their good faith duty to defend their
insureds.92 To manage this caseload, they typically turn to claims adjusters93 who often simplify
the law into a few key principles, and largely resolve claims on the basis of clearly defined rules
and concrete evidence of tangible harms, especially medical bills.94 Interestingly, insurance
89
See ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE L AW § 3.10 at 219 (1988). See generally, Fernando
Gomez & Jose Penalva, Tort Reform and The Theory of Coordinating Tort and Insurance, 43 INT’L REV. OF L. AND
ECON. 83, 84 (2015).
90
See STEPHEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND
UNKNOWNS (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf;
Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 11-19 (2013); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).
91
Recent scholarship suggests litigation financiers have powerful roles to play as claims aggregators. See generally,
Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L. J. 697, 736 (2005) (a “tort claim…will
often be a significant asset in a plaintiff’s portfolio, while a purchaser of tort claims may be able to diversify…by
purchasing a variety of different tort claims”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers As Monitors in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a
Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L. J. 65, 101 (2010) (arguing that allowing plaintiffs to sell their claims would solve
the imbalance between “one-time, risk-averse plaintiffs” and “repeat-player, risk-neutral defendants”).
92
On insurers’ obligations of good faith and their settlement strategies, see State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 668 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2012); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24-27 PFD NO. 1 (2017).
93
See ROSS, supra note 32, at 25.
94
Id., at 21.
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companies seem to have gotten better at managing these settlements over time: since the 1950s,
the share of tort costs attributable to administrative costs has fallen by almost 25 percent.95
The plaintiffs’ bar is a central player in the world of private administration, too. Moves to
deregulate the market in legal services over the past four decades have allowed lawyers to
advertise for clients, develop increasingly sophisticated referral networks, and coordinate more
effectively.96 The size of plaintiffs’ firms has increased, as has their capitalization and level of
specialization.97 All three of these changes have helped the plaintiffs’ bar facilitate the
administration of the claims that fall into their portfolios. Concentrations of claims allow firms
to see returns from the efficiency benefits of private administration.98
4. Commonality
Even where litigation is party-driven, even where settlement contracts are enforceable, and even
where there are repeat players poised to capture gains from administration, only certain social
situations offer fertile soil for the production of private administrative institutions. Private
administration, at least in the prototypical form we mean to describe here, requires a class of
cases with similar, though typically not identical, fact patterns. Commonality among claims
offers the opportunity to develop rules of thumb for handling settlement. Completely disparate
fact patterns make it much harder to establish durable private administrative efficiencies. But
American tort lawyers have been remarkably creative in identifying ways of forging
commonality in classes of seemingly disparate claims.
Consider automobile accident cases, for example. The “eight hundred pound gorilla” of the
American tort system, such cases account for nearly two-thirds of all injury claims, three-
95
TOWERS WATSON, UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 8 (2011). These data are highly contested. See, e.g., J.
ROBERT HUNTER AND JOANNE DOROSHOW, TOWERS PERRIN: “GRADE F” FOR FANTASTICALLY INFLATED “TORT
COST” REPORT: PADDED, INEXPLICABLE DATA STILL SHOW COSTS LOWER THAN 1983 LEVELS (2010) (criticizing the
Towers Watson methodology). Nonetheless, only a consortium of insurers is in any position to be able to see the
contours of the privately administered systems of tort settlement in the U.S. See Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, supra
note 5 at 275-76.
96
On advertising, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, (2004) [hereinafter Yeazell, Brown]. But see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange
Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L. J. 1225, 1244 (2004) (referrals account for 75.8% of auto specialists’
business). Direct advertising may be more important for some types of practice than it is for the profession in
general. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1083 (2011) (on advertising and settlement mills). On referral networks and coordination in the plaintiffs
bar, see WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS, supra note 74, at 240-278; Sara Parikh, How the Spider Catches the
Fly: Referral Networks in the Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243 (2006); Stephen C.
Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DE PAUL L. REV. 183, 198-205 (2001) [hereinafter Yeazell, Re-
Financing].
97
See Parikh, supra note 96 at, 247-51 (2006) (describing the stratification of the plaintiffs’ bar and referral
networks); Yeazell, Brown, supra note 96, at 1991-2000; Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to
Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiff’s Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 219, 227-232 (2002) (describing the specialization and stratification of the plaintiff’s bar).
98
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5.
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quarters of all damage payouts, and three-quarters of all lawyers’ fees in the tort system.99 Each
of these cases might be valued by its own costly trial to ascertain who was at fault.100 Instead,
claims adjusters often come up with rules that generally predict outcomes of cases, instantly
paying those who were rear ended or refusing to pay anyone who violated a traffic law, for
instance, often without significant additional factfinding. In high-value cases, these rules of
thumb may break down, but for many cases, they significantly reduce the costly investigative
work that would otherwise be necessary to assess the strength of a claim.101
The commonality requirement for private administration evokes the commonality requirement
for class action treatment under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.102 But it is
importantly different. The Rule 23 commonality test is applied by judges, with commonality
protecting class members’ right to effective representation.103 In private administration,
commonality is a functional constraint on the achievement of economies of scale. The only
commonality obligations in private administration are ones that private and well-incentivized
actors (ranging from repeat-play defendants, to insurers, the plaintiffs’ bar, and litigation
investors) need in order to achieve economies of scale in the private administration of their
claims. Commonality imperatives in the world of private administration are not legal tests. They
are legally-constructed sociological facts.
Class actions play another role, too. At the opposite extreme, where claims become so similar as
to be essentially the same injury,104 class actions are often the superior mechanism for claims
resolution. When claims have substantial common features but do not produce good vehicles for
class treatment, conditions are ripe for private administration and informal aggregation.105
5. Numerosity
Private administration also typically requires a sufficiently high volume of claims with
substantially common features. One-off cases are one-off cases. They are exceedingly difficult
99
Engstrom, supra note 73, at 295 (2018); JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 1 (2010),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf.
100
And indeed, many do. Cohen estimates that nearly 60% of tort cases were over automobile accidents. See
THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS 1
(2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf.
101
See note 238, infra.
102
FED. RULES OF CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
103
See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1424 (2003) (the
commonality requirement aims “[A]t insuring that the named plaintiff can be trusted to represent the interests of his
fellow class members”). But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 459-63 (2013) .
104
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50 (“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the class members have suffered the same injury”) (internal quotations omitted); Sykes v. Mel S. Harris &
Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting the 23(a)(2) requirement “obligates a district court to determine
whether plaintiffs have suffered the same injury”) (internal quotations omitted).
105
Erichson, Information Aggregation, supra note 6. There are two main types of cases where this condition tends
to be true. First, in areas where disputes between actors tend to follow similar patterns, as with auto accidents. And
second, in mass tort cases, especially after Amchem and Ortiz, where a class action cannot be certified due to lack of
commonality; here, private administrative institutions often emerge in the wake of multi-district litigation
proceedings.
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to rationalize or aggregate. Absent substantial numerosity of claims, rationalized management

struggles to produce returns to scale. The considerable costs of creating a system of private
administration will prove not worth the investment, since there will be no further claims in which
to amortize the up-front costs.
Actors build private administrative institutions when they can capture the economies of scale.
When the “market” for legal claims exhibits commonality and numerosity, the potential for large
returns exists.
6. Settlement orientation
The potential for private administration will only come to fruition, of course, if parties in a
position to put such administration in place desire faster, cheaper, and more predictable dispute
resolution. If key parties have some systemic reason for not settling claims, private
administration will typically not arise.
Consider, for example, doctors in medical malpractice cases, who are often reluctant to settle
cases in which they expect to come out the winner.106 A party managing the expected financial
costs and benefits of litigation will typically be willing to settle winners and losers alike, so long
as the expected value of settlement is higher than the net value of going to trial. But medical
malpractice defendants appear to resist settling expected winners, so as to avoid the reputational
effects of settlement in the medical care marketplace. Stated more generally, cases involving
parties like doctors with reasons such as reputation to attend individually to the particular
circumstances of an individual claim are less likely to participate in the construction of private
administrative settlement systems that deal with claims en masse rather than individually.107
7. Public Competitors
Lastly, private administration in tort will typically emerge when the government has not created
a public regime to rationalize the common law claims process. Public systems like the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program108 or no-fault workers’ compensation programs109 will
often crowd out the demand for private administrative institutions.
106
Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1459-63 (2007); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 40-41 (1984).
107
Priest and Klein also speculate, for instance, that defendants in product liability suits might be more likely to
settle losers and fight winners because the precedent set by the cases will affect whether they can win future cases.
This dynamic, they believe, explains why product liability win rates are so low for plaintiffs. Priest & Klein, supra
note 107, at 40-41.
108
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (2016); see Lainie Rutkow et
al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program and Its Influence During the Last Two Decades, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 681 (2007).
109
E.g., N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law. §§1-401 (McKinney 2018); see Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand
Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries in the United States, 1900-2017, 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 891 (2017).
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The class action and multi-district litigation in the federal courts are two further ways the legal
system facilitates the administration of claims. Administrative systems often flourish in these
settings. Class treatment, in particular, at least before it was closed off to most tort claims,
seemed to offer a way of forcing all the parties into a settlement system. But even while a class
action is often deeply public, the compensation systems provisionally put in place under the class
action nonetheless rely heavily on techniques of private administration.110 They closely
resemble the settlement systems of less formalized private administration. The MDL system
even more so.111 Class actions and MDL treatment do not so much replace private
administration as facilitate it.
Conversely, when private administration thrives, it can sometimes obstruct the enactment of
public alternatives. States that did not adopt no-fault liability seem not to have done so at least in
part because of the development of private administrative systems that produced in common law
auto cases something approaching what the public alternative promised.112 And history suggests
that private administration is a fierce competitor. States that did enact public no-fault programs
soon found enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys engineering creative ways to litigate around them,
pushing cases back into a private system of litigation that also came to be characterized by forms
of private administration.
* * *
To recap, we contend that private administration rests on a foundation of party-driven claims

