THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136806. August 22, 2000]

EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleges

that the Sandiganbayan[1] gravely abused its discretion when it issued its Resolution
dated July 28, 1998 denying his demurrer to evidence and the subsequent Resolution
dated December 17, 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No.
23069.[2]
The factual background of this case is set out herein:
On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, filed an information[3] with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of
the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second information[4] was filed charging
petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. These informations
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively.
Criminal Case No. 23070 was raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Acting upon a motion for reinvestigation filed by petitioner, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information[5], which motion was eventually
granted by the Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1996.[6]
Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. 23069 was assigned to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also filed a motion for reinvestigation with the court on May
8, 1996, to which the prosecution objected. On June 18, 1996, the court issued a
resolution deferring action on petitioners motion for reinvestigation until compliance by
the prosecution with the courts resolution of March 20 and 28, 1996, requiring the
amendment of the information so as to indicate the office-related character of the crime
charged. On November 8, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an ex-
parte motion[7] for the admission of an amended information which reads -

That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim
a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a
public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers
Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a
privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of
said accused.

In its resolution[8] of January 30, 1997, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[9] praying that the court reconsider its
admission of the amended information. He claimed that the crimes charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 23069 and 23070 arose out of the same incident; that considering that the
latter case had already been dismissed by the court on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the same since the crime charged was not office-related, the same
ruling should apply to the former case. After the prosecution had filed its comment,[10] the
First Division issued a resolution[11] on April 25, 1997, denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 23069 and his motion for reconsideration. With
regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan held that

In criminal cases, the courts jurisdiction in the first instance is determined by

the facts alleged in the complaint or information. The complaint or information
must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set
out therein and the punishment provided for by law for such acts fall within the
jurisdiction of the court in which the complaint or information is presented. If
the facts set out in the complaint or information are sufficient to show the court
in which the complaint or information is presented has jurisdiction, then the
court has jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil 366; Magay vs. Estiandan, 69
SCRA 456; Enerio vs. Alampay, 64 SCRA 142).

A perusal of the Amended Information in the instant case readily shows that
the felony allegedly committed was office-related, hence, within the jurisdiction
of this court. It is alleged therein that accused mayor committed the crime of
grave threats when he levelled and aimed his gun at and threatened to kill
private complainant Simeon Legazpi during a public hearing about the
pollution which resulted from the operation of Giant Achievers Enterprises
Plastic Factory and after said complainant rendered a privileged speech
critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of the accused. As
the local chief executive, the health and sanitation problem of the community
was one of the accuseds main concern[s]. Thus, accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing. It is
apparent from the allegations, that, although public office is not an element of
the crime of grave threat[s] in abstract, as committed by the accused, there is
an intimate connection/relation between the commission of the offense and
accuseds performance of his public office.

Moreover, accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of

his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during
the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The ruling in Criminal Case No. 23070 relied upon by the accused will not
apply in this case, because the offense involved there was [a] [v]iolation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. It is an essential element of said offense that the
act of the accused in causing undue injury to any party including the
Government or the giving to any party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or
perference was done in the course of the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial function. The ponente, the Hon. Jose S. Balajadia,
however, found the said circumstance not obtaining in the said case (Crim.
Case No. 23070) because the incident complained of took place after the
public hearing when the accused was not anymore performing any of his
official administrative functions. The difference lies in the fact that in the case
at bar (grave threats), said condition is not a component element. All that the
law requires for the crime to be within the jurisdiction of this court is the fact
that the felony was committed in relation to his office (not during the discharge
of his official function).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and on the further ground that accuseds primary

intent in pleading a reinvestigation is the determination of the office-related
character of the crime, which is now passed upon, his Motion for
Reinvestigation is hereby DENIED due course. His Motion for
Reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated January 30, 1997 is likewise
DENIED for lack of merit.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above cited ruling, but the
Sandiganbayan denied the same in its resolution[12] dated June 18, 1997. Thus,
petitioner was prompted to file a petition for certiorari[13] with this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayans April 25, 1997 and June 18, 1997 resolutions, which case was
docketed as G.R. No. 130231. However, in our resolution[14] dated September 22, 1997,
we dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned [resolutions
were] tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, the trial of Criminal Case No. 23069 proceeded. On May 19, 1998, after the
prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer
to evidence[15]on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had
committed the crime charged in the information and that the act complained of took
place while he was performing his official functions.
In a resolution[16] dated July 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
demurrer to evidence. The resolution states that
xxx xxx xxx

The accused herein is charged with having threatened to kill Simeon Legaspi
by pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. There is evidence on record that the
acts were indeed committed. Regardless of whether or not the pistol was
cocked, the pointing of a firearm at a person in a hostile manner is an act
demonstrating an intent to inflict harm to that person. Whether or not the
accused Mayor was in the performance of his proper duties when he pointed
the .45 caliber pistol is not a proper issue of jurisdiction for this Court since all
illegal acts are never proper acts of ones public office. What is at evidence is
that an ordinary citizen was not in a position to convoke the Sanggunian
Bayan nor to preside over the same, much less to interfere with the legislative
proceedings of the Municipal Council which, because he as mayor, the
accused could and did, even if unlawfully.

xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its December 17, 1998 resolution[17] explaining that
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, an illegal act is not an official act; rather the question boils down to
whether or not the acts attributed to the accused herein were performed by
him in the occasion of either the performance of his duties or of his assertion
of his authority to do so. Were the rule to be otherwise, the Sandiganbayan
would never have jurisdiction of criminal acts of public officers since these
acts would never be the performance of official duties or be official acts,
although they might be in the occasion thereof.
 xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner asks this Court to set aside the July
28, 1998 and December 17, 1998 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan and to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 23069. In addition, petitioner prays for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin public respondent from
further proceeding with said case until this petition has been resolved.[18]
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Comment[19] on April 22, 1999. On May
18, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to resolve[20] his application for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding with the case, which prayer he reiterated in a subsequent
motion[21] filed with this Court on July 22, 1999. On September 6, 1999, the Court denied
petitioners July 22, 1999 motion for lack of merit.[22] Petitioner filed a Reply[23] on
December 6, 1999. The prosecution and the defense then filed their respective
Memorandums on March 16, 2000[24] and on March 30, 2000,[25] respectively, after which
the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner sets forth the following issues for the Courts resolution -
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 23069 FALLS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION.
III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
[26]

With regard to the first issue, petitioner claims that the elements constituting the
crime of grave threats have not been proven. He insists that the prosecution had not
established that his act of pointing a gun at complainant Simeon Legaspi, assuming that
it had actually occurred, constituted grave threats.[27] However, quite to the contrary, the
Sandiganbayan found that the prosecutions evidence, standing unrebutted by any
opposing evidence, sufficiently established the crime charged.[28]
The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. A lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the
appellate courts will not review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide
whether or not such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has
been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. [29] Mere
allegations of such abuse will not suffice. For the special civil action of certiorari to lie, it
is crucial that

there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the

very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
law and common law traditions. To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of
discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all, in contemplation of law. xxx [30]

When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
 Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for
[31]

the court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may file an appeal from the
judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial.[32] In the present case, we are not
prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it
denied petitioners demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecutions
evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly,
there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that would
show otherwise.
Coming now to the second issue, petitioner assails the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
over the case on the ground that the crime was not committed in relation to his
office. He contends that it has not been established that the crime charged was
committed by him while in the discharge of or as a consequence of his official functions
as municipal mayor. Additionally, he claims that public office is not an essential
ingredient of the crime of grave threats, which may be committed by a public officer and
a private individual alike, with the same facility.Therefore, the Sandiganbayan
erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the present case.[33]
It is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court
acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction
until the final determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation
vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate upon actions pending before its enactment. However, where such
retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot
be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment.[34]
The original information in Criminal Case No. 23069 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on December 1, 1995, whereas the amended information was filed with
the same court on November 8, 1996 and admitted by the Sandiganbayan on January
30, 1997. The applicable law at this time would be Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD
1606), as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 (RA 7975), [35] which took effect on May
16, 1995.[36] Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975, provides that
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, xxx
 xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
crime charged must be either one of those mentioned in paragraph (a) abovementioned
or one committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The Court has held that an
offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accuseds office when such office is
an element of the crime charged[37] or when the offense charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of the official functions of accused. This was our ruling in Cunanan v.
Arceo[38] wherein the Court explained several decisions dealing with the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. The Court held

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the

scope and reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds]
office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People
v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is
that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds
office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court,
through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case
may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds]

respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused]
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or

information.[39] In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the
accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming
a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had
rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners
official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997
resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was
precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have
been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[1] 
The assailed resolutions were issued by the First Division composed of Presiding Justice Francis E. Grachitorena
and Justices Catalino R. Castaneda, Jr. and German G. Lee, Jr. However, by the time the December 17, 1998
Resolution was issued, Justice Lee, Jr. was replaced by Justice Gregory S. Ong.
[2] 
Rollo, 8.
[3] 
Records, vol. II, 2-A 2-B.
[4] 
Rollo, 73.
[5] 
Ibid., 100-101.
[6] 
Ibid., 87-90.
[7] 
Records, vol. 1, 100-101.
[8] 
Rollo, 118.
[9] 
Ibid., 119-122.
[10] 
Ibid., 123-124.
[11] 
Ibid., 126-132.
[12] 
Ibid., 134-136.
[13] 
Records, vol. I, 307-424.
[14] 
Ibid., 476.
[15] 
Ibid., vol. II, 6-18.
[16] 
Rollo, 49.
[17] 
Ibid., 50.
[18] 
Ibid., 44.
[19] 
Ibid., 182-193.
[20] 
Ibid., 194-200.
[21] 
Ibid., 203-208.
[22] 
Ibid., 209.
[23] 
Ibid., 220-225.
[24] 
Ibid., 228-238.
[25] 
Ibid., 241-280.
[26] 
Ibid., 256.
[27] 
Ibid., 256-259.
[28] 
Ibid., 49.
[29] 
Tan v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 18 (1997). See also Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 328 (1998);
People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
[30] 
Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).
[31] 
Morales v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 211 (1997).
[32] 
Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677 (1986), citing People v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 162 (1982);
Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324 (1979); People v. Romero, 22 Phil 565.
[33] 
Rollo, 260-272.
[34] 
People v .Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998); Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997);
People v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996), citing People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976) and People v. Paderna, 22
SCRA 273 (1968).
[35] 
Entitled AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS
AMENDED. Approved on March 30, 1995.
[36] 
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[37] 
People v. Cawaling, supra.
[38] 
242 SCRA 88 (1995).
[39] 
People v. Cawaling, supra., citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408 (1995); Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA
584 (1998); Chico v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 (1998); Cunan