Conflict of Contract Laws
Conflict of Contract Laws
Conflict of Contract Laws
In the conflict of laws, the validity and effect of a contract with one or more foreign law elements will
be decided by reference to the so-called "proper law" of the contract.
History[edit]
Until the middle of the 19th century, the courts applied the lex loci contractus or the law of the place
where the contract was made to decide whether the given contract was valid. The apparent
advantage of this approach was that the rule was easy to apply with certain and predictable
outcomes. Unfortunately, it was also open to abuse, e.g. the place could be selected fraudulently to
validate an otherwise invalid contract; it might lead to the application of laws with no real connection
with the transaction itself, say, because the parties signed the agreement while on holiday; or it
might have been difficult to decide where the contract was made, e.g. because it was negotiated and
signed on a railway journey through several states.
To avoid these difficulties, some courts proposed applying the lex loci solutionis or the law of the
place of performance of the contract. This produced difficulties in cases where the contract required
each party to perform its obligations in a different country, or where the place of performance was
dictated by later circumstances. However, as the public policies driven by the theory of freedom of
contractevolved, the Doctrine of Proper Law emerged.
Proper law[edit]
The proper law of the contract is the main system of law applied to decide the validity of most
aspects to the contract including its formation, validity, interpretation, and performance. This does
not deny the power of the parties to agree that different aspects of the contract shall be governed by
different systems of law. But, in the absence of such express terms, the court will not divide
the proper law unless there are unusually compelling circumstances. And note the general rule of
the lex fori which applies the provisions of the proper law as it is when the contract is to be
performed and not as it was when the contract was made.
The parties to a valid contract are bound to do what they have promised. So, to be consistent, the
Doctrine of Proper Law examines the parties' intention as to which law is to govern the contract. The
claimed advantage of this approach is that it satisfies more abstract considerations of justice if the
parties are bound by the law they have chosen. But it raises the question of whether the test is to be
subjective, i.e. the law actually intended by the parties, or objective, i.e. the law will impute the
intention which reasonable men in their position would probably have had. It cannot safely be
assumed that the parties did actually consider which of the several possible laws might be applied
when they were negotiating the contract. Hence, although the courts would prefer the subjective
approach because this gives effect the parties' own wishes, the objective test has gained in
importance. So the proper law test today is three-stage:
it is the law intended by the parties when the contract was made which is usually evidenced by
an express choice of law clause; or
it is implied by the court because either the parties incorporated actual legal terminology or
provisions specific to one legal system, or because the contract would only be valid under one of
the potentially relevant systems; or
if there is no express or implied choice, it is the law which has the closest and most real
connection to the bargain made by the parties.
It is only fair to admit that the task of imputing an intention to the parties in the third situation
presents the courts with another opportunity for uncertainty and arbitrariness, but this overall
approach is nevertheless felt to be the lesser of the available evils.
Express selection[edit]
When the parties express a clear intention in a choice-of-law clause, there is a rebuttable
presumption that this is the proper law because it reflects the parties' freedom of contract and it
produces certainty of outcome.[citation needed] It can only be rebutted when the choice is not bona fide, it
produces illegality, or it breaches public policy.[citation needed] For example, the parties may have selected
the particular law to evade the operation of otherwise mandatory provisions of the law which has the
closest connection with the contract.[citation needed] The parties are not free to put themselves above the
law and, in such cases, it will be for the parties to prove that there is a valid reason for selecting that
law other than evasion.[citation needed]
Implied selection[edit]
When the parties have not used express words, their intention may be inferred from the terms and
nature of the contract, and from the general circumstances of the case. For example, a term granting
the courts of a particular state exclusive jurisdiction over the contract would imply that the lex fori is
to be the proper law (see forum selection clause).
Closest and most real connection[edit]
In default, the court has to impute an intention by asking, as just and reasonable persons, which law
the parties ought to, or would, have intended to nominate if they had thought about it when they
were making the contract. In arriving at its decision, the court uses a list of connecting factors, i.e.
facts which have an unambiguous geographical connection, and whichever law scores the most hits
on a league table created from the list will be considered the proper law. The current list of factors
includes the following:
Problems[edit]
There are many problems affecting this area of law, but two of the most interesting are:
Incapacity through age[edit]
States approach the issue of intentionality from two related, but distinct, conceptual directions:
liability in which the law holds individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions, and
exculpability in which fundamental social policies exclude or diminish the liability that actors
would have incurred in different circumstances.
Many states have policies which protect the young and inexperienced by insulating them from
liability even though they may have voluntarily committed themselves to unwise contracts. The age
at which children achieve full contractual capacity varies from state to state but the principle is
always the same. Infants are not bound by many otherwise valid contracts, and their intention is
irrelevant because of the legal incapacity imposed on them by the state of the domicile (the lex
domicilii) or nationality (the lex patriae). This recognises a set of social values that requires
exculpation even though there is relevant action and consent freely given.
Equally, states have an interest in protecting the normal flow of trade within their borders. If
businesses had constantly to verify the nationality or domicile of their customers and their ages, this
might slow down business and, potentially, infringe privacy legislation. Hence, conflicts of public
policy can emerge which complicate the choice of law decision and invite forum shopping, i.e.
traders will always seek to sue infants with whom they have contracts in those states which accord
priority to commercial interests, while children will seek the avoidance of liability in the courts which
protect their interests. This would be achieved during the characterisation stage by classifying the
issue as status and its incidents rather than contract because a party's status and lack of capacity
would be in rem.
Mistake, misrepresentation, etc.[edit]
In many states, fundamental mistakes, misrepresentations and similar defects may make a contract
void ab initio, i.e. the defect is so serious that it prevents an agreement from ever coming into being.
If this happens, every term in the contract including the express selection of the proper law, would be
unenforceable. This raises the question of whether the lex fori should operate a policy of saving the
validity of contracts wherever possible. Suppose that a contract would be valid under many
potentially relevant laws but not under the putative proper law, and that, until problems arose, the
parties have acted in good faith on the assumption that they will be bound by the agreement, some
courts might be tempted to ignore the apparent proper law and choose another that would give effect
to the parties general contractual intentions.
English law[edit]
In English law, the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 formally incorporates the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations the "Rome Convention") opened for signature in Rome on
June 19, 1980, and signed by the United Kingdom on December 7, 1981; the Convention on the
Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Rome Convention(the "Luxembourg Convention") signed
by the United Kingdom in Luxembourg on April 10, 1984; and the first Protocol on the Interpretation
of the Rome Convention by the European Court (the "Brussels Protocol") signed by the United
Kingdom in Brussels on December 19, 1988.