Corporate Governance What Is Corporate Governance?
Corporate Governance What Is Corporate Governance?
Corporate Governance What Is Corporate Governance?
Value creation:
Value creation is the primary aim of any business entity. Creating value for customers helps
sell products and services, while creating value for shareholders, in the form of increases in
stock price, insures the future availability of investment capital to fund operations.
First article
Value creation and value capturing in strategic management
studies
Abstract:
The purpose of the paper is to carry out a literature review of studies on value creation and value
capture in order to find possible gaps that represent still unexplored fields in strategic management.
A systematic approach allows a better understanding through an overview of current debate and the
identification of research gaps concerning human resources’ value creation and value capturing.
Literature review is central since it plays two basic roles: exploratory and confirmatory. In the
exploratory role, literature is used to show the current debate on value creation and capturing and to
underline the main research streams, while the confirmatory approach allows scholars and
practitioners to identify the research gaps and to verify if the current research has achieved
satisfactory and/or contradictory results.
Introduction:
It is generally assumed that all of the social sciences (law, economics, media, education,
behavioral science, etc.) are involved in the endeavor to maximize value. However, the
discipline that has been considered The Queen of the Social Sciences—economics—has often
looked at the notion of value from a perspective that is different from social value theory. This
has been especially evident when it comes to the difference between market ethics and social
value theory. In spite of the admonition of Adam Smith that the wealth of nations is based on a
company’s (or the economy’s) ability to maximize benefits for shareholders and stakeholders by
operating in line with the principle of value creation (operating more effectively and efficiently to
give the customer a better quality product at a lower price) market ethics do not always coincide
with this principle. Too often market ethics (the utilitarian effort to maximize benefits by creating
the competitive advantage) tend to compel companies to seek capturing value rather than
creating value (this was perhaps most pronounced in the dynamics connected with what caused
the proverbial domino to fall that resulted in the global financial crisis.
conclusion
– The purpose of this paper is to investigate the firm’s role in the value creation proces s. In
particular, after categorizing the activities that firms carry out to facilitate the creation of
value, the “value space,” an actionable framework within which different dimensions of
value creation are integrated, is developed and discussed..
Second artical
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Value Creation in
Entrepreneurial Firm
Introduction
The compliance with codes of corporate governance has become the norm for listed firms all
over the world. In most countries, Entrepreneurial firms do not have to comply with such codes
but it has been argued that such codes should also apply to these small medium enterprises
(SMEs). Since corporate governance forms the environment for the internal activities of a
company and appropriate environmental conditions are crucial for corporate entrepreneurship to
flourish in a company, it is apt that these two topics be discussed in relation with each other.
Corporate governance mechanisms may dampen value creation in firms if appropriate
measures are mandated by the regulators. This paper examines the implications of the
extension of corporate governance principles to SMEs and the impact this will have on value
creation through corporate entrepreneurship.
Corporate Entrepreneurship
One additional note of considerations necessary to the impact the implementation of corporate
governance would have on value creation in entrepreneurial firms. The competitive edge of
entrepreneurial lies in the creativity and innovation. It would be disastrous should corporate
governance undermine value creation efforts, which in the instance of firms that have gone past
the survival and development phases of growth would take the form of corporate
entrepreneurship. Thus far our consideration of corporate governance has not considered the
impact on internal operations of the entrepreneurial firms. At this juncture, we need to consider
the implications of corporate governance on value creation in these firms
Conclusion
Third article
Introduction
Our paper is an attempt to bridge these two strands of literature concerning private equity, the
first of which analyses the operating performance of acquired companies, and the second
analyzes fund IRRs. We focus on the following questions: (1) Are the returns to large, mature
PE houses simply due to financial gearing over and above gearing in the comparable quoted
sector, or do these returns represent the value created in enterprises they engage with, over
and above the value created by the quoted sector peers? (2) What is the effect of PE ownership
on the operating performance of portfolio companies relative to that of quoted peers, and how
does this performance relate to the financial value created (if any) by these houses? (3) What
are the distinguishing characteristics of the governance and operational approach of these PE
houses relative to those of the PLC boards, and which of these characteristics are best
associated with value creation? In particular, we are interested in taking a step beyond Jensen’s
hypothesis by investigating whether large, mature PE houses create enterprise value by
engaging in “active” ownership or governance and operational engineering, in addition to
employing leverage .
summary
This paper reviews the literature on the linkages between corporate governance and
entrepreneurship and how corporate governance systems may be conducive or obstructive to
entrepreneurship and economic development. We employ cross-country data to illustrate how
corporate governance institutions (as measured by property rights and concentration of
corporate ownership) may influence the entry of new firms and the efficiency of capital
allocation. As a measure of how efficiently capital is (re)allocated in an economy, we utilize a
measure of the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to output. Our findings support the
view that weak protection of property rights and investors and high aggregate ownership
concentration are negative factors for resource allocation and new firm formation. Ownership
concentration and weak institutions reduce new firm formation.