processes and formal freedom to alienate tort claims. Moreover, we expect private
administrative bodies to develop in areas where repetitive fact patterns with important common
features recur in substantial number; where repeat players who value efficiencies are present; and
where the government has not displaced them.
Lo and behold, and as the next section describes, this pattern is precisely what we see in the
world.
D. The scope of private administration
One of the most important features of American tort law is how little we know about it. A
quarter century ago, Michael Saks asked whether we really knew anything about the behavior of
110
See NAGAREDA, supra note 5.
111
See Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in Historical Perspective, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 95 (2018) (under a system of MDLs, “each plaintiff is handed a ready-made case”) (quoting
John Logan O’Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the Defendants’ Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.
J. 133, 139 (1966)); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the
Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2017) (comparing MDLs to administrative
agencies and noting how they empower parties to “find more efficient paths” to claims resolution than formal trial
procedures).
112
See generally, Engstrom, No Fault’s Demise, supra note 5.
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the tort litigation system at all.113 In some respects, our knowledge about the tort system today is
worse than it was when Saks wrote, because the number of trials – the number of public data
points – has continued to decline in the intervening years.114 There is in this sense even less
information about tort outcomes in the public domain. Settlement is private and opaque; it
happens with nary a public trace. And so tort law in the age of private administration has what
Professor Nora Engstrom calls an “invisibility problem.”115
Private administrative institutions are created in the shadow of the law by private actors for
private ends. They do not publicize their results, because they do not answer to anyone other than
the private players who operate them: insurers and plaintiffs’ lawyers chief among them. This
lack of data on the settlement phase has “hidden” the “largest part of the litigation process,” in
the words of one scholar of the American torts system.116
Nonetheless, researchers have developed some estimates about the scale of the settlement system
in the United States. Because private administrative institutions tend to emerge where there is a
large volume of settlement, a sense of the market for settlements should offer a rough sense of
the possible scope of private administration.
Estimates of settlement in the United States range and vary by type of claim, but the evidence
suggests the rate of settlement has increased in the past few decades. In the federal court system,
.9 percent of filed cases were resolved by trial in 2017, down from 11.5 percent in 1962, with the
decline beginning in the mid-1980s.117 Once cases have been filed, tort suits are among the most
likely to settle, with an estimated 70-80% of filed claims ending in settlement.118
Settlement numbers like these are especially interesting in the torts field, for reasons evident in
the torts literature. Claims valuation in tort can be inordinately complex. Because so few of
these cases go to trial, negotiators often lack reliable information about how much a claim is
worth. Saks compares this situation to “that of a blindfolded archer who is permitted to see the
target only 5% of the time, and then only through a fog at dusk.”119 In lieu of reliable information
about trial outcomes, negotiators typically rely on limited data and pure intuition. In one survey,
a lawyer described their process for determining the value of a claim as “a gut feeling;” another
113
See Saks, supra note 43.
114
Engstrom, supra note 10, at 2131. Heroic acquisition of plaintiff’s lawyer practices and insurer data sets by
intrepid scholars has pushed in the other direction. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral
Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001); Bernard Black et al., The Effect of “Early
Offers” in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 6 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 723 (2009); Engstrom, Run-of-
the-Mill Justice, supra note 5; David A. Hyman et al., Settlement at Policy Limits and the Duty to Settle: Evidence
from Texas, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 48 (2011).
115
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5, at 1514.
116
Saks, supra note 43, at 1212.
117
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR tbl. C-4 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2017.pdf; Engstrom,
supra note 10, at 2131; Galanter, supra note 10, at 459.
118
Eisenberg & Lanvers supra note 10, at 133. Of course, estimating settlement rates is a highly fraught process. See
Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 10, at 114 (“No single, agreed method of computing settlement rates exist”); Saks,
supra note 43, at 1212 (“Parties control knowledge about settlements, while trial data are owned by the public”).
119
Saks, supra note 43, at 1223.
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as “common sense.”120 When the RAND corporation asked sixteen members of the Los Angeles
Claims Managers Association to evaluate the same hypothetical claim, assessments generally
ranged from $50,000 to $150,000, but others went as low as $6,000 and as high as $750,000.121
Despite such haphazard and variable processes of valuation, however, settlement ultimately
requires a convergence in claims evaluations between the two sides. This is where private
administration answers a pressing need. The fact that settlement happens in such a high
percentage of cases despite grave valuation problems suggests the institutions at work producing
bargaining conventions that, in turn, allow for convergence in claims valuation. The work of
creating the patterns and routines and rules of thumb for claims settlement is the work of private
administration.
In state and federal courts alike, private administration has grown to encompass crucial swaths of
the tort docket. Federal courts now self-consciously and unabashedly rely on private
administration to resolve the multidistrict litigation actions that now constitute nearly forty
percent of the federal docket.122 Federal district judges managing MDLs self-consciously
attempt to drive mass tort cases to resolution by settlement and view remanding cases back to the
referring courts for trial as a failure.123 (The MDL courts have largely been successful in this:
only 2.6 percent of actions have been remanded to trial in the history of MDL.124) Resolution in
the MDL context typically means the production of some kind of a classic mass tort managed
grid or matrix that allows the parties to match certain kinds of injuries to certain dollar valuation
ranges.125 Indeed, settlement in the MDL context virtually necessitates the development of
private administrative institutions, especially in the larger cases, as judges try to drive hundreds
or even thousands of actions into settlements.
In the state courts, auto injury cases are the paradigm private administration case. Jennifer
Wriggins has deftly demonstrated that state tort doctrines and regulations ensure that almost all
auto accidents are covered by insurance; the law, she argues, gives auto torts “most-favored
injury status.”126 Because insurance is so prevalent, victims—and the repeat play lawyers who
120
Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6.
121
See MARK A. PETERSON, NEW TOOLS FOR REDUCING CIVIL LITIGATION EXPENSES 3 (1983),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3013.html.
122
See Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled
Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2017).
123
See Gluck, supra note 111.
124
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 10, at tbl. S-20,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/jb_s20_0930.2017.pdf. The report gives three categories of actions:
those remanded for trial (16,600), those terminated in the transferee court (486,136), and those still pending
(124,202). Cases terminated in federal court are either settled or dispensed with in pretrial proceedings. Admittedly,
however, it is unclear how many of these 486,136 actions are settled as opposed to dispensed with. See also Gluck,
supra note 111.
125
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 308 (2011);
Kishinevsky, supra note 42, at 1147 (“damage averaging has become a highly used…device for apportioning
settlement proceeds among claimants’); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula”, 90 TEX. L. REV.
571, 591-94 (2012).
126
Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries With Remedies: Driving, Insurance, Torts, and Changing
the Choice Architecture of Auto Insurance, 44 LOY. A. L. REV. 69, 71 (2010).
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can make a living representing them—can expect to be compensated for their injury.127 And
because defendants are almost always insured, the law creates a powerful repeat player on the
defense side with a strong incentive to settle cases. In part because of this social and legal
architecture, automobile accidents comprise an overwhelming majority of state tort cases.128 To
cope with this high volume of cases, auto insurers have largely turned to private
administration.129
And auto cases are not alone. Before the widespread implementation of workers’ compensation
regimes, large industrial employers regularly relied on private administrative strategies to settle
their employees’ claims.130 Vestiges of such institutions still persist in the railroad industry
today, where torts are governed by federal law and thus not covered by most state worker’s
compensation schemes.131 Attorneys in product liability cases (which settle at disproportionately
high rates) often litigate with the goal of finding privately administered resolutions of individual
cases.132 The same holds for certain other types of mass tort cases, too.133
So, here we are. Tort law in the United States has produced a sprawling, far-flung, and
decentralized system of private claims administration, which has in turn generated de facto
liability norms and damages rules that are both structured by and depart from the rules of the
substantive law of torts. And because so many domains of tort law are producing such privately
administered outcomes, it is time to update Leon Green’s question about tort doctrine for a new
century. Green’s question was how American tort doctrine allocates authority in the jury trial. A
century later, the analogous question is how American tort doctrine facilitates and conditions
private administration.
127
Id., at 71. See also KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY,
133 (1986) (“Over the past few decades the growth in the amount and kinds of insurance that are now commonplace
has been enormous”).
128
See notes 99-101, supra, and accompanying text.
129
See generally Engstrom, No-Fault’s Demise; ROSS, supra note 32.
130
See WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 103-126 (documenting private settlement systems
adopted by large American employers in the years before workers’ compensation statutes); Kaczorowski, supra note
32; Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5 (documenting a world of private claims management at the turn of the twentieth
century).
131
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (West); ELY, supra note 59, at 219 (railroads are still not
covered by workers’ compensation today). In lieu of workers’ compensation, many railroads seem to have created a
system of private administration to handle tort claims. Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 49, 57-61 (1988) (describing a system where cases overwhelmingly settle, few
plaintiffs have lawyers, and settlements are structured to emulate workers’ compensation regimes).
132
See, e.g., notes 71-80, supra. According to one estimate, product liability cases account for around 5.7% of tort
dispositions but only 0.6% of tort trials, implying that they settle at a much higher rate than average. COHEN, supra
note 100, at 14.
133
See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 130-48 (describing “corporate settlement mills”); Deborah R. Hensler
& Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
961, 973 (1993) (noting that offers to “settle claims for small amounts quickly, based on only minimal supporting
information from plaintiffs” has become a “staple” of mass tort litigation). See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30
MISS. C. L. REV. 255 (2011).
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II. The Doctrines of Private Administration
Foundational doctrines in American tort law foster and sustain the world of private
administration. In particular, tort doctrine in the United States facilitates private administration
by allocating responsibility to repeat players (often regardless of fault) and by subtly promoting
the use of statistical techniques in damages and settlement calculations.
A. Respondeat superior
The single most important doctrine of private administration in tort is surely the rule of
respondeat superior, which holds employers liable without regard to their fault for the tortious
conduct of employees acting within the scope of their employment.134 Respondeat superior is, as
the late great tort jurist Gary Schwartz once put it, the “hidden and fundamental issue” in tort
doctrine.135 William O. Douglas grasped the basic point, too. Douglas, who was an erratic but
sometimes visionary agency law scholar before becoming an erratic and sometimes visionary
justice of the Supreme Court,136 understood that vicarious liability was fundamental to what he
called the tort system’s “administration of risk.”137
Employers’ vicarious liability for the torts of their employees systematically structures
settlement in vast swaths of the torts landscape. The conventional wisdom in the field holds that
respondeat superior claims constitute the lion’s share of tort suits in the United States.138 Precise
estimates of exactly how many tort claims involve respondeat superior vary. The private
structure of tort settlement makes it essentially impossible to establish certainty on the point. But
scholars seem to agree that most cases involve institutional defendants.139
Yet the pervasiveness of vicarious respondeat superior cases raises a puzzle for tort doctrine.
Harold Laski observed it a century ago that the “seeming simplicity” of vicarious liability
“conceals in fact a veritable hornet’s nest of stinging difficulties.”140 For even though vicarious
134
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
135
Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739
(1996).
136
See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, 85-87 (1986); JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT
JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 92-124 (1980). For examples of Douglas’ tort scholarship, see
William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929) [hereinafter
Douglas, Administration of Risk]; William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L. J. 193, 195-210 (1929).
137
Douglas, Administration of Risk, supra note 136.
138
Alan Calnan, The Distorted Reality of Civil Recourse Theory, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 159, 181 (2012).
139
Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between
Individual Organizational Litigants and the Disposition of Federal Cases, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005)
(“organizations are defendants in more than 80% of all federal litigation”); Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel,
Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
101, 110 (1999) (72.6 percent of tort defendants are “institutional” as opposed to individual); Richard Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (96% of surveyed tort suits were for negligence of employees
or children).
140
Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105, 106 (1916).
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liability cases are ubiquitous, and even though vicarious liability is a long-standing bedrock
concept in tort doctrine, the basic principle sits awkwardly in the landscape of tort.
Vicarious liability is one of the few areas in the entire field of tort law in which the wrongfulness
of the conduct of the responsible actor is irrelevant to the analysis. Why is this so? Tort jurists
often assert that employers should be liable for the risks they create.141 For example, Judge
Henry Friendly in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States famously claimed that respondeat
superior rests “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim
responsibility for accidents that may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities.”142 But
why does the law attribute the risk to the activity of being an employer, rather than the activity of
being an employee, or to whatever activity the plaintiff was engaged in? Vicarious liability
doctrine, at least on its surface, contains no answers. And falling back on the Latin maxim of
respondeat superior, as Laski noted, “may bring us comfort, bit it will not solve our
problems.”143
Some efforts to explain vicarious liability draw on the nineteenth-century principle that the
master and servant were the same legal entity, a fictional creature Ernest Weinrib has
cumbersomely named the “employer-acting-through-the-employee.”144 But as critics have long
observed, the legal fiction of unity begs the question of why the law treats employer and
employee as the same person—and why it sometimes doesn’t!145 Nor can the identity argument
explain why employers are liable for the torts of an employee who is acting in some fashion
unrelated to the interests of the employer,146 including in a fashion squarely opposed to the
employer’s interests147 or even directly against employer instruction.148
Economics-based tort theory also has a difficult time justifying respondeat superior. The
traditional justification on efficiency grounds is that firms are well positioned to spread the risks
of their employees’ behavior and manage and optimize the costs and benefits of their employees’
141
P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 17-18 (1967). Douglas refers to this principle as the
“entrepreneur theory.” Douglas, Administration of Risk, supra note 136, at 586 (1929).
142
398 F.2d 167, 171 (2nd Cir., 1968).
143
Laski, supra note 140, at 107.
144
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 186 (1995). See also John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211, 1232-33 (2009) (discussing respondeat superior as a case of “fusion of agency”);
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate
Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2197-98 (2005) (recounting the nineteenth century
principle).
145
E.g., Laski, supra note 140, at 106-07 (“It is the merest dogma . . . .”). See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts
Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 351 (2007); Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden
and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1752 (1996).
146
CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (trawler owner liable where crew intentionally
destroyed lobster traps, motivated by the infamous “tension that raged between lobstermen and draggers”); Ramos v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (employer may face punitive damages where sales manager physically
assaults a convenience store owner while filling in for a vacationing delivery truck driver).
147
Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (motel is liable where its manager breaks into a
woman’s room and sexually assaults her).
148
Moecker v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (An employer can be held
liable for the torts of her employee “even if the alleged wrong was a crime, was not authorized by the employer, or
was forbidden by the employer”).
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conduct.149 But this rationale holds puzzles, too, for the doctrine doesn’t purport to allocate the
costs of a firm to the firm. Instead, tort doctrine typically only holds employers liable for costs
to others when their employees happen to have committed some wrongful act. Vicarious
liability is both too far from traditional requirements of wrongfulness and too close to those
requirements to make sense. In addition, the public policy justifications of loss spreading and
deterrence do not always hold true; they hold only under certain contingent assumptions. In
many contexts, for instance, firms cannot effectively monitor their employees. And in some
instances, the injury victims themselves (or perhaps the employees) will be more effective loss
spreaders. The law of respondeat superior is indifferent to these variations. It is a one-size-fits-
all rule whose doctrinal justifications are weak at best.
Yet if the proffered explanations struggle to account for the doctrine of vicarious liability, its
social functions in the world of private administration are powerful and far more certain.150
Respondeat superior pervasively structures the private administration of risks after the fact of an
injury. Functionally, respondeat superior institutionalizes large sections of tort law’s world of
private administration by replacing one-off single-shot employee defendants with repeat-play
defendants capable of settling claims at scale. Without respondeat superior, claims litigation
would formally target employees rather than firms, at least absent the fault of the employer.
Firms would sometimes indemnify their employees, of course. But the indemnification practices
of state and local governments in litigation over Section 1983 claims, where there is no vicarious
liability doctrine, offer good evidence that considerable confusion would follow.151 There are
considerable obstacles to systemic indemnification clauses, not least of which is the difficulty of
monitoring employees who can operate free of the fear of tort liability.152 And such litigation in
149
See ATIYAH, supra note 141 at 13, 23 (noting that employers were deep pocketed and well positioned to spread
risk); WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 121 (1987);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 170-5 (1987); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 514, 543 (1961); Douglas, Administration of Risk, supra note
136.
150
The rule conditioned the basic structure of the twentieth-century firm and helped produce a modern regime of
management. It contributes today to some post-modern firms’ efforts to remain decentralized and operate through
independent contractors, whose torts are not imputed back to the firm. Even before a single risk is realized, an entire
world of private organization arises out of the basic tort rule’s allocation of responsibility. See, e.g., SALLY H.
CLARKE, TRUST AND POWER: CONSUMERS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE MARKET (2007); Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a
Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2005).
151
Rules about who pays for how much of a judgement (police officers, police departments, the municipal general
fund, etc.) vary by jurisdiction. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1165-73 (2016). Perhaps as a result, many police departments have no idea which
lawsuits are brought against them and make little effort to collect and analyze data about any but the most high-
profile cases. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1082
(2015) (“run-of-the-mill cases are largely ignored”) [hereinafter Schwartz, Introspection]; Myths and Mechanics of
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1041-52 (2010)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Myths]. Even when police departments are eager to rationalize their settlement process and
internal structure, the attorneys defending the city or the individual officers often refuse to turn over relevant
information for fear that internal investigations might harm their pending cases and because they believe the police
departments have little financial stake in the litigation. See Schwartz, Introspection, at 1097-1101; Schwartz, Myths,
at 1065-66.
152
See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 932 (2014) (city risk managers often refuse to
finalize indemnification decisions until after negotiations have concluded for fear that indemnification agreements
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Section 1983 cases is, as a result, ad hoc, badly rationalized and variable from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Even with the possibility of indemnification, the absence of vicarious liability
substantially complicates the administration of such cases.
The respondeat superior doctrine is an end-run around the cumbersome and inevitably uneven
practice of indemnification. As Joanna Schwartz has shown, for example, the absence of
vicarious liability in the Section 1983 context systematically reduces settlement values in civil
rights claims by rendering uncertain the pool of assets available to fund a damages award.153
Even where indemnification is nearly universal, the web of indemnification relationships creates
disconnects between payers and negotiators, meaning those who are negotiating often lack
information about expenses or incentives to reduce the transaction cost of negotiation;
meanwhile, those who are paying often lack the control or incentive to build more efficient
settlement institutions.154 And indeed, in their study of settlement rates, Eisenberg and Lanvers
found the settlement rate for 1983 actions to be significantly lower than for tort claims more
generally.155 The structure offered by respondeat superior, by contrast, instantly creates a larger-
scale party on the defense side of the equation. It means that tort claimants are able to identify
an entity on which to make claims, typically a repeat-play entity. Notably, absent vicarious
liability, victims would often lack the information to know which specific actors are responsible.
Vicarious liability renders recovery more certain and less tenuous. The rule gives one single,
central entity control over the disposition of a large number of claims. Respondeat superior
makes the firm itself a repeated party in each of these suits. A centralized body of professional
managers can gather information and devise a single set of objectives and best practices for
dealing with liability.
Respondeat superior creates a powerful economic interest in and opportunity for efficiencies in
how claims are processed. A single firm bears the cost of repeated negotiations, adverse
judgments, and litigation generally. Repeat-play employers thus have strong incentives to invest
resources to manage the settlement process in the aggregate and over time.
Such firms have good reason to promulgate internal rules and guidelines for settling claims.
Having settled a large number of claims, such firms can gather information about the going rates
for different types of claims. They can establish internal law departments to routinize the
process of settling claims. They can replace uncertain one-off negotiations with simple rules of
thumb. Some firms replace lawyers with claims adjusters—many of whom have little to no
formal legal training at all—to settle lawsuits. Consider, for example, railroad employee injuries
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and outside of workers’ compensation. Railroad
employers are barred by statute from creating fully ex ante alternatives to tort claims.
Nonetheless, in cases where employees have been exposed to known risks they aim to get as
close as possible by establishing ex post administrative alternatives. Prospective railroad
will raise payouts); Schwartz, supra note 135, at 1753 (“indemnification claims by employers against negligent
employees are exceedingly rare”). Admittedly, however, employers may still indemnify their employees in lieu of a
contractual obligation. Schwartz, supra, at 912.
153
See Schwartz, supra note 152, at 931-37 (2014).
154
See note 151, supra.
155
See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 10, at 130 (“Constitutional tort[s]” consistently settle at lower rates than
“Tort[s]” more generally). The category of “Constitutional tort” is “dominated by actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.” Id., at 125-26.
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defendants typically offer a contractually predefined benefit scheme in exchange for employees’
agreements not to sue in the future should they develop work-related injuries in the future.156
Individuals, of course, typically have neither the resources nor the reason to establish a system of
private administration. But firms typically do. They have administrative capacity and economic
motives. Vicarious liability takes advantage of these features of the firm to support a regime of
private administration in the settlement of tort claims.
B. Collateral Source Rule and Subrogation
Tort law is embedded in a broader system of accident compensation and risk management.157
Worker’s compensation, private insurance, social welfare programs, and other forms of redress
collectively help bear the costs of injury in America, providing an estimated $1.1 trillion in
benefits to victims.158 Including the cost of administering these programs, America spends $1.7
trillion per year making injury victims whole.159 Tort accounts for about 10% of overall spending
and 8% of benefits.160 As they interact, the programs constituting America’s system of accident
compensation may facilitate or frustrate one another. Consequently, important legal rules,
institutional practices, and informal norms manage the interaction between these programs.
In particular, the law of subrogation and the rules about collateral sources are two principal
domains that coordinate tort law with the broader system of accident compensation.161 Collateral
source rules govern the implications of a third party’s payment to the plaintiff of some or all of
the plaintiff’s damages. Traditionally, the collateral source rule treats compensation to the
plaintiff from a third party as irrelevant in calculating the damages owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff.162 The law of subrogation comes into the picture, in turn, once a third party has made a
collateral payment. The law of subrogation deals with the tort claims rights of third parties
156
These contracts often require creative lawyering, as the FELA prevents “any contract…to enable any common
carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by” the act. 45 U.S.C. §55. Courts have even had to directly
regulate private administration, deciding what separates a permissible settlement from an impermissible waiver. See
Wicker v. Consolidated Rail. Corp., 142 F.3d 690 (3rd Cir., 1998); Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 104 F. 3d
89 (6th Cir., 1997); Brooke Granger, Comment, Known Injuries vs. Known Risks: Finding the Appropriate Standard
for Determining the Validity of Releases Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1463 (2015).
157
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, 201 (2008); Kenneth Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance,
and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993).
158
All figures are drawn from ABRAHAM, supra note 157, at 201.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
See Gomez & Penalva, supra note 89, at 83. See also, ABRAHAM, supra note 157, at 202-11 (listing collateral
source rules and subrogation as doctrines which coordinate between tort law and insurance).
162
Thus, if a plaintiff sustains $100 of damage and receives $50 in insurance, she could still sue the tortfeasor for
$100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979). For a survey of first-order justifications and
critiques of the collateral source rule, see Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the
Face of Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965, 969-77
(2012).
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making payments, determining when and how they can step into the shoes of a plaintiff for
purposes of pursuing a tort claim against the tortfeasor.163
The first-order debates over subrogation and the collateral source rule take up the question of
how these doctrines relate to the goals and normative commitments of tort law. Corrective
justice scholars and some courts observe that the combined effect of the collateral source rule
and subrogation is to increase the likelihood that wrongdoers and only wrongdoers repair the
losses caused by their wrongful conduct. A set of fine theoretical questions arise out of
subrogation actions about extent of a defendant’s duty. (Do tortfeasors really owe duties of care
to victims’ insurers?)164 In turn, efficiency-minded accounts of the collateral source rule focus
on the importance of maintaining deterrence incentives by internalizing to defendants the full
cost of their wrongful conduct.165 Deterrence-oriented justifications of the subrogation action
focus on allowing insurers to recoup losses so as to allocate injury costs to the best cost avoiders
and to permit efficient pricing of insurance.166 From a compensation perspective, subrogation
actions also limit double-recovery windfalls for tort claimants, especially in cases in which the
claimant has not paid premiums for the compensation in question.167
In addition to these first-order functions, however, the subrogation and collateral source rules
also have crucial second-order roles. Like respondeat superior, they shape the interactions
among administrators of the broader system of accident compensation and risk management.
Without the traditional collateral source rule, for example, a plaintiff’s claims against a
defendant are complicated by their interaction with payments to the plaintiff by one or more third
parties. Defendants may resist settlement in order to await third-party payments. Certain third-
party payers might slow-walk their payments in order to facilitate greater tort recovery.
For its part, the subrogation rule introduces a powerful new player into the world of private
administration. If respondeat superior adds repeat-players on the defense side, subrogation adds
repeat-players to the plaintiff side. Insurer-subrogees have powerful incentives to learn to
163
See note 89, supra and accompanying text.
164
Traditionally, the answer to this question that subrogation allows the insurer to “succeed[] to the rights of the”
insured and sue in their name. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 204 Neb. 414, 416-417 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For defenders of subrogation, see 3105 Grand Corp. v. City of New York, 288
N.Y. 178, 182 (1944) (“[S]ubrogation. . . [ensures] the one who in good conscience ought to pay should be
compelled ultimately to discharge the obligation”); KEETON AND WIDISS, supra 89, § 3.10 at 220-21 (“Thus,
subrogation…plac[es] the economic responsibility for injuries on the party whose fault cause the loss without also
allowing a [double] recovery…that would violate the principle of indemnification”).
165
KEITH N. HYLTON, TORT LAW: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 400 (2016).
166
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY AND STEVEN SHAVELL, SUBROGATION AND THE THEORY OF INSURANCE WHEN SUITS
CAN BE BROUGHT FOR LOSSES SUFFERED (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 23303,
March 2017) (subrogation can lower insurance premiums and lead to more positive-value tort suits); Alan O. Sykes,
Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2001) (subrogation generally prevents skewed incentives for
insureds). But see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
155 (1986) (subrogation results in less effective risk pooling and may leave insureds undercompensated).
167
KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 89, § 3.10 at 220-21 (“Thus, subrogation…plac[es] the economic responsibility
for injuries on the party whose fault cause the loss without also allowing a [double] recovery…that would violate the
principle of indemnification”).
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resolve claims quickly and at low cost.168 Most plaintiffs are one-shot plaintiffs, unless they are
terribly unlucky. By contrast insurers and other subrogees can accumulate and aggregate their
tort claims. A subrogee with a portfolio of claims is much like a repeat-play tort defendant.
Both manage portfolios of claims, and both have powerful incentives to manage those claims in
the aggregate. It is no coincidence that specialized subrogation professionals increasingly help
insurers resolve a high volume169 of cases and spread information about subrogation through
specialized professional networks.170 In some areas, to be sure, the cost of monitoring claims
brought by policyholders means that insurer-subrogees may not be able to exercise their
subrogation rights effectively.171 But in others – including some like health insurance that were
once thought not to be susceptible to subrogation claims172 – subrogation is now a standard part
of the administration of tort, accounting for about $2 billion annually, according to one
estimate.173
An observer can get a sense for the full extent to which private administration characterizes the
world of tort from the arbitration agreements insurers use to manage the relationship between
their property policies and their liability policies. The same insurers who sell first-party policies
to protect victims against accidents often also insure potential tortfeasors against liability.
Because they are on both sides, such insurers have an incentive to build efficient private
administrative bodies in anticipation of litigation174 and to precommit to settling claims through
them.175 Such agreements may further reduce costs by establishing uniform proceedings176 that
168
HYLTON, supra note 165, at 424 (“The subrogating entity may be able to litigate less expensively than the victim
can because it is a ‘repeat player’ in litigation”); Gary T. Schwartz, National Health Care Program, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1339, 1347-48 (1993) (noting how large insurers and governments resolve claims smoothly and with little
apparent hassle).
169
Jeff Baill, Confessions of an Insurance Subrogation Attorney, 82 HENNEPIN LAW. 28, 30 (2013); Latitude
Subrogation Servs., https://www.latitudesubro.com/ (last visited Jan 30, 2019); Nat’l Subrogation Servs., LLC,
Benefits of Subrogation, https://www.nationalsubrogation.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (discussing the benefits
of “[o]utsourced subrogation”).
170
Baill, supra note 169, at 30 (detailing how the National Association of Subrogation Professionals has fostered a
sense of “understanding”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF SUBROGATION PROFESSIONALS, https://www.subrogation.org/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019); White & Williams L.L.C., THE SUBROGATION STRATEGIST,
https://subrogationstrategist.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
171
2 AM. L. INST., ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 170 (1991).
172
Id. (“[T]he costs of monitoring lawsuits brought by policyholders…undoubtedly preclude full enforcement of
subrogation rights in cases involving small sums”).
173
MICHAEL J. BRIEN & CONSTANTIJN W. A. PANIS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN HEALTHCARE
SUBROGATION (2013), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/analysis/health-and-welfare/trends-
and-practices-in-healthcare-subrogation.pdf. Subrogation recoveries seem to have grown considerably over the past
decade. Id., at 21.
174
Robert J. Demer, Inter-Company Arbitration Revisited, 52 JUDICATURE 111, 113 (1968) (“Usually, the
representatives of signatory carriers in a locality will. . .establish the administration of an arbitration unit”). On the
theoretical incentives, see Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical
Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261, S273-74 (2007).
175
See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1348 (such agreements are prevalent among auto insurers in southern
California); Demer, supra note 174, at 115 (the 1967 Nationwide Inter-Company Arbitration Agreement system
dispensed with 86,118 cases for a total of around $32 million claimed); N. Morgan Woods, Nationwide Inter-
Company Arbitration Agreement, 1956 INS. L. J. 47 (1956).
176
Demer, supra note 174, at 112 (“pleadings are uniform, brief, and free from technical detail and limited in
extent”).
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emphasize speed and simplicity over formal procedural safeguards.177 In short, subrogation
creates sustained demand for private administration by creating a class of repeat plaintiffs who
value the speed, thrift, and certainty of private administration.
C. Damages
Few developments in American tort law have done more over the past century to increase the
importance of private administration than the general increase in damages awards. By increasing
defendants’ and insurers’ financial stake in litigation, rising damages awards have created
powerful incentives to develop economies of scale and systems for managing damages risk.
And make no mistake, despite a slowdown in the past decade or two, the story of damages over
the past century has largely been one of expansion. In the 1950s, the money moving through the
tort system amounted to a few billion dollars, or less than one percent of GDP.178 Although
estimates vary, sources generally agree that the money in the tort system today amounts to
hundreds of billions of dollars, or around 2 percent of GDP. As Ken Abraham puts it, this is “a
more than one-hundred-fold cost increase since 1950.”179
Part of the “slow, determined march”180 to higher damage awards was driven by creative
entrepreneurial trial lawyers, who breathed life into old nineteenth-century doctrines governing
pain and suffering damages, turning a relatively minor feature of torts practice into a driver of
billions of dollars of tort damages.181 Part of the process has no doubt also been the dynamic
expansion of liability insurance. As more tortfeasors are insured, the returns to litigation
increase. As enterprising attorneys find new ways of holding defendants liable, more people buy
larger insurance policies. And so on as the cycle continues.182 And part of the damages increase
has been the costs themselves. Rising wages since World War Two (even if stagnant since the
early 1970s for most Americans) have increased the value of wage replacement, even accounting
for inflation.183 Still more importantly, sharply rising medical care costs have put medical
177
See, e.g., id., at 112-13; Stephen H. Lash, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Disputes as a Response to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Insurers, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 102, 105 (1979)
(“[L]awyers are rarely involved” in inter-company arbitration agreements); Woods, supra note 25, at 50 (“simplicity
was again the watchword”).
178
See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 95, at 5. The Towers-Watson studies, which come out of the insurance industry
have been controversial. See J. ROBERT HUNTER AND JOANNE DOROSHOW, TOWERS PERRIN: “GRADE F” FOR
FANTASTICALLY INFLATED “TORT COST” REPORT: PADDED, INEXPLICABLE DATA STILL SHOW COSTS LOWER THAN
1983 LEVELS (2010) (criticizing the Towers Watson methodology). Nonetheless, only a consortium of insurers is in
any position to be able to see the contours of the privately administered systems of tort settlement in the U.S. See
Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, supra note 5 at 275-76.
179
ABRAHAM, supra note 157, at 3.
180
Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859,
865.
181
John Fabian Witt, The Political Economy of Pain, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E.
NELSON 235, 237 (Daniel J. Huselbosch & R. B. Bernstein eds., 2013).
182
See generally, ABRAHAM, supra note 157.
183
See generally, ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 329-532 (2016). On wages specifically, see id., at 541-43.
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damages front and center.184 New medical innovations, for example, mean costly new
procedures that can be billed to the tortfeasor to make the plaintiff whole.185 To be sure, many
states have tried to quell the rising tide of tort damages, often with some success. 186 But no one
can doubt that the damages landscape is still radically different than it was at the midpoint of the
twentieth century.
Private administration is like a system of dams and levees by which the American tort system
tamed and channeled the deluge of new damages and rendered it manageable. From the
perspective of enabling private administration, the key pieces of the damages landscape are the
make-whole rule, the actual damages rule, and the lump-sum rule:
1. Make-whole
Tort damages aim to make the plaintiff whole.187 The classic Harper, James, and Gray treatise
puts it this way: tort damages promise to deliver compensation “making [a plaintiff] whole as
nearly as that may be done by an award of money.”188 The “make-whole” principle is often cited
as an underpinning to the efficiency-motivated account of tort law. The premise of the efficiency
views is that damages reasonably approximate the losses suffered by the plaintiff; such damages
(and only such damages) will internalize to a defendant the costs of her behavior and thus prompt
her to take those precautions worth taking.189 The make whole principle accommodates the
corrective justice approach to tort as well—when a tortfeasor pays damages, she restores the
resources she appropriated and in so doing repairs the wrongful loss she imposed on another.190
184
See Victor R. Fuchs, The Health Sector’s Share of the Gross National Product, 247 SCIENCE 534, 535 (1990)
(American medical care costs grew at a rate of 5.7 percent per year versus 4.1 percent per year for the rest of the
economy); Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Historical, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA (Dec. 11,
2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html.
185
Consider the debate over whether to allow victims of toxic tort exposure to recover the cost of decades of
diagnostic tests necessary to catch medical conditions before they become too acute. One set of commentators
referred to such tests as potentially “Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize.” Arvin Maskin et al., Medical
Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 521 (2000).
186
See Drucilla K. Barker, The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance Markets: An Empirical
Analysis, 17 J. OF HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y, AND L. 143 (1992) (finding that tort reforms lowered liability insurance
risk and increased profitability); Ronald M. Stewart, et al., Malpractice Risk and Cost Are Significantly Reduced
after Tort Reform, 212 J. OF THE AM. COLLEGE OF SURGEONS 463 (2011).
187
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §901(a) (One of the purposes of tort damages is “to give compensation,
indemnity, or restitution for harms”); DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES,
EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 8.1, at 667 (3 ed. 2018) (“[A]wards are aimed at compensating the victim or making good
the losses proximately resulting from the injury”); FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR, AND OSCAR S. GRAY, 4
THE LAW OF TORTS §25.1, at 490 (2nd ed.) (1986) (“the cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is
that of compensation for the injury”) (italics theirs). But see Maria Guadalupe Martinez Alles, Tort Remedies as
Meaningful Responses to Wrongdoing, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW (John Oberdiek & Paul
Miller, eds., 2019) (forthcoming) (arguing for a more punitive understanding of tort damages).
188
HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY, supra note 187, §25.1, at 493.
189
Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1337
(2015) (“setting damages equal to harm fully internalizes the externality caused by the harmful act and thereby
induces socially optimal behavior”); Posner, supra note 139, at 32. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
190
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 437-39 (2002)
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What is less apparent in the literature, but crucially important in tort practice, is that the make-
whole principle also usefully structures the private administration of tort law. Compare the
alternative approach articulated brilliantly by Goldberg and Zipursky. They argue that in
practice, juries ought to and do set damages that are “fair” and “reasonable,” not damages that
aim to be fully compensatory.191 Let’s call this the “make-fair” principle.192 The make-fair
principle has some support in formal tort doctrine, at least when it comes to intangible pain and
suffering damages;193 Goldberg and Zipursky contend further that make-fair is more consonant
than make-whole with the basic structure and logic of the tort cause of action. But the law is
make-whole, at least for the most part. And make-whole facilitates private administration of tort
claims in ways that make-fair never could.
For settlement to work, parties need to be able to arrive at a shared sense of value on their claim.
The make-whole principle anchors damages values more securely in concrete, calculable
expenses with relatively predictable damages.194 To be sure, noneconomic damages remain
open-ended, even on a make-whole rationale. But with respect to special damages like lost
wages and medical care costs, make-whole authorizes tort to rely on an entire world of
independently existing actuarial predictions about human life and well-being. It authorizes the
law to rely on wage and hour data, medical cost projections, and even mortality predictions.195
By contrast, make-fair would put leave the system with open-ended and unguided jury verdicts.
Jury verdicts are already notoriously difficult to predict.196 Make-fair would exacerbate the
difficulty.197 By contrast, make-whole supplies private administrators with benchmarks in
crafting the settlement values that make private administration function.
2. Actual damages
191
JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG AND BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 345
(2010).
192
See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435
(2006) (arguing in favor of the make-fair principle).
193
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §912, Comment b (explaining that the “only standard” for noneconomic
harms to body, feeling and reputation is that damages should be “such an amount as a reasonable person would
estimate as fair compensation”).
194
See Phillip J. Hermann, Predicting Verdicts In Personal Injury Cases, 20 J. MO. B. 135, 142 (1964) (“juries
presented with the same injury, facts, and economic loss…tend to render awards remarkably consistent in size”);
Sloan & Van Wert, supra note 43, at 133 (“Several studies. . .have found that. . .compensation rises with economic
loss”); Michael J. Saks, et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 L. AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 243, 244
(“Using. . .a small number of predictor variables, several studies have been able to account for half or more of the
variation in awards in sampled cases”) (1997).
195
See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 187, §8.4, at 704-07 (tort law authorizes the use of mortality tables to
establish life expectancy for the computation of lost wages and medical expenses); Ronen Avraham & Kimberly
Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 661, 671-77 (2017); Vincent C. Immel, Actuarial Tables and
Damage Awards, 1958 INS. L. J. 535.
196
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury’s Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
43, 85 (1991). But see note 194, supra (sometimes juries seem to behave somewhat predictably).
197
For instance, introducing damage caps for noneconomic damages (which are already awarded according to make-
fair principles) reduces the time needed to settle a case. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees,
Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J. OF L., ECON., & ORG.
517, 537 (2003).
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Related to, but conceptually distinct from, the make-whole principle is the principle of
actual damages. Even when tort doctrine adopts the make-whole principle, there are still
multiple ways the law could aim to make a plaintiff whole. Consider here two such ways. Some
years ago, Kathryn Spier distinguished between “finely tuned” damages and “flat” damages.198
“Finely tuned damages” are the prototypical mode of awarding tort damages in the courtroom.
They are custom tailored to a victim’s actual damages through detailed individualized inquiry.
In theory, though not always in practice, finely tuned damages increase the accuracy available to
any one damages valuation.199
A “flat damages” approach, by contrast, relies heavily on averages as an administrative-cost

