Pakistan-Russia Relations Redux:

Muhammad Nawaz Khan

From Estrangement to Pragmatism

Muhammad Nawaz Khan*

Abstract
Pakistan-Russia relations have a complex history of
divergences, contradictions and ambiguities that
heightened during the Cold War and subsequent era of
Afghan Jihad. However, the gradual rapprochement that
paved the way for institutionalised engagement started
after Pakistan joined the war against terrorism. Based on
secondary review of academic and online sources, this
article explores how relations between the two countries
evolved from estrangement to institutional engagement,
with a special focus on why this relationship is significant
for both. Economic, energy, defence, counterterrorism,
and socio-cultural domains are the important variables
that are discussed. Given existing geopolitical
compulsions like Moscow‟s quest for playing a decisive
role in Afghanistan‟s security calculus; Pakistan‟s pursuit
for coming out of the United States‟ straitjacket and
finding alternative regional partners offer the reasons,
challenges and outlook in shaping prospective ties. It is
argued that Pakistan-Russia ties are likely to improve in
the future, especially in terms of economic, defence and
counterterrorism cooperation.

Keywords: Bilateral Relations, Cold War, Defence Cooperation,

Counterterrorism, Geopolitics, Regional Fragility.

*
The author is Research Officer at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI),
Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at: [email protected].
________________________________
@2019 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.
IPRI Journal  XIX (1): 56-85.
https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190103.

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 Pakistan-Russia Relations Redux:
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Introduction

akistan-Russia relations can be best summarised as a narrative of

P mutual misunderstandings, miscalculations and wasted opportunities

due to the shifting policies of the two states under geopolitical
realities of the Cold War period. History testifies to the fact that their
relations have remained low key with only a few exceptions of economic,
trade and investment cooperation during the 1960s and 1970s.1 The post-
9/11 era has renewed opportunities for warming bilateral relations
wherein both states can act rationally under their common strategic and
economic interests on matters involving regional and international
sensitivities, specifically the Afghanistan quagmire and terrorism. More
specifically, it is the post-2014 regional security environment of Central
and South Asia, particularly rise of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)2
in Afghanistan, which is now steering the two countries‟ convergence of
interest. ISK in Afghanistan has raised serious security concerns for
Russia, paving the way for enhanced cooperation with Pakistan.
Russia acknowledges Pakistan‟s indispensability for bringing
enduring peace and stability in Afghanistan. Stronger ties with Islamabad
may also create multilateral economic space for Moscow in the United
States (US)-led unipolar world. Moreover, both desire economic
collaboration for projects in Central Asia;3 and Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) by the Kremlin can help lessen Pakistