M?

3.T.I
A g u i d e to the
Tactical Appreciation

1987
J23-007 JAN 88

LAND WARFARE CENTRE

JUNIOR STAFF WING

3.T.1

1988

A GUIDE TO THE
TACTICAL APPRECIATION

References: A. JSP(AS)102 (Second Edition) - Service Writing, 1984

B. MLW One 5.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1986

C. MLW One 5.2 - Aide-memoire, 1987

This manual replaces all previous handouts from the Junior

Staff Wing on the subject of military appreciations.

The manual does not replace References A, B and C. Rather it

binds together the philosophy and directs the students' attention to
interpretation applicable to the appreciation at unit level.

The manual is published under the authority of the Chief

Instructor of Junior Staff Wing for use by students attending the Junior
Staff Course.
.123-008 JAN 87
I

AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

Proposals for amendment or additions to the manual should be

referred to the Module Master for Operations. Such proposals should
include a draft of the suggested amendment.

Amendment List
No Date Amendment Made By Date
J I 9-001 JAN 88

LAND WARPARK CENTRE

JUNIOR STAFF WING

MILITARY APPRECIATIONS

'At the beginning of 1944, Lieut-General Scoones was

commanding 4 Corps on the Assam front. He was an
informed, thoughtful soldier with a clear mind of
the analytical type. My staff sometimes complained
that he produced lengthy appreciations in which all
factors and courses of action were conscientiously
considered. I always pointed out that these
appreciations could be re-read after the event and
found uncannily accurate. A General whose
appreciations can stand this test is not perhaps as
rare as a politician whose speeches can equally bear
re-reading, but such far sightedness is one of the
foundations of real Generalship and is not too
common a gift. Scoones had, too, a steadiness in
crisis that was, for the battle he was to fight, an
invaluable quality.'

Defeat into Victory

Field Marshal Viscount Slim

References: A. JSP (AS) 102, Service Writing (Second Edition), 1984,

Chapter 16

B. MLW One.5.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1986

Chapter 5

C.
MLW One.5.2, Aide-Memoire, 1987 Chapter 10

INTRODUCTION '
1. An estimate or appreciation of a situation is the military term
defined as a 'logical process of reasoning by which a commander
considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and
arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to
accomplish his mission' (Reference A, Chapter 16, paragraph 1601).
 -2-

2. The appreciation is essentially the process whereby operational

information is collected and then used to produce outline plans. The
references cover the appreciation as it relates to strategic, tactical,
and administrative problems at formation level. While the basics remain
the same ft»r all levels, there is a need for amplification of the unit
level appreciation.

3. The purpose of this manual is to explain the steps inherent in

an appreciation applicable to unit level tactical problems.

4. In considering this purpose students should be aware of the

following:

a. This manual does not replace the References in any way but
rather binds together the philosophy. Students are
encouraged to read the References to gain a broader
viewpoint.

b. There are no drills or simple keys to success. The

appreciation is simply one person's thought process on
paper. Each person's approach is going to vary
particularly on points of detail and interpretation of
what is of relative importance. This manual gives
detailed explanation but DOES NOT encourage slavish
adherance to every example*

5. This manual is set out in six parts as follows:

a. Part 1. (White). Part 1 encompasses some background

reading by giving:

(1) some explanation of the logic inherent in the

appreciation process,

(2) a reading list with explanatory notes, and

(3) some hints on the collection and layout of

information.

b. Parts 2 to 5. (Part 2 Yellow, Part 3 Blue, Part 4 and 5

White). Parts 2 to 5 consist of a step by step guide to
the factor analysis appropriate to offensive and defensive
operations.
c
* Part 6. (Green). Part 6 is a glossary of definitions and
explanations of tactical terms.

6. Parts of this manual will appear repetitive. This is necessary

because of the variation in needs among students. Some can understand
the process from a logic diagram. Others prefer a general overview of
each section of the process and what it does. Again others need a
detailed factor guide. Most seem to gain from examples. One may
therefore find the same information presented in four different ways.

7. The information given in this manual should be examined

critically. The emphasis and many of the explanations are based on the
author's viewpoint. The coverage is particularly geared to the JSC and
is therefore not an exhaustive overview of the military appreciation
process. The appreciation is a creative and a thinking exercise and
student submissions should reflect this.

\
J19-002 JAN 87

PART 1

BACKGROUND TO THE APPRECIATION PROCESS

The Tactical Decision and Military Judgement

1. To make a tactical decision requires sound military judgement.

Inherent in judgement is experience and analytical thought. These two
aspects require perspective as both are clearly evident in every
deduction in the appreciation process.

2. The analytical process is based on propositional thought (the

logical connection of given truths or facts) and is the basis of the
'scientific' solution. It is characterized by a computer style binary
operation where factors either fit a programme or blue print (of
doctrine) or they do not. It is the process of logic which tends to
lead to the 'black or white and no grey' solution.

3. The conceptual process is based on appositional thought (the

placing of the complete problem next to solutions found in the past for
similar problems) and operates on the basis of experience and is
characterized by 'gut feeling'. It does not operate on the building
blocks of data or propositions but rather on whole images drawn from
what the brain has been exposed to or experienced. The expression of
this thought process in any endeavour is often regarded as 'artistic'.
Rommel called it 'fingerspitzenfuhl' (finger feeling).

4. Arms officers frequently operate in the conceptual mode more

than the analytical and tend to arrive at a solution on first sight of
the problem. This accords with unit training. The temptation is then
to situate the appreciation.

5. Both the analytical and the conceptual process must be brought

together. The conceptual provides inspiration or hypotheses for the
analytical to test. Officers who do operate with a conceptual bias must
exercise extreme self discipline to subject the 'gut feeling' to an
objective analysis. Service officers frequently do not suffer from this
distraction and therefore tend sometimes to produce better technical
appreciations than their arms counter-parts. Their analysis, however,
suffers from lack of detailed hypotheses and sound practical premises.

6. Both arms and service officers currently suffer from a lack of

operational experience. It is only by the application of the discipline
inherent in a sound appreciation that both the conceptual and analytical
skills can be truly developed in peace-time.
Complete the following reading in the sequence given:
f
a. Study the remainder of Part 1, less Annexes A, B and C.

b. Scan the remainder of Part 1.

c. Study the description of the following terms and ensure

that you understand them thoroughly:

(1) Aim. See Parts 2 and 3. See also Part 6 Glossary

for the words:

(a) aim,
)
(b) clear, )
(c) defend,
\
)
(d) delay, ) These words are listed
)
(e) deny, ) in the glossary under
)
(f) destroy, )
) 'Task Verbs'.
j
Cg) contain, )

(h) secure, )
\
)
(i) support, and

(j) limitation.

Key Terrain. See Part 6 Glossary. As

indicates, the identification of this terrain is the
key to the appreciation. Key Terrain is often on
approaches but may not always be so. Where a piece
of Key Terrain outside an approach is used in an
enemy defence and therefore becomes an objective, a
preliminary operation may be required.

(3) Objective. See Part 6 Glossary.

(4) Vital Ground. See Part 6 Glossary.

(5) Approach. See Part 6 Glossary.

(6) Time and Space. See Parts 2 and 3.

(7) Assessment of Tasks. See Parts 2 and 3.

 6-11

(8) Courses Open to Own and Enemy. See Parts 2 and 3.

Note that courses should be fully stated. Enemy
courses should be kept broad but are not simply re-
statements of doctrine. From these descriptions
effect is derived (see Part 6 Glossary) which in turn
leads to own courses. Own courses are described in
detail and include support aspects.

(9) Mission. When examining the statement of the mission

in the outline plan be aware of the relationship
between it, the original task and the aim. The
limitations are not expressed in the mission because
they are already included in courses and will be
reflected in the outline plan. Often, but not
always, the mission will be the fundamental task
given by the superior commander. It may be that the
fundamental task was to deny penetration in strength
through an area and that the best method of achieving
this (from courses open) is to attack the enemy. In
such cases the wording of the mission may be quite
different from the task or the aim even though it is
achieving both. Thus the aim 'to def within bdry'
becomes the mission 'to def HILL X', HILL X being the
vital ground. Check the task verbs in the Glossary.

(10) Outline Plan. It is here that you apply what was

taught for operation orders including precedence,
double entry book-keeping, use of Annex A to Chapter
6 of Reference B for command status and its wording,
and the statement of tasks. If a platoon is to
capture objective one in phase two then that becomes
its task '(Phase 2 : capture Objective 1)'. See
paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of Annex B to Part 1.

d. Now relate these terms to the flow diagram at Annex A,

the 'Deductive Reasoning Process' explained below and the
hints for appreciation writing. Relate this, in turn, to
the example appreciations in Parts 2 and 3.

e. Study Part 3.

f. Read Part 6.

\ The Deductive Reasoning Process

8. Level of Thinking. The level' of the reasoning process sets the

scene. A battalion commander in giving a task to a company commander
will have considered the problem to platoon level to ensure that the
company commander has the necessary resources. In like manner the
brigade^ commander considers down to company level and tasks battalions,
and the company commander considers section level and tasks platoons.
The frame work for this 'two down' level of consideration is set by the
context of 'two up' both in terms of own forces and enemy. Thus a
 6-11

battalion commander examining a defence problem will analyse his problem

to platoon level while at the same time being mindful of the brigade and
divisional commander's aim and approaches to the battalion and brigade
vital ground. While considering that a battalion or regiment of enemy
will attack his position he will consider that regiment in a divisional
setting being mindful of the normal allocation of divisional resources
to that regiment.

9. Fact. A fact is a thing assumed as a basis for inference. It

is assumed, therefore, that the data given in the texts, manuals and
narratives to problems are facts upon which we may infer information not
given.

10. Factors. A factor is a useful fact from which deductions can

be drawn. This means that a fact which pertains to the achievement of
the aim of an appreciation is a factor. thus in a set of references, a
narrative and a map, we find many facts and we select the relevant ones
and list them under the heading 'FACTORS' and sub-headings 'Relative
Strengths', 'Ground', 'Assessment of Tasks', 'Time and Space' and 'Enemy
Courses' and others that may seem relevant. The relationship between
Aim, Factors, Own Courses and Outline Plan is shown in the flow diagram
at Annex A to Part 1. Note that Own Courses and Outline Plan are not
factors.

11. Deduction. A deduction is inference from general to

particular. Thus given the factors that there are two LMGs and one RPG
identified on Hill X causing delay to our advance, one can use the
general information in MLW Three 2.2 -The Musorian Armed Forces 1980
under doctrine, organisations, and order of battle, and a map to deduce
such things as:

a. it is possibly a platoon position;

b. there is a third squad which, by doctrine, in this phase

of war, would be located in the vicinity of area Y;

c. there are two more RPG 7s;

d. there are probably some other heavier weapons such as HMGs

or AT3s (the general idea and narrative would give clues
here);

e. the platoon would be within range of at least the RAG; and

f. most important, what does all this mean to you? This

leads to such deductions as:

(1) number of objectives,

(2) size of targets and therefore size of fire unit

required,

(3) likely enemy DF tasks which you need then to avoid,

 6-11

(4) the ratio of fire units to objectives and manoeuvre

elements and therefore the requirements for the
development of adequate combat power, and

(5) the emphasis to be given to your own resources such

as employment of support section to destroy a bunker
or use of air burst to destroy enemy in open pits.

Note that a deduction 'I must maintain momentum' is nonsense because it

is a statement of principle. It is from this principle and its
application to given facts that you deduce how you can achieve momentum
in the particular scenario. For amplification of the 'so what' process
see Part 6 Glossary.

12. Quantity of Deductions. What is needed from deductions is

usable information. Thus at unit level you seek information which
relates directly to how you deploy platoons, direct and indirect fire
support, and any other assets under your command to achieve the aim.
That is the reason for applying the 'so what' process; 'so what' relates
to your level of reasoning and your aim. The deductions should be
sufficiently developed so that they can be picked up in later sections
of the appreciation (time and space, assessment of tasks, courses open).
For example the air situation may lead to a general deduction that some
precaution is needed. This is of little use unless adequate resources
are identified (eg level of digging, air sentry per platoon or company
area etc) so that these can in turn be listed under assessment of tasks.

13. Summary of Deductions. There are two ways of looking at

summary of deductions: ,

a. At the end of a large unwieldly subject such as ground it

is useful to summarize the main points as they inter-
relate. It may also be useful to do the same between some
major headings such as ground and enemy.

b. A tabular layout of an analysis of approaches summarizes

in note form all the deductions in a host of perspectives
and then gives the assessment of the approach on the same
. page.

Either way it is a useful tool to condense information in the context of

the aim and its limitations.

Re-Appreciation

14. Note that on completion of the appreciation the situation could

change. If you are involved in a long term task (eg defence or
deliberate attack) it may be worthwhile to end the appreciation with
either:

a. 'Re-appreciate at ' (time/date); or

b. 'Re-appreciate when '

 1-6

Hints for Appreciation Writing

15. What is to follow is an idea of self organization for the task

of writing an appreciation. This can be ignored, adopted in part and
adapted, or used in its entirety. The point is that each person has his
or her own approach to the gathering and use of operational
information. This is offered as a guide to those who are still
formulating their approach.

16. It is suggested that you have a note book and into this you
write the headings of the appreciation and outline plan on separate
pages. A loose leaf folder is useful for this as it allows the addition
of pages. As you progress through your reading, the first concern' is
deriving the aim. This and its limitations can be entered (in note
form) into the note book as you read. Limitations can be placed
straight into 'Assessment of Tasks and Time and Space' as applicable to
remind you to consider them. As you read on through the problem you may
find that you think 'I must remember to consider this when I get to that
part of the appreciation'; note it down under the relevant heading
straight away before you forget. This process continues through
planning and conduct of your reconnaissance and during the appreciation
itself. You may be formally writing up ground when a thought occurs to
you concerning enemy courses; make a note of it straight away.

17. During your reconnaissance it may be useful to have an analysis

of approach table in your notebook (see Parts 2 to 5) and fill it out as
you go.

18. In conjunction with your notebook, a spare talc on your

mapboard can be very useful. On this you mark (during your map
reconnaissance and confirm on your ground reconnaissance) the following
(checking each against the meaning given in the Glossary at Part 6):

a. obvious obstacles and cannalizing effects offered by the

ground;

b. key terrain;

c. vital ground;

d. objectives (if it is an attack appreciation);

e. FUP;

f. approaches;

g. ground covering approaches; and

h. alternative approaches to objectives if applicable.

While doing this remember you are thinking two down in the context of
the problem. It may be useful in defence, for example, to draw in the
main approach to the formation/brigade ground to derive the approaches
to your vital ground.
19. The drawing exercise on the talc provides a useful basis for
preparing overlays later. The prime purpose, however, is to assist in
the generation of data for the notebook and the appreciation itself.
This is achieved by arriving at measurable aspects such as:

a. the size and location of objectives;

b. the capacity of approaches;

c. the assault distances; and

d. the ranges of key terrain which dominate likely siting of

own troops (eg a ridgeline to the front may allow enemy
tanks to neutralise ones own defensive positions if
located within 1 500 m in direct line of sight).

20. It is useful to prepare the pages of your appreciation before

you sit down to do it. This prevents the loss of a train of thought
while you write 'EXERCISE SECRET' and so forth on pages. Prepare your
annexes and overlays so those that need to fold out next to certain
texts do so. This is particularly relevant to the analysis of
approaches and approach overlay. The outline plan overlay should fold
out next to the outline plan.

21. Work out the time and space for your conduct of reconnaissance
and the writing of the appreciation. When doing this for the
appreciation, a minimum of 30 percent should be allocated to ground.
Many spend much more than this which is quite workable given that a
thorough ground analysis will produce the bulk of the data required.
Make sure, however, that you leave sufficient time for both compulsory
overlays and a review of your work.

22. When you have completed your outline plan overlay, check it
against the requirement listed in the problem.

Hints for Students on a TEWT

23. Hints for students on a TEWT ate given at Annex C.

Service Writing Conventions

24. The JSC appreciation trains students for staff work where
operational information is collected and then used to produce suggested
solutions to a commander. Service writing standards must therefore be
high.

25. The details of service writing requirements with supporting

references are listed at Annex B to Part 1.
 6-11

Conclusion

26. The amount of study required to this point may seem to be

somewhat excessive. The appreciation process is, however, an essential
part of a staff officer's tool kit. The process can be used to solve
military administrative problems and in the assessment of a host of
military and non military issues. The vehicle used to teach the subject
at JSW is the tactical note form appreciation and this brings with it
the advantages of developing an understanding of both the tactical
principles and the practicalities of fighting on the battlefield. The
subject is therefore extensive and important but the application of it
is not difficult. The difficult part is understanding the process and
if you have followed the instructions given in this part you should now
be well on the path of that understanding. The application of the
process is time consuming and the major difficulty lies in maintaining
concentration.

27. Having done the study, developed an understanding, and written

appreciations, you will be in a position to apply military judgement
based on a sound balance of analytical and conceptual thought.

Annexes: A. Attack Appreciation Flow Diagram

B. Service Writing Conventions in the Appreciation, Outline

Plan and Overlays

C. Hints for the Delivery of Operational Briefs

ATTACK APPRECIATION FLOW DIAGRAM
J19-004

ANNEX B TO
PART 1 OF
3.T. 1

SERVICE WRITING CONVENTIONS

IN THE APPRECIATION OUTLINE PLAN AND OVERLAYS

References: A. JSP (AS) 102 - Service Writing (Second Edition), 1984

B. MLW One 5.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1986

1. Common Conventions in the Appreciation. The common service

writing conventions for the appreciation (not outline plan) are listed
bel ow. They are displayed in the example appreciation layouts in Parts
2 and 3

Serial Point Location/Reference

1 Layout and content Examples in

Parts 2 and 3

2 'For' 'By' use names not appointments Examples

3 Map references A. para 259

4 Security classification A. para 221 and 223

5 Page numbering including Annexes A. para 209

and Appendices

6 Copy numbering including Annexes A. para 211

and Appendices

7 Heading content A. para 203

8 Paragraph numbering A. para 208

9 Sequence (logical development) Parts 2 to 5

10 Unit titles A. paras 244-246

11 Place names A. paras 247-248

13 Location (Note: GR or GS not used A. paras 247-248

with numbers)

14 Date/time groups (no need to use A. paras 236-240

time zone suffix because it is
mentioned in superscript)

15 Directions A. para 243

 1B-2 ANNEX B

Serial Point Reference

16 Approaches are lettered. B. para 525

17 Approach presentation B. para 529

(The illustration at Annex D to Glossary Part 6
Reference A is limited. Approaches
are more usefully drawn to scale
to reflect capacity. This is
discussed in Part 6 Glossary.
Overlays are discussed further
in paragraph 3 below and in Parts
2 and 3.)