reducing mechanism. Flat damages are typically set in advance and are one-size fits all. They
might be set equal to a victim’s ex ante expected level of damage (as in the “very specific”
guidelines for determining damages outlined in the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act)200, or to a defendant’s ex ante expected level of harm. Typically they are
defined by statute.201 Flat damages sacrifice the possibility of perfect accuracy in any one case,
often in return for the prospect of less expensive proceedings with the same aggregate level of
damages for particular classes of plaintiffs and defendants.202
Tort chooses finely-tuned damages, at least as a doctrinal matter. But there is an irony at work in
the law’s finely tuned damages regime. The high cost of determining finely-tuned damages in
any one case has helped push the actual practice in the field ever further toward the flat damages
approach.
Consider the flat damages strategies that have flourished in certain statutory regimes. They are
almost impossible to defend on a purely individualized corrective justice basis.203 They treat
plaintiffs and defendants in the aggregate. They aim to do the work of administration inside the
law itself. That is to say, they are systems of public (not private) administration. Workers’
compensation is perhaps our best example.204
Of course, flat damages regimes exhibit a variety of defects. They have all too often failed to
include mechanisms for updating values over time. That is why workers’ compensation damages
198
Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J. OF L., ECON., & ORG. 84, 85
(1994).
199
Id.
200
Id., at 85.
201
Id., at 85. Such systems are also common in British personal injury law. See id., at 85.
202
Id. (flat damages facilitate settlement and reduce administrative costs).
203
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 576, 597 (2008) (“an individual responsibility
paradigm for torts does not permit collective resolution of mass tort cases”). But see Randall R. Bovbjorg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909-17 (1989) (arguing jury
awards for non-economic losses are untethered to any objective basis and so would be more accurate if statutorily
defined).
204
See Spier, supra note 198, at 85; LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND AND THOMAS J. KNEISER, THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (1980); KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
214 (1997).
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schedules fell so badly behind inflation in the 1970s and 1980s.205 The actual damages rule, by
contrast, offers a built-in mechanism for resetting the price of settlements. The occasional trial
produces new information about values, which in turn filter into the settlement system. The trial
lawyers who first erected the system of private administration aptly called these cases “trial
balloon litigation”;206 in their view, the function of the occasional trial was much like the
bellwether case in modern aggregate litigation contexts. 207 Its goal was to recalibrate the values
being used to resolve cases outside the courtroom in the system of private administration.208
And herein likes the irony of the finely-tuned damages rule of tort. Its vast cost gives rise to a
privately administered flat damages regime. The finely tuned and individually tailored damages
system of the common law of torts constructively shapes the system of private administration.
When confronted with the huge costs of determining finely tuned damages, and their huge
uncertainty,209 private administrators respond by doing their own flattening, creating grids of
settlement values based on the severity of the claim that resemble the legislatively-defined
damage schedules.210 And in some respects the private administrators do their public
competitors one better. Private settlement matrixes constructed in the shadow of the law are
more dynamic and responsive to changing times than the most prominent schedules constructed
by statue.211 Private administration thus does something quite remarkable. It accomplishes
privately and in the shadow of the courthouse what the law on its own has considerable difficulty
achieving publicly and inside the courtroom.
c. Lump Sums
One last damages doctrine warrants attention, namely the rule that tort damages are awarded in a
lump sum, rather than periodically over time.212
205
See McCluskey, supra note 22, at 810 (“most states did not regularly adjust these maximum benefit levels for
inflation, with the result that from 1940 to 1972 maximum benefit levels decreased as a proportion of average wages
in most states”).
206
TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS THROUGH 1955, at 307 (Melvin Belli, ed. 1956) (“the expression is used ‘to send up a
trial balloon’ to see…how juries are reacting to the particular values and the injuries that they are told about and
shown”) (quoting plaintiff’s lawyer Joseph Sindell). See also Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5 at 1612.
207
See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir., 1998); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706
(5th Cir., 1990); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula”, 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012). Although
increasingly, many litigants are dispensing with even bellwether trials, indexing on a few settlements instead.
Zimmerman, supra note 37.
208
See Daniels & Martin, supra note 96, at 1247-48 (suggesting a connection between jury verdicts and insurance
settlement values); Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1610-12.
209
See Bovbjorg et al., supra note 203, at 919-24.
210
See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5, at 1534 (“the system is, in the words of Sledge, ‘a grid’”)
(internal footnotes omitted); Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1617 (discussing the prevalence of grids in private
settlement markets); McGovern, supra note 27, at 1372; Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, supra note 5, at 268-69.
211
See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5 at 1617; see also note 206, supra.
212
DOBBS & Roberts, supra note 187, §8.1 at 667 (“Personal injury awards are lump-sum awards; unlike workers’
compensation awards, they are not paid out in weekly or monthly sums”); JOHN G. FLEMING, FLEMING’S LAW OF
TORTS §10.20, at 262 (Carolyn Sappideen & Prue Vines, eds., 10th ed. 2011) (“The only form of compensation
known to the common law is a lump sum award”).
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Public systems of administration like workers’ compensation adopt a periodical strategy.

