Observations of A Platoon Leader in Vietnam
Observations of A Platoon Leader in Vietnam
Observations of A Platoon Leader in Vietnam
AD NUMBER
AD855115
FROM
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.
agencies and their contractors; Critical
Technology; 30 JAN 1967. Other requests
shall be referred to Chief of Staff for
Force Development, Washington DC.
AUTHORITY
DiSTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. .0810
IN VL.Y I"1 TO
AGA-P (M) (24 Jan 67) FOR OT RD 30 JeIsuary 1967
4. The war in Vietnam has been characterized as, a small unit leaders
war. 'this report addresses the small unit leader and should be of particular
value co all junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers. It is
anticipated that portions of this report will appear in a future publication
of the Infantry Magazine.
2)
Ii
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5
I
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
PAGE
I. TERRAIN 1
II. NAVIGATION 4
VII. WEAPONS 27
VIII. EXPLOSIVES 31
X. COMMUNICATIONS 34
QI
, FOMORD
IJ
OBSERVATIONS OF A PLATOON LEADER
TERRAIN:
dt i
I
During the dry season when the paddies have been plowed,
movement is again hampered by the roughness of the ground. This
condition is almost as bad as the wet rice pa&.dy.
2
LAI
44
II
NAVIGATION:
Thorough understanding and professional use of map reading
and navigation are essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
The importance of map reading ability is often not meaningful,
nor appreciated, through the long hours of tedious classroom
instruction. Practical exercise in the field is where pro-
fessional ability is founded. Believe me, you must be able
to put your classroom knowledge of map reading to practical
application in Vietnam.
4
The junior officer proficient in map reading and navigation
is a most notable asset to his unit whether it be an American
or Vietnamese unit. In counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam
where movement is critical, this is especially valid.
The platoon leader who fails to use and trust his non-
commissioned officers with the map is creating a problem for
himself. Most senior NCOs have had many years of experience in
map reading and navigation. They can offer much assistance.
This does not, of course, relieve the leader of the responsibility
for the actions of his unit. The platoon leader is a supervisor
at all times and must be aware of, and check, the actions of his
subordinates.
2) 5
Movement. Let me first discuss movement. En a guerrilla
infested area, the leader must keep bne principle in mind above
all else - SECURITY. It is mandatory to move with all around
security when terrain permits. This is executed by providing
point, flank, and rear security teams. A platoon file may look
like this: 0 0 a PY.,k 5eC4,-IP5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44
~0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0o o0 0
0 o
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8
In a delaying mission the sniper is very effective. A
single sniper can hold up a greatly superior force while his
comrades effect withdrawal. Very often too, the sniper is
utilized to bait an ambush by withdrawing into the prepared
trap7.
9
Fire and Maneuver/Movement. Fire and maneuver/movement demand
special consideration here. These are the most basic of tactical
lessons, the first learned in training but often the first
forgotton in combat. The common communication, "My unit is pinned
down by fire," is an impossibility unless the enemy enjoys
superiority in number or a superior position. In almost any
combat situation involving an engagement with the enemy, fire and
maneuver is the immediate solution. This lesson is so often
violated by the small unit leader that it is rapidly becoming
absurd.
Search and Clear/Destroy. The basic difference between a
search mission and the movement to contact mission is the time
allotted. Proper execution of the search mission requires adequate
time, while the latter is concerned with contact and pursuit and,
therefore, is conducted quite rapidly.
10
In villages, huts may contain bunkers for protection
against artillery. These bunkers may be inside or close to the
hut. If a bunker is to be destroyed, insure that no civilians
are hiding inside. Smoke or tear gas are good means to drive
persons from a bunker. The same results are obtained by
indicating in the presence of villagers that a grenade will be
thrown into the bunker. This will encourage villagers into
talking friends and perhaps the enemy from underground shelters.
aThe absence of children in an area frequently is a good
indication of enemy activity. This situation should trigger
caution, observation, and alertness.
ii
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The planning phase of the ambush, however, is often
shortened greatly by time limitations imposed by last-minute
missions. Therefore, SOPs must be formed to eliminate some
of the time consuming steps in preparing a unit for a mission.