2. Outline Plan. The outline plan follows the general structure

of an operation order and is the best way of converting a chosen course
into a directive. Many students have difficulty with this section and
the references are not clear. This area is therefore dealt with in some
detail. The level, content and layout conventions are listed below:

a
' Level» The purpose of an outline plan is to provide
sufficient information to allow a trained staff officer to
draft the operation order from it. See Reference B,
paragraph 542.

b. Basis of the Outline Plan. The plan is based on the best

course. The detail in the plan is extracted from the
relevant deductions particularly in ground, time and space
and assessment of tasks.

c. Content. The content of the outline plan is to include:

(1) the mission stated in full;

(2) a general outline - stated in at least as much detail

as the course adopted;

(3) grouping and tasking;

(4) essential co-ordination instructions; and

(5) essential administrative support and command and

control matters.

d. Convention in Layout. Many students have difficulty with

the layout of an outline plan. The reasons for this lie
in the fact that they are usually rushed at the end of the
appreciation process and there is no specific example in
Reference B. If students have derived information in
sufficient detail throughout the appreciation, the outline
plan becomes a transcription exercise. The following
points should be noted:
 IB-3 ANNEX B

(1) An Outline Plan example Is given in Part 2.

(2) Maximum use of abbreviations should be used except in

paragraph headings.

(3) The headings should follow the 'SMEAC' mnemonic.

(4) The grouping and tasking is best done at battalion

level and below by:

(a) phases if grouping changes for each phase, or

(b) stating the grouping for all phases first if it

is to remain constant and list tasks by phases.

The method for detailing grouping is covered in Annex

A to Chapter 6 of Reference B. Attention is
particularly drawn to Appendix 1 to Annex A for the
wording for the various status of command. The
confirmatory notes for appreciation exercises give a
useful basis for grouping and tasking conventions.

3. Outline Plan Overlay. The outline plan may be written on the

side of the overlay or in the body of the text. The latter course is
more appropriate at JSW because of the volume of information involved.
The overlay should , however, fold out next to the outline plan. (The
approach overlay should fold out next to the analysis of approaches).
The following points on outline plan overlays should be noted:

a. Purpose and Value. Essentially a picture is worth a

thousand words and so lies the value of an overlay. The
purpose is to allow the reader to quickly and accurately
understand the content of the outline plan. In line with
this, overlay techniques should be substituted for written
techniques. For example, phase lines should be
illustrated rather than simply code worded and in turn the
co-ordination instructions should refer to the overlay.

b. Avoidance of Duplication. It is fairly pointless to give

the same information in the same form twice, one in the
outline plan and once in the overlay. Duplication is
relevant if alluded to in the text and illustrated (and
referred to) in the overlay. There is not much written
about overlays. Some relevant hints on written • and
overlay technique can be extracted from Reference B,
paragraph 715.

c. Content. The overlay is to include:

(1) an adequate heading (just 'Outline Plan' does not

fulfil the requirement);

(2) 'EXERCISE SECRET' top and bottom;

 2 A-4 ANNEX A

(3) map references for the map upon which the overlay Is
based;

(4) copy number (relates to the security classification);

(5) annex block;

(6) three grid intersection points on three different

sets of northings and eastings unless the scale of
the map precludes this, also include a north point;

(7) orientate the overlay so that the en is at the top of

the trace regardless of north direction; and

(8) the information required to reflect the outline plan

(including all the points requested in the problem
given) and displayed:

(a) in correct colours (or legend used);

(b) usinj correct symbols (or legend used);

(c) neatly; and

(d) in a manner allowing easy adjustment.

The coverage listed above gives sufficient basis for other overlays and
therefore they will not be treated in detail here. Remember, however,
that if a number of overlays are produced on the one scale map, it
should be possible to lay one on top of the other and match
information. It is useful therefore if grid intersections are the same
for each overlay. If information is repeated in several overlays it
must be named the same in each. Thus App B is always App B whichever
overlay it appears on (as is KT3 or Obj 4 and so on). Avoid using too
many overlays as this can become awkward and confusing. In defence you
need a ground overlay on an enlargement, a derivation of approach
overlay on the normal scale map, perhaps a ground capacity and perhaps a
suggested platoon location overlay. In the attack you generally only
need an approach overlay. In all appreciations you need an outline plan
overlay.

Conclusion

4. When writing an appreciation remember that you are

communicating to the reader not yourself (even if you have written to
and by yourself at the beginning). It is essential therefore that you
get your meaning across succinctly and clearly. Present your
information so that it is easy to follow. Ensure that if documents must
be read side by side that you present it so that one page folds out next
to the other, so saving the reader from the frustration of having to
unbind your work.
 2 A-5 ANNEX A

5. Halle Selassie, upon the invasion of Ethiopia by the Italians

in 1935, did his appreciation and gave the following clear concise plan:

'Everyone will now be mobilized

and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be
sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their
wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives
will take any woman without a husband. Women with
small babies need not go. The blind, those who
cannot walk or for any reason cannot carry a spear
are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt
of this order will be hanged.'

Haile Selassie
Emperor of Ethiopia

This is a good example of clear and concise operational staff

work.
J23-009

ANNEX C TO
PART 1 OF
3T1

HINTS FOR THE DELIVERY OF

OPERATIONAL BRIEFS

'Above all, individual training was the time for TEWTs. A TEWT
was a Tactical Exercise Without Troops. It could be held in the open,
or on a sand or cloth model made up to represent a suitable piece of
ground, or even on a map. A senior officer prepared the exercise and
gave us all pieces of paper that told us what troops were supposed to be
taking part 011 our side, what we were trying to do, what we knew about
the enemy, what the situation was when the exercise began, and what
person we were supposed to be representing. Then at the appointed time
we gathered at a viewpoint or round the sand model, and the director
gave out Narrative 1. In Narrative 1 our make-believe commander usually
appeared and barked out a series of orders. Problem 1 followed
immediately: "What is your plan to carry out these orders? Tell me
here in thirty minutes".

We looked at the ground, and at our notebooks, and back again,

and straggled off in small syndicates to work out a feasible solution.

Time was up. We gathered again. The director said, "Masters,

let's have your syndicate's plan".

"Well, sir, we don't know much about the enemy here, and
— er

"Yes, yes, I don't want the whole appreciation - just your

plan".

"Well, sir, the guns are out of range and will have to be moved
..." I ploughed miserably on. No comment was made when I finished.

"Murray, yours".

"My intention is to capture Black Ridge - there - in sufficient

time to enable consolidation to be completed before last light.
Consolidation will take two hours. Last light is at 1827 hours, so I
must capture Black Ridge by 1627 hours. Support - 84 Field Battery from
positions behind Tuni Hatti 1765. Battery to be in position by 1500
hours for ranging. Start line-copse 194033 - track to 193030 - house
193026. Zero hour 1530 hours ...."

I hung my head in shame. Here was the only sensible plan,

coming out in short, decisive phrases, with no urns and ers, carrying
conviction, simple to understand. Our syndicate had had the same plan,
but no one listening to me would have thought I believed in it myself,
so they certainly would not have. I noted down on the tablets of my
memory: make up your mind, know what you are going to say, say it
briefly, then stop.'
(Extract from : John Masters, Bugle
and a Tiger, Transworld, London, 1956)
 1C-2 ANNEX C

General

1. Listed below are some notes to assist students during the

conduct of exercises where briefings on tactical plans are required.
The skills presented here are important for all officer development
courses, for officer training in units and particularly for the
development of oral briefing techniques. The notes follow the sequence
of a TEWT from ground orientation to the presentation of plans.
Concepts of operations are included because students are given these in
exercise papers and are required to present concepts for contingency
plans during indoor exercises such as the CPX.

Ground Briefings

2. It is suggested that students use the following sequence when

required to give a ground orientation briefing:

a. Present Location. Give the grid reference.

b. Grid North or South. Indicate by pointing.

c. Area of general interest. Using the north or south point

as centre of arc, identify left and right arcs and
describe the ground therein in general terms.

d. Ground Essential to an Understanding of the Problem. Use

the vertical clock or angular measurement from a reference
point method to indicate:

(1) key terrain;

(2) obstacles;

(3) killing grounds;

(4) cover.

Method of Indication and Measurement

3. The Vertical Clock Method.

a. Imagine that a clock face is suspended vertically, with

its centre on a stated reference object and with 12
o'clock vertically above that object.
 2 A-3 ANNEX A

b. Reference to another object or target is given in terms of

the clock, hour on which it libs, and by the angle in mils
from the centre of the clock measured along the radius of
the circle eg would be 'Reference bottom right corner of
house. Right, 4 o'clock, 40 mils, left hand patch of two
patches of scrub'.

4. Determining Angular Measurement.

a. Measurement by the Hand Span Method. A person's hand

extended at arm's length can be used to measure angles.
Indicate the distance to the objective as knuckles, fist
or hand span from a known reference point.

b. Measuring by Binoculars. Standard service binoculars have

inscribed graticules. Details of the graticule pattern
are:

(1) horizontal interval between each graticule ... 10

mils;

(2) vertical graticule length (height):

L
(a) large (centre) graticule .... 20 mils;

(b) middle size graticule 10 mils;

(c) small size graticule 5 mils.

(3) Indicate the objective in units from a known

reference point.

Observers must indicate recognition by stating 'seen' or

1
again'.

Notes for the Preparation of a Presentation

5. When preparing a presentation follow the check list below:

a. Be Prepared. Allow time at the end of your consideration

for:

(1) preparation of your overlay, and

(2) rehearsal of your presentation including a check list

of the sequence of presentation.

b. Overlay. Ensure that your overlay:

(1) is heat,

(2) uses correct military symbols,

 2 A-4 ANNEX A

(3) shows your plan and groupings,

(4) avoids unnecessary detail, <

(5) records your name, and

(6) is titled.

Conduct of the Presentation. Be prepared to conduct your

presentation as follows:

(1) Speak Clearly. Express your ideas concisely with

clear diction and correct military terminology.
Avoid jargon, cliches and statements not related to
the problem.

(2) Speak Slowly. A balance must be found between

speaking so quickly that you cannot be followed and
so slowly as to make it difficult for the audience to
concentrate.

(3) Speak Confidently. Know what you intend to do.

Refer to you notes when necessary. Speak to your
instrutor and syndicate.

(4) Relate Overlay to Ground. Ensure that your overlay

and map are oriented to the ground and relate the
overlay to the ground. For example:

'one battlaion located:

here - (point to the overlay)
there - (point to the ground)!

(5) Answer the Questions. Ensure you have answered all

the questions in the problem.

Preparation of the Audience and Aids. Use this sequence:

(1) set your mapboard on the easel and orient it to the

ground;

(2) reposition the syndicate, if necessary;

(3) give the syndicate your ground orientation briefing;

(4) state any assumptions you have made; and

(5) present your plan/concept in the sequence shown

below.

Delivery of the Execution Paragraph. The execution

paragraph must be presented in a manner which is clear and
easy to follow. It is suggested that:
 1C-5 ANNEX C

(1) For defensive operations you should:

(a) state your vital ground;

(b) give grouping and tasks of major infantry and

armoured units;
«

(c) give grouping and tasks of composite forces,

screen and reserve; and

(d) give tasks and priorities of supporting arms.

(2) For offensive operations you should:

(a) state what you consider to be the enemy's vital

ground; and

(b) present the operation in its chronological

sequence by phases and if applicable, detail:

i. those tasked, eg assault, flank security,

reserve and fire support (both direct and
indirect);

ii. limits of exploitation; and

iii. locations for reorganization.

f. The Cardinal Rules. Ensure you:

(1) do NOT speak to your notes or your mapboard,

(2) do NOT present you plan without reference to the

ground during outdoor exercises,

(3) do NOT attempt to justify your plan as you present

it, and

(4) do NOT waffle.

g. Conclusion. Be:

(1) confident,

(2) concise, and

(3) accurate.

The Presentation of the Outline Plan

6. An outline plan should be presented in the following sequence:

a. Mission.
 2 A-6 ANNEX A

b. Execution.

(1) General Outline. A concise statement of how the

mission ts to be achieved.

(2) Grouping and Tasks. An explanation of the grouping

and tasks of the major units and, if necessary, sub-
units under command; followed by a description of the
general tasks and priorities of supporting arms. The
normal sequence is:

(a) units under command in order of precedence;

(b) special tasks with composite grouping, eg screen

and reserve; and

(c) supporting arms in order of corps seniority.

(3) Co-ordinating Instructions.

(a) Timings. Key timings only.

(b) Control Measures. Any additional control

measures not shown on the overlay.

(c) Fire Plan. Details of objectives, priorities,

effect required and outline timings.

(4) Administration and Logistics. Key aspects relating

to administration in support of your plan, if
appli cable.

(5) Command and Signal. Location of your headquarters

and any essential command and signals matters.

7. Avoid reference to specific units by title during the

presentation. Use generic terminology. For example, instead of '3 PI
with 1 Tp A Sqn 11 Armd Regt, 2 Tp C Sqn 11 APC Regt and 101 Fd Bty' ,
use 'a mounted platoon supported by a troop of tanks and battery of
field artillery'. Your overlay, however, must show the specific units
by their correct military symbols.

8. An example Outline Plan Overlay is shown at Annex A to Chapter

7 of Reference B. Note that only the 'Mission' and ';Execution'
paragraphs are written on the Overlay.
 1C-7 ANNEX C

The Concept of Operations

9. A concept of operations is a verbal or graphic/written

statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions and intentions
throughout an operation. In other words, it is a broadly stated outline
plan. It is to be presented orally and supported by an overlay. You
will be given concepts of operations in your problems and you will be
required to present your commanders concept in exercises during the JSC.

10. Notes to support the presentation of a concept of operations

should be prepared in the following sequence:

a. Assumptions. Reasonable assumptions which would be most

likely to occur and which are essential for the
development of your concept.

b. Assessment of Likely Enemy Operations. Key aspects of the

enemy's intentions, objectives and likely actions.

c. Mission.

d. Concept of Manoeuvre. A thorough description of the

general outline of the entire operation including a
statement of the grouping and manoeuvre (by phases if
applicable) of your forces.

e. Deception Plan. Objective.

f. Fire Support. A general statement of priorities for

support for both artillery and air.

g. Key Timings. Summarize key timings applicable to the

operation.

h. Vulnerabilities, Disadvantages and Risks of Own Concept

and Proposed Counters.
J 19-005 JAN 88

PART 2

THE DEFENCE APPRECIATION

'The objective of the defence will be to destroy

the enemy and not merely to stop him'

Field Marshal Montgomery

'Defensive operations are a prelude to offensive

action and as such are only temporary. Defence
must be aggressive in order to retain high morale
and an offensive spirit. Defensive operations may
be conducted:

a. to weaken a numerically superior enemy,

b. to fight the enemy on ground of the defender's

choosing,

c. to deny the enemy access to a vital area,

d. to gain time for more favourable conditions of

battle,

e. to protect or cover the operations of another

force,

f. to permit the conduct of offensive operations

by another force elsewhere, or

g. to avoid destruction or unacceptable losses.'

MLW One.1.4 - Formation

Tactics, 1987

Introduction

1. In writing a defence appreciation do not think defensively.

Work out where and with what the enemy will assault. Decide where he
can be destroyed while own troops combat power is maintained, and then
site weapons to achieve that destruction and site obstacles to guarantee
it.

2. What is to follow is a check list for the appreciation for area

defence. It is not exhaustive and should not be followed slavishly. It
should be read in conjunction with the example appreciation at Annex A.
 2-2

Aim

3. The alternatives for the statement of the aim in area defence

could be:

a. to defend a feature,

b. to defend within boundaries ,

c. to deny access to , or

d. to deny an approach.

You must appreciate that each of these alternatives, taken as your aim,
will result in a different plan. The defence of a feature will lead
you, in most cases, to a set-piece area defence with troops occupying
prepared defensive positions. Defence within boundaries will lead to a
more flexible approach to the selection of the ground on which to base
your defence and you will have to select your vital ground within the
area given and you should therefore defend on the approaches to that
vital ground. In denying access to an area you must cover all the
approaches into your area. See Glossary Part 6 for the definitions of
defend and deny. Note that you can deny an approach but your cannot
defend an approach.

Limitations

A. By its very nature, this phase of war tends to proffer the

greatest number of limitations. See Part 6 Glossary for a definition of
limitation. Typical limitations are:

a. occupy by time;

b. defend by time;

c. patrol requirements laid down by superior HQ;

d. work party requirements;

e. achievement of mutual support with other units/sub-units;

f. deny routes through the area;

g. level of digging (stages 1 to 3) laid down by a superior

HQ;

h. denial of particular approaches to the next level vital

ground; and

i. the provision of forces for security tasks, eg screen etc.

Note that this list is not exhaustive.

 2-3

Factors General

5. List the factors you believe relevant for each section in your
notebook. Then check them against Annex B. Do not simply copy out the
sequence/statements in the Annex as this will obstruct your own thought
process.

6. See the definitions of factor and deduction in the Part 6

Glossary. List your factors down one side of the page and deductions on
the other. An example of this is shown at Appendix 1 to Annex A.

Relative Strengths

7. If enemy and own troops are treated separately for convenience

ensure that you summarize the 'relative strengths' at the end. Annex A
lists some of the factors, questions and type of deductions required
here. Broadly speaking look at:

a. With regard to the enemy:

(1) grouping, strength and location;

(2) reconnaissance;

(3) indirect fire support;

(4) sequence of attack including probes;

(5) armour;

(6) air threat; and

(7) intention.

b. With regard to own forces:

(1) special equipment;

(2) anti-armour resources;

(3) defence stores;

(4) indirect fire support;

(5) direct fire support; and

(6) co-ordination with flanks.

c. Summary of deductions giving a view of relative combat

power. This may be left until after Ground where approach
capacities are determined. This will give you the basis
for deducing the ratio of infantry and armour. The
artillery and anti-armour ratios remain fairly fixed. If
you do leave this until after ground, say so here for the
 6-11

reader's benefit. What comes from this then is a

statement of advantages and disadvantages to each
combatant.

Ground

8. This involves the following:

a. A statement of ground general (see Annex B).

b. Selection of key terrain (see definition in the Part 6

Glossary) and numbering them.

c. Selection of vital ground (see Part 6 Glossary).

d. Selection of approaches (see Part 6 Glossary) by

(1) selection of enemy assembly areas;

(2) selection of FUP;

(3) recognition of natural obstacles which will effect

the approaches between the FUP and vital ground; and

(4) drawing in of the assault part of the approach (see

Part 6 Glossary).

e. Determination of ground covering approaches.

f. Completion of a tabular assessment of approaches (see

headings at paragraph 4.c.(2) to Annex B).

g. Completion of an approach overlay showing:

(1) key terrain,

(2) vital ground,

(3) FUP, and

(4) approaches.

In deriving this during the JSC it will be necessary to

use two overlays. First identify your key terrain and
vital ground on an enlargement. Then on the map mark in
the one up approaches through your area, the vital ground,
and FUP, and then derive the approaches to your vital
ground illustrating these on an overlay. Then transpose
the approaches thus derived onto the map enlargement
overlay to facilitate a study of ground covering.

h. Completion of a ground capacity overlay showing possible

MG (or section) and anti-armour weapon sites (using
numbered goose eggs).
 6-11

i. Completion of a summary of deductions in the body of the

appreciation.

9. The detail for the above is shown in Annex B to Part 2.

Staff checks

10. Up to the point of drawing platoon 'goose eggs' around possible

section positions you were expanding your options. At this point you
have begun to narrow them. Time and space and assessment of tasks are
two staff checks applied to the volume of resource information developed
so far in the appreciation process. Where and how these checks are
conducted is a personal thing. For example, much of the detail for the
assessment of fire support tasks may have been covered under the 'effect
of fire support' in the analysis of approaches. Time and space may have
been constantly alluded to. It may be necessary again after each course
(this is particularly true in the attack appreciation). In MLW One 6.1
- Staff Duties in the Field, 1971, assessment of tasks is shown after
enemy courses. Wherever they are put, these two staff checks are a
direct lead in to the development of courses and ensure that the
resource allocation will realistically support all course options.

Time and Space

11. Time and space can be detailed either in the text or in a table
set out in the text or as an annex. This part really has to do with the
preparation for rather than the conduct of the battle. The suggested
headings are detailed at paragraph 5 of Annex B. Conclude this section
with a summary and a priority of work. This section may follow the
assessment of tasks. If it does, a preliminary time and space is useful
to determine what is possible (eg Stage 2 or Stage 3 digging etc). If
this section does precede assessment of tasks it may be useful to leave
the priority of works until the conclusion of the assessment of tasks.
If you do this, explain it in the text.

Assessment of Tasks

12. Complete a table in the text or as an annex which first lists

the tasks common to all the approaches (eg limitations to the aim) and
then list tasks by approaches. All tasks should be given a priority.
The denial of approaches can be described by referring to MG (or
section) and/or anti-armour positions identified in the analysis of
approaches and the ground capacity overlay. The denial of approaches is
derived from ground covering approaches. Having made out the shopping
list apply the budget and derive compromise solutions. This leads to
the identification of platoon 'goose eggs' around the numbered section
positions identified as the best.

13. See Annex A paragraphs 11 to 14 and Annex B for the detail

required in assessment of tasks.
 2-6

Enemy Courses

14. Enemy courses are derived from doctrinal statements, from

deductions made under relative strengths and from deductions made under
ground particularly in relation to approaches. Enemy courses are not
simply a re-statement of approaches but a statement of how they will use
those approaches in terms of size and type of force. See Annex A for an
example.

15. Enemy courses are lettered and stated in broad outline but in
sufficient detail to show effect. They should reflect the following:

a. more than one;

b. likelihood;

c. enemy doctrine;

d. state effect on own forces (basis of own courses); and

e. state the most probable course.

16. The detailed considerations are listed at paragraph 7 of

Annex B.
/

Own Courses

17. Own courses are numbered using Roman numerals. See the example
at Annex A. Remember that no course is without disadvantages. The
advantage of the appreciation process is that you recognise these and
then take steps in your best course to overcome them as best you can.
Avoid stating principles and characteristics as advantages and
disadvantages. Most advantages and disadvantages will have been
identified during the previous appreciation steps, however, a review of
the considerations for defence may provide further points.

Outline Plan

18. The conventions for the outline plan are given in detail at
paragraph 2 of Annex B to Part 1. An example of an outline plan for a
company level area defence problem is given at Annex A at the conclusion
of the example appreciation.

Outline Plan Overlay

19. The conventions for the outline plan are listed at paragraph 3
of Annex B to Part 1. Check the requirement in the problem and ensure
that all the information is shown. If you cannot find an appropriate
symbol (eg for OC battle pit) make one up and describe it in a legend.
 6-11

Re-Appreciation

20. If you believe a re-appreciation may be necessary at a later

stage, end your submission with 'Re-appreciate at ' or 'when ....'.

Revision

21. Throughout the appreciation check your work against the list at
Annex C to Part 2.

Annexes: A. An Example of the Layout of an Appreciation and

Content of an Outline Plan for a Defence Problem at
Company Level
/

B. Factors, Courses and Deductions for the Defence

Appreciation

C. Defence Appreciation Check List

J23-001

ANNEX A TO
PART 2 OF
3.T.1

AN EXAMPLE OF THE LAYOUT OF

AN APPRECIATION AND CONTENT OF AN OUTLINE PLAN
FOR A DEFENCE PROBLEM AT COMPANY LEVEL

1. What is to follow must be read in conjunction with the text and

Annex B to Part 2. Students are warned against following this section
slavishly.

2. The annexes and overlays are not included in the example.

There is sufficient detail in the text and Annex B to Part 2.

EX SECRET
Page 1 of 26
Copy No 1 of 2

OPS 310

AN APPRECIATION OF THE D COY 11 INF BN DEF

OF THE AREA OF CHARD SPUR 0643 0743

For: CAPT I.B. SMART

By: CAPT I.B. SMART

Loc: D Coy 11 Inf Bn BEAUDESERT

At: 1200K On: 2 May 93

References: A. R832, Sheet 9542-111NW, LOGAN VILLAGE, Ed 2, 1:25 000

B. R832, Sheet 9542-111SW, BEAUDESERT, Ed 1, 1:25 000

C. Map Enlargement, BIRNAM RANGE Area, 1:6 250 approx

D. Confirmatory Notes to Preliminary Order, given by CO

11 Inf Bn at HQ 11 Inf Bn at 011800K May

Time zone used throughout the appreciation : Kilo

AIM

( deny NW app to )
1. To ( def within bdrys ) with fol limitations:
(def MALFUNCTION JUNCTION)

EX SECRET
 2 A-2 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
- 2 -

a. occupy by ;

b. def by ;

c. deny en use of SHANES ROAD;

d. deny north app to Bn vital gnd;

e. prov work parties ;

g«

FACTORS

(An example of the tabular layout of factors and deductions

is shown at Appendix 1.)

Relative Str
(List factors here) (List deductions here)

2. En.
a. (1)

b. (See factor guide (2) (See deductions in factor guide)

at Annex B to Pt 2)
c.

3. Own Tps.

a. (1)

b. (See factor guide (2) (See deductions in factor guide)

at Annex B to Pt 2)

c. (3)

d.

4. Summary of Relative Strs. (This may be given in outline here

and then developed further after gnd if the app capacity will help
formulate the relative combat ratio statements. See paragraph 7c of
Part 2.)

EX SECRET
 2 A-3 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
IJT—

Cud

5. Gen. (1)

(2) .

(3)

6. Key Terrain (KT) See (1) Vital Gnd. (Deductions

Annex A leading to choice of VG)

7. Apps. These were derived (1) Analysis of Apps. See

on Ref B (see over- Apendix 1 to Annex B.
lay at Annex A) and are (Ensure that this appendix
shown on Annex B. folds out next to the
Annex. Note that the key to
this analysis Is the
treatment of gnd covering).

(2) Capacity of Gnd to Spt Wpns

to Cover App. See Annex C.
(Here show possible MGS (or
sects) and anti-armd wpns on
an overlay. These relate
directly to key terrain. It
may be useful to include the
apps again in this overlay).

8. Summary of Deductions on Gnd. (This may prove a useful lead

into en courses, obs planning and anti-armd planning).

Time and Space.

(This may be covered now or after Assesment of Tasks. It is sometimes
covered now in at least preliminary form to see what is achievable in
the time frame, eg if time does not allow for the prep of altn posn then
there is no point analysing altn posn tasking. See Part 2 and Annex B
to Part 2 for the details required here. The aim is to produce a pri of
work ie a sequence in which the posn will be prep.)

9.
Time now.
a.
(timings given in (1) (time for battle procedure
b. limitations) sufficient?)
(number of section hours
c. (2) available)
(deduct times for tasks
d. (3) given in factor column)
(timings deduced (4) (deduce time left and what
e. you can do with this time,
earlier, eg digging
to OHP time) eg altn posn, stage 3,
f.
obs etc

EX SECRET
 2A-4 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
-4-

(5) Pri of Work (Sequence in

which posn will be
developed)
(a) (if time and space
precedes assessment
(b) of tasks it may be
useful to complete
(c) this section after
assessment of tasks. If
you choose to do this,
say so) .

10. Summary of Deductions (If applicable)

Assessment of Tasks
(Make out a shopping list, apply the budget of resources and suggest
compromise solutions as lead into own course. Some find the listing of
all tasks confusing. The prep and conduct tasks are separated here but
this is not mandatory. Most prep tasks are covered in time and space.)

11. Conduct of the Battle (This may be shown as an annex. An altn

way of developing this in a quantitative manner in a table is
illustrated at Appendix 2.

Ser Task Resource Pri Remarks

TaT TbT" (O TdT (I)
1 Deny App A MG )Posn from (Give pri to
)gnd various posns
2 Anti- )capacity eg MG2, 4, 6,
Armd ) 7, Pri 1
)0bs from MG 8, 9 Pri 2)
3 Obs )gen assess- (Altn for obs)
m e n t of app (Posn which
satisfy more
than one app)

Deny App B MG
Anti-armd
Obs

(Limitation (Task resources

Tasks) two down)

(Deduced Tasks)

12. Deductions
(From the table and pri of tasking etc derive combinations of
sect posns to give possible pi posns. Derive also the best
anti-armd posns. Show these on an overlay as a series of over-
lapping 'goose eggs'. List the capabilities of each pi posn
and set of two anti-armd posns).

EX SECRET
 2 A-5 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
-5-

13* Preparation for the Battle

(This may be shown as an annex. This part, if used, may
summarize the tasks realized from the conduct aspect).

Ser Task Resource Prl Remarks

(Here list all the (By sect not (Derived (Discussion of

prep tasks eg ptl pi or coy) frcm the such aspects as
develop wire obs, conduct altn obs may be
bn work parties, of the useful)
digging) Battle)

(If a Time and Space has already been covered, now add the
'Priority of Work' from that section)

14. Application of Resource Budget

(A summary of the above giving a mix and match of posns and
anti-armd and obs altns leading to a clear cut definition of
options. Do this by gp high pri MGs into pi posns.)

15. PI and Spt Sect Posns.

(Here discuss each pi and spt sect posn as a basis for the
development of own courses.)

EN COURSES

16. (Introduce the en courses with a statement(s) on how you see

the battle developing to the deliberate attack stage. Do this in the
context of one up. Then derive the deliberate attack options onto your
posn).

17. Course A. A bn ni atk spt by a coy of tks on app C while B Coy

is neutralized preceded by probes and prep fire. (State these in
general terms. The day version of this is not another course):

a. Likelihood. Quite likely especially if the quick atk on

B Coy failed. It is also the atk which is recognised as
likely in the CO concept as Phase 1 of the atk to the
11 Bn VG.

b. Effect. As this course uses a large number of tks I need

to seek Bn assistance in separating the armd from the inf
and thus allow D Coy to conc on the inf. My best Carl
Gustaff posns for this course are 1 and 4 with altns at 6
and 8. This course does not allow me to rely on spt from
B Coy so I need to max my MG fire fwd of posns 7, 10, 12,
13, 14. I should ensure that I have two pis up. I can do
this both fwd and back. I need to ensure that I use
claymores in the area (This area gives the
fine tune to the options developed under Assessment of
Tasks).

EX SECRET
 2 A-6 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
- 6 -

18. Course B.

a. Likelihood.

b. Effect. ...

19. Course C

ENEMY'S MOST PROBABLE COURSE

20. (This may combine some aspects of other courses as well. If so

summarize effect).

OWN COURSES

21. Course I. (stated fully) Def well fwd. Pi posns 1, 2 and 5.

Spt Sect loc posn 1 with altn at posn 3. Coy HQ loc rear posn 5. Obs
loc (This may be spt by an overlay for obs or any other aspect
not economically described in writing).

a. Advantages.

(1) Dominates Bn Killing Gnds 1, 2, 3.

(2) Covers dead gild in creek to NW of posn 6.

(3) Covers as far fwd as CENTRE SPUR.

(4) Allows dispersion.

(5) Max depth to VG.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Large obs requirement.

(2) Vulnerable to tk dir FS from CENTRE SPUR.

(3) Salient eff in posn 2 may require counter penetration

force.

(4) Exposed to air and gnd obsn.

22. Course II.

a. Advantages.

b. Disadvantages.

EX SECRET
 2 A-7 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
-7-

23. Course III.

a. Advantages.

b* Disadvantages.

SELECTION OF BEST COURSE

24. I will adopt Course IV because it:

a ) (Reasons or statements of
) major advantages and how
b ) this course minimizes the
) disadvantages so far
) developed.
)
d )

OUTLINE PLAN
FOR THE D COY DEFENCE OF THE 170 FEATURE

25. Mission. To def 170 FEATURE.

26. Execution:

a. Gen Outline. Def with two pis fwd and one pi in depth as
per overlay. Ptl Iocs fwd vie 069432. Wire obs to be
const fwd of and between fwd pi. Coy HQ to be loc in rear
of depth pi.

b. 10 PI

(1) G£^_

(a) In loc Spt Sect

(b) In DS MFC

(2) Tasks.

(a) Occupy SPUR 061166.

(b) Deny northern app.

(c) Deny en use of SHANES ROAD.

(d) Prov spt to 11 PI.

(e) Prov interlocking FS with 12 PI vie 069468.

(f) Prov interlocking FS with 13 Inf Bn vie 072281.

EX SECRET
 2 A-8 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
- 8 -

11 PI.

(1) Gp. In loc Coy Comd Gp.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Occupy SPUR 069465.

(b) Deny northern app.

(c) Prov spt to 10 PI and 11 PI.

(d) Prov PI str mine laying party night 6/9 Aug.

d. 12 PI.

(1) Gp. No change.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Occupy SPUR 067467.

(b) Deny northern and NW app.

(c) Prov spt to B Coy and 11 PI.

(d) Prov interlocking FS with 10 PI at 069468.

e. Spt Sect.

(1) Tasks.

(a) Pri. prov anti-armd FS IAW Bn anti-armd plan.

(b) Altn. Deny en armd app from north. Loc vie

050462. See overlay.

(c) Altn. Deny en use of SHANES ROAD. Loc 10 PI.

(d) Altn. Ilium. Loc vie 068473.

f. Coord Instr.

(1) FS;_

(a) FOP loc Coy HQ.

(b) MFC loc 10 PI.

(c) Coy HQ MG with tripod and C2 sight prov spt to B

Coy alloc to 12 PI.

(2) Bdrys Annex C.

(3) Locs Annex C.

EX SECRET
 2 A-9 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
-9-

(4) Timings.

(a) Occupy by 060800.

(b) Def by 100600.

(c) Stage II by 081800.

(d) Wire obs const by 081800.

(e) OHP on sleeping bays by 090600.

(f) Ptl prgm commence 050800.

(5) Obs.

(a) Loc and Types. Annex C.

(b) Pis to const wire obs within bdry.

(c) 11 PI to lay Bn obs night 6/7 Aug.

(6) Ilium. Passive. No ilium to be fired without Bn HQ

approval.

(7) Pri of Work.

(a) Fighting pits to Stage II.

(b) Wire obs const.

(c) All OHP complete incl sleeping bays by 090600.

(d) Complete Stage III.

(8) Ptl. Prgm iss separately,

(b) Tasks.

(1) Bn Ptls. Tasks TBA NLT 042359. Coy to prov one sect
standing ptl and recon ptl from 050800. Intensity
increased from 081800.

(2) Coy Ptl.

i. Recon. Prov EW of en activity to north of Coy

loc. Routes iss at ptl briefing.

ii. Standby. Res. Be prep to react as req. Str

half pi.

(I.B. SMART)
CAPT
OC D COY

EX SECRET
 2 A-10 ANNEX A

EX SECRET
- 1 0 -

Annexes: A. Key Terrain, Vital Gnd, App and Killing Gnd in D Coy

Area.

B. Derivation of App to D Coy Vital Gnd

C. Gnd Capacity in the D Coy Area

D. Courses for the Def of the 170 FEATURE

E. Outline Plan for the Def of the 170 FEATURE

Distribution: Copy No (incl annexes)

OC D Coy 1
File 2

EX SECRET

Appendices: 1. Example of the Tabular Layout of Factor and

Deductions

2. Example of Weight Scoring of Machine Gun and Carl

Gustaf Sites in the Assessment of Tasks.
J23-012

APPENDIX 1
ANNEX A TO
PART 2 OF
3T1

EXAMPLE OF TOE TABULAR LAYOUT OF FACTORS AND DEDUCTIONS

EX SECRET

Relative Str (1) Gg^ Regt gp spt ty tk bn, anti

1. armd coy and elm DAG.
2. En.
(2) Str. My coy will face at least
a. 301 Rif Div is adv south using MOUNT an inf bn and coy tks (13 MBTs).
LINDESAY HIGHWAY. Obj is
BEAUEESERT. In addition to thrust on (3) Loc. 18 km to north. Will take
MDUNT LINDESAY HIGHWAY will develop */2day to reach A Coy from NORTH
altn push through BIRNAM RANGE down MACLEAN. Regt arrive 071200.
MUNDOOLUN ROAD 0321 to 0812 using
regt gp. (4) Recon. Div recon through area
so en has good terrain brief.
b. Adv guard of regt gp at PARK RIDGE. Regt recon in area now. Need to
clear posn for own recon and own
c. Est close to NORTH MACLEAN 0127 by ptl prgm to begin on
first light 6 May. occupation. Own ptls need anti
armd wpns to face BREMs.
d. Air parity exists.
(5) Indir FS. En arty In range now
e. Anticipate del snail qty nerve agent so CUP required ASAP and likely
from maj ally in early May. OPs ident and denied. Expect
RAG to be in range between
070600 and 071200. This cfm CO
(SIP requirement.

(6) Sequence of Atk/Probes. (Worst

case)
(a) Ptls from now. Need min
own sect str fitting ptls.
(b) Arty (from M G ) harassment
from now.
(c) A Coy to receive probe atk
followedfcyatk fran line
of march from 071200. All
prep for battle mist be
complete ty this time.
(d) Deliberate atk on Bn,
possible through A Coy
(check app in gnd) to
commence from 071400. Need
to have repair and
replenishment facy between
first and second atk.

EX SECRET
2A1-2

(e) A coy def area relative to

Bn vital gnd Indicates that
en will atk A Coy while he
troves along axis of rd.
Thus for encounter battle A
Coy is en bn immediate Obj
while Bn vital gnd is
subsequent obj. Thus
during this atk A Coy will
need to destroy approx 500
men and 13 MKTs. Need to
find adequate killing gnd
to fit this requirement
under gnd.

(7) Armd. Have two Carl Gustafs to

kill 13 MBTs. Need Bn spt and
contingency forrainof three
sets of altn posn covering
adequate killing gnd. These
need to be dug in and complete
with pre prepared ammo and anti-
armd obs. Need to tie into Bn
anti-armd plan.
(8) Air. Air parity means a
requirement to appoint one air
sentry for coy posn as long as
he can cover whole posn. If
wooded features preclude this,
need more. Ident major air app
and determine sentry posn in
gnd.
(9) NBCD. Need facy for TQPP3 in
posn in loc of all pits. Need
NBCD sentry in each pi and at
CHQ.
(10) Intention. Unlikely that regt
gp will be spt by extra regt.
Regt against Bde does not accord
with odds favoured by en.
Therefore can expect atk on
narrow front with tks well
fwd. He prefers night for
deliberate atk so can expect him
to atk night 7/8 or, more
likely, on night 8/9 May. My
proximity to 12 Bn may mean that
A Coy is held while an atk on B
Coy is pushed through isolating
12 Bn and improving relative
combat power. My disposn mist
allow max spt to B Coy during
this phase of en atk while
fighting holding atk. My battle
will be highlighted ty encounter
atk. Then my pri will be to spt
rest of bn while holding my cwn.

EX SECRET
J23-013
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANN FX A TO
PAPT 2 OF
EXAMPLF OF WEIGHT SCOPING OF MACFINF PUN AND CARL C-USTAF 3T1
SITES IN TFF ASSESSMENT OF TASKS

Ser Description Type Section Position Number

(a) (b) (c) (d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1. Deny App A MC- X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Anti
Armd X X X X X X

2. Deny App B KG x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Anti
Armd X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

3. Deny App C MGx X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Anti
Armd X X X X X X X X X X X

4. Deny App D MG X X X X X X X X

Anti
Armd X X X X X X

5. Direct FS to Band MG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
D Coy and 12 Bn

6. Anti Armd Fire Anti X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

to Killing Gnd 1 Armd

7. Deny en use of rd. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

8. Total Anti Armd 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 1

9. Total MG 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 2 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 2 2

Deductions from Analysis of Ground to Fire Tasks •

1. Pri 1 I*G Posn. 1,2,3,5,8,11,14,15,16,17,21,23,27,30,33,36
2. Prl 2 yG Posn. 4,6,7 ,12 ,18,24,25,26,28,29 ,34,35
3. Pri 1 Anti Armd Posn. 1 ,2,6,7 ,8,14,16,21 ,23,25,27,34,35
4. Pri 2 Anti Armd Posn. 3,4,5,11,12,18,19,20,22,36
Note: This example can be developed upon, eg a preferred approach could be given an extra weighting.
J23-014

ANNEX B TO
PART 2 OF
3T1

FACTORS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENCE APPRECIATION

Note: The list given is not exhaustive and does not apply to every situation. Use it simply to trigger your
thoughts for each section.

Factors Deductions
(a) (b)

1. En^ From ex papers list: (1) Gp. En force threatening your posn
in one up context (ie the regt
a. Gen sit. facing your bn posn). Fran this
you extract what you will face in
b. Gp. str.

c. Loc. (2) Str. En force expected against

you. Hew much inf, armd, arty etc.
d. Rate of adv.
(3) Loc. What does en current loc mean
to you? Most of these questions
will be dealt with below. For the
moment simply work out when he will
close on your posn.

e. Special equip: (4) Recon. What recon is in area and

so what?
(1) Armd.
(5) Indir FS. What indir FS do you
(2) Arty. face, vten will it be in range,
what obsn does he have, and what
(3) NBCD. will you do about it?

(4) Air. (6) Sequence of Probes/Atk. From his

doctrine wark out the worst case
f. Admin sit. sequence of the battle and what
this means to your prep for and
g- Actions by doctrine. conduct of the defensive battle.

(7) Armd. How nuch armd has he got,

how will he use it in the sequence
developed above, and what will you
do about it?

(8) Air. What is the threat? Where

will it come from and what counter
measures should you take?

List arty other special equipment

oriented deductions as applicable (eg
NBCD).
 2B2-2 ANNEX B

(9) Intention. Fran the foregoing what

is the enemy's aim, how will he
achieve it, (in the one up context)
how does this effect me, and what
must I do about it? Note this
discussion is a prelude to the
development of enemy courses. An
analysis of approaches is necessary
before enemy courses can be
discussed in detail.

See example of the above at Appendix 1 to Annex A.

2. Own. From ex papers list: (1) Against each of the factors discuss
how these can be used for the
a. Secial equip. achievement of the aim given the ex
picture developed above, eg:
b. Anti arrad resources.
(a) C2 Sight and Tripod and
c. Def stores. requirement to spt distant
unit and how this can be done.
d. Indir FS.
(b) En MBTs to anti armd resources
e. Dir FS. and so viiat.

f. Requirement for flank coord gLven in (c) Capacity to lay obs in terms
orders. of def stores and time.

(d) Indir FS requirements,

shortfalls and means to
overcome this in gen terms in
use of FPF, role of obs and SA
fire, and mix of claymores.

(e) Dir FS facy from neighbouring

units and now this can be
coord and what effect can be
expected. Will it still be
aval during encounter and
delib atk battles? So what?

(f) Coord requirements with

specialist pi and flanks.
 2B2-3 ANNEX B

3. Summary of Relative Str. list ratios of inf, armd and arty if possible. You may have to examine gnd to
gain analysis of apps (frontages/capacity etc) before writing this paragraph. Ident task on each app in relative
terms (eg 1 have 200 men and 3 MBTs to destroy on App D but have spt fire from all of D Coy, 6 x bn RCL and an M3
from B Coy to supplementrayfire. He can/cannot develop adequate combat ratios on this app. So what?

A. Gnd.

a. Gnd Gen. Write a paragraph on how the

gnd impresses you as the comd who must
achieve the aim.

b. Key Terrain (KT). (Mark in numbered (1) Vital Gnd (VG). Indicate which KT
circles on an overlay.) is VG and why.

c. Apps. Using a map draw in app to bn VG (2) Analysis of Apps.

which gp through your area. Then derive
the app to your VG. Then show these (a) Assy Area,
latter app on an overlay to an
enlargement. This last step facy the (b) Route to FUP.
analysis of apps.
(c) FUP/LD.

(d) Frontage/Capacity.

(e) Going (inf/armd, day/night).

(f) Ground covering.

i. Ghd/features outside
bdry.

ii. KT.

(g) Natural Obs.

(h) Distances (length of apps,

division of app into killing
gnd, range of wpn into killing
gnd, range and ability of en
dir FS wpn to engage own gnd
covering etc).

(i) Gen Assessment.

 2B2-4 ANNEX B

(3) Gnd Capacity. Divide KT into

MG/sect posns and SRAAW posns.
Show this cm an overlay to the
enlargement. This overlay should
also show apps to assist assessment
of tasks.

5. Time and Space. (1) Time for battle procedure. Is it

sufficient?
a. Time Now.
(2) Mjmber of sect hrs aval.
b. Time Occupy By.
(3) Sect hrs remaining after deduction
c. Tine Def By. of bn and coy tasks and tp rest.

d. Time En to Close on Posn. (4) What can be achieved in time

remaining?
e. Time for Bn Tasks.
(5) Pri of work (sequence in which posn
f. Other Time Limitations. will be prep).

g. Time for Coy Tasks so far deduced.

Note: Time and space is an on going staff check throughout the appreciation. Listing the key aspects in one
place is difficult. It can be overcome by doing a 'gross error check' before assessment of tasks to
establish if there is enough time for the prep of altn coy posns etc. Then after assessment of tasks
deductions (3) to (5) can be fully developed. In arty case deduction (5) cannot be developed until after
assessment of tasks.

6. Assessment of Tasks. There are twa areas of tasking to be assessed. One for the preparation and one for
the conduct of the battle. Most of the former is derived from the latter and relates to the resource of time and
so is covered in time and space. Some assessment of preparatory tasks may be relevant here. Primarily the
assessment concerns the conduct of the battle.

a. Bn Tasks for Conduct of the Battle (from (1) Resource required (two down ie
aim limitations eg prov dir FS to sect) and pri.
another coy)

b. Denial of Apps. (2) m posns ) pri 1

) pri 2
(3) SRAAW posns ) pri 3

(4) Obs requirement to chan/slcw.

Deduced Task for Conduct of the Battle (5) Resource required (twa down) and
(eg coy standing ptl, NBCD sentries pri.
etc).

Note: See Appendix 2 to Annex A for a method of

weight scoring MG/Sect and SRAAW posns.
 2B2-5 ANNEX B

(6) Combination of sect and SRAAW posns

which meets requirement and pri.
Do this by pi 'goose eggs' around
sect Iocs.

(7) Discussion of each pl and SRAAW

posns.

7. En Courses. From the foregoing list a number (1) Effect. What effect does this
of options open to the enemy. Describe these options course have on the identified pl
in broad outline and state their likelihood. Which is and SRAAW posns? What shape do the
the most probable course? obs plan options take.

(2) Effect of the Most Probable

Course. Having determined the most
probable course, hew do you now
view the combined effect of all
courses, ie what nust my own
courses include?
J23-002

ANNEX C 1
PART 2 Of
3T1

DEFENCE APPRECIATION
CHECKLIST

SERVICE WRITING GND OWN COURSES TACTICS

Security Classification Grid Gen More than one Tie in left and right
Copy Number KT Follow deductions Def VG
Page Number VG Based on effect Depth
File Reference Assy Area Aim/limitations covered All round def
Title Route to FUP Advantages Firepower
Written by/for FUP/LD Disadvantages Mutual spt
Date/Time Frontage/Capacity Workable Uses obs realistically
References Gnd Covering Anti-armd def
Time Zone Natural Obs OUTLINE PLAN Security
Sequence Distances Concealment
Place Names Upper Case Gen Assessment Mission Control
Max Abbr App on Overlay Gen outline Connuni cations
Headings Underlined Gnd Capacity on Overlay Gp
En Courses Lettered Tasks
Own Courses Numbered TIME & SPACE Coord instr
Annexes Headed Follows from courses
Distr List Time Now
Time for battle procedure OVERLAY
AIM Occupy Bn
Def By Ex Secret
Aim Deploy ptl Heading
Occupy by Bn tasks times Map Ref
Def by Pri of Work Copy No
Other limitations Annex Block
ASSESSMENT TASKS 3 Grid Intersections
RELATIVE STRENGTH Correct Colours
Bn Tasks Correct symbols
En Gp/Str Coy Tasks IF Tasks
En Loc Denial of App loc Each Pl
En Recon Itoo Down Loc CHQ
En Arty Pri Tasks Loc crew served wpn
En Sequence Probes/Atk Pl Posn Loc and type of Obs
En Ik Loc Standing ptl(s)
En Air EN COURSES
En other Special Equip
En Intention More than one
Own Special Equip Likelihood
Own Anti-armd Reflect Doctrine
Own Def Stores Effect
Indirect FS Most probable
Direct FS
Coord with flanks
J20-020 JAN 87

PART 3

THE ATTACK APPRECIATION

IatroductIon

1. At the JSW, the attack appreciation is conducted at unit level

and therefore concerns the clearance, destruction, capture or security
of an enemy company size position. The scale of the enemy picture is
thus reduced from that seen in the defence appreciation. Most of the
points raised for the defence appreciation, however, remain valid. For
example, ground is considered in a similar manner but from the reverse
view point. The attack appreciation is concerned with key terrain as
objectives (See Part 6 Glossary) rather than as defensive localities.

2. What is to follow is a check list for the attack appreciation.

It is not exhaustive and should not be followed slavishly.

Aim

3. The alternatives for the statement for the aim for the attack
could be:

a. to clear ;

b. to capture ;

c. to secure ; or

d. to destroy.

4. The aim here must be the one directed by the next senior
commander and not what you believe should be done. The implications of
other manoeuvre, time and space, and the overall plan have been
considered by the next senior commander and, to enable the success of
his more important mission, you must obey the directive as given. The
difference between them must be understood. 'To clear' may be achieved
simply by manoeuvre aad fire power and it may only be necessary to
subsequently pass a force through the objective later to confirm that it
has been cleared. 'To capture/secure' indicates the necessity to hold
that piece of ground either by placing troops on the objective or on
ground covering the enemy approaches to it. 'To destroy' involves the
fixLng aad subsequent destruction of the enemy. The fixing could be
done by either a cut-off force or by the Phase 1 assault force capturing
a depth objective which will prevent the enemy withdrawing. The
destruction would then be achieved by the subsequent assaulting
forces. The definitions of these terms are given in the Glossary at
Part 6.
 3-2

Limitations

5. In contrast to the defence appreciation the attack proffers few

limitations. Typical of those Imposed are:

a. ASAP ;

b. attack complete by ; or

c. exploit to

Note that this list is not exhaustive.

6. Timings are normal and if they are the only limitation they
should be included in the statement of the aim (eg to clear MALFUNCTION
JUNCTION by 121400K May).

Relative Strengths

7. If enemy and own troops are treated separately for convenience

(and this may be the case) summarize the 'relative strengths' at the
end. This summary may be more appropriate after an examination of
ground when approach frontages and, therefore, more exact combat ratios
are determined. Combat ratios should cover relative strengths in regard
to infantry, armour, anti-armour and artillery. Annex B lists some of
the factors, questions and type of deductions required. Broadly
speaking look at the following areas:

a. With regard to the enemy:

(1) strength and location (this may be illustrated on an

overlay) ,

(2) number and type of objectives (platoon, company or

battalion size objectives),

(3) size of objectives and therefore size of fire unit

required to neutralize,

(4) support,

(5) reserve,

(6) air,

(7) artificial obstacles, and

(8) reaction.

b. With regard to own forces:

(1) specialist sub-units (units) and equipment and their

use,
 3-3

(2) direct fire support assets,

(3) indirect fire units (See Part 6 Glossary for the

definition and calculations of fire units),

(4) ratio of own to enemy and the means to maximize own

combat power ratios, and

(5) administration situation.

Note that this list is not exhaustive.

Ground

8. This involves the following:

a. A statement of ground general.

b. Selection of key terrain features (see definition and

description at Part 6 Glossary) and their numbering.

c. Selection of the vital ground (see definition at Part 6

Glossary).

d. Drawing in of approaches (see Part 6 Glossary) by:

(1) selection of assembly areas,

(2) selection of FUP,

(3) identification of obstacles constricting the assault

between FUP and vital ground, and

(4) drawing In of routes to the FUP and the dimensions of

the assault.

e. Completion of a tabular analysis of approaches.

f. Completion of an approach overlay which folds out next to

the analysis of approaches showing:

(1) key terrain,

(2) vital ground,

(3) assembly area,

(4) routes to FUP,

(5) FUP,

(6) assault routes,

 3-4

(7) objectives,

(8) killing ground if desired, and

(9) locations suitable for direct fire support if

desired.

g. Completion of a summary of deductions in the body of the

appreciation.

9. The detail for the above is shown at Annex B. Analysis of

killing ground is useful if it develops deductions concerning the
thwarting of the enemy's intention to kill you. You do this by
examining counter-measures calculated against the killing ground
dimensions (eg range of weapons etc). Thus the placing of tanks on a
ridgeline to the enemy's front, out of range of his anti-armour weapons,
may stop his use of ground covering that killing ground.

Assessment of Tasks

10. The analysis of approaches offers a list of costs; any

preliminary operations (if required), objectives to be captured,
objectives which must be targets, flanks which need protecting, and
other tasks. Assessment of tasks is a simple staff check to assess
requirements and priorities and then impose the availabilities and
restrictions/limitations. It is based on the analysis of approaches.
Thus it converts ground data into numerals for quantities and
priorities. The assessment is best based on a logical progression of
the complete assault from preliminary o perations through to
reorganization.

11. Assessment of tasks can be prepared as follows:

a
' Part One. Assess tasks for each appD ach to the vital
ground by analysing the objectives that lie on that
apprcsc'h. The resources required for each objective or
group of objectives may vary between approaches usually
because the shape of the ground will present different
ground covering. If there are other objectives associated
with the p<sition that do not lie on the approach under
consideration detail them under other tasks for that
approach. These tasks may result in preliminary or
subsequent operations being undertaken before or after the
main attack. The assessment should also include the tasks
and locations for Limits of Exploitation and
Reorganization.

b. Part Two. Having completed an assessment for each

approach, a summary may be completed, by imposing the
availabilities and restrictions/limitations. The
requirements for other tasks must also be included here.
In any event they must be considered in Courses. The
summary should only apply fc> those approaches that require
adjustments to tasks or resources.

Parts One and Two above are illustrated at Enclosure 2.

 6-11

12. At the conclusion of assessment of tasks you should have the

basis for own courses. The assessment should contain the statements
that sufficient resources are or are not available. The body of the
appreciation is to show any resource adjustments that may have to be
made to make an approach workable. In short you will have concluded by
specifying:
a. the need for any preliminary operatins, phases and where
phase lines are to be located (if necessary);
b. the combination of approaches (if applicable) which
overcome the resource deficiencies; and
c. the discounting of low priority tasks and the acceptance
of the remainder as within resources and integral to
courses open.

Time and Space

13. Unlike the defence appreciation, the time and space here
follows each approach through to the vital ground. Thus it should be
presented in a table showing:

a. time now;

b. time restrictions (if applicable from limitations);

c. time for battle procedure;

d. for each approach the time for movement to the FUP and
therefore the earliest H hour;

e. for each phase on each approach the time:

(1) from LD to objective,

(2) for fight through, and

(3) for reorganisation; and

f. time for the taking of vital ground for each approach and
a statement concerning the need in courses to allow for
extra time for the mopping up of other objectives not
covered by a particular approach.

14. The timings should be based on a commonsense application of the

guidelines in the Aide-memoire. Note that calculations go to the vital
ground only.

15. The time that the aim is achieved is important if a time

restriction applies. This can only be achieved after a study of courses
open. Otherwise approaches are treated as courses and this is a common
and severe mistake. Each course should give an indication of the time
that the aim is achieved by if the limitation ASAP applied. The aim is
only achieved when all tasks have been completed. This may also mean
when any subsequent (other tasks) operations are completed if such tasks
relate to the completion of the aim.
 6-11

Enemy Courses

16. Enemy courses are derived from doctrinal statements and

deductions made under relative strengths and ground. The examination of
ground will reveal his favoured killing ground, his dispositions to
achieve his aim and his most likely withdrawal routes if applicable. Do
not simply restate the doctrine (eg he will fight until I deploy and
then withdraw) but detail how he will achieve the statement of doctrine.

17. Enemy courses are lettered and stated in broad outline. They
should reflect the following criteria:

a. enemy doctrine;

b. more than one;

c. state likelihood;

d. state the effect this enemy course has on each of my

approaches and the counters required; and

e. state the most probable course.

Own Courses
18. Own courses are based on the assessment of tasks and the effect
of enemy courses. They are numbered using Roman numerals and must:

a. incorporate the aim and limitations;

b. be based on earlier deductions;

c. be achievable within resources;

d. take account of all the considerations for the attack (see

Annex A);

e. be stated fully (by phase, objs captured, fire support,

flank security, preliminary operations, subsequent
operations, reorganization, etc);,

f. be detailed as a number of options (ie more than one

course); and

g. detail advantages and disadvantages for each course

including the time and space aspect (this may necessitate
an extra time and space segment for each course).

(Note. The effects and likelihood of enemy courses should be countered

in Own Courses. A statement must be made on how well (or poorly) each
Course counters the likelihood and effects applicable to the Course).
 6-11

19. Own courses may precede enemy courses (the side with the
initiative may have his courses described first). Students may find
this confusing because of the difficulties of incorporating effect.
Students unfamiliar with the appreciation process are advised to keep it
simple and examine enemy first.

20. Your best course is quite often the result of countering the
disadvantages of a previous course. Thus II is better than I, and III
better than II, and IV better than III, so IV becomes the chosen course.
This may not always be the case but, obviously, disadvantages need to be
minimised.

Outline Plan

21. The conventions for the outline plan are given in detail at
paragraph 6 of Annex C to Part 1. The sequence for the presentation of
an outline plan brief is given at Appendix 1 to Annex C to Part 1.

22. As the outline plan is simply a detailed statement of your best

course it is implicit that it is tactically sound (ie it accords with
the considerations of the attack at Annex A).

Outline Plan Overlay

23. The conventions for the outline plan overlay are listed at
Paragraph 3 of Annex B to Part 1. Check the requirements of the problem
and ensure that all the detail required is shown. If something (eg a
boundary) is requested but for some good reason it is not applicable,
explain that on your overlay. Some of the more usual items shown on an
outline plan overlay are:

a. assembly area;
b. routes from the assembly area to the FUP;
c. FUP and LD for each phase;
d. objectives;
e. axis;
f. boundaries (if applicable, this relates to the boundary
between assaulting sub-units and between sub-units in
reorganisation locations);
g. fire support tasks;
h. limits of exploitation;
i. reorganisation locations for all manoeuvre elements;
j. direct fire support locations; and
k. any other requirements related the tactical problem.
 3-8

24. On completion of this, check your problem and ensure that all
that is required has been covered. If you need to use unauthorised
symbols, a legend must be included. Above all, the overlay must
accurately depict the best course.

Re-Appreciation

25. For formal appreciations at higher levels the task may have to
be re-appreciated. Such an appreciation may form the basis of a
contingency plan.

Revision

26. Throughout the appreciation and at the end check your work
against the tactical considerations at Annex B and the appreciation
check list at Annex D.

Annexes: A. Considerations for the Attack

B. Factor and Deduction Guide for the Attack Appreciation

C. Attack Appreciation Check List

 3A-1

J20-022

ANNEX A TO
PART 3 TO
3T1

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ATTACK

1. Considerations for the attack should be evident in all the

deductions which lead to viable courses open. It may be that some are
discounted by some sound reasoning. If so, the reasoning must be
given. Some notes on each consideration are as follows:

a. Concent ration.

(1) Was superior combat power concentrated at each point

of the assault?

(2) Was at least a ratio of three to one allocated for

the capture of each objective?

b. Penetration. Was the attack organized in depth and was it

given limits of exploitation past the position?

c. Firepowe r.

(1) Was the fire plan considered? Did it provide depth

and flexibility. Was it used on likely enemy
withdrawal routes?

(2) Was each piece of ground covering allocated as a

target?

(3) Was a target indicated to cover the reorganization?

(4) If allocated, were tanks used in the assault or to

provide fire support? Were they used realistically?

(5) Was CAIRS used realistically?

(6) Was the DS field battery superimposed to provide for

emergency or unexpected targets?

(7) Was direct fire support in a position to give optimum

effective fire?

d. Secure FUP/LD. Were elements provided to secure the FUP

and LD for each phase? Were FUPs secured as a firm base
in each case?
 2 A-2 ANNEX A

e. Secure Flanks. Was part of the force tasked to secure the

flanks, or at least was flank security considered? Did
the flank security have sufficient combat power to counter
the likely threat? Did the flank security force have
appropriate command, control and communications?

f. Maintenance of the Momentum.

(1) Was phasing kept to an absolute minimum?

(2) Was the assaulting force well grouped? •

(3) Was a reserve/depth allocated for each phase?

g. Retention of the Initiative. Was flexibility built into

the plan (eg superimposed fire units) in order to achieve
tactical advantage throughout the attack?

h. Reorganization. In so far as it is possible to decide,

does the course provide for a rapid reorganization, all
round defence and orientation towards the most likely
threat?

i. Enemy Reserve. Does the course recognise the threat of a

DAG fire mission on the enemy position once the withdrawal
had been effected?

j. Surprise. Does the plan incorporate any form of deception

or surprise to assist the attack? If surprise was not
thought possible, does the course balance this with some
other resource, eg preparatory fire?

k. Aim. Does the plan achieve the aim of the appreciation

and cater for any 1 imitations that may have been imposed?
 3B-1 ANNEX B

J23-016

ANNEX B TO
PART 3 OF
3T1

FACTOR AND DEDUCTION GUIDE

FOR THE ATTACK APPRECIATION

Note: The List given below Is not exhaustive and the headings offered do not apply to every situation, They
are offered simply to trigger thought process on each factor.

Factor Deduction
(a) (b)

1. En. From ex papers list: (1) Str and Loc. From info given ident size
of posn (eg coy gp), what is in it, what
a. Gen sit. extra equip might be incl which so far
has not been shown, and where squad size
b. loc and state of def. posn and hy wpn rut shown might be loc.

c. Wpiis ident. (2) Obj. Ident number and loc of two down
size objs (at coy level, squad or hy wpn
d. Posn (obj) size (for deductions on tgt posns, at In level, pi posns).
size and fire unit required). Deductions here may have to be completed
under gnd when key terrain are ident.
e. Air sit.
(3) Size of Obj. Determine size of objs and
f. Spt and admin sit. therefore sizes of fire units required
to cover them.
g. Intent/reaction ty narrative and by
doctrine. (4) Spt. Determine what spt the en posn
will get in term of indir and dir FS
(if applicable) and eff on you. (Eg DAG
IF on posa to harrass your reorg).
Ident possible OP.

(5) Res. Will en use a res for counter

atk? If so what should you do?

(6) Air. How does en air eff you (if

applicable) and what should you do about
it?

(7) Artificial 0b6. How has he used

artificial obs, for what purpose and
what can you do to defeat his aim in obs
deploynent?
 2 A-2 ANNEX A

(8) Reaction. By doctrine and fcy his

disposn and state of def, what is his
reaction to ny atk going to be? (Don't
develop courses but the raw data upon
which en courses can be developed and by
which app and combat power can be
analysed.)

2. Own. From ex papers list: (1) Specialist Units and Equip. In this sit
how can I use atch elm to best
a. Specialist sutr-units (units) and equip. advantage? Don't just list
characteristics from a book but rather
b. Dir FS assets. how atch elm develop maroeuvre elm, vrtiat
anno types should be used on obj. In
c. Indir FS units. short, work out how atch elm can max the
combat power ratio in this sit given the
d. Admin sit. number and type of obj.

(2) Dir FS. How many tgts of obj size can

you eqgage sinultaneously with dir
fire? How does this eff the aslt when
infir fire lifts?

(3) Indir FS. Given tgt size what is min

fire unit size. Therefore how many fire
units do you have. After aloe of res to
be superimposed (best if you use DS Bty)
how many tgts can you neutralize at one
time. Given this and the lumber of
objs, can you neutralize all objs
simultaneously? If so, so what? If no,
S) what?

(4) Ratios. Given lumber of objs and number

of manoevre elms, what is the ratio of
one to the other. If it is three to one
in your favour, so what.? If not, so
what? Remember the need to include the
need for depth. Thus like your fire
units, the number of manoeuvre elms aval
is usually one less. Relate the
shortfalls to en intent. If the en
intends to stay and fight (or if he
might intend this) you may have to
consider phasing. (At company level try
to avoid phasing).

(5) Admin. What administrative prep is

necessary? Amno, casevac, special equip
etc. Normally, these aspects, if
routine, are covered by SOP. Only
concern yourself with the unusual or
special requirements for this atk.
 2 A-3 ANNEX A

3. Siimmary of" Relative Str. Complete au overview of both sects to tie together the 'relative' aspects so
Inr not covered. Thus yju might ojiiceru yourself with such matters as:

a. type of arty and nor araro required (delay or air burst)';

b. need for specialist spt (eg use of tks in aslt rather than FS, or use of par pi to clear obs, or
role of anti armd as flark seurity etc);

c. hjw APCs can be used after dissembarkat I.011 of Cps;

d. best di.r or atk;

e. ni^U' o r day

f. prelim ops required;

g. out off (if aim is to destroy);

h. requirenent to phase (remembering need to mminize phasing);

i. where relative to en pi posn it vwuld be best to reorg given problems of en reaction in terms of
arty and counter atk;

j. what flanks need no protection given en and own loc;

k. what eff constraints given in limitations have on your development of combat power (eg if aim b
clear posn ASAP it is not feasible to ergage in lergthy nine cleariqg op);

I. what non guaranteed FS can be tasked ty you (eg mdm bty in spt to you but at pri call to DAIO);

in. hjw the safety distance problems presented by CAIRS arty and nor can be overcome; and

II. subsequent ops required.

4. Gild.

a. Grid Gen. Write a paragraph on how the gnd impresses you as the comd who must achieve the aim.

b. Key Terrain (KT). (1) Vital Gnd (VG). Deduce VG from KT and
state why the VG, if taken, wjuld deny
(See Part 6 Glossary for definition of the en the achievement of his aim and
KT and mark these 011 an overlay.) therefore the success of yours.

(2) Obj. If not completed already in

relative str, use your KT and VG to cfm
objs to be captured/cleared. Note all
objs are KT but not all KT are objs.

(3) App. Deduce apps by ident

(a) your assy area,

(b) your FUP,

(c) route to FUP,

 2 A-4 ANNEX A

(d) natural obs between EUP and VG,

(e) LD, and

(f) aslt route to VG.

Note: Analysis of Apps can be completed in table
form with the headings (4) (a) to (m) listed Complete the above on an overlay.
on the left hand side of the page. The
ranainder of the page is ruled into columns (4) Analysis of Apps. In the text or on an
representing apps that you are considering. annex analyse the following aspects of
The data within the headings ( (4) (a) to each app. Note that the app overlay
(m)) is then answered. must fold out next to this analysis:

(a) Assy Area. If an assy area is

required, there may be only one for
all apps. If so, analyse this
separately examining such aspects
as:

i. time taken for units to get to

it,

ii. cover from view and fire,

iii. se urity, and

iv. routes in for admin aspects if

required.

(b) Route to FUP.

i. Cover from view and fire.

ii. Time required to nove from

assy area to FUP.

iii. Tasks ident eg par tial

neutralization of en posn etc
during nov, route security.

(c) PUP.

1. Capacity.

ii. Dead Gnd.

iii. Security.

iv. Defilade.

v. Proximity to ID.
3B-5 ANNEX B

(d) LP.

i. Angle to aslt.

ii. Security.

iii. Natural landmark or need to

mark.

(e) Going.

i. By day/night inf.

ii. By day/night armd.

iii. Major natural obs.

iv. Cover aval.

(f) Frontage/Capacity.

i. Width of app.

ii. Capacity for inf/tk.

iii. Spacing aval for inf and

adequacy of this in given
terrain.

(g) Gnd Covering.

i. Objs which cover app.

ii. Other KT which cover app.

iii. Other features which are not

KT or objs which cover app (eg
OP posn not ident as KT).

iv. How gnd covering effs aslt eg

sequence of gnd covering
influencing aslt given dead
gnd along the way and ranges
of en wpns.

v. Therefore where are the en

killing gnds on this app?
Does this app encompass the
main en killing gnd.
2 A-6 ANNEX A

(h) Objs Which Must be Captured. This

is dir flow on from grid covering.
Note that some objs not on app may
have to be captured if that app is
used because of proximity or type
of fire that they can produce.
Suggest whether these can be
incorporated into an adjusted axis
of aslt in a course or if a
separate op (ie preliminary op) or
phase is necessary before this app
is used. Note from capacity of app
what combat power can be developed
to aslt objs on the app and whether
or not this is sufficient for three
to one ratio. If not suggest ways
of overcoming the problem (eg
phasing). If this is not possible
suggest that app is perhaps not
usable.

(i) Obj/KT Which Must be Tgt. This is

dir flow on from deductions on gnd
covering.

(j) Eff on FS.

i. Indir FS. Tgt to fire unit

ratio and what can be done to
overcome short falls eg use of
dir fire, phasing etc.

ii. Dir FS. Bill for indir FS to

engage tgts of opportunity
when indir FS lifts from obj
being aslt and tgts not being
engaged by indir FS. What are
the shortfalls and what can be
done about them? Where can
dir FS elms be placed to meet
requirement?

(k) Length of Aslt airi Fight Through.

List distances and associated
timings necessary to complete
each. List rate of advance to stow
basis of your cab illations. Use
these figures later in time and
space.

(1) Flank Security. What flaik

security is necessary and what pri
do you put on these tasks. Use
this info latar in assessma t of
tasks.
 2 A-7 ANNEX A

(m) Gen Assessment. Is tlie app

workable in terms of combat p>wer
which can be developed? What are
the advantages and disadvantages?

c. Summary of Deductions from Apps. Where is en main killing gnd? Which is the best app? What ar
the major difficulties listed in apps? Can they be overcome by a combination of apps. Should an
app be discounted? Be very careful in discarding apps early as later considerations could redeem a
app which is marginal at this stage. Note that apps are not courses but are the means to generat
the detail necessary for the developma t of own courses. From the overall view of apps and killin
grids does 39 ur impression of en intention change or develop further in detail? Do you vent to ad
some points on relative str? If a write a a w paragraph.

5. Assessment of Tasks. Mich of the gnd work has been done for this in the analysis of apps.

Objs or gp of objs by app requiring (1) Resources required and their

clearance/capture. priority for fol tasks:

(a) Clear obj,

(b) Depth,
(c) Res,
(d) Secure FUP/Firm Base,
(e) Flank security,
(f) Indir FS,
(g) Dir FS, and
(h) Other tasks.

(Ncte that the info for the above

is taken from deductions in
analysis of app. If special
equip/unit requirements are ident
add these to the list.)

(2) Summary of resources required for

each app.

(3) Application of the budget o f own

orbat and development of
compromises to meet combat power
requirements incl:

(a) phasing,

(b) mix of app, and

(c) push tbrcugh depth elm if en

withdraws.

This lays the basis of own courses.

See Annex A for an example of a possible layout for
assessment of tasks.
 2 A-8 ANNEX A

6. Time and Space.

a. Time Now

b. Battle procedure time from MLW One 6.2.

c. Time restrictions from aim limitations. (1) Is the battle procedure time
sufficient given problems such as
getting units to disengage?

(2) Timings for each app for the

following:

(a) mov to PTJP,

(b) time in FUP,

(c) aslt, )
) (1)
(d) fight through, and )
)
(e) reorg (2). )

(3) App with earliest H Hr.

(4) App with latest H Hr.

(5) If time for completion of atk is
given, what is time span for H
Hr. For this you work out the
earliest H Hr and then working bade
from completion time, calculate
latest H Hr.

d. Summary of tine and space if applicable. Cover such aspects as the app with the earliest H Hr ma
not cover the bulk of the obj therefore aim complete time may be earlier on another app etc.

Notes. (1) In the assessment of tasks the need to phase may have been ident on one or more apps. If so thes
three elm will need repetition for each phase.

(2) There are two timings for this in MLW One.6.2. One is for reorg between phasing and the other i
final reorg. Final reorg time is difficult to apply here because subsequent tasks have to be time
in courses, If one is working bade frcm a completion time for latest H Hr it can be used.

7. En Courses. From the foregoing list a number (1) Eff. What eff does this course
of options open to the en for the achievement of his have on the use of each app. What
aim. Describe these options in broad outline and other counter measures should you
state their likelihood, effect and which option is the employ in your Courses. Can apps
most probable. be combined or modified to counter
en eff.
 3B-9

8. Cton Courses. List all possible courses that will attain the aim, and that are
within our capability, bearing in mind the counter measures you have considered under
'effect' during 'enemy courses'. Where a course exists, which is a combination of two or
more of the previously examined courses, it becomes another course. It must be examined
separately on its cwn merits.

9. Following the description of the course, list the advantages and disadvantages of
each.

10. Best Course. Selecting the best course is the culmination of the appreciation.
A careful comparison of each course against the other leads to the seletion of the best
course ie that course which is most likely to defeat the enemy's plan.
 3C-1

J23-004

ANNEX C TO
PART 3 OF
3T1

ATTACK APPRECIATION
CHECKLIST

SERVICE WRITING GROUND EN COURSES TACTICS

Security Gnd Gen Fully described Concentration
Classification Key terrain Likelihood Penetration
Copy Number Vital gnd Effect on each app Firepower
Page Number Obj Most Probable Firm Bases
File Reference App Reflects doctrine Secure LD
Title Assy area Secure Flanks
Written by Route to FUP OWN COURSES Maint of Mjnentum
Written for FUP Fblly described Retention
Date/Time LD Time aim complete Initiative
References Goitig Advantage Rapid Reorg
Time Zone Frontage/Capacity Disadvantage En Res
Sequence Gnd covering Surprise
Counters effects?
Place names in upper case Obj to be captured Aim achieved
Abbreviations Obj/KT/tgt Achievable
Headitigs Effect of FS
Underlined Length of aslt fight through OUTLINE PLAN
En courses lettered Flark security Mission
Own courses numbered Gen assessment Gen Outline
Anrexes headed App on Overlay Gp
Distribution list Summary Tasks
Legible Script
Coord Instr
ASSESSMENT TASKS Follows from Courses
AIM By app/obj
Aim Clear obj OVERLAY
Limitation (s) Secure FUP/LD/Firm Base Ex Secret
Depth Heading
RELATIVE STR Res Map Ref
En Flank Security Copy No
Str/Loc Fire Spt Annex Block
Obj PI against squad Three Grid intersection pts
Obj size Tk tasked Correct colours
Spt Correct symbols
Res TIME & SPACE Neat
Air Time Now Assy area
Artificial obs Battle Procedure FUP A D
Reaction M>ve to FUP Route to Assy Area FUP
Own Earliest H Hr Obj
Special equip/units Latest H Hr (if applicable) Axis/Axes
Dir FS LD to obj(s) Bdry
Indir FS Fight through Limit exploitation
Ratios Time VG taken Reorg loc
AdmLn Reorg Other req from green
Summary Time aim complete
Limitation to Aim
.123-017
JAN 87

PART 4

THE ADVANCE APPRECIATION

Notes on the factors to be considered for an advance appreciation are listed below.

