Republic of the Philippines Necessarily, the discretion of respondent court to grant

SUPREME COURT said extension for filing a second motion for

Manila reconsideration is conditioned upon the timeliness of
the motion seeking the same.
SECOND DIVISION
Same; Same; Finality of Judgments; Once a decision
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 has become final and executory, it is removed from
the power and jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.,
revoke it.—No appeal having been taken seasonably,
INC., petitioner,
the respondent court’s decision, dated September 25,
vs.
1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO
The subsequent resolutions of respondent court, dated
ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing
private respondents to file a second motion for
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Motion for reconsideration and reversing the original decision are
Reconsideration; Only a motion for re-hearing or null and void and cannot disturb the finality of the
reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final judgment nor restore jurisdiction to respondent court.
order or judgment sought to be re-examined.— This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a
Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 decision has become final and executory it is removed
of the original fifteen (15) day period, the running of from the power and jurisdiction of the court which
which was suspended during the pendency of the first rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals could it. The decision rendered anew is null and void. The
no longer validly take further proceedings on the court’s inherent power to correct its own errors should
merits of the case, much less to alter, modify or be exercised before the finality of the decision or order
reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The sought to be corrected, otherwise litigation will be
filing of the motion for leave to file a second motion endless and no question could be considered finally
for reconsideration by herein respondents on February settled. Although the granting or denial of a motion for
29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of the motion itself reconsideration involves the exercise of discretion, the
on March 7, 1980, after the expiration of the same should not be exercised whimsically, capriciously
reglementary period to file the same, produced no or arbitrarily, but prudently in conformity with law,
legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing or justice, reason and equity.
reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final order or
judgment sought to be re-examined. Torts and Damages; Negligence; Contributory
Negligence; Private respondents’ negligence was
Same; Motions; Motion for Extension of Time; An not merely contributory but goes to the very cause
application for extension of time must be filed prior of the accident, hence, he has no right to recover
to the expiration of the period sought to be damages for the injuries which he and his wife
extended.—The consequential result is that the suffered.—The above findings clearly show that the
resolution of respondent court of March 11, 1980 negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not
granting private respondents’ aforesaid motion for only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife
leave and, giving them an extension of ten (10) days to but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
file a second motion for reconsideration, is null and accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby
void. The period for filing a second motion for precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of
reconsideration had already expired when private the road were known to, hence appreciated and
respondents sought leave to file the same, and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
respondent court no longer had the power to entertain reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio
or grant the said motion. The aforesaid extension of ten Esteban could have avoided the injurious
(10) days for private respondents to file their second consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that
motion for reconsideration was of no legal there was some alleged negligence on the part of
consequence since it was given when there was no petitioner.
more period to extend. It is an elementary rule that an
application for extension of time must be filed prior to Same; Same; Same; Last Clear Chance; Private
the expiration of the period sought to be extended. respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to PLDT considering that he trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for
had the last clear chance to avoid the injury.—The the installation of its underground conduit system. The
presence of warning signs could not have completely complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs failed to notice the open trench which was left
was to inform and warn the public of the presence of uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
excavations on the site. The private respondents lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the
already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of
jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. the jeep was shattered.2
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention
of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
when the doing of the said omitted act would have the result of their own negligence and that the entity
prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own and Company (Barte, for short), an independent
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the contractor which undertook the construction of the
cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity manhole and the conduit system.3 Accordingly, PLDT
that one should exercise a reasonable degree of filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that,
caution for his own protection. Furthermore, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no
respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or
the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a any of its employees.4 In answer thereto, Barte claimed
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence involving respondent spouses and that it had complied
and location of the excavations there. It was his with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of
his imprudence. the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the
Same; Same; One who claims damages for the presence of excavations.5
negligence of another has the burden of proof to
show existence of such fault or negligence On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision
causative thereof.—A person claiming damages for in favor of private respondents, the decretal part of
the negligence of another has the burden of proving which reads:
the existence of such fault or negligence causative
thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
affirmatively established by competent evidence.
considerations the defendant
Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action
Philippine Long Distance Telephone
has the burden in the first instance of proving the
Company is hereby ordered (A) to
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action
pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the
must fail.
sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00 exemplary
REGALADO, J.: damages; to plaintiff Antonio
Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as
This case had its inception in an action for damages moral damages and P500.00 as
instituted in the former Court of First Instance of exemplary damages, with legal rate
Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses of interest from the date of the filing
against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone of the complaint until fully paid. The
Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they defendant is hereby ordered to pay
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as
jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open attorney's fees.
 (B) The third-party defendant is of September 3, 1980, contending that the second
hereby ordered to reimburse motion for reconsideration of private respondent
whatever amount the defendant- spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of
third party plaintiff has paid to the September 25, 1979 penned by Justice Agrava was
plaintiff. With costs against the already final. It further submitted therein that the
defendant. 6 relationship of Barte and petitioner PLDT should be
viewed in the light of the contract between them and,
From this decision both PLDT and private respondents under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not
appealed, the latter appealing only as to the amount of liable for the acts of an independent contractor.18 On
damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal. May 11, 1981, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its resolution denying said motion to set
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of aside and/or for reconsideration and affirming in
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in said toto the decision of the lower court dated October 1,
appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava 1974. 19
as ponente, reversing the decision of the lower court
and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It Coming to this Court on a petition for review
held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following errors:
and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the
claim for damages.7 A copy of this decision was 1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying
received by private respondents on October 10, private respondents' second motion for
1979. 8 On October 25, 1979, said respondents filed a reconsideration on the ground that the decision of the
motion for reconsideration dated October 24, Special Second Division, dated September 25, 1979,
1979. 9 On January 24, 1980, the Special Ninth Division and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated
of the Court of Appeals denied said motion for January 24, 1980, are already final, and on the
reconsideration.10 This resolution was received by additional ground that said second motion for
respondent spouses on February 22, 1980.11 reconsideration is pro forma.