Unemployment compensation systems do the same. Such systems bring their own managerial
bureaucracies to the public law of the claim, often managing cases for years, monitoring the
plaintiff, calculating damages, dispensing payments, and litigating subsequent developments
such as downstream injuries.213 Where tort has front-end uncertainty over how much the court
will rule damages to be, compensation systems with period payments have back-end uncertainty
of how much the injury will ultimately cost.214
In tort law, by contrast, the lump sum rule is foundational. It powerfully conditions the system
of private administration that manages tort claims. The lump sum rule avoids the systems of
claims management that persist for months and years after a claim is presented. It avoids such
cumbersome systems of public claims management, however, at the cost of requiring the costly
calculation of highly uncertain future damages at trial. The lump sum rule produces trials with
armies of dueling experts and statisticians testifying to future probabilities, expected wages, life
expectancies, and more.215
To focus on trial, however, is to miss the way in which the lump sum rule interacts with private
administration and in particular with the private administration of structured settlements. One
thing the lump sum rule does is allocate to the private sphere the conversion of tort damages
from stocks into flows. Private administration manages to accomplish a periodic payment
structure for those plaintiffs who desire it. A crucial institution in the world of private
administration is the structured settlement.216 Structured settlements are private periodic
payment systems, purchased with lump sum awards.217 First entering the scene in the 1960s and
70s,218 they took off in the 1980s219 and by 2016, an estimated $5.8 billion of annuities were
purchased to fund 25,201 structured settlement obligations.220 One study in 2011 found they
account for about 7% of eligible cases, a number that goes up as the size of the damages
increases.221 These data support the idea that companies use structured settlements as a way to
213
See ONTARIO COMMITTEE ON TORT COMPENSATION, REPORT [OF THE] COMMITTEE ON TORT COMPENSATION 10-
13 (1980) (outlining the administrative costs of variable payments); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Lump-Sum Versus Periodic
Damage Awards, 10 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 131, 144 (1981); Stephen D. Sugarman, Damages, in FLEMING’S THE LAW
OF TORTS 261, 263 (10th ed., 2011).
214
FLEMING, supra note 212, at 255-56.
215
See Rea, supra note 213, at 133 (anticipatory damages require a “forecast of future losses” involving “expert
testimony”). For a sense of the numerous, complicated issues involved in such a calculation, see Michael I. Krauss
& Robert A. Levy, Calculating Tort Damages for Lost Future Earnings: The Puzzles of Tax, Inflation, and Risk, 31
GONZ. L. REV. 325 (1996).
216
See DANIEL W. HINDERT, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS AND PERIODIC PAYMENT JUDGEMENTS §1.03(1)(d) (2017);
see also HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY, supra note 187, §25.2 at 501 n.8 (proposing structured settlement as a possible
alternative to lump sum damages).
217
Danninger et al., Negotiating A Structured Settlement, 70 A.B.A. J. 67, 67 (“once there is agreement on a payout
schedule, that schedule is fixed”)
218
See HINDERT, supra note 216, at §1.02(4)(“The first reported uses of periodic payments to settle personal injury
cases was in the 1960s”);
219
Danninger et al., supra note 217, at 67 (“in 1979, no more than 3,000 cases were resolved in structured
settlement. By 1983, that number had increased to 15,000, representing $1.5 billion of defendant premiums”).
220
HINDERT, supra note 216, at §1.03(1)(a). Other sources put the number a bit higher, with one claiming that
“between 50,000 and 60,000 tort claims were settled via structures in 2001.” See Scales, supra note 180, at 882.
221
Patricia Born, Periodic Payments Reform: Who Benefits?, 30 J. OF INS. REG. 197, 210, 216 (2011).
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cope with the liability intermittently imposed by the lump sum rule. By “stretching out”222 large
judgments, insurers can reduce their reserves and increase their profits223 and large companies
can avoid bankruptcy and take advantage of the preferential tax and bankruptcy treatment given
to such arrangements.224 When damages are smaller, however, insurers can close out a case
quickly from existing funds without having to establish additional reserves for the future.225
Where the tort system imposes the risk of large lump sum judgements, private actuaries create
institutions to systematize it.
Structured settlements are often prepared and administered by specialized insurers, who largely
sell them to defendants.226 Alternatively, plaintiffs receiving lump sum settlement awards or
damages awards at trial are free to go into the annuity market and turn their lump sum into a
privately administered periodic payment system. Either way, the lump sum rule helps to sustain
elaborate private bureaucracies of settlement and insurance. The lump sum doctrine undergirds
an elaborate structure of private administration.227
D. Reasonable Care
The basic duty of reasonable care interacts with and facilitates private administration, too.
Reasonableness is the quintessential duty of the common law of torts, the duty to exercise the
care that is due under the circumstances.228 And all by itself, the reasonableness standard creates
powerful incentives to produce systems to administer it outside the individualized inquiries of
the courts.
First-order analysis of the reasonableness rule is ubiquitous in the literature. Some jurists focus
on the wrongfulness of a person’s failure to conduct oneself reasonably.229 Other first-order
interpretations of the reasonableness standard concentrate on the incentives the standard creates
to avoid undue risks.230 Each of these accounts treats the core feature of the reasonableness test
as a kind of fortuitous accident. The heart of the reasonableness test is its variability and
flexibility. What is reasonable at one place or time may or may not be reasonable elsewhere or
at a different time. As Learned Hand put it in his famous Carroll Towing opinion, there is “no
general rule” for negligence – only particularized judgments of negligence under the
222
Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as Structures of Rights, 88 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1953, 1953 (2002).
223
Claude C. Lilly, Alternatives to Lump Sum Payments in Personal Injury Cases, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 243, 244
(1977).
224
See Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as Structures of Rights, 88 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1953, 1962-67 (2002).
225
See Born, supra note 58, at 201; Sugarman, supra note 213, at 277 (“defendant insurers are eager to get these
small claims off their books while keeping their administrative costs as low as possible”).
226
See Dominic P. Carestia, Structured Settlements in Practice, 46 MONT. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985).
227
See HINDERT, supra note 216, at §4.06(1); Danninger et al., supra note 217, at 70 (referring to “annuity brokers”
who “assemble settlement packages”).
228
See PROSSER AND KEETON §31, at 169
229
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 244 (forthcoming 2019) (“the duty
issue…is the issue of whether a certain kind of obligation is owed by a [defendant] to certain [plaintiffs]”);
WEINRIB, supra note 144, at 147 (“wrongdoing consists of the failure to live up to the standard of reasonable care).
230
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3.
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circumstances. 231 It all depends. And therein lies an opportunity for private administration. The
uncertainty of the reasonableness rule creates space for private institutions to move in and cash
out case-by-case uncertainty over the run of a portfolio of cases, turning expensive,
individualized, and uncertain inquiries – what Holmes referred to the as the “featureless
generality”232 of reasonableness – into an administratively streamlined, rule-based process. 233
Offering proof for such a fact-intensive test involves substantial costs, and those costs in turn
create an environment in which efficient private administration is often able to achieve
considerable economies.234
The negligence standard also produces uncertainty. As Robert Rhee observes, this greater
uncertainty helps drive risk-averse plaintiffs into the settlement system with its private
administrative features.235
For both of these reasons – administrative costs and uncertainty -- the Holmesian featureless
generality of the negligence standard produces powerful inducements to enter into privately
administered arrangements. Private administration, it seems, reduces the generality of the public
standard to a private and dynamic set of rules designed to save time and money across the run of
cases.236
Indeed, as it has turned out, private administration performs the very role Holmes thought judges
well-positioned to perform. In 1881, Holmes imagined that it was judges who would rely on
“experience” to reduce standards to rules -- that it would be judges who would take a “state of
facts often repeated in practice” and draw from jury verdicts a particular lesson about what
reason required under that state of facts.237 It turns out that judges are not the only ones who can
save time and effort by promulgating a system of rules. Indeed, in the American tort system it
has been the people who manage tort’s systems of private administration who do the work
Holmes described.238
E. Duty and the Assault on the Citadel
231
United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“there is no general rule to
determine when the absence of a bargee or other attendant will make the owner of the barge liable for injuries to
other vessels if she breaks away from her moorings.”)
232
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1888)
233
See PROSSER AND KEETON §32, at 173; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (arguing that although rules are typically more costly to create than standards, standards are
more difficult to apply to a particular case than rules).
234
See Bruce Hay & Kathryn Spier and (helps create the “settlement surplus” for those who choose to forego trial).
235
See Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125 (2008).
236
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 145-49 (1991).
237
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881).
238
For instance, H. Laurence Ross found that auto claims adjustors often agreed to pay based on whether a
policyholder violated one of several rules, “regardless of intention, knowledge, necessity, and other such
qualifications” as might be normal components of a tort claim. As applied, their accident law included such rules as
whether the claimant was rear ended, favored by a stop sign, favored by a green light, or hit by someone making a
left into oncoming traffic. See ROSS, supra note 32, at 98-101. See also McGovern, supra note 27, at 1370-72 (on
how claims resolution facilities devise heuristics that are not “fuzzy or expensive to apply”).
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In 1931, Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed that the “assault on the citadel of privity is
proceeding apace these days.”239 For a century, the doctrine of privity of contract had shielded
manufacturers by asserting that product sellers and manufacturers had no duty of care other than
to those with whom they had contracted directly.240 Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
had substantial consequences. For one thing, it touched off a multi-decade wave of scholarship
using extended citadel metaphors to describe the doctrinal shift Cardozo had set in motion.241
More importantly, a string of early twentieth century decisions expanded liability beyond direct
purchasers, authorizing suits by people injured by a product, regardless of privity.242
The scholarship in product liability has understandably focused on the doctrinal expansion of
products doctrine in the decades after MacPherson, from Justice Roger Traynor’s early
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. to the Second Restatement in 1964 and
beyond.243 The arc from MacPherson to no-fault products liability is an oft-chronicled sequence
in the doctrinal history of American private law.244
But one of the significant effects of the doctrinal shift in American products liability law was the
concomitant rise of a system of private administration to manage and resolve the claims that
arose out of the new doctrines. The removal of doctrinal barriers turned national markets into a
source of new tort claims – and products cases are fertile soil for private administrative
economies. Product cases involve institutional repeat-play defendants who manage not
individual cases but portfolios of cases over an entire product line. (It is no coincidence that
product liability cases account for over ninety percent of the pending MDL caseload.245)
F. Causation
239
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180 (1931).
240
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842); Michael Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Privity of Contract:
Judicial Activism in the Supreme Court of Canada, 57 U. TORONTO L. J. 269, 269 (2007).
241
See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). For metaphors, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The
Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845 (2016); William A.
Worthington, The “Citadel” Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 227-28
(1995); Baz Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products Liability, 27
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 647 (1977); Samuel J. M. Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation of the
Victory or Consideration of All Interests?, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1,1 (1967); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Fall]; William L.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1099-1100 (1960)
[hereinafter Prosser, Assault].
242
See John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733 (1998);
Prosser, Assault, at 1100-14.
243
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358
(1960); Kenneth S. Abraham, Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1823, 1828-30 (2016); Prosser,
Fall, at 800-05.
244
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
245
See Resnik, supra note 122, at 1802.
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For decades and more, jurists have formulated accounts of the causation requirement.246 For
corrective justice and civil recourse scholars, causation establishes a connection between
wrongdoers and injury victims that, in turn, warrants a duty of repair or empowers injured parties
to seek recourse for their grievances.247 For economically-minded tort thinkers, the causation
requirement is a convenient device for reducing the administrative costs of taxing risky
behavior.248
Our project here, once again, is not to critique any one of these accounts, but rather to add a
further observation about a further practical function of causation doctrine. The law of causation
does not only reflect the moral connection between wrongdoers and their victims, or provide a
mechanism for internalizing externalities, though it may sometimes do some of either or both of
these things. The law of causation also structures and conditions the process by which tort
claims are managed in the systems of private administration. For one thing, causation doctrine
identifies the parties who find themselves working together in a private administrative system.
Only parties with plausible causal connections to one another will find themselves managing
claims. This fact is a deep background structuring feature of tort doctrine and the systems of
private administration that have grown up around it. A number of causation doctrines add
further pieces to the architecture of private administration.
1. Binary causation. The but-for causation inquiry in tort adjudication adopts a binary rather
than a probabilistic approach to causation. Consider the non-swimming plaintiff in New York
Central Railroad Company v. Grimstad.249 Judge Ward decided that Grimstad’s death was not
caused by his employer’s negligent failure to have a buoy on board because Grimstad was more
likely than not to have been unable to stay afloat long enough for such a buoy to get to him. And
so Grimstad’s widow received nothing – not a discounted award, but no award at all. One effect
of the binary character of causation, then, is to drive risk-averse parties, prototypically one-shot
plaintiffs, into settlement at a discount. Private administration allows such plaintiffs to discharge
the risk of a bad outcome on the all-or-nothing question of causation by obtaining a discounted
settlement. Indeed, what it allows such plaintiffs to do is to opt into a private system that adopts
precisely the probabilistic approach that the binary approach of tort law’s causation doctrine
rejects. For in the settlement system, the value of the plaintiff’s claim will be a product of the
probability of her being able to win at trial on the binary causation question.
2. Causal link. The doctrine of “causal link” holds that when a plaintiff alleges a tortfeasor
of injuring her with a specific act—say, driving without his headlights on—she must show that
“the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.”250
Causal link forces a plaintiff to connect the defendant’s conduct (driving without his lights) with
246
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433B (1965); PROSSER AND KEETON §41, at 269; SANDY STEEL, PROOF
OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 1 (2015).
247
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 116-119 (2016); WEINRIB, supra note 144, at 10 (The “master feature
characterizing private law” is the “direct connection” between plaintiff and defendant, as established through such
features as “the requirement that the defendant have caused the plaintiff’s injury”).
248
CALABRESI, supra note 189, at 6-7 n. 8 (referring to causation as a “weasel word”); LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 149, at 229 (“the idea of causation can largely be dispensed with in an economic analysis of torts”).
249
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F.334 (2d Cir. 1920).
250
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69,
71 (1975).
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the type of wrongful injury she sustained (getting hit by his car).251 This doctrine has at least two
significant effects on the world of private administration. For one thing, it allows plaintiffs to
connect their injuries to large-scale actors whose conduct generates risk. Such large-scale
defendants have motive and opportunity to establish systems for the management of the claims.
At the same time, the general causation test252 posed by the causal link doctrine requires
plaintiffs to make substantial upfront investments that are generic across all such cases. And
where the law requires large upfront investments that can be inexpensively reused between cases
by many different plaintiffs, it invites aggregation. 253 Consider, for example, the “trial in a box”
strategy of aggregation by which plaintiffs’ bar trade associations share information about certain
recurring injuries.254 Early mechanisms of information sharing among plaintiffs’ lawyers
organizations accomplished much the same end beginning in the middle of the twentieth
century.255 And before that, enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers with portfolios of the same kinds of
claims were able to amortize the cost of developing evidence on general causation across the run
of claims.
Consider, too, the effects of the general causation requirement in toxic tort cases. As Roger
Cramton has observed, toxic tort plaintiffs have an incentive to wait for other plaintiffs to file
first so that that can free ride off some other party’s expensive research. By contrast, plaintiffs’-
side lawyers who aggregate claims reap the rewards of expensive generic proofs by amortizing
them across a portfolio of claims. General causation requirements thus create incentives for
plaintiffs to band together and aggregate their claims.256 And this tendency towards aggregation
has grown even stronger as courts have started to require more expensive scientific evidence.
Since Daubert257 and Kumho258 asked courts to assess the scientific validity of different types of
evidence directly,259 judges have increasingly demanded epidemiological evidence to prove
251
Zuchowitz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 390-91 (1998) (Calabresi, J.); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170-71 (1920).
252
In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs must show “general” and “specific” causation. To prove general causation, a plaintiff
must show that the substance in question is capable of causing the type of injury in question. To show specific
causation, plaintiff must demonstrate that her particular injuries were caused by her exposure to the toxic substance.
Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc. , 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007); Raynor v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 104
F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2120-31 (1997).
253
NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 16 (aggregation achieves efficiency benefits by “spread[ing] the fixed costs of
generic assets over more units”); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and Settlement Class
Actions, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 818 (giving the example of discovery and expert testimony as generic assets for
proving causation amenable to collective, pooled investment).
254
See NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at 14; Scott Paetty, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 845,
874-75 (2008) (“[A] trial in a box is a package that contains rulings and materials on” relevant parts of a trial).
255
See WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS, supra note 74, at 243-44.
256
See Cramton, supra note 253, at 821 (“Collective action may solve the ‘free rider’ problem of. . .some litigants
benefitting from, but not contributing to, the expensive efforts of another litigant in discovering causation”); Paetty,
supra note 254, at 874 (noting “rulings and materials” on general causation as one of the items commonly in a “trial
in a box” kit).
257
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
258
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
259
See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1563, 1565 (2000).
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general causation.260 Epidemiological studies are frequently more expensive than other forms of
evidence for general causation.261 To the extent that they raise the fixed costs of initiating
litigation and encourage plaintiffs to pool their resources, expensive general causation
requirements encourage aggregation.
3. Specific causation: The flip side of general causation and causal link is the obligation to
prove specific causation: namely, whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was caused by the
defendant’s tortious act in the relevant sense.262 Under what David Rosenberg calls the “strong
version” of the preponderance rule, plaintiffs must provide some “particularistic” proof of
causation, even if they have probabilistic evidence showing the defendant is more than 50
percent likely to have caused the harm.263
In many cases, including toxic tort cases, such proof is often difficult to provide.264 And it is
often exceedingly expensive, requiring investments that have little or no value for subsequent
cases.265
Such highly expensive specific causation requirements produce real savings opportunities for
administrative alternatives to tort, whether public or private.266 Such systems work not in
specifics, but in averages. They omit the work of specifically connecting plaintiff and defendant.
In the world of private settlement, repeat-play defendants and repeat-play plaintiffs’ lawyers get
the opportunity to economize on investigative costs and to share the gains all around.267 This is
essentially what workers’ compensation achieves for the processing of work injuries; private
administration means that the same process happens in tort, but in private not in public.
260
Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2001); David
E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 61-69 (2008) (courts increasingly
reject many alternative means of proving causation). For a survey of the alternatives to epidemiological studies, see
Beecher-Monas, supra note 259, at 1604-24.
261
Geistfeld, supra note 260, at 1016 (epidemiological studies tend to be more expensive than other types of
studies).
262
See STEEL, supra note 246, at 6.
263
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System,
97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
264
Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1004 (2017).
265
See Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently?: Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic
Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2010) (“most specific causation testimony [in toxic tort cases] is presented as
‘differential diagnosis’ testimony”). See generally Joseph Sanders and Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of
Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and
Substantive Law, 64 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001) (on differential diagnosis testimony).
266
Nor are they alone in making toxic torts prime candidates for private administrative solutions. David Rosenberg
explains that the “centralized corporate sources, statistical predictability, massive scale, and relative uniformity of
disease risks,” make such torts less costly to adjudicate on a per-case basis than an equal number of generic accident
cases. Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 855.
267
Consider the case of Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., where plaintiffs hired a single doctor to fill out one thousand
standard form affidavits for as many plaintiffs, and the court rejected the affidavits as insufficiently detailed. The
case highlights the push and pull between legal requirements that impose economic costs and private administrators
who try to economize around them. Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2000); William A.
Ruskin, Prove It or Lose It: Defending Against Mass Tort Claims Using Lone Pine Orders, 26 AM. J. OF TRIAL
ADVOC. 599, 607 (2003).
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4. Collective causation: Doctrinal theories of “collectivized”268 causation such as market