AIM

1. Selection of Aim

a. What is my fundamental task? eg Adv? Secure? Insert Blocks?

b. What limitations are there? eg Secure? Atk?

c. What are the implications of this on my considerations? State as deductions.

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

2. Preliminary Time and Space Kate of adv required. Major time limitations?
Any given time restrictions. Mobility requirements. Maint of momentum?
Possible influence en gp.
Earliest/latest Start Time.

3. Relative Str.

a. En.

(1) Gen sit. Possible en delay posn. Where is he?

(2) Likely intentions. Likely en gp. What is tie?

Gen order of march. What is he likely to do?
(3) Spt arms: Armd, Arty Eg need for firepower fwd. Is there any threat frcm insurgents?
Engr. Degree of acceptable risk.
Degree of search and rate of adv.

(4) Air.

(5) Admin sit.

(6) Insurgent threat.

 6-11

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

b. Own Tp

(1) Present Gp. Gen gp for adv gd, flk gd and order Are changes needed in my gp?
of march.

(2) Armd, Arty, Engr Acceptable risk What is the ideal composition of
Capacity to: the components of my force.

(3) Air sit. a. Recon What have I got on my flanks?

(4) Admin sit. c. Interdict Arty gp?

(5) Flanking forces. c. Use more than one route - Can I advance on a wide front?
(forces and fire spt aval).

(6) Special equip Need for flank, security. Can I out-manoeuvre the en?

Other

eg Civilians, refugees Employment TC resources. How can I reduce the problem?

Need to ensure clearance of route(s) Methods of control?

4. Gnd.

a. Gen. Major diaracteristics Effect on conduct of task: mobility, How can I best use the ground ava
incl obsn, cover, potential rate of adv restrictions on mov etc.
obstacles, dominant features
etc.

b. Final Obj(s) Number of possible routes to obj(s) Hew many routes are aval?

Routes (Approaches). To aid consideration use a trace shewing proposed routes and other detail as
required. It is suggested that a table as follows be used in conjunction with the trace:

Are routes suitable?

Assessment What is the distance to be covered?
Consideration Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Etc What natural obs are there any where?
SP. LD Where are the natural def features?
Are there critical points that effect my
Distance/Time move?
Where is the en on route?
Going-Tracked etc etc etc
Wh Note: Make assessments in note form.
Inf
Obs Viable routes in time frame.
Critical Pts Security req.
Objs on Route Gp req of particular routes,
Bounds Eg bridging req, wh or tracked
Security etc. Con req:
Gun Areas etc Comms
 4-3

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

d. Summary of Routes.
(If Required)

5. Time and Space

a. It is suggested that a table as follows be used:

Factor Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 etc

Earliest H hr
Time Now 0600 hrs
Time for mounting
- Deployment
- Battle Procedure
- ftov to Assy Area/FUP 4 hrs Any changes from Preliminary Time and
- Time in Assy Area/EUP Space?
- Mov time to SP/LD
Any other pre H hr Hew much time mist I allow at obj if
factor 1000 hrs I must secure it?

Therefore Earliest H hr 1000 hrs How much time should I allow for
possible en action en route?
Latest H hr
Time by which obj mist Mounting times?
be secure 1700 hrs
lime to secure 30 1630 hrs Are there any other time
Mov time for (rate) .. 4 hr 1230 hrs considerations?
Allowance for action eg preparation of eqpt, mov
en route: restrictions due to refugee? Mov of
Coy atk guns or piquets?
Pl atk
etc
Aiiy other post H hr
factor

Therefore Latest H hr 1230 hrs

Viable routes Can I achieve ny aim in the time

Flexibility H hr (from frame?
earliest/latest H hr) Are all routes viable?
Req for ni mov. Mjst I mov by day and ni?
Can I adjust my timing on any route?
 6-11

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

~ (a) (b) (c)

6. Assessment of Tasks.

a. Note. Assessment of tasks is NOT an attempt to neatly balance the forces aval to you between routes. It
is a statement of the resources that you vrould like to employ on each route - it would be normal to find
that to use all routes aval you would need nuch more than your total force.

b. From your assessment you should be presented with the basis for your later consideration of Courses Open,
eg How many routes are viable.

c. It is suggested that a table as follows be used:

Task (as ~req) Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 etc

Covering Tps

Adv Gd
- Van Gd

- Main Gd

Flank Gd

Rear Gd

Main Body

Special Tasks

COURSES OPEN

Own Courses. Can I obtain benefit by combining any

of these courses. Thus making a
a. Course 1. To further course? eg day or ni? Foot
or mounted? etc.
(1) Advantages.

(2) Disadvantages.

b. Course 2. To etc

En Courses. What effect does this course have on

me? Is it really likely that he
a. Course A. To would do this? What most I do to
counter this course of action?
(1) Likelihood.

(2) Effect (on me)

b. Course B. To etc
J23-018
JAN 87

PART 5

THE APPRECIATION GUIDE

FOR THE WITHDRAWAL

1. Selection of Aim.

a. What is ny fundamental task?

b. Wliat limitations are there? eg Denial Time?

c. What are the implications of this on ny considerations? State as deductions.

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

2. lYelimnary Time and Space.

a. Start time and completion. Withdrawal will/will not be under En rate of adv unopposed?
pressure. En EEA ny loc?

b. Earliest ETA en. Friendly force req to achieve clean Denial Tine?
break (if under pressure). What do I need to achieve a clean
break?

3. Relative Strengths.

a. En. Direction of en threat and type, of Where is he?

atk.
(1) Gen sit (front and En capability within time frame. What is he?
flanks). Probable degree of en pressure at
denial time. What is his aim?
(2) Likely intentions. Forces req.
Need for one or more stabilising What is his likely reaction?
(3) Spt Arms; Armd/arty and/or intmed posn.
engr. Degree of acceptable risk. What is his ability to penetrate,
Gen security req behind ny posn: envelop, infiltrate and follow up?
(4) Air. RV's, mounting areas etc. Hew does this effect ny security
req?

What is his air capability?

(6) Insurgent threat.
 5-2

Factors Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) •(b) (c)

b. Own Tp.

(1) Condition and . present Str required in present posn and What have I got?
gp of units. intmed posn. How can I make the best use of my
Acceptable risk. resources?

(2) Armd. Ability to meet en threat(s). Do I have superior mobility compared

Protection of routes RV and 'soft' to the en?
areas eg gun area. What armd should be withdrawn early?
How can I best use ny armd?
(3) Arty. Spt required. What support is required at:
Mov/Deployment of guns. (1) main posn, and
Protection of gun areas. (2) intmed posn(s).
From where can these loc be spt?
When should guns redeploy?

(4) Engr. Requirement to meet en threat. What is the requirement for route
Pri of tasks. denial?
Preliminary and/or res dml required. What prep is requird for dml?
Is a dml gd req?
What prep is nee in new posn(s)?

(5) Air. Degree of spt (CAIRS and tpt). How can I best use the air aval to
Flank survl. me?

(6) Tpt. Gp to units/sub-units. Any limitations on use of tpt?

How can I best use the resources
allotted to me?

(7) Admin sit. Mov of ech and HQ. What requirements are there for
security?

(8) Flanking forces. Need for flank security.

(9) Special equip.

 6-11

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

4. Other

eg Civilians, refugees Employment TC resources. How can I reduce the problem?

Need to ensure clearance of route. Method of control?
Effect cxi security?

5. Gnd.

a. Gen, (if required) Effect on conduct of task, mobility, How can I best use the ground aval?
rates of mov, restrictions on tnov
Major characteristics incl etc.
obsn, cover, potential
obstacles, dominant
features etc.

b. Location of New Posn for Routes How many routes are aval?
Main Body. RV/mounting areas and requirements
for security.
Number of possible routes.

Routes. To aid consideration use a trace showing proposed routes and other detail as required. It is
suggested that a table as follows be used in conjunction with the trace:

Consideration Assessment
Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Etc
Check Pt

KV

Stabilising Posn etc etc etc

Intmed Posn

Mounting Areas Note: Make assessments in note form

Critical pt Security req. Loc of security Likely en app?

Distance/Time forces. Possible intmed/staWIlzing posn(s)?
Going - Tracked Gp req for routes eg bridgeing, wh Possible en outflanking routes?
Wh or tracked etc. Routes, check pt, RVs, mounting
Inf Preliminary deployment of security areas?
Day/Ni forces incl covering force. Are there any critical points?
Obs Stabilizing posn(s) loc. . Going, obstacles?
Bounds Preparation/protection of intmed Effect of en arty and air threat?
Report Lines posn. What cover is there?
Gun Areas Req to hold critical pt. Have I been given intmed and/ or
etc Protection and/or preparation for stabilizing posn? Do I need them?
dml of obs and critical pt. Where?
Day and/or ni mov.
Crossing of obs/critical pt.
 5-4

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

Order of mov from posn. What are ny security req?

Protection mor, guns. Where are dml req?
Viable routes in time frame:
Con req:
Phases
Mov HQ
Mov ech
Comms

6. Summary of Routes.
(if required)

7. Time and Space. Timings for:

a. Time now a. Moves of sevurity forces. Time to hold in present posn?

b. Earliest ETTA en b. Moves of recon parties and How soon can rear recon parties and
rear parties. unessentials leave?

c. Posn denied until c. Thinning out. When should deployment of security

forces take place?

d. No wdr before (excl d. Time to abandon (if not How long do I have in which to
recon parties) fact). prepare obs dml etc?

e. Thinning out begins e. Timings for ptl activity. How many obs, dml can I prepare?
Which are most important?

f. Posn abandoned by Fire plan. IF, air etc. Can I wdr all my eqpt?

g. All tp clear Priority of work, When can I destroy eqpt and stores?
of line Eqpt denial req.
by

h. Others as req eg time for

mov to RV, embussing areas,
new main posn, prepare obs
etc.
 5-5

Factors Deductions Typical Questions

(a) (b) (c)

8. Assessment of Tasks. What would 1 like to do to deny this

posn to the en?
a. Note. Assessment of tasks is NOT an attempt to neatly balance
the forces aval to you. It is a arrangement of the resources What itust I do to maintain my
that yoiu would like to employ cm each task. security?

b. From this assessment you should be presented with the basis for What priority do I place on these
your later consideration of Courses Open. tasks in relation to each other?

c. It is suggested that a table as follows could be used: Can any of these tasks be carried out
. concurrently or ty the same sub unit.

Task Resources Req Pri Remarks

Covering Force Coy, Tp Tk

Patrols 2P1

Flank Guards,
Rear Gi etc

Intmed Posn

Stabilizing Posn
etc

COURSES OPEN What effect does this course have on

me?
9. En courses. Is it really likely that he would do
this?
a. Course A. To What mist I do to counter this course
of action?
(1) Likelihood.

(2) Effect (on ne)

b. Course B. To etc

10. En Most Probable Course. I consider that the en is likely to follow

his Course because
 6-11

11. Own Courses. Can I obtain benefit by combining any

of these courses? Thus making a
a. Course 1. To futher course?
Day or ni?
(1) Advantages. Foot or mounted?
etc?
(2) Disadvantages.

b. Course 2. To etc

12. Selection of Own Best Course. I will adopt my Course

as

PLAN

13. Mission.

14. Execution.

a. Gen Outline etc

15. Administration and logistics )

) when required
16. Conn and and Signal )
J19-009 JAN 87

PART 6

GLOSSARY OF TACTICAL TERMS

1. This glossary has been compiled to help the JSC student to be

more precise in his use of tactical terms in appreciations, TEWTs and
syndicate discussions.

2. What is to follow is not designed to replace existing sources

of definitions but rather expand upon them or state them in terms
relevant to the unit and sub-unit appreciation. It is useful to compare
the definitions given with those in the glossary in JSP (AS) 101, the
MLW series and those in the Concise Oxford Dictionary. The reader is
warned that sometimes the choice of words and, in places, whole
definitions, have no official authority.

Advance

3. The advance is an offensive operation designed to close with an

enemy force and engage him in decisive combat under conditions that
favour the advancing force.

a. Advance to Contact. Contact has been lost or not yet

made. The emphasis will be on wide reconnaissance with
the main force uncommitted but ready for action.

b. Advance in Contact. Contact has been made with enemy

covering troops, but the advance continues. At this stage
advance and attack may be interwoven as the momentum is
maintained.

c. The Pursuit. The advance continues in contact against an

enemy who has lost the initiative and is withdrawing off
balance. Contact must be maintained and risks will be
taken to hurry relentlessly and turn the pursuit into a
rout.

Aim

4. The aim is derived from the task given by higher authority. It

is a positive and vigorous statement of the given task. It identifies
exactly what has to be brought about. It is usually followed by
limitations. There can only be one aim for any task. This aspect is
further treated in Parts 2 to 5.
 6-2

Ail-Round Defence

5. Although defended localities may be sited primarily against

attack from a particular direction the defender must be capable of
repelling attack from any direction. Given the opportunity, the enemy
will choose to attack a position from what he considers to be the
weakest side. Commanders must be fully prepared therefore to fight when
outflanked or attacked from any direction. During chemical operations
there must be continuous awareness of the danger from the upwind
direction.

Alternate Position

6. See 'positions'.

Approaches

7. An approach to the vital ground, be it occupied or defended by

the enemy or ourselves, begins at the assembly area and ends on the
vital ground. Thus in the analysis of an approach one examines:

a. the assembly area,

b. the route to the FUP,

c. the FUP and LD, and

d. the ground used in of the assault.

8. The selection of assembly areas and routes to the FUP, FUP and
LD should be based on the considerations shown in this glossary and MLW
Three 2.2 - Musorian Armed Forces, 1980. Having established an LD
examine the ground between it and the vital ground. The frontage
available to the assault force will be determined:

a. by the obstacles identified; or

b. if there are no constricting obstacles, the width of the

defended position; or

c. the width of the LD itself.

9. Having worked out the frontage, draw two parallel lines from
the LD to a point short of the vital ground and then bring them to a
point on the vital ground. This is an artificial exercise designed to
allow scientific measurement of an assault route which all too often
does not bend to science. The measurements are discussed in Parts 2 and
3 under the analysis of approaches and are designed to allow you to
determine how you can maximise your combat power on that axis.
 6-11

Arc of PI re

10. An arc of fire is described by the boundaries of an area a

weapon is required to fire into. It is rarely the maximum range of the
weapon as this is normally reduced by the shape of the ground and
obstacles.

The area inside the arc of fire onto which both direct and indirect fire
can be brought to bear ^s called the Field of Fire.

Assembly Area

11. The Assembly Area is where final administrative preparations or

regrouping takes place before an attack. It should be:

a. Free from enemy ground observation.

b. Concealed from enemy visual air reconnaissance.

c. Easily accessible.
\

d. If possible, out of range of enemy mortars.

Note: When examining enemy assembly areas check MLW Three 2.2 -
Musorian Armed Forces, 1980, paragraph 979, 981 b(l), Figure 9-
12 and 9-13.
 6-4

Attack

12. There are two types of attack:

a. The Quick Attack. This is a rapidly mounted assault to

take advantage of an unprepared, and weak, enemy position.

b. The Deliberate Attack. This is an attack against well

prepared and organized defences. It involves careful and
detailed planning, and the full co-ordination of all
available resources.

The term infiltration refers to a penetration action which

inserts forces either deep into enemy rear area to threaten
communications and attack depth positions, or with the more
limited objective of disrupting his forward defences.

Axis

13. An axis is a general line astride which a formation, unit or

sub-unit moves. The leading formation, unit or sub-unit is not
responsible for clearing the axis unless ordered to do so. The plural
of axis is axes.

Battle Group

14. A battle group is a tactical grouping of combat arms elements

based on the HQ of an armoured regiment or a mechanized infantry
battalion.

Bound (Advance)

15. A bound is a feature of tactical significance on or astride the

axis which could be held defensively if the neied arose. At formation
level a bound may be given a nickname and used as a control feature. In
this case movement from bound to bound will only be with the permission
of the controlling HQ. (See 'report line and tactical bound').

Capture

16. See 'task verbs'.

Counter-attack

17. A counter-attack is an action against an attacking force to

regain lost ground or to destroy an enemy. Counter-attacks will either
be local or deliberate. Local counter-attacks must be launched within a
battalion's own resources to catch the enemy off balance before he has
had time to consolidate a gain. A handful of determined men can often
 6-11

restore the situation with little loss. A deliberate counter-attack

will be mounted by a formation reserve to regain ground against limited
objectives. Since it is likely to prove time-consuming and expensive in
terms of men and materiel, a deliberate counter-attack should only be
mounted when the ground to be recovered is vital to the defensive
position. All available fire support and close air support will be
allocated to this attack, which cannot be launched at will. It is a
large usually pre-planned concentration of force and the decision to
execute must be taken early enough for last minute planning and
deployment to take place. See also vital ground.

Counter-penetration

18. Counter-penetration is a move to block incursion into a

defended area. Counter-penetration tasks will be planned before the
battle is joined and positions will be reconnoitred and, if possible,
prepared. Armed helicopters may be most suitable for this task. Timing
is critical. The counter-penetration force must be steady in position
before the arrival of the enemy. Fire support should also be pre-
planned.

Covering Force

19. The term covering force is used to describe a force operating

forward of the main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging,
delaying, disorganizing and deceiving the enemy force before he can
attack the force covered.

20. A covering force battle is essentially a battle of movement and

there will seldom be time or the need to prepare elaborate defensive
positions. The commander is not expected to hold ground at all costs,
but to give way before a superior enemy; in order to delay him again
from another position. In order to achieve this, delaying positions
must be selected which offer good fields of view and from which fire can
be brought to bear on the enemy at long ranges. Enemy reconnaissance
and probing attacks must be held off and time-wasting preparation for a
deliberate attack forced upon him.

21. A covering force must avoid becoming involved in close-quarter

fighting. This calls for a timely decision to break contact. Should
the force become closely involved, the commander must decide whether the
whole delaying position should be abandoned, or whether only certain
sectors should be relinquished.
 6-6

Checkpoint (In Withdrawal)

22. A checkpoint is a place normally established at an easily

recognizable location on the route back, through which troops move on
their way back to their RV. Troops should not halt but the commander
should advise when his troops are through. Checkpoints will be required
at battalion group and company level and may be required at platoon
level. Checkpoints must have radio, and above platoon level be manned
by an officer or warrant officer. See also 'Rendezvous'.

Capture

23. See 'task verbs'.

Clear
24. See 'task verbs'.

Cleared Route

25. A cleared route is a route that must be cleared of enemy by a

formation or unit. It must be kept clear until responsibility for it is
handed over to another formation, battle group or battalion.

Combat Team

26. A combat team is a sub-unit of a battle group, usually

consisting of armour and infantry commanded by a squadron or company
commander.

Command

27. Command is the the lawful authority exercised by NCO and

officers over subordinates. On operations it involves planning,
decision-taking, issuing orders and supervising the implementation of
orders. See also 'control'. Administration is a function of command.

Concentration Area

28. In the concentration area, troops are brought together,

briefed, rehearsed, administered and prepared for battle. The area
should ideally be free from enemy interference, be concealed, and have
room to permit manoeuvre by the forces using it.
 6-7

Contain

29. To stop, hold or surround the forces of the enemy or to cause

the enemy to centre his activity oh a given Eront preventing his
withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere.

Control

30. Control is the mechanics of command. It is those measures

employed by the commander and his staff to ensure the most effective
implementation of his orders. Thus the allocation of an authority may
be made to a commander which is less than command but allows optimal use
of the resource without the burden of command. See also 'command' and
MLW One 6.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1979, Chapter 4, Annex K.

Co-ordination Point

31. Designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent

units/formations must make contact for purposes of control and co-
ordination. The terms junction point, limiting point and interlocking
points are sometimes wrongly used in a similar context. Junction point
is a British term and its meaning is similar to co-ordinating point.
Limiting point is mentioned in JSP (AS) 102 but is not defined in the
glossary. Interlocking point is not defined but is used colloquially to
describe the point at which the inside lines of two arcs of fire of
mutually supporting weapons cross.

Decisively Committed

32. Decisively committed is defined as: 'A unit which has committed
its fire and manoeuvre resources to the degree where it has lost freedom
of action'.

Dead^ Ground

33. An area which because of the shape of the ground, it is not

possible to see into or to bring accurate direct fire to bear.

Deduction

34. A deduction is inference from general to particular. Thus

given the factors that there are two LMGs and one RPG identified on Hill
X causing delay to our advance one can use the general information in
MLW Three 2.2 - The Musorian Armed Forces, 1980 under doctrine
organisations and order of battle to deduce such things as:
f
a. it is possibly a platoon position;
 6-8

b. there is a third squad which, by doctrine, in this phase

of war, would be located in the vicinity of area Y;

e. there are two more RFG 7;

d. there are probably some other heavier weapons such as HMGs

or AT3s (the general idea and narrative would give clues
here);

e. the platoon would be within range of at least the RAG; and

f. most important, what does all this mean to you? This

leads to such deductions as:

(1) number of objectives,

(2) size of targets and therefore size of fire unit

required,

(3) likely enemy DF tasks which you need then to avoid,

(4) the ratio of fire units to objectives and manoeuvre

elements and therefore the requirements for the
development of adequate combat power.

(5) the emphasis to be given to your own resources such

as employment of support section to destroy a bunker
or use of air burst to destroy enemy in open pits.

Note that a deduction 'I must maintain momentum' is nonsense

because it is a statement: of principle. It is from this
principle and its application to given facts that you deduce
how you can achieve momentum in the particular scenario. See
also the explanation of 'so what'.

Defence

'The objective of the defence will be to destroy the enemy and

not merely to stop him' : Field Marshal Montgomery

35. There are two types of defence:

a. Deliberate Defence. This is defence prepared when out of

contact with the enemy. There will be time for detailed
reconnaissance and the arrangement of the defence on
favourable ground.

b. Hasty Defence. This is defence built up under the threat

of, or In the face of, an enemy. There will be
Insufficient time to prepare a deliberate defence and the
ground will have to be taken as it is and prepared as far
as time and the enemy will allow.
 6-9

36. The main types of defensive operations are Area and Mobile.

a. Area Defence. In this the commander will rely on the use

of prepared posit Ions on commanding ground, mutually
supporting firepower and obstacles to prevent the enemy
penetrating the framework of the defence and destroying
him when he attempts do so. The commander would
normally retain a mobile reserve, strong in armour, to
defeat enemy that successfully penetrates the position.

In area defence the attacker is destroyed, as he struggles to break into

the defended area of ground, by concentrated direct (and indirect) fire
from mutually supporting positions.

b. Mobile Defence. The commander will aim to deFn-ii. the

enemy within an area of considerable depth by a continuous
process of checks and counter attacks rather than
defeating him on a specifically defined position. The
commander may c'ioosh f:<> hoi 1 st!l<:e«:<j<i gcou-id and to use
both artificial and natural obstacles in order to channel
the enemy into areas where he can best be defeated.

In mobile defence the attacker is detroyed by mobile reserves, once well

sited defensive localities and obstacles have forced him into selected
areas. (See also Killing Areas).

De f <-;n.!•-•.] 1, >•; -*1 i ry

37. A defended locality consists of mutually supporting strong-

points and will usually be defended by a company.

38. Defended localities should be so sited that penetration within

them is virtually impossible. See also 1strongpoint'.

Defend

39. See 'task verbs'.

Defilade Position

40. A position at an angle to the enemy line of advance vhlch

enables engagement of the enemy's flank without being seen ;>y ^.nemy
forces following on. Thus from a defilade position enfilade fire is
produced. See also 'enfilade fire'.

Delay

41. See 'task verbs'.

 6-10

Demolition

42. Demol i t. i ons r<< i-. f i.iisl .is:

a. Preliminary Demolition. Preliminary demolitions are those

which do not interfere with our planned tactical movement.
Normally the commander will delegate authority to fire
these demolitions to the engineers as soon as there is no
danger of prejudicing surprise or otherwise affecting
operations. The earlier preliminary demolitions are fired
the better in order to release engineers for other tasks.

b. Reserved Demolition. Any demolition which is not to be

blown without the authority of the commander is a reserved
demolition. By implication preserved demolitions are
confined to those demolitions which, if they fell intact
into enemy hands, would seriously prejudice the tactical
situa" ion.

c. States of Readiness.

(1) State 1 means that the demolition has been prepared

but is safe. The firing circuits are made up but not
connected and detonators are not inserted.

(2) State 2 or Armed means that the demolition is ready

for initiation. The firing circuits have been
connected and detonators now inserted. It will take
a push of a button to detonate charges.

Deny

43. See 'task verbs'.

Depth

44. Every defensive layout must have depth if it is to defeat a

sustained attack. The greater the enemy firepower, cross-country
performance and mobility, particularly at night, and the wider the
frontages to be held, the greater that depth must be. Some degree of
enemy penetration will be inevitable, but this must be contained by
positions in depth to stop the enemy seriously disrupting the defensive
layout. The mobility of mechanised forces will enable them to check,
contain and counter-attack any penetration more easily than non-
mechanized forces.;

45. Depth gives the defence the added advantage that the enemy will
be forced, to plan later phases of his attack without detailed
reconnaissance, and may be compelled to commit his reserves prematurely
to maintain the momentum of his attack.
 6-11

46. Additional depth for the main defensive zone can be provided by
deploying a covering force in front of it.

47. Positions in depth will also surprise and unbalance the

attacker thus providing conditions for counter-attack.

48. As many long range weapons as are available should be so

deployed that they can engage the enemy as far out as possible. The
development and use of obstacles must be co-ordinated with the
employment of long range weapons. Local reserves should be maintained
to prevent infiltration between positions.

49. The term 'depth units' refers to those units sited in depth in
specific areas, which are essential to the integrity of the defence
layout. See also 'reserve*.

Destroy

50. See 'task verbs'.

Direct Fire

51. Direct Fire is produced by weapons where the person aiming the
weapon must be able to see the target or, if firing at night or in poor
visibility, must have been able to see his target before in order to
record his fall of shot eg GPMG on fixed lines.

Direct Support - See 'support'.

Effect

52. Effect is a term used to describe the import of an enemy course

or action on own forces. 'This course denies me the max spt from B
Coy. To make up for this I must ' The counter-measures are a
basis for developing the polish and detail needed in the step from
'Assessment of Tasks' to 'Own Courses'.

Electronic Silence

53. The deliberate prohibition of electronic radiations, normally

applied for a stated period, to specific equipments or frequency bands.

Electronic Warfare

54. That division of the military use of electronics involving

actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated
electromagnetic energy and actions taken to ensure our own effective use
of electromagnetic energy.
 6-11

Enfilade Fire

55. Fire which strikes the side of the enemy. A principle for the
siting of anti-tank weapons; but GPMGs should also be sited if possible
to fire along a line of advancing troops from one end.

Exchange Point (XP)

56. A point located near the rear of a divisional boundary where

empty second line vehicles meet full' third line vehicles, which have
driven up with combat supplies from a Replenishment Park. Crossing
loading may take place, or more usually drivers exchange vehicles.

Exploit

57. To exploit is to take advantage of a successful attack by

following-up and harassing a dislocated enemy with the aim of further
disorganizing him in depth. This may provide the opportunity to capture
ground which was not part of the objective of the original attack. It
is normally necessary for a commander to lay down a limit of
exploitation.

Factor

58. A factor is a fact contributing to a result. This means that a

fact which pertains to the achievement of the aim of an appreciation is
a factor. Thus in a set of references, a narrative and a map, we find
many facts and we select the relevant ones and list them under the
heading 'FACTORS' and sub-headings 'Relative Strengths', 'Ground',
'Assessment of Tasks', 'Time and Space' and 'Enemy Courses' and other
than may seem relevant. The relationship between Aim, Factors, Own
Courses and Outline Plan is shown in the flow diagram at Annex A to
Part 1. Note that Own Courses and Outline Plan are not factors.

Field of Fire

59. The area which a weapon or group of Weapons may cover

effectively with fire from a given position.

Fire and Movement

60. When troops in contact of advancing to contact move they must

retain tactical balance. This is normally described as keeping one foot
on the ground. Before a group or vehicle moves, another group or
vehicle must be in fire positions providing, or ready to provide, fire
support. It may be seen as mobile mutual support.
 6-14

Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)

63. This is a co-ordination line which indicates the foremost

limits of ground combat units excluding areas in which the screen and/or
covering force are operating.

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)

64. The FLOT is the line which indicates the most forward positions
of own troops, in any kind of operation, at a specific time. It is an
important control line for the co-ordination of indirect fire and close
air support.

Forming-Up Place (FUP)

65. An area to which troops deploy immediately before an attack and

in which they may adopt their assault formations. It allows a buffer of
time between the move forward and crossing the line of departure at
H Hour. The FUP is occupied for as short a time as possible although it
is here that final orders or briefings may be given or orientation
carried out. If it is outside the FEBA it must be reconnoitred and
protected before the assaulting troops move into it. The area chosen
should have the following criteria:

a. Secure from direct enemy action (This security may be

provided by the initial firm base force or it may be
necessary to use a separately designated force. A platoon
can secure a company FUP).

b. Defilade from the enemy's direct fire weapons.

c. Away from likely DF tasks.

d. In dead ground to the enemy observation.

e. If possible accessible by a covered approach.

Forward Slope

66. A position which is exposed to direct fire and to observed

indirect fire. See also 'reverse slope'.

Ground Covering Approaches

67. First see the explanations of 'approaches' and 'key terrain'.

To identify Ground Covering Approaches in defence, take each approach in
turn and identify locations from which you can interfere with an
attacking enemy using that approach. These locations will include some
or all of your key terrain and features outside your boundaries
including some occupied by flanking units. Deductions can be made from
this concerning the potential of your relevant key terrain and the
support available to you. In the attack examine the problem from the
reverse point of view. It may be useful here to also identify possible
Oft which cover the approach.
 6-11

Harbour Area

68. A bivouac under cover, occupied when not in close contact with
the enemy, for the purpose of carrying out essential replenishment and
the maintenance of vehicles and providing rest for personnel.
Occupation may occur by day or by night and may continue for several
days.

Hours

69.
a. H Hour. When used in connection with planned operations,
it is the specific hour on which the operation commences.
At the tactical level, it is invariably when troops cross
the line of departure.

b. L Hour. The time at which troops cross a subsequent line

of departure - invariably the start of Phase 2 of an
operation.

c. N Hour. That time planned for the explosion of the first

of a series of tactical nuclear weapons, as part of a
specific ground force's operation, or in the case of a
single strike the time planned for that explosion.

d. P Hour. In airborne operations, the time of drop of the

first sticks of the main body.

e. Y Hour. In helicopter operations, the time the first

helicopter takes off from the pick up point at the
commencement of operations.

Holding Ground

70. To hold is to retain possession of a specific piece of ground

by force. A unit holds ground when it is physically in possession of
that ground. Invariably this requires some form of digging.

Indirect Fire

71. Fire where the man aiming the weapon does not need to see the
target or the fall of shot as his fire is either predicted or being
observed, normally by an FO or MFC.

Intimate Support Tanks

72. In the attack a proportion of tanks may accompany infantry to

an objective to provide immediate, intimate and accurate fire support
when artillery, mortar or other forms of fire support has had to stop
because of safety distances.
 6-11

73. The intimacy of tanks is not from their proximity (whether

mounted or dismounted) but from their gun fire on the ground.

Junction Points

74. See 'co-ordination points'.

Killing Area or Ground ;

75. An area in which a commander plans to force the enemy to

concentrate, so as to destroy him. Killing ground is not a universally
accepted term but is. a useful concept when looking at enemy approaches
to the vital ground. Having determined the approaches, killing grounds
can be identified and related to ground covering approaches. Thus
specific ground covering approaches are identified as suitable sites for
anti-armour weapons if the killing ground is on an armoured approach and
so forth. This ultimately leads to a series of alternatives for
covering a number of killing grounds. The main advantage of the concept
is that it engenders an offensive line of thought rather than the rather
defensive attitude prevalent in many defence TEWT.

Key Terrain

76. JSP (AS) 101(A) defines key terrain as 'any locality, or area,
the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant'. Students often experience difficulty in selecting key
terrain, usually because they cannot decide which feature(s) within
their boundaries are of tactical significance. To be able to select key
terrain you need two things: first, a thorough understanding of what
your aim is and second, knowing what the enemy's intention is. If you
apply these two criteria along with the JSP definition to the features
of significance within your boundaries then you will be able to
determine the key terrain without difficulty. In other words, key
terrain is tactically significant ground which either the defender or
the attacker will utilise to achieve his aim. While at the JSC the
identification of key terrain is to occur within your boundaries.
Ground of importance outside your boundaries is to be identified as
other ground covering approaches. See definition/explanation of 'ground
covering'. Sometimes key terrain can be identified as clusters of two
down sized pieces of ground (at company level, section sized 'goose
eggs'). Those new to the appreciation process are advised to simply
identify the features as such that are key terrain and treat ground
capacity separately. Sometimes, however, a more defined approach is
required, eg for identifying likely enemy squad positions or vital
ground on a flat feature. Note that for an attack, all objectives are
key terrain but not all key terrain are objectives.
 6-17

Limitations to the Aim

77. Having selected an aim it will be apparent that, in most

instances, the given task will include some limitations to the freedom
of action to carry out that task. A commander may often give a time
frame or require subsidiary tasks be carried out or that the task be
performed in a certain manner. These facts are limitations to the
aim. Note that limitations are imposed by 'Sir' not by the writer of
the appreciation. Principles are not listed as limitations (eg impose
maximum casualties) but are considered in the body of the
appreciation. Limitations should be written straight away into notes
under the headings 'time and space' and/or assessment of tasks as
appropriate.

Line of Departure

78. The line of departure will normally be the forward edge of the
FUP and, if possible, at right angles to the direct FS. It is the line
which assaulting troops cross at H Hour. It must be secure, and, if
necessary, troops musti be allocated to hold it. All timings for fire
and manoeuvre plans ajre based on the time troops cross the line of
departure.

Map Appreciation

79. A map appreciation is the means of producing a reconnaissance

plan. Complete as much of the appreciation as possible off the map and
other detail given to you. You should be able to complete at least the
aim, relative strengths, ground, some aspects of assessment of tasks and
time and space and enemy courses. From this questions will emerge which
form the basis of the ground reconnaissance plan. Questions will apply
particularly to the selection of key terrain, vital ground, approaches
and the analysis of approaches. Take care though: DO NOT CLOSE YOUR
MIND TO THE REALITY OF THE GROUND.

Minefields

80. There are four main types of tactical minefields:

a. Tactical Minefields. Tactical minefields are part of the

formation obstacle plan and are designed to delay, channel
or break up An enemy advance. They are covered by
observed direct or indirect fire.
 6-11

b. Protective Minefields. These are for the close-in

protection of a unit. Protective minefields are to slow
an enemy attack in its final stages. They should be well
concealed to achieve surprise and should be covered by
small arms and anti-tank fire. They are sited by the unit
commander and laid by units.

c. Nuisance Minefields. Nuisance minefields are laid by RAE

and Assault Pioneers only to delay and disorganize the
enemy particularly reconnaissance patrols, by introducing
a sense of uncertainty and a need for caution, which will
have a subsequent effect on morale. All types of mine may
be used. They are not normally marked but are recorded
and reported. They are particularly effective during a
withdrawal.

d. Phoney Minefields. An area of ground used to simulate a

minefield with the aim of deceiving the enemy. They are
marked in exactly the same way as a real minefield.

See MLW Two 2.5 Mine Warfare and Booby Traps, 1982, Section 1-5 for
further details.

Mission

81. A mission duly assigned to a unit; a task. It is constructed

by employing mission/task verbs. An example of a defence mission is 'To
def SLENDER RIDGE' where Slender Ridge is the vital ground. An example
of an attack mission is 'To clear HOT POT by 1400'. Note while
limitations are not normally included, a statement of any time
constraint may be valid in a mission.

Mutual Support ,

82. Mutual support increases the strength of any defensive

position. It exists when the enemy cannot attack one position without
being subjected to direct fire from at least one other position. Where
observation and fields of fire are good, the long range of ATGW and tank
guns allow wide frontages to be held whilst still achieving mutual
support across the front. Where visibility and fields of fire are
restricted mutual support will depend either on holding a narrower front
or, if this is unacceptable, confining mutual support to within
battalions or even within company localities and leaving gaps in
between.

83. In addition, by night, mutual support will be influenced by the

scale and efficiency of night fighting and surveillance aids, on whether
the ground enables them to be used fully, and on what night fighting
equipment the enemy possesses As it will often be impracticable to have
different positions for night and day, a commander will have to take the
requirements of the night battle into account when deciding defensive
positions.
 6-11

84. Frequently the unavailability of troops will create a conflict

between the need for depth and the demands of mutual support across the
front. Depth is the more important, and often mutual support between
battalions and companies may have to be sacrificed. Commanders must
have the courage to accept gaps which must be covered by at least
surveillance and indirect fire.