On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals 2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid
received private respondents' motion for leave of court decision and resolution and in misapplying the
to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated independent contractor rule in holding PLDT liable to
February 27, 1980. 12 On March 11, 1980, respondent respondent Esteban spouses.
court, in a resolution likewise penned by Justice Agrava,
allowed respondents to file a second motion for A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the
reconsideration, within ten (10) days from notice respondent court, as shown by the records and
thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by private admitted by both parties, may be graphically presented
respondents on April 1, 1980 but prior thereto, private as follows:
respondents had already filed their second motion for
reconsideration on March 7, 1980. 14 (a) September 25, 1979, a decision
was rendered by the Court of
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to Appeals with Justice Agrava
and/or motion to dismiss said second motion for asponente;
reconsideration. 15 The Court of Appeals, in view of the
divergent opinions on the resolution of the second (b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said
motion for reconsideration, designated two additional decision was received by private
justices to form a division of five.16 On September 3, respondents;
1980, said division of five promulgated its resolution,
penned by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the
(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for
decision dated September 25, 1979, as well as the
reconsideration was filed by private
resolution dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in
respondents;
toto the decision of the lower court.17

On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion

to set aside and/or for reconsideration of the resolution
 (d) January 24, 1980, a resolution motion for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer
was issued denying said motion for for the extension of the period within which to do so.
reconsideration; On the other hand, they could have appealed through
a petition for review on certiorari to this Court within
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said fifteen (15) days from February 23, 1980. 22 Instead,
denial resolution was received by they filed a motion for leave to file a second motion 'for
private respondents; reconsideration on February 29, 1980, and said second
motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of
(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for which motions were by then time-barred.
leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration was filed by private Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980
respondents of the original fifteen (15) day period, the running of
which was suspended during the pendency of the first
(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals could
for reconsideration was filed by no longer validly take further proceedings on the
private respondents; merits of the case, much less to alter, modify or
reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The
filing of the motion for leave to file a second motion
(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was
for reconsideration by herein respondents on February
issued allowing respondents to file a
29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of the motion itself
second motion for reconsideration
on March 7, 1980, after the expiration of the
within ten (10) days from receipt;
reglementary period to file the same, produced no
and
legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final order or
(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution judgment sought to be re-examined. 23
was issued, penned by Justice Zosa,
reversing the original decision dated
The consequential result is that the resolution of
September 25, 1979 and setting
respondent court of March 11, 1980 granting private
aside the resolution dated January
respondents' aforesaid motion for leave and, giving
24, 1980.
them an extension of ten (10) days to file a second
motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period
From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that for filing a second motion for reconsideration had
both the motion for leave to file a second motion for already expired when private respondents sought leave
reconsideration and, consequently, said second motion to file the same, and respondent court no longer had
for reconsideration itself were filed out of time. the power to entertain or grant the said motion. The
aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had respondents to file their second motion for
procedural governance at the time, provided that a reconsideration was of no legal consequence since it
second motion for reconsideration may be presented was given when there was no more period to extend. It
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order or is an elementary rule that an application for extension
judgment deducting the time in which the first motion of time must be filed prior to the expiration of the
has been pending. 20 Private respondents having filed period sought to be extended. 24 Necessarily, the
their first motion for reconsideration on the last day of discretion of respondent court to grant said extension
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days within for filing a second motion for reconsideration is
which to do so, they had only one (1) day from receipt conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion seeking
of the order denying said motion to file, with leave of the same.
court, a second motion for reconsideration. 21 In the
present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of No appeal having been taken seasonably, the
the resolution denying their first motion for respondent court's decision, dated September 25,
reconsideration, private respondents had two remedial 1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980.
options. On February 23, 1980, the remaining one (1) The subsequent resolutions of respondent court, dated
day of the aforesaid reglementary period, they could March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing
have filed a motion for leave of court to file a second private respondents to file a second motion for
reconsideration and reversing the original decision are Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on
null and void and cannot disturb the finality of the the inside lane before it swerved to
judgment nor restore jurisdiction to respondent court. hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could
This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a have been corroborated by a picture
decision has become final and executory it is removed showing Lacson Street to the south
from the power and jurisdiction of the court which of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke
it.25 The decision rendered anew is null and void.26 The It has been stated that the ditches
court's inherent power to correct its own errors should along Lacson Street had already