share liability,269 alternative liability,270 and industry-wide liability271 absolve plaintiffs of the
need to identify a specific defendant. Where adopted, these have been important doctrines in
opening new categories of viable tort claims. And in this sense, collective causation doctrines
(like most liability-extending doctrine) have created new classes of claims susceptible to private
administration.
The most interesting interaction between collective causation and private administration,
however, recalls the binary causation point with which we started this subsection. For despite
inroads by certain collective causation doctrines, the courts have been resistant to the statistical
turn and have imposed the binary approach of traditional causation doctrine.272 The rejections of
the market share approach in lead paint cases273 and in other areas, for example, are part of a
more general reluctance by the courts to embrace statistical alternatives to the binary approach.
Private administration, by contrast, is inescapably statistical. It relies indispensably on

aggregates and averages to accomplish its goals. And in this sense it repeats in the private sector
a version of what juries accomplished a century ago, when the contributory negligence rule
dominated the law books. Observers of tort under the contributory negligence rule agreed that
juries essentially created a de facto comparative negligence regime. They resisted entering
verdicts against plaintiffs for contributory negligence.274 Today, it is not the juries doing the
work so much as the system of private administration. Settlement systems have displaced the
binary law of causation with statistical aggregation in private administration, producing a de
facto world of statistical causation in tort, much as juries once produced a de facto world of
comparative negligence -- doctrine be damned!
G. Apportionment (joint liability)
Today, over half of tort suits arising out of accidental bodily injuries involve multiple
defendants.275 Some of these cases can be sorted out using the doctrines governing
268
See generally Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 890-932 (2005)
269
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487
(1989), cert. denied sub. nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
270
See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
271
See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nimours & Co., Inc., 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
272
Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971)
273
Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc.,
994 F.2d 112, 123-29 (3d Cir. 1993); Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market Share Liability Beyond DES
Cases: The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 125 (2006)
(“Initially, litigation against manufacturers of lead pigment was no exception”). But see Thomas ex rel. Gramling v.
Mallett, 285 Wis.2d 236, 255-56 (2005) (extending Wisconsin’s “risk-contribution theory” of liability to lead paint
manufacturers).
274
See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164 (1920); Daniel Kessler, Fault, Settlement, and Negligence Law, 26
RAND J. ECON. 296 (1995).
275
David Carvel et al., Accidental Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 43 RAND J. OF ECON. 51, 52
(2012).
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causation276—if one tortfeasor breaks the plaintiff’s shoulder and another breaks her shin, each
tortfeasor pays for the damage they caused. In many cases, however, the injury is indivisible. In
these cases, the tort doctrine governing liability apportionment structures the character of the
settlement process.
Most obviously, joint and several liability,277 where implemented, has helped bring about the
private administration of the settlement process by increasing the exposure of large, deep-pocket,
repeat-play entities and thus increasing the role of parties with motive and opportunity to
rationalize the settlement process. Consider the theme park,278 the product manufacturer,279 or
the hospital.280 These are precisely the kind of repeat players likely to use and establish private
administrative regimes. Joint liability increases the number of cases such deep pocketed
defendants must address, creating good reason to incur the up-front costs of investing in private
administration.
Indeed, from a second-order perspective, joint and several liability is the allocation rule most
favorable to systems of private administration. Joint liability without contribution makes
settlement harder to routinize because the value of a given settlement under joint liability
depends so radically on litigation strategy of other joint tortfeasors. Several liability, for its part,
minimizes the role of the deep-pocketed repeat player defendant. Joint and several liability, by
contrast, functions to organize otherwise messy groups of defendants and foregrounds the role of
those defendants most likely by virtue of their scale to be in a position to create economical
administrative systems for resolving claims. The joint liability of repeat-play defendants is a
machine for the promotion of private administration.
H. Apportionment (settlement and contribution)
More subtly, though just as importantly, the apportionment rules relating to settlements under
joint-and-several liability are incomprehensible except by reference to the private settlement
process. Indeed, no other area of tort doctrine has given more self-conscious attention to the
promotion of private administration than the rules apportioning liability between settling and
non-settling tortfeasors.
276
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 26 (2000).
277
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 10 (2000).
278
See, e.g., Walt Disney Co. v. Wood, 515 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1987), superceded by statute as recognized in Fabre v.
Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). For an extended discussion of this case and its implications for how we should
think about joint and several liability, see Donald Gifford & Christopher Robinette, Apportioning Liability in
Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 701,
754-5 (2014); Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not) In a Restatement: ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability Apportionment, 33
CONN. L. REV. 77, 104-07 (2000); Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third) Apportionment As It
Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L. J. 565, 586 (2000).
279
Injured employees can often use joint liability to hold a product manufacturer liable for a workplace accident
where a workers’ compensation statute might otherwise preclude them from having a tort claim. See, e.g., Liriano v.
Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2nd Cir. 1999); Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992).
280
Victims of medical malpractice often sue a wide assortment of medical institutions in addition to their negligent
physicians. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 2017); Garcia Colon v. Garcia Rinaldi, 340
F. Supp.2d 113, 127 (D.P.R. 2004); Velez v. Tuma, 492 Mich. 1 (2012); Maloney v. Valley Medical Facilities, Inc.,
603 Pa. 399 (2009).
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In cases of settlement with a subset of the relevant tortfeasors, the old rule of joint liability
without contribution actions among joint tortfeasors had some virtues. It allowed a party
desiring peace to settle and be done with a claim. Settlement was final, with no lurking risk of a
residual contribution action by a joint tortfeasor.281 The old rule of no contribution actions also
created powerful incentives for each tortfeasor to settle. Settlement avoided the risk of a
damages award for which a non-settling tortfeasor might be held fully liable. But such
incentives were actually too strong. The joint liability rule with no contribution action produced
too many opportunities for the plaintiff to collude with one or more tortfeasors at the expense of
others. The old no-contribution rule thus interfered with the rational administration of claims by
creating a race to collusive settlement.282
Ever since the advent of joint and several tort liability, jurists have actively debated which
apportionment doctrines best facilitate the private settlement of claims. Judges, legislators,
insurers, and tort lawyers have debated fine doctrinal questions about whether to permit
contribution actions against settling defendants,283 and about which set-off rules (if any) ought to
exist for the benefit of non-settling defendants at trial.284
Consider the contribution rules governing whether one jointly liable defendant who has paid
damages to a plaintiff may sue a fellow tortfeasor to collect the fellow tortfeasor’s share of the
damages.285 A particularly thorny issue for this doctrine is whether a non-settling tortfeasor who
litigates and loses can bring a contribution action against a settling tortfeasor. If no contribution
action is permitted, the litigating defendant may end up paying some portion of the settling
defendant’s share of the damages. If a contribution action is permitted, the settling defendant
will not be able to buy peace from the plaintiff.286
The law’s earliest effort to solve this problem seemed to make things worse, not better. The first
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) permitted non-settling tortfeasors to
bring contribution actions against settling tortfeasors.287 The Act provided that a settlement
281
Merrywether v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) (articulating the rule of no contribution); Frank H.
Easterbrook et al., Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. L. & ECON.
331, 343-68 (1980) (arguing no contribution might be more efficient in many cases). The pervasiveness of this “old
rule,” however, has long been a matter of some contention. Easterbrook et al., supra, at 332-37.
282
Easterbrook et al., supra note 281, at 333 (“[A] plaintiff could settle for small amounts with all but one defendant
and then ‘go after’ that defendant for the remaining joint liability”); Charles O. Gregory, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1172 (1941).
283
Compare UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §5 (1939) with UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT §4 (1955); see also Easterbrook et al., supra note 281.
284
Compare UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §5 (1939) with UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT §4 (1955) (both specifying set offs in the amount of the settling tortfeasor’s payment to the
plaintiff) with the proportional liability rule (specifying set-off in the amount of the settling tortfeasor’s share as
determined at trial). See Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 668 F.3d, at 993-95 (describing how settlement offset
rules affected an insurer’s decision about whether or not to litigate); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 NYU L. REV. 427 (1994); Alper Nakkas, Settling with Multiple
Litigants, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 125, 125 (2010); Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, 259, 322 (A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
285
PROSSER AND KEETON, §50, at 336.
286
Nakkas, supra note 284, at 125.
287
Comment, subsection (b) UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §4 (1955).
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would only relieve the settling defendant from future contribution actions if the settlement
reduced the plaintiff’s damages against remaining non-settling tortfeasors by the released
tortfeasor’s share of the damages.288 Concerned parties soon reported that defendants were
reluctant to settle because settlement did not bring peace absent the plaintiff’s agreement to
relieve non-settling defendants of the risk of paying damages greater than their share.289
Plaintiff’s attorneys, in turn, were reluctant to accept such settlements because they had no idea
how valuable these settlements were worth.290 The result was widely thought to be a disaster for
private settlement. Insurers’ trade associations and the plaintiffs’ bar both opposed the 1939
UCATA precisely because the regime interfered with the settlement process in which these
ostensible adversaries had a mutual interest.291 By contrast, Wisconsin was widely praised for its
rule providing that nonsettling tortfeasors had no contribution action against settling
tortfeasors.292 Under the Wisconsin practice, observers reported that settlements flourished.293
By the middle of the 1950s, the first UCATA was replaced by a new one that switched the
contribution rule, eliminating contribution actions altogether.294
Today, a substantial literature in the field suggests that the bargaining effects of particular
apportionment rules are highly contingent on things such as the number of parties involved, the
solvency of the parties, and the correlation of expected trial outcomes between and among the
parties.295 Apportionment rules may prove fatal to settlement,296 or they may facilitate
settlement.297 It all depends. The important point here is that virtually everyone agrees that the
288
Id.
289
Id. (“No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined
on the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to which he will not be a party.”).
290
Id. (“Plaintiff’s attorneys are said to refuse to accept any release [containing the provision] because they have no
way of knowing what they are giving up.”).
291
Id. (noting this objection to have been a chief factor in the law’s defeat in New York and crediting this objection
as “one of the chief causes of complaint where the Act has been adopted, and one of the main objections to its
adoption”); Fleming James, Jr. [Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense]: Replication, 54 HARV. L. REV.
1178, 1182 (1941) (citing a 1939 memorandum from the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives criticizing
the Act on the grounds that it would “restrain, hinder, and delay the settlement of cases”).
292
Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1162
(1941); Donald W. Fisher, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 OHIO STATE L. J. 674, 675 (1948)
(“[T]he joint tort procedure of Wisconsin . . . is frequently singled out for approval.”); Charles O. Gregory,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 365, 365 (“[T]he splendid contribution
practice which has developed in Wisconsin”).
293
James, supra note 292, at 1162.
294
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §4 (1955); see William Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41
CAL. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1953) (observing that the 1939 UCATA would need to be withdrawn and redrafted and had
only been adopted in nine jurisdictions). Subsequently, some states have adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, which reduces a plaintiff’s judgement against non-settling defendants by the settling defendants’ share of the
liability. Comment, UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT §6 (1977). See also UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY
ACT §8 (2003) (adopting the 1977 approach).
295
Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 284; Spier, supra note 284, at 321-22.
296
Consider the apportioned share setoff rule under a system of joint and several liability, whereby one joint
defendant’s settlement reduces the judgement against the non-settling defendant by the settling defendant’s share of
the liability. When the defendants’ probabilities of winning are independent and litigation costs are low, the
apportioned share rule should reduce the likelihood of settlement. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 284, at 466-67.
297
Consider the pro tanto setoff rule, whereby one joint defendant’s settlement reduces the judgement against the
other joint defendant by the amount of the settlement. Where the two defendants’ probabilities of winning are
positively correlated, the pro tanto rule should encourage settlement under a regime of joint and several liability,
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crucial criterion for evaluating this class of tort apportionment rules is the extent to which they
facilitate or obstruct the private settlement process.298
III. The Private Administration of First Order Goals
A second-order view of tort as private administration does not require the displacement
of the principal first-order accounts of tort. Corrective justice and civil recourse interpretations
will continue to do battle with functionalism.299 But focusing on the world of private
administration has important ramifications for the contenders in the struggle for first-order
primacy. On one hand, the system of private administration places real limits on the domain of
corrective justice. Private administration displaces inquiry into rights and wrongs and substitutes
aggregate administrative management for individualized attention to fine questions of justice.
On the other hand, systems of private administration challenge efficiency-oriented accounts of
tort by creating settlement practices that routinely and by design advance the private interests of
the parties over public well-being.
Private administration also revises an influential account of the role of law in American
public policy. Since Tocqueville nearly two centuries ago, observers have remarked on the
special authority of lawyers in American policy-making. One influential strand of that literature
holds that lawyer-dominated public policy entails adversarial and legalistic process. But the
pervasiveness of private administration presents a new look at the mechanics of legalism in the
actually existing world. The second-order world of private administration is quietly managed by
repeat-play actors whose interests are best understood not only as adverse (though sometimes
they are that), but also as codependent and even aligned. Private administration reveals that the
accomplishment of public policy goals through lawyers and courts can be bureaucratic and
administrative rather than adversarial and legalistic.
A. The Private Administration of Justice
According to the corrective justice view, tort law is best understood “from within and not as the
juridical manifestation of a set of extrinsic purposes.”300 The corrective justice interpretation
insists that tort’s animating principles are internal and relational.301 For corrective justice
theorists, the problem is that the defendant has wronged the plaintiff. Because she has violated
her obligation to care for the plaintiff, the defendant must restore the equilibrium between them
because any settlement below the settling defendant’s share increases the amount the non-settling defendant would
pay in judgement. Nakkas, supra note 284, at 125-26.
298
Comment, UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §6 (1977) (weighing a rule’s propensity to encourage settlement as
one of the major determining factors in its adoption); Comment, subsection (b), UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT §4 (1955)
299
For a powerful new statement of the civil recourse view, see GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 229.
300
See WEINRIB, supra note 144, at 5.
301
See Rustad, supra note 3, at 421 (“civil recourse’s focus is about one-on-one relationships between an injured
plaintiff and…an individual defendant”); JULES COLEMAN, T HE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 16 (2001) (“Tort law’s structural core is represented by case-by-case
adjudication in which particular victims seek redress for certain losses from those whom they claim are
responsible.”); WEINRIB, supra note 144, at 10 (the “master feature characterizing private law” is “the direct
connection between the particular plaintiff and the particular defendant”).
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by repairing the wrongful loss.302 Or—under an alternate formation—the wrong has created a
harm which should be allocated on the basis of moral desert.303 According to the closely related
theory of civil recourse, the plaintiff has been aggrieved by the defendant and is empowered by
the law to achieve redress in the courts.304 The courts then decide how the plaintiff may use the
state to make demands on the defendant.305 At the core of all these conceptions of tort is a
concern about restoring the moral balance between two parties. Tortfeasors violate the rights of
victims, and tort law exists to restore the balance that is upset by tortious wrongs.
The first-order literature in corrective justice and civil recourse has long been preoccupied with
the challenge offered to the corrective justice account by the consequentialist alternatives. But
the practical challenge of our time to such views of tort is not the economists’ efficiency
theories, though the literature could easily leave one with that impression. The practical problem
for corrective justice accounts arises out of the pervasiveness of settlement.306
In some respects, corrective justice rises to the challenge. Corrective justice scholars have long
contended that tort law’s animating principles survive the pervasive fact of settlement.307
Persons with claims sounding in corrective justice are free to discharge those claims if they so
choose. Settlement, after all, is another way in which an empowered victim may achieve redress
for a wrongful injury.308 Indeed the streamlined settlement systems made possible by private
administration will often advance the projects of corrective justice and civil recourse. The aim of
such systems is precisely to reduce the huge administrative costs of tort, and such costs are
obstacles to the realization of corrective justice and civil redress.
In other respects, however, private administration is a threat to the normative project of repairing
wrongful losses. Many tort claimants never encounter anything resembling the finely wrought
302
See Rustad, supra note 3, at 463; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J.
695, 707 (2003) (“Corrective justice theory…explains that one who has wrongfully injured another has a duty of
repair running to the victim.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 349,
350-51; COLEMAN, supra note 301, at 15 ( “individuals who are responsible for the wrongful losses have a duty to
repair the losses”) (emphasis omitted);
303
See Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 421 (1982) (arguing that torts give
rise to wrongful gains which must be annulled”); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 449, 496-513 (1992) (positing that the costs of wrongs should be borne among those responsible according to
their degree of fault).
304
GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 229, at 6.
305
See Rustad, supra note 3, at 434 (“In Goldberg’s view, tort law is not a system of compensation, but
fundamentally about victim empowerment”); Zipursky, supra note 302, at 733-53. Pure corrective justice theorists
see the duty of repair as central to tort; civil recourse theorists understand it as important because of it governs the
more fundamental goal of tort, which is to articulate when and how plaintiffs may seek redress from defendants. Id.,
at 735. But see Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2011)
(arguing civil recourse theory is a corrective justice account of tort).
306
The historical literature in tort made this observation some time ago, when it moved from counting appellate
opinions to studying docket sheets. See, e.g., RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN
NEW YORK CITY, 1870-1910 (1992); Friedman, supra note 32, at 351-78. The next step was to see that even docket
studies are likely misleading. The claims files of firms in dangerous industries are much better. See Issaacharoff &
Witt, supra note 5; Kaczorowski, supra note 32.
307
Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 Indiana L.J. 370 (1992).
308
See Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 47
(2017) (“The holder of a right ought to be able to decide how far—and in what forum—she will press it”).
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doctrinal distinctions of the law of private wrongs. To the contrary, they encounter a privately
administered settlement system structured and managed in the law’s shadow. As we showed in
Part II, that system reflects and arises out of the basic doctrinal principles of American tort law;
those background principles shape and condition private administration.309 But privately
administered settlement practices reflect anticipated trial outcomes only wholesale and in the
aggregate. In individual cases, the settlement awards available in systems of private
administration will depart from what individualized corrective justice would demand. Settlement
systems alter the substantive rights and duties that parties encounter in the actually existing
world. And they do so because powerful actors and institutions in the tort claims system reshape
the regime of actually existing rights and wrongs.
The settlement system is a marketplace. But it is no idealized free marketplace of autonomous