These procedures are explained to all new personnel soon after
arrival in the unit. The SOP is reviewed and revised periodic-
ally. A reconnaissance by the platoon leader is essential to
the successful accomplishment of the ambush mission. Lack of
knowledge of the terrain will cause confusion at the ambush
site and often will lead to the selection of a poor location.
In the event a leader's reconnaissance is not possible during
the planning phase due to time limitation or inaccessibility
of the proposed location, it may be conducted as the unit moves
into the area. This technique is especially useful when danger
of enemy or native observation of movement into the ambush site
exists. The entire unit is able to observe the proposed loca-
tion as the patrol moves through the area. The patrol then moves
to a location preferably at some distance away to plan the layout
of the ambush. Count on all movements being observed by the
inhabitants or the enemy thus lessening the chance of surprise.
I 13
•
Open areas present a formidable problem when attempting
to cloLe with the enemy. Regular enemy forces such as main
force Viet Cong and NVA units will allow troops to gain close
proximity to the enemy defenses before engaging. Again, move
in open areas exercising great caution.
14
L
In clear areas, the defense will take different form.
Positions will be further apart because visual observation
is a greater consideration than in dense vegetation. In
open areas bounded by a woodline, the perimeter should be
entrenched out of grenade range from the woodline. Plan on
booby trapping with trip flares and noise making devices.
15
thus does not lea~ve the fighting position. t
Do not neglect observation and listening posts. These
early warning systems apply In Vietnam as in former wars.
Maximum use is made of explosives and early warning
devices in the night defense. Claymores, trip flares, and
noise makers are positioned at dusk or after dark if possible.
Remember here that trip flares are very difficult to rig
utilizing the pressure-tension device. Squad leaders should
supervise the use of this device. Most commonly the pressure
device, activated by tripping the safety release, is used.
Never under-emphasize the use of explosives and early warning
devices.
During the positioning of the perimeter, a unit is extremely
jvulnerable. Therefore, proper security must be established
during occupation of the defensive position. At each position
a minimum of one man on alert is maintained, one individual on
j guard, the other working to improve the position. All auto-
matic weapons are always manned. Remember, unless you supervise
the troops will drop their equipment and sit down with little
regard for security.I
Proper communications are vital to the success of the
defense. Visual or noise signals are used if radios or tele-
phones are not available in sufficient amount. Communications
must be established with parent and subordinate units, with
any outposts, and with each fighting position. Thus, when a
position becomes engaged, the leader can rapidly determine the
situation. This also eliminates the necessity to examine the
perimeter after darkness, a dangerous practice which may
compromise the positions. No movement should exist inside
the perimeter once darkness falls, except In an emergency.
Plan fires to secure avenues of approach into the perimeter
and safeguard dangerous flanks. Illumination fires must also
be planned.
Perhaps it is unnecessary to tell small unit leaders to
check each position before and after the perimeter is formed.
Howiever, be aware of the fact that failure to do so may mean
the difference between success and failure. The Individual
soldier will find little interest in his position or fields
of fire if the leader shows no interest in them. A leader's
presence does much to influence the situation by adding a
sense of urgency to an otherwise routine mission.
16
4 agement. The perimeter has been established and the
conduct of the night defense begins. The mission of the
defense is to repel and destroy the enemy. In order to
execute this mission successfully the individual soldier
must know what, when, and how to engage.
) 17
Ii
movement, or fires.
18
toVillages in the area are less built up than the tunnels
beneath them. Each hut contains an underground bunker able
to accommodate all occupants of the hut. The entrance may be
inside under the bed, for example, or on the outside near
the hut. Such bunkers also hide arms, ammunition, and
equipment caches on occasion. More often, however, such caches
are entered through other concealed entrances. Each system
of tunnels contains an escape exit at a distance from the en-
trance and in a concealed position, such as in the surrounding
jungle. Exits have been found with a concrete slab neatly
concealed away from any access route.