be exercised before the finality of the decision or order been covered except the 3 or 4
sought to be corrected, otherwise litigation will be meters where the ACCIDENT
endless and no question could be considered finally MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1
settled. Although the granting or denial of a motion for shows that the ditches on Lacson
reconsideration involves the exercise of Street north of the ACCIDENT
discretion,27 the same should not be exercised MOUND had already been covered,
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but prudently in but not in such a way as to allow the
conformity with law, justice, reason and equity.28 outer lane to be freely and
conveniently passable to vehicles.
Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into The situation could have been worse
the substantive merits of the case, we find no error in to the south of the ACCIDENT
the findings of the respondent court in its original MOUND for which reason no picture
decision that the accident which befell private of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing
respondents was due to the lack of diligence of south was taken.
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running
findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-
and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced husband claimed. At that speed, he
by the respondent court's resolution of January 24, could have braked the vehicle the
1980 which we quote with approval: moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND. The jeep would not have
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND
along the inside lane of Lacson several feet as indicated by the
Street. If it had remained on that tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must
inside lane, it would not have hit the have been running quite fast. If the
ACCIDENT MOUND. jeep had been braked at 25
kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would
Exhibit B shows, through the not have been thrown against the
tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT windshield and they would not have
MOUND was hit by the jeep suffered their injuries.
swerving from the left that is,
swerving from the inside lane. What Fourth. If the accident did not
caused the swerving is not disclosed; happen because the jeep was
but, as the cause of the accident, running quite fast on the inside lane
defendant cannot be made liable for and for some reason or other it had
the damages suffered by plaintiffs. to swerve suddenly to the right and
The accident was not due to the had to climb over the ACCIDENT
absence of warning signs, but to the MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had
unexplained abrupt swerving of the not exercised the diligence of a good
jeep from the inside lane. That may father of a family to avoid the
explain plaintiff-husband's accident. With the drizzle, he should
insistence that he did not see the not have run on dim lights, but
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason should have put on his regular lights
he ran into it. which should have made him see the
 ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
running on the outside lane at 25 notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
kilometers an hour, even on dim petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he
lights, his failure to see the passed on that street almost everyday and had
ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake knowledge of the presence and location of the
the car was negligence on his part. excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
The ACCIDENT MOUND was him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely
relatively big and visible, being 2 to responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he
did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent
in time, he would not have seen any Court of Appeals in its original decision that there was
warning sign either. He knew of the insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the
existence and location of the part of PLDT. We have for consideration only the self-
ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and
many previous times. With ordinary the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the
precaution, he should have driven scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of
his jeep on the night of the accident the incident and the non-submission of a medical
so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT report from the hospital where private respondents
MOUND.29 were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily
explained.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very extended resolution of January 24, 1980 —
cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right (a) There was no third party
to recover damages.30 The perils of the road were eyewitness of the accident. As to
known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private how the accident occurred, the
respondents. By exercising reasonable care and Court can only rely on the
prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have testimonial evidence of plaintiffs
avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even themselves, and such evidence
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged should be very carefully evaluated,
negligence on the part of petitioner. with defendant, as the party being
charged, being given the benefit of
The presence of warning signs could not have any doubt. Definitely without
completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of ascribing the same motivation to
said signs was to inform and warn the public of the plaintiffs, another person could have
presence of excavations on the site. The private deliberately engineered a similar
respondents already knew of the presence of said accident in the hope and
excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these expectation that the Court can grant
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to him substantial moral and exemplary
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden damages from the big corporation
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the that defendant is. The statement is
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the made only to stress the
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of disadvantageous position of
warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes defendant which would have
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said extreme difficulty in contesting such
omitted act would have prevented the injury.31 It is person's claim. If there were no
basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for witness or record available from the
their injuries where their own failure to exercise due police department of Bacolod,
and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a defendant would not be able to
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a determine for itself which of the
reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last correct as to the report or non-
 report of the accident to the police 12 Rollo, CA-G.R. No. 57352-R, 141-
department.32 143.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of 13 Ibid., Id., 155-156.

another has the burden of proving the existence of
such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts 14 Ibid., Id., 144-153.
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence.33 Whosoever 15 Ibid., Id., 168-171.
relies on negligence for his cause of action has the
burden in the first instance of proving the existence of
16 Ibid., Id., 185-196.
the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

17 Rollo, 111-118.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of
Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3,1980,
are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, 18 Ibid., 119-120.
promulgated on September 25,1979, is hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. 19 Ibid., 137-138.

SO ORDERED. 20 The rule has since been modified

by Sec. 11, B.P. 129, effective August
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and 14,1981, which provided that in the
Sarmiento JJ., concur. then Intermediate Appellate Court a
second motion for reconsideration
would be allowed only if the first
motion for reconsideration resulted
in the reversal or substantial
Footnotes modification of the original decision
or final resolution. Thereafter,
1 Civil Case No. 8681, Judge Ernesto effective July 28,1986, Sec. 11 of B.P.
Tengco, presiding. 129 was amended by Sec. 6 of
Executive Order No. 33 providing
2 Rollo, 49-51. that in the present Court of Appeals
no second motion for
3 Ibid., 52-55. reconsideration from the same party
shall be entertained.
4 Ibid., 56-58.
21 In the computation of the
5 Ibid., 59-61. reglementary period, especially if it
is interrupted by the filing of a
pleading, the date when the
6 Ibid., 70.
pleading is filed and the date of
receipt of the judgment or order
7 CA-G.R. No. 57352-R, Justices Jose thereon are to be excluded (Lloren,
B. Jimenez and Benjamin K. Gorospe etc. vs. De Veyra, etc., et al., 4 SCRA
concurred. Rollo, 72-79. 637 [1962]; De las Alas, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 83 SCRA 200
8 Rollo, 21,156. [1978]).

9 Ibid., 80-85, 156. 22 Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court;

Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
10 Ibid., 93-98. 139 SCRA 179 (1985).

11 Ibid., 21,158. 23 Sec. 3, Rule 52, Rules of Court.

24 Galima, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 16 SCRA 140 (1966); Tuazon vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 43 SCRA 664
(1972),

25 Comia, et al. vs. Nicolas, etc., et al.,

29 SCRA 492 (l969).

26 Heirs of Patriaca, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, et al., 124 SCRA 410 (1983).

27 Lucero vs. Dacayo, etc., et al., 22

SCRA 1004 (1963).

28 Gardner, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals. et al., 131 SCRA 585 (1984).

29 Rollo, 97-98.

30 Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific

Co., 7 Phil. 359 (1907).

31 Sangco, Torts & Damages, 1978

Rev. Ed., 150.

32 Rollo, 95.

33 Barcelo, etc. vs. Manila Electric

Railroad & Light Co., 29 Phil.351
(1951); Sec. 1, Rule 131, Rules of
Court; 1 Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed.,
370.