Case Digest - GONZALES Vs ABAYA Case Digest PDF
Case Digest - GONZALES Vs ABAYA Case Digest PDF
Case Digest - GONZALES Vs ABAYA Case Digest PDF
FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including
petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to
avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After
several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their
arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
they returned to their barracks.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP
Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and
directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for
coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other
accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-
2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended,
against the same military personnel.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed
with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over
all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.
Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to
the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat
before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and
in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners'
applications for bail.
Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood
incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by
the AFP.
The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
in relation to the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004
that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is
absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of
coup d’état before the regular courts.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-
constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed
for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is
purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the
RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making
such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction
over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take
away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer
over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the
courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration
by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.
2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime
of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally
applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article
96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
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