85. Mutual support should always be achieved by sections within

platoons. Between larger sub-units a lesser degree of support may have
to be accepted. When the threat is primarily an armoured one mutual
support between anti-armour weapons is essential. See also 'fire and
movement'.

86. Where the. arcs of mutually supporting weapons overlap, an

'interlocking point', may be designated for the purpose of control and
safety. 'Interlocking Point' is not an official term but it is in
general usage in some formations and units.

Objective

87. A definite tactical feature (usually occupied or suspected of

being so), the seizure or holding of which is essential to the
commander's plan. Thus when battlefield indicators reveal that there is
an enemy platoon on a feature and the task of clearing that platoon is
given to a company, objectives are identified two down (ie there are
three squad objectives) and these are related to key terrain. See 'key
terrain'. When examining objectives each should be measured and
assessed for size of fire unit needed to neutralize it and the type of
ammunition (delay, airburst, etc) that would be most suitable for the
task.

Occupy

88. To occupy is to move into an area and to complete deployment

there in preparation for the main phase of the operation being
conducted.

Obstacles

89. See 'minefields'. In employing obstacles certain

characteristics and principles must be kept in mind.

a. Principles Related to all Obstacles. Obstacles:

(1) are sited either to delay in killing ground or to

canalise enemy into killing ground;

(2) must be co-ordinated with anti-tank fire a counter-

attack plans at appropriate level;
 6-11

(3) must be covered by observation and fire, preferably

direct fire weapon from defensive location;

(4) can separate components of a force, eg infantry and

tank;

(5) can still cause delay even after being breached;

(6) should create surprise where possible;

(7) supplement natural obstacles where possible; and

(8) should be concealed where possible or otherwise they

are next to useless.

Minefields.

(1) Minefields can be a double edged weapon. They must

not restrict our own movement and must be carefully
recorded. Points to note are:

(a) Anti-tank mines designed to cut tracks of a tank

and immobilize it so that it can be destroyed by
anti-tank weapons. Percentage hits relates to
density. One anti-tank mine per metre of front
gives 50% kill probability, for APCs.

(b) Density doesn't describe effectiveness of anti-

personnel mines. Less than 24 blast per metre
may not stop determined infantry. Effect
greatly increased with fragmentation mines.

(c) Minefield should not be less than 300 m deep to

prevent the enemy breaching it in one night.
Depth gained by increasing width between strips.

(d) Minefield should be patrolled to prevent enemy

interference - fences repaired regularly.

(e) General layout of minefield in defensive

position must be simple. The greatest use
should therefore be made of single large
minefields.

(f) Aim must be clear, eg stop tank, stop infantry,

delay.

(g) All should be fenced/marked in accordance with

MLW Two 2.5 - Mine Warfare and Booby Traps,
1982, Section 2-2.

(h) Unmined passages left for safe passage of patrol

or larger forces, eg counter attack force.
 6-11

(1) Lane is 10 paces wide for patrol or wheeled

vehicles.

(j) Gap is 100 paces wide for formed bodies of

assault element.

(k) Breaching rates for a minefield:

i. clear 2m footpath - Sect 30m/hour by day

(reduce by 50% by night).

ii. lane 100 m by 8 m - Tp - 8 hr by day

10 hr by night

iii. refer to MLW One 6.2 - Aide-memoire, 1981

for breaching with explosives.

(1) Phoney minefield - formation policy for laying -

recorded as for minefield it simulates.

(m) Fragmentation mines cannot be surface laid (M16

is 20 cm from base to tip of actuating prongs).

c. Wire Obstacles. When siting or planning the construction

of wire obstacles, be mindful of the following:

(1) wiring at night particularly causes much noise -

liable to enemy interference;

(2) time available (daylight, moonlight or darkness);

(3) frontage required;

(4) acquisition and delivery of stores;

(5) rehearsals essential particularly if restricted to

night laying.

(6) NEVER mix loads mines/wire/demolition stores.

(7) concealment.

One Star General

90. A low grade petrol with a high lead content. Usually

associated with a high anti-knock rating.

Phases

91. Attacks are sometimes divided into phases to assist in

maintaining control and to make the maximum use of supporting fire.
Phases will be necessary when re-grouping or a re-allocation of
 6-11

resources has to take place or when fresh groups have to be introduced

either to pass through or hold what has been won already. A plan
requiring many phases is likely to be complicated and may well result in
excessive pauses and loss of momentum. This will give the enemy a
chance to recover and launch counter-attacks. When examining an
approach for phases ask yourself these questions:

a. Is phasing the only way to generate the necessary combat

power?

b. If other objectives preclude my phasing because of their

proximity could I pass through a depth platoon to take it
out without phasing?

c. If phasing is the only solution, where could I draw in my

phase line (being aware that the FUP/LD must be in accord
with the characteristics given earlier in this Glossary)?

d. Does a phase line on a well separated objective offer me a

marked advantage? (It may be that from FUP/LD to Obj 2 I
have one platoon frontage and from Obj 2 to Obj 3 and Obj
4 I have 2 platoon frontage allowing a re-allocation of
resources).

Positions

92. There are a number of terms relating to various types of

positions used in defence. Some of these are peculiar to anti-armour
weapon siting, armour and infantry sub units and unit positions in area
and delaying defence. The terms are not addressed in the JSP Glossary
and there is also considerable contradiction in the common usage of the
terms. An attempt to dissentangle this is offered below.

a. Main Position. The position from which an armoured

vehicle or anti-tank weapon carries out its primary
task. This may also be called main battle position.

b. Primary Position. The main position from which an

infantry unit intends to fight. It may have reconnoitred
or prepared an alternative position to which it might move
if the primary position becomes untennable.

c. Alternative Position. a position from which the primary

task can still be carried out if the main/primary position
becomes untennable. They are uSed to:

(1) deceive the enemy ground and air reconnaissance,

(2) overcome the visibility problems presented by night,

(3) achieve all round defence,

(4) provide positions for counter-penetration, and

 6-11

(5) achieve delay along an enemy axis of advance.

Alternative positions for infantry units should be

examined carefully as they are resource intensive. Care
should also be taken to ensure that the enemy cannot use
them against the defenders.

d. Secondary Position. A previously reconnoitred and, if

possible, prepared position to which an anti-tank weapon
or armoured vehicle or armoured sub-unit may have to move
to carry out a secondary task, eg deny another approach.

Radio Silence

93. A period during which all or certain radio equipment capable of

radiation is kept inoperative.

Reconnaissance Plan

94. See 'map appreciation'.

Report Line

95. A report line is an easily recognizable feature, at right

angles to the axis, which is used to report progress. It has no
tactical significance. It is given a nickname.

Reserves

96. In defence a formation commander requires to meet both

anticipated and unexpected situations. The correct division of
resources between forward and reserve troops, and deciding when to
commit reserves are amongst the most difficult decisions which a
commander will have to make.

97. Without a reserve a force lacks flexibility and balance. once

a reserve has been committed a new one must be created. A reserve
should include a balance of all combat arms and be capable of matching
enemy mobility. In mechanized operations, APCs will provide mobility
for the infantry and ensure a quick response. In other types of
operation the degree of mobility of the infantry element of a reserve
will vary between marching, carriage on tanks and a lift in support
helicopters.

98. , The size of reserves depends on the design for battle. There
may be occasions when half a formation is initially held in reserve, but
usually this will not be practicable.

99. In deciding when to commit reserves the following factors

should be taken into account:
 6-11

a. An attacker is more vulnerable when he is on the point of

launching his assault or has just reached his objective.
A quickly mounted counter-attack may achieve results out
of all proportion to its size.

b. The deployment of the reserve should be timed, if

possible, to avoid the worst of any enemy preliminary
fire. To be able to do this, particularly at night,
positions including alternate positions and routes will
have to be reconnoitred and prepared.

c. The ground and the enemy strength will indicate the

advantages of counter-attacking or of remaining positioned
in depth. If the ground being forefeited is not vital to
the continued defence of the area, and if the aim is to
inflict casualties on the enemy by attrition, reserves may
be employed better by occupying positions in depth and
gradually bringing the enemy to a halt.

d. It may be possible to destroy or compel the enemy to

withdraw by bringing an increasing weight of fire to bear
from the front, flank or rear, without using the reserve.

100. The possible roles for a reserve often conflict and may make
the decision on its positioning one of priorities or compromise.

101. In all operations a reserve should be nominated and, if

possible, constituted. A reserve is held in readiness to react to the
unexpected. Likely tasks may be given, but a commander must retain the
ability to deploy his reserve to any area in order to maintain or regain
the tactical balance. See also 'depth'.

Reverse Slope

102. Any slope which descends away from the enemy.

103. Although reverse slopes will often provide the best positions
for defence, in each case the choice of a forward or reverse slope
position should be decided on its merits.

104. A battalion or company commander may adopt a reverse slope

position:

a. to surprise and deceive the enemy about the location of

the defensive position,

b. when a forward slope might be made untenable by enemy

fire,

c. when occupation of the forward slope is not essential for

observation, and

d. when the fields of fire on the reverse slope are

sufficient.
 6-11

105. The advantages of a Reverse Slope Position are:

a. enemy ground observation (including the use of radar) of

the position is masked;

b. enemy direct fire is less effective owing to the lack of

observation;

c. the enemy may be deceived over the strength and location

of the positions;

d. the attacker's illumination may be of restricted value;

e. the defender's illumination will be much less likely to

give away the detailed location of the defensive position;

f. enemy assaulting troops will be skylined within range of

all the defender's weapons;

g. the defenders may have more freedom of movement; and

h. the defender's administrative arrangements (feeding,

resupply) are eased as they are out of sight other than
from the air.

106. The disadvantages of a Reverse Slope Position are:

a. observation to the front is limited and the defender may

be unable to cover minefields and other obstacles to the
front effectively;

b. the effective range of direct fire weapons, such as tanks

and LRAAWs may be severely limited;

c. the enemy may be able to launch a surprise attack,

particularly at night, unless there are some observation
and surveillance posts including patrols, overlooking his
approaches; and

d. the enemy will assault downhill.

107. The reverse slope position should be designed to inflict

maximum casualties on the enemy forward of the position and to provide
effective surprise fire as the enemy crosses the crest. It should be
organized as follows:

a. The forward edge of the position should be within

effective small arms range of the crest, but far enough
from the crest for the enemy to be exposed to this fire
for as long as possible. When the threat is predominantly
armoured some tanks may be positioned forward in the
sniping role.
 6-11

b. Protective minefields and wire should be sited on the

reverse slope behind the crest line and there should be DF
tasks in this area.

c. Observation and surveillance posts should be sited forward

and to the flanks to provide observation and give warning
of the enemy approach.

d. The illumination plan should provide maximum illumination

of the enemy as he crosses the crest and encounters the
minefield and wire.

e. Where possible fire from flanking defensive positions

should be sited to engage the enemy on the forward slope.

Rendezvous - RV (in the Withdrawal)

108. RVs are areas where companies and platoons collect and
reorganize as an entity before continuing the withdrawal on foot, in
vehicles or by helicopter. RVs must be designated by the next higher
commander to prevent friendly forces clashing during the withdrawal.
RVs must be:

a. secured, defendable and large enough to hold the force

which is to occupy it,

b. in a defilade area which is not an obvious target for

enemy harassing fire, and

c. protected. (In the case of a company this may be done by

the first platoon to arrive and at battalion level the
depth company might take on this responsibility. These
protection parties must make a daylight reconnaissance of
the area).

Screen

109. Security elements deployed from, for the immediate protection

of, and normally supported by a defensive position.

Secondary Position

110. A completely new position, normally prepared but certainly at

least reconnoitred, to which a crew served weapon will be moved once
its primary position has become untenable or when its primary position
has become ineffective because of the flow of battle. A crew served
weapon may remain in a hide until the main enemy thrust has been
identified. It will then be called forward to man its primary or
secondary position. See also 'primary position'.
 6-11

Secure

111. To secure is to take an objective which may or may not

currently be held by the enemy and put into effect those measures and
dispositions that will, as far as possible, prevent the enemy destroying
or capturing that position.

'So What'

112. Having collected your information and grouped it under the

appropriate factor the next step is to make deductions from the facts
set down. Your deductions must be relevent to the achievement of your
aim and should make a practical contribution to your reasoning process.
See 'factor and deduction'. Once you have set down a fact or group of
facts ask yourself the question 'so what?' If this leads you nowhere
you may be considering a factor that is not contributing to a result; if
so, discard it. You should continue the process of asking 'so what?'
until all possible deductions that are relevant to your aim have been
made from that factor. Some simple examples to illustrate the method
follow:

a. From a personal reconnaissance a commander has obtained

the following information for the factor 'Ground'.

(1) Open, undulating and firm going. No obstacles.

SO WHAT?

(2) Therefore it is suitable for tanks and provides good

going for wheeled vehicles.

SO WHAT?

(3) Therefore movement not restricted to roads. The

advance could be made on a broad front.

b. In the preceding example the 'so what' process led through

a logical progression with each deduction adding something
to the appreciation. Without careful attention to your
'so what' process you may find yourself making a
'statement of the blatantly obvious' which takes you no
further forward. Such a 'statement' is not wrong if it
helps you towards making a real deduction but it does not
necessarily need to be written down. For example, from a
study of relative capabilities under the factor 'Enemy*,
the defending commander notes:

(1) The enemy has 90 tanks; we have 30.

SO WHAT?
 6-11

(2) Therefore the enemy has a superiority of 3:1 in

tanks. (This is 'blindingly obvious* and to stop the
'so what' process here would be wrong as no
progression has been made from the factor. There is
no need to write down this 'statement' unless you
feel that it will help you progress logically into
the next 'so what'.)

SO WHAT?

(3) Therefore I should site MRAAW forward and consider

siting tanks forward as well to achieve maximum
attrition as early as possible.

SO WHAT?

(4) Therefore I could have difficulty in finding a strong

armoured reserve.

SO WHAT?

(5) Therefore I should look at the ground to see whether

there are any areas suitable for medium artillery
defensive fire and anti-armoured obstacles. This
could relieve me from covering the area with direct
fire weapons.

c. In addition to the dangers of 'stating the obvious' you

must be aware of the dangers of reasoning yourself into an
SOP. This does not help you in progressing toward the
achievement of your aim. For example, whilst still
considering relative capabilities under the factor
'Enemy', the defending commander notes:

(1) The enemy is well supported by artillery.

SO WHAT?

(2) Therefore:

(a) I must dig in with good overhead cover. (This

is an SOP and has added nothing to the process
of producing deductions from the factor. It
should not be included.)

(b) I should occupy a reverse slope, for my main

position to be out of observed indirect fire if
at all possible. (This is a progressive
deduction that is helping you towards a soundly
conceived plan.)

(c) I should achieve OHP by

(d) As stated in the explanation of deductions, the

end point of the 'so what' process is where
useful information (ie information at your level
and usable in your plan) is generated.
 6-11

Stages of Digging-in an Infantry Position

113. There is some conflict in the references on the subject of what

constitutes Stage 1, 2 or 3 digging. While on the JSC work on the
description of the stages which follow:

a. Stage 1. Two man fire trenches 4ft 6 inches or 1.5 metres

deep, clear fields of fire, spoil hidden, pit camouflaged.
It takes approximately 4-8 hours to prepare.

b. Stage 2. Stage 1 pit is revetted, usually overhead cover

(sometimes overhead protection is developed) and crawl
trenches are begun. It takes approximately 24 hours to
prepare.

c. Stage 3. Sleeping bays are completed with overhead

protection, crawl/communication trenches are developed,
and the position is camouflaged. It takes approximately
three days to prepare.

Note that units lay down their own definition of the detail for
each stage in SOPs. The timings allow for routine rest,
administration and security (eg standing patrol etc.)

Support

114. The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids,

protects, complements, or sustains any other force. The word 'support'
can be used in a number of contexts. Some are:

a. Mutual Support. See the explanation earlier in this

glossary. In this context a company commander can be
tasked to provide direct fire support to another
company. If that other company is also tasked with
providing direct fire support to the first company then
mutual support can be achieved. An individual unit cannot
achieve mutual support but two units can.

b. In Support. This term and the others associated with it

(eg in direct support) are used to denote command status
and the degree of guarantee of that support.

Tactical Bound

115. A tactical bound, during movement, is the next area of ground

of tactical significance to which a part of the force will move. They
will be covered by troops already in fire positions providing, or ready
to provide, fire support. See also 'fire and movement'.
 6-11

Task Verbs

116. When stating an aim, mission or task it is imperative that the

correct action verb is used.

Serial Verb Definition

(a) (b) (c)

1. To Capture To seize and hold an objective.

2. To Clear To ensure an objective or clearly defined route

is free from local enemy interference.

3. To Defend To employ or deploy combat power to prevent,

resist or destroy an enemy attack and, during
the conduct phase, to accept decisive
engagement.

4. To Delay To obstruct, hinder and inflict maximum damage

on the advancing enemy without becoming
decisively committed (1).

5. To Deny To prevent enemy use of an area, feature, route

or facility by a physical presence, firepower,
obstacles, contamination, destruction or a
combination of these measures.

6. To Destroy To inflict such casualties on an enemy force

that it is not longer capable of performing its
role.

7. To Contain )
To Hold ) As defined in JSP (AS) 101 Glossary (2).
To Secure )
To Support )

Notes: 1. Decisively Committed is defined as: 'A unit which has

committed its fire and manoeuvre resources to the degree
where it has lost freedom of action'.

2. 'To hold', 'to secure', 'to contain' and 'to support' are
further explained in this glossary.

Withdrawal

117. Withdrawal is a defensive operation yhich may be designed with

the primary purpose of extricating a force from a situation and retiring
in good order to another position, or it may be designed to delay an
enemy advance. The extent of the delay to be imposed will dictate the
tactics.
 6-31

118. A withdrawal may be conducted deliberately as part of a pre-

arranged plan, or more hastily as a result of a tactical reverse or on
orders of a superior commander. In either case, the considerations for
conducting the operation are the same. The aim of the commander, in
both cases, will be to maintain an intact front during the operation and
to occupy a new defensive position with as little enemy interference as
possible. Close contact is to be avoided.

119. Withdrawal will either be conducted in or out of contact with

enemy. To withdraw in contact is the most difficult operation in war.

Vital Ground

120. This is ground the possession of which by the enemy will

seriously intefetre ,with the successfuly defence of the position. It is
of such significance that if it is lost and the defence is to continue,
it must be retaken. It will normally be selected by a superior
commander. See also 'key terrain'. Having selected key terrain one then
examines them all to ascertain which fulfils the definition of vital
ground. Having thus identified the vital ground the focal point for
approaches is established. See also 'approaches'. Note that the vital
ground is not necessarily the highest or the rearmost feature.