choice. Tort plaintiffs do not consent in some free and unconstrained fashion to part with claims
in return for redress designed for their claim. Instead, like so many other markets, the settlement
system is characterized by powerful institutions, market-dominant actors, and sharply limited
choices. Settlement practices in tort claims are best thought of not as a free market, but as
privately managed administration that structures, shapes, and constrains the free choice of tort
claimants. The key actors who function as administrators of private settlement systems –
insurers, repeat-play defendants, and plaintiffs’ representatives – are often more concerned with
resolving liability claims quickly and efficiently than they are with resolving them justly.
Particularized justice or redress is too costly for most cases, and so the private administrative
state deals in aggregates. As we have seen, contextual fault standards give way to bright line
rules;310 detailed accounts of actually sustained harms are compensated according to heuristic
grids of anticipated damages;311 and complex issues of causation are reduced to a few boxes on a
form.312 Private administrators, in other words, reshape the doctrines of the tort system to
accommodate the efficient resolution of claims. (Witness the well-documented fact that
settlement tends to overcompensate small, poorly-substantiated claims and undercompensate
large and meritorious claims.313) It is no wonder, then, that Christopher Robinette (building on
the foundational work of H. Laurence Ross and others) has argued that the aggregative
techniques of routinization pose a serious challenge to the corrective justice account of tort.314
Indeed, on closer examination, the idea of claimants freely choosing to settle their corrective
justice claims is often more fantasy than reality. Nora Engstrom notes that settlement mills
hustle their clients into quick settlements, often threatening to raise fees if plaintiffs insist on trial
in order to “dissuade a client from insisting on her day in court.”315 In one study of litigants in all
personal injury cases up to $50,000, 11% of litigants never met with their lawyers at all.316 Only
18% believed they exercised “a lot” of control over their case,317 with 46% blaming their lawyer
309
See Section II.A supra.
310
See notes 236-238 supra and accompanying text.
311
See notes 209-211 supra and accompanying text.
312
See, e.g., note 267 supra and accompanying text.
313
See note 43, supra and accompanying text.
314
Robinette, supra note 5.
315
Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 5 at 1526.
316
Hensler, supra note 37, at 93.
317
Id., at 95.
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for their lack of control.318 One can only imagine what the statistics would look like for
settlement mills specifically. While litigants’ perceptions may not necessarily be reliable
indicators of how much control they actually exerted, such perceptions are a problem for those
who argue that claimants are empowered by tort to seek redress as they see fit.
Consider too that private administrative bodies not only alter the substantive rights and
obligations of tort, they sometimes do so in patently unfair fashion.319 Resource imbalances
between litigants can force parties into unfair settlements.320 And many private administrative
bodies are in fact designed to confuse, hector, and demoralize plaintiffs into acquiescing to
speedy—and small—settlements. Henry Farber and Michelle White, for instance, surveyed one
hospital’s informal claims resolution process for patents’ tort claims. They found it mainly
existed for the hospitals to secure information about how litigious the patient was. 321 The claims
resolution process rarely settled cases and when it did, it did so at a considerable discount over
the settlement patients received if they initiated a lawsuit.322 Goldberg recognizes the problem
these types of institutions pose to the corrective justice view of tort. He concedes that it would
significantly undermine the enterprise of tort if lawyers recommend settlement to maximize the
returns to their portfolio of claims.323 And there seems little doubt that in many domains of tort
practice this is precisely what happens.324
A system of private administration may, to be sure, offer real advantages in ensuring that people
get their just deserts. For instance, private administration holds out the promise of smoothing the
problem of unevenly distributed moral luck. Under a fault-based system of tort law, careful
drivers injured by solvent careless drivers receive compensation. Equally careful injured drivers
(in precisely the same moral position) receive no such compensation if the other driver who
causes them injury exercised due care or is otherwise judgment proof. Thus, a blameless driver’s
compensation in tort depends on whether they were “lucky” enough to be hit by a solvent
careless driver.325 By the same token, the sanctions on careless drivers also depend on luck;
whether or not a careless driver pays for is carelessness in tort depends in substantial part on his
good or bad luck as to whether a pedestrian happens to be in the wrong spot as the he careers
down the street.326 Settlement systems do not do away with such moral luck altogether. But by
aggregating away from the particulars of particular claims, key features of the private
318
Id., at 96. For more extensive examination of the attorney-client relationship, see Id., at 92-97.
319
Efforts to save money may lead claims resolution facilities to violate their own procedural rules—the Manville
Personal Injury Trust, for instance, violated its “first-in, first out” rule by attempting to settle any case scheduled for
trial, regardless of when it was filed. Id., at 175.
320
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1076-78 (1984).
321
Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical
Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994).
322
Id., at 802.
323
See John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VALPARAISO L. REV. 1221, 1266-67 (2008).
324
Erichson, supra note 34, at 1020-22; Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 5; Issacharoff & Witt, supra
note 5; Reemus & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 160-63; Witt, Private Bureaucratic Legalism, supra note 5.
325
See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 165, 165-
66 (2008). On moral luck generally, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979).
326
Baker, supra note 325, at 168-70.
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administrative system -- insurance and settlement in particular -- smooth out some of the morally
arbitrary features of tort adjudications.327
On the other hand, the same capacity to predict and allocate risk that allows private
administrators to solve some problems of moral luck also entrenches and recreates unjust
patterns of discrimination and domination. It is no secret that the structure of tort law reproduces
discrimination on the basis of gender and race.328 To the extent private administration reflects
tort law, it reflects these biases. Indeed, it may make the discrimination worse. Where the tort
system uses race-based and gender-based economic data to set compensation, it risks allowing
injustice in one area to create injustice in another. Martha Chamallas gives the example of tort
law’s use of demographic data to calculate a victim’s lost earning capacity; using such data
allows racist and sexist employment decisions to create racist and sexist tort compensation.329
But the tort system often uses discriminatory actuarial categories when individualized data is not
available.330 Substituting predictive categories for individualized treatment is one of the bedrock
tenets of private administration. It should come as no surprise, then, that private administration
often recreates some of the problematic dynamics Chamallas and others identify in tort damages.
As early as the turn of the 20th century, railroad executives encoded their prejudices into their
settlement practices by dividing claimants into demographic categories.331 Executives believed
juries were more sympathetic to women than men,332 and less sympathetic to black plaintiffs
than white plaintiffs.333 When one railroad compiled detailed records of its settlements, it found
that it gave black plaintiffs disproportionately small settlements, while it offered women
disproportionately generous compensation.334 This problem still pervades many different types
of private administrative institutions today. For instance, insurers are often accused of engaging
in racial and gender discrimination in setting premiums and offering coverage. When confronted,
defenders respond that they are merely offering coverage tailored to the risk profile of the
individual in question.335
In submitting to private administration, plaintiffs may lose more than autonomy. The experience
of adjudication in private administration is qualitatively different and may well deny plaintiffs
more than merely their just deserts. Scott Hershovitz, for instance, has pointed out that the
327
For a more comprehensive treatment of how insurance ameliorates some of the problems of moral luck in tort,
see Kenneth Abraham, Tort Luck and Liability Insurance, 70 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 11-34 (2017). To the extent private
administration substitutes the vicissitudes of judicial discretion for a more streamlined and consistent set of recovery
values, it might reduce yet another aspect of moral luck.
328
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 195 (tort law offers lower penalties for torts committed against women and
minority racial groups); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1999). See also notes 11-12, supra.
329
See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender Specific Economic Data in Tort
Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994).
330
See Id., at 79-84.
331
WELKE, supra note 57, at 105-112.
332
Id., at 108.
333
Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 HOWARD L. J. 99, 108-110 (2005);
334
335
Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to Credit, and Insurance: An
Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts,
1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 593-95 (1996).
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structure of tort law delivers “collateral benefits” for victims that exceed the mere value of their
monetary compensation.336 Through tort litigation, victims are empowered to seek answers for
why the tortfeasor harmed them, participate in a public conversation about the duties we owe to
one another, and other indirect benefits of the organization of the tort system.337 These collateral
benefits often sound in corrective justice—the tort system assigns responsibility for harms as
well as compensation, and the assignment of responsibility is often central to making a plaintiff
whole.338 Civil recourse theorists may also add the tort system empowers a plaintiff to demand
an explanation from any defendant, regardless of whether the plaintiff has actually suffered a
wrong.339 Because private administrative bodies are not homogenous, some may capture some
of the collateral benefits Hershovitz outlines.340 For instance, where profitable, some repeat
litigants have incorporated apologies into their mass settlement practices.341 And some dedicated
private administrators attempt to make claimants feel heard, respected, and given individual
treatment.342
But the structure of private administration more typically omits the collateral benefits of
traditional tort law. Private settlements are just that: private. Private actors do not generally
make public announcement of the resolutions they reach, and often the terms of the settlements
they reach include nondisclosure agreements prohibiting such announcements.343 Such failure to
disclose disrupts the expressive collateral benefit of tort: confidential settlements do not force the
tort system to express the duties we owe to one another publicly and do not allow litigants to
argue for modifications to the prevailing standard of care.344 In moving away from individualized
consideration to aggregate treatment, private administration also deny litigants the ability to tell
their story.345
336
Hershovitz, supra note 4, at 71.
337
Id, at 71-74. Hershovitz also explains how the procedure of bringing a tort suit has “collateral costs” as well,
including incentives to make evidence of errors more difficult to obtain, litigation-related aggravation, and other
harms brought on by the specific operation of the tort system. Id., at 74-75.
338
Id, at 95-100. For theorists who argue apology and assignment of responsibility are part of a corrective justice
remedy, see Prue Vines, Apologizing to Avoid Liability: Cynical Civility or Practical Morality?, 27 SYD. L. REV.
483 (2005). For those who disagree, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329 (2002) (“the duty to
apologize…[is] not derived from corrective justice”).
339
Hershovitz, supra note 4, at 100-01.
340
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 513, 519 (1998)
(describing how participants in the Dalkon Shield Claimant’s Trust had several choices of claims resolution
procedures); Hensler, supra note 37, at 182 (discussing how claims administrative facilities can run the spectrum
from “administrative” to “adjudicative”).
341
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349,
358-60 (2008) (surveying large institutions that offered apologies as part of their settlement process and noting that
apologies facilitated settlement).
342
See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 340.
343
The rate of secret settlement is contested. For a more extensive discussion see Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura
J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1460-64 (2006);
Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 906-10 (2012). See generally, Scott A.
Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867-70
(2007) (on the enforceability of confidentiality agreements in settlements).
344
See Hershovitz, supra note 308, at 45-47; Fiss, supra note 320, at 1085-87.
345
See Hensler, supra note 37, at 99; E. Allan Lind et al., In The Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990) (finding personal injury litigants were
more satisfied with arbitration than with bilateral settlement because they felt their cases received more respectful
53

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B. The Private Administration of Efficiency
In the efficiency view, tort law is predominantly functional. Tort judgments are best, on this
view, when they minimize social costs by encouraging the allocation of risks to their least cost
avoiders.346 The efficiency view adopts the ex ante perspective: it inquires into the incentive
effects of tort liability for future behavior.347 And because it adopts ex ante posture, the
efficiency account of tort law necessarily contemplates a certain kind of private administration,
namely the private behavioral response to the risk of future tort liability. In this respect, private
administration of the ex ante variety is not a challenge to functionalism but its fulfillment. A
century ago, for example, Taylorism and scientific management of the workplace arose hand-in-
glove with the new liability regime of workmen’s compensation.348
This article has focused on a different kind of Taylorism, namely the scientific management of
the claims process after the fact of injury, where the private administration of claims proceeds in
the service of a kind of ex post efficiency. Speedy settlements reduce the transaction costs by
which accident costs are allocated and reallocated. And there is reason to think that private
administration has achieved significant savings. Over the past half-century, the aggregate
administrative costs of tort claims relative to the total amount of tort transfers has decreased.349
In important ways, however, ex post private administrative practices in the claims administration
process depart from the project of advancing efficient allocations, and indeed depart from the
project of promoting the public welfare under any plausible definition. Private administrative
practices are created by private actors for self-regarding reasons. They arise out of public view
and with little public accountability. Where efficiency-minded theorists ignore the ways private
administration changes their models, they entrust social planning to the very actors they seek to
regulate.350 Divergence between the private interests of the parties in tort law’s far-flung and
private systems of settlement are thus virtually inevitable.
Consider the widespread existence of nondisclosure agreements in tort settlements. William

Sage and his colleagues conclude that nearly 90% of medical malpractice settlements in the
University of Texas system include nondisclosure agreements.351 Defense lawyers routinely
treatment); Menkel-Medow, supra note 340, at 528-36 (some forms of alternative dispute resolution may allow
plaintiffs to feel heard).
346
CALABRESI, supra note 189, at 27 (the principle function of accident law is to minimize the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding them”); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE xvii
(2002) (“social decisions should be based exclusively on their effects on the welfare of individuals—and,
accordingly, should not depend on notions of fairness, justice, or cognate concepts”).
347
Barbara J. Fried, Ex Ante / Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123 (2003).
348
John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2003)
349
See note 95, supra.
350
Here, we especially build on the insight of Keith Hylton, who argues that economically-inclined tort theorists
must include the costs of litigation in their models of how tort law allocates the cost of accidents. Keith N. Hylton,
Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991).
351
William M. Sage et al., Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Medical Malpractice Settlements by a Large
Academic Health Care System, 175 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. INTERNAL MED. 1130, 1132 (2015) (finding 88.7% of
medical malpractice settlements made by the University of Texas System contained nondisclosure agreements).
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report that they include confidentiality clauses in their settlement agreements as a matter of
course.352 But nondisclosure agreements open up a gap between private and public interests.
They allow private parties to buy and sell information that is of value to the rest of us.353 They
deprive the public of valuable information that would allow parties to manage their risks more
effectively moving into the future, and they do so because the law of settlement contract
enforcement allows the sale and purchase of the right to communicate information about tort
claims.354
Confidentiality agreements in private settlements are a specific example of a more general

problem. The participants in a system of private administration may be able to arrange collusive
settlements that reduce the private cost of behavior below its social cost, leaving some of those
social costs on third parties. The threat is salient, for example, in tort claims between repeat-play
defendants, on the one hand, and repeat-play plaintiffs’ representatives, on the other. Such
plaintiffs’ representatives have an incentive to settle claims in such a way as to maximize their
imputed hourly returns instead of maximizing the value of each claim.355
The common thread for nondisclosure agreements and collusive settlements more generally is
that they reach results favoring the moving forces behind the agreements over the public. Such
risks are built into the very DNA of private administration. By allocating the administration of
public questions to the private sphere, the system of tort settlement in the United States trades off
advantages of speed and flexibility, on the one hand, for the vices of rent-seeking and
opportunism, on the other.
Conclusion: Legal Architecture for a Private Administration World
This article has only just begun to sketch the significance of placing private administration at the
center of accounts of American tort law. Forms of private administration are pervasive in our
law because the legal system in the United States plays a famously significant role in public
policy making, and because this distinctively important legal system allocates equally distinctive
power in the litigation process to private parties.
352
Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of
Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 (2001) (quoting an insurance defense attorney who had not put a
settlement together in the past “five or six years…[without] a confidentiality clause in it”).
353
Spier, supra note 284, at 324 (“There are important externalities at play”). The ability to limit public information
about a tort claim has substantial vale, because when defendants possess better information about the value of the
claim than plaintiffs, they can get away with disproportionately small settlements. See Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on
the Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
613, 614 (1997). But see Moss, supra note 343 (confidential settlements might benefit the public).
354
Owen M. Fiss, supra note 320, at 1085 (“[W]hen parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and for a price
it does not know it is paying”); Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and
Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 316 (2018) (arguing that confidentiality is “socially undesirable”
in the case where it hides useful information from would-be plaintiffs).
355
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 624-25 (5th ed. 1998); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998).
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The idea that American litigation processes are distinctively party-driven is of course no novel
insight; such a claim has long been central to the comparative law literature.356 The problem is
that scholars have drawn incomplete lessons from the fact of party-driven process.
Since at least Robert Kagan’s groundbreaking work, lawyers and political scientists have
contended that litigation lends a dimension of adversarial legalism to American public policy.357
In one especially prominent version of this view, articulated by Kagan among others, American
policymaking is hindered by a pervasive adversarialism supposedly built into the very structure
of litigation.358 In this literature, tort claiming serves as a paradigmatic site of adversarial
legalism.359 Among other things, tort appears in the literature as a key source for a culture of
claiming and rights assertions.360
The literature, however, has missed the ways in which litigation in the age of settlement is
ultimately not adversarial (or not only adversarial) but cooperative. Settlement alters the
adversarial process by adding substantial (though often hidden) cooperative and managerial
dimensions. Private administration as it has developed is a bilateral and cooperative endeavor
between the contending sides in tort disputes to take advantage of available economies.
Sometimes, as the literature on mass tort litigation has shown, it verges on the collusive, for
ultimately, litigation is not about crushing the other side, or at least not only about that.361
Litigation is also about the pursuit of peace—for both sides.362 And that puts litigation as a
dimension of public policy in important new light.
Put differently, markets take many structures, sometimes horizontal and other times hierarchical,
sometimes decentralized and sometimes centralized. In the same way, adversarial legalism
produces many different formations, some of which are collusive, cooperative, and managerial
356
Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 292-299
(2002); Richard Marcus, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in Goals for Civil Litigation, in GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 123, 135 (Alan Uzelac, ed., 2014) (“American
exceptionalism depends largely on its embrace of the private enforcement goal”).
357
KAGAN, supra note 16; BURKE, supra note 19; FARHANG, supra note 19; J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1155-56 (“Private litigation also
gives individuals a ‘personal role and stake in the administration of justice’”).
358
KAGAN, supra note 16; see also W. KIP VISCUSI, ed., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (2002).
359
BURKE, supra note 19.
360
For the sophisticated version of the hypothesis about tort claiming and a broader culture of claiming, see
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994); see also Laura M. Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights:
Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 187 (2009).
Casual and less sophisticated examples abound, too. See, e.g., Steve Spellman, Tort Reform is a Sad Symptom of a
Litigious Society, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Mar 1, 2017),
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/opinion/local_columnists/steve-spellman-tort-reform-is-a-sad-symptom-of-
a/article_39160026-fdf4-11e6-a152-235290b858a2.html.
361
See note 29, supra.
362
NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at ix (“the most ambitious settlements seek to make and enforce a grand, all-
encompassing peace”); Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943
(2017); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 125, at 267 (2011) (noting that “achieving closure” is often a primary
objective in tort litigation); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1177, 1200-02 (2009) (defending the “public value” of “mass resolution); Rhonda Wasserman, Future
Claimants and the Quest for Global Peace, 64 EMORY L. J. 531, 533, 536-39 (2014) (“The defendant’s interest in
global peace…is both intense and understandable”).
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rather than adversarial and legalistic. In the literature on adversarial legalism, giant
environmental projects like the retrofitting of Oakland Harbor serve as paradigm cases. In
domains where settlement is the norm, by contrast, the story is very different. Settlements by
their nature are cooperative: parties agree to settle because, as best they can determine, it is in
their mutual interest to bring closure to their dispute. Sometimes this takes the form of bespoke
settlement arrangements tailored to the individual circumstances in question. And sometimes, in
domains such as automobile accidents and other repeat-play areas in tort, legalism combines with
private discretion to produce private settlement systems with administrative bureaucracies,
settlement grids, and stereotyped rules of thumb for the aggregate resolution of disputes.
When private administration is the order of the day, as it so often is in the law of tort claims, the
law and the literature ought to take into account the pervasiveness of second-order administration
in advancing its first-order goals. Private administration is the architecture within which the law
alternately vindicates and obstructs the basic goals of deterrence and corrective justice.
All this is hard to see in the shadows of the law, to be sure. The systems of tort settlement are
unusually hidden in the gloom. But a law that is blind to the distinctive characteristics and the
pervasiveness of private administration is simply stumbling in the dark.
57

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Tort as Private Administration

Nathaniel Donahue* & John Fabian Witt**

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I. A World of Private Administration

II. The Doctrines of Private Administration

III. The Private Administration of First Order Goals

Conclusion: Legal Architecture for a Private Administration World

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I. The World of Private Administration

A. Defining Private Administration

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B. Origins of Private Administration

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If workers’ compensation statutes brought closure to generations of efforts toward private

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C. Institutional foundations of private administration

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1. Party-driven claims processes

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3. Repeat Players: Insurers and the Bar

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to rationalize or aggregate. Absent substantial numerosity of claims, rationalized management

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To recap, we contend that private administration rests on a foundation of party-driven claims

D. The scope of private administration

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II. The Doctrines of Private Administration

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B. Collateral Source Rule and Subrogation

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A “flat damages” approach, by contrast, relies heavily on averages as an administrative-cost

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Public systems of administration like workers’ compensation adopt a periodical strategy.

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