19
are needed here. Dogs have also been found effective in os
locating enemy in the tunnels. When the tunnel search is
concluded, all entrances and junctions are blown by a demo-
lition team.
20
Mantraps. Mantraps are very difficult to detect and are
effective casuality producers. A variety of these devices
exists but the pit is more frequently encountered.
21
Booby Traps. Booby traps are used to a great extent. The '1
unsophisticated enemy uses spears and other pointed objects
given velocity by a bent tree or a counterweight. The more
sophisticated enemy uses explosives. Explosive booby traps
are commonly found along'trails and roads, on a door, or around
a gun emplacement.
22
SBecause the enemy makes use of refuse, care is taken to
destroy any items of use to him. C-ration cans, for example,
should be opened at both ends and flattened or pierced with a
bayonet.
FIRE SUPPORT:
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4, Mortars. Personal experience has .iown that many small unit
leaders consider the accuracy of the 81mm mortar erratic. This
holds true also for the 4.2 inch mortars whtch are organic to
the rifle battalion. Erratic firing end short rounds have
caused friendly casualties and endangered friendly troops on too
many occasions. In most cases, the fault cannot be placed on
forward observers. On the contrary, old ammunition appears to
be one problem area. The major problem, however, is the lack
of training of the mortar crews. The weapon platoon usually
receives the brunt of administrative details in areas other than
Vietnam. Mortar crews are thus denied adequate training, triin-
Ing which should rely heavily on live fire exercises.
25
! i
Units may choose to use the 81mm mortar forward observer's
radio as a second radio within each rifle platoon. Fire
missions, therefore, are given over the company command net,
either by the platoon leader or the forward observer traveling
with the platoon leader. Of course, it is desirable for the
forward observers to be utilized since it frees the platoon
leader of an additional responsibility. The platoon leader that
learns to use the mortar effectively, has his own hip pocket
artillery.
26
explode in the air, high above the point desired on the ground.
JEAPONS:
I
The United States Army is equipped with the finest firearms
in the world's arsenal of weapons. It is one thing to make
this statement and another to see it qualified.
M-16 Rifle. Much publicity has been given the M-16 rifle.
Certainly, it 17s a very outstanding weapon. There are, however,
some misconceptions and faults about the weapon.
27
(i
3--
To touch on the .. .......... and bad
...misinformation p
.aNpoints of th
4he weapon .
in no way overrides its excellence. Many troops, for instance,
believe the weapon to be rustproof. Southeast Asia contains
an accumulation of the worst conditions to which any weapon or
equipment can be subjected. The barrel, muzzle, dust cover,
modified bolt closer, and front and rear sight assemblies all
are rust catchers.
28
~ The rifle is carried vertically with the rifle butt resting
on the right ammunition pouch. This method is useful in deuse
vegetation with little overhang, or in rugged terrain.
29
The grenade launcher is ineffective in dense undergrowth
due to the lack of fields of fire. Here it is wise also
for the weapon to be carried round-in-chamber and breech open
to avoid accidental discharge. The thumb holds the round in
the chamber.
As with the M-16 rifle, the basic load for the M-79 is
usually doubled by many units. The grenadier may, therefore,
carry a 36 round basic load.
30
AntI
used in the deployment of the machine guns.
EXPLOSIVES:
M-26, Fragmentation Hand Grenade. The new model of the
hand grenade, the M-26, makes no snap and hissing noise as did
its predecessor, the MK 11, which is also used in Vietnam.
Use an explosive such as the grenade whenever possible in
lieu of small arms fire. In the night ambush, for instance,
the grenade is very effective since it has a large killing radius
and does not compromise the friendly position.
The primary weapon is not standard but rather depends on
the situation.
31
II
Repeated carrying of the M-26 causes the safety release
to break, exposing the striker. The grenade is not dangerous
in this state but is difficult to carry. Proper securing of
the grenade to the LBE prevents exposing a dangerous dangling
blasting cap. The grenade should be checked periodically to
insure a tight fit of body and fuze assembly. Guard against
the tendency to rely on the rifle, rather let the situation
determine the weapon.
White Phosphorus Grenade. This grenade is not often used
in Training but it finds varied use in Vietnam. It is often
utilized to start fires and to signal in addition to the
demoralizing effect caused when used against personnel. As
a signal, it gives a large volume of white smoke in a very
short time. This proves effective in overcoming the Jungle
canopy.
EQUIPMENT:
No one can discount the fact that the American is the
best equipped fighting man in the world although such equip-
ment may not be best suited for the area in which he muLt
fight. The American soldier, however, relies heavily on
reissue and resupply. Supervision here is a must to prevent
unserviceability and loss of equipment. Proper accountability
and requiring good maintenance habits in the. field is the key.
Load Bearing Equipment. The LBE withstands the Vietnam
climate and terrain exceptionally well. Major rust catching
items are the entrenching tool and bayonet. The snap on
the grenade retaining straps on each side of the ammunition
pouch will also rust and prevent openi2r. These should be
cleaned and oiled periodicall .
To allow rapid retrieving of magazines from the ammunition
* pouch raise the center magazine slightly above the others.
32
* j
done by placing a bottle of water purification tablets
LThisis
or a rock at the bottom of the pouch.
he must take the pack with him when he maneuvers against the
enemy. Such action reduces agility and increases fatigue.
Third, when a soldier uses the prone position, the combat pack
presents a high silhouette as evidenced by the many hits it
jhas sustained in hostile action.
The canvas siding will tear over the inside ankle bone after
extensive use. A small leather patch sewn over this area
eliminates the problem. In addition, the sole cracks in the
center exposing a metal plate. This, however, does not render
the boot useless. Another bad point is that the boot is not
well adapted to mountain operations because the ankle does not
receive adequate support.
e 33 .,
Il
COMMUNICATIONS%
The handset is new also and cuts out much background noise.
The thin plastic membranes over the mouth and ear pieces are
easily broken. Moisture here leads to transmitting and receiving
difficulties. The cellophane or plastic protecting the C-ration
spoon is a field expedient. The plastic protective bag of the
BA 386, battery, provides a better means of protection. The
bag is placed over the entire handset and taped at the open end.
34
if'
L signals, is virtually impossible.
Smoke from the grenades will not easily penetrate the jungle
canopy. To overcome this obstacle, the grenade is attached
to a tree Lop or to a sapling bent over and allowed to spring
to its upright position.
The White Phosphorus grenade is excellent in penetrating
the jungle canopy. The large volume of dense white smoke rises
quickly in comparison to the slow burning smoke grenade.
35
35
A
Hand and Arm Signals. Use of hand and arm signals is -
36
I,
I
The land or jungle leech presents a greater problem than
the water leech. It is so named because it is found in the
thick jungle undergrowth. Its movement and size resemble
the inch worm.
371 II
ki
54 Ilk
A
1. TERRAIN.
2. NAVIGATION.
39
b. Secure movement. Never move without providing V r
for all around security. You must be ready for immediate
action if you use roads and trails. Disperse critical
weapons to spread the fire power out in the unit. Avoid
the herd instinct. Carry weapons ever ready. Avoid over-
reaction to the situation involving the sniper, but be
aggressive.
c. Fire and maneuver is the immediate solution to
almost any combat situation.
40
e. Plan to use grenades ana claymore mines to avola.
compromising your position.
6. FIRE SUPPORT.
J 41
I$
I
7 WEAPONS.
a. The combined light weight and fire power of the
M-16 rifle makes this weapon desirable for airmobile and
counterinsurgency use. The bore and magazine of t:e rifle
must be kept free of grit and mud. Weapons and magazines
must be checked frequently to prevent jamming and misfiring.
To allow freedom of movement of one hand, the rifle is carried
verically with the rifle butt resting on the right ammunition
pouch. This method is particularly useful in dense vegetation
and in rugged terrain.
8. EXPLOSIVES.
9. EQUIPMENT:
42
C!
b. Insist upon proper accountability In the
10. COMMUNICATIONS.
43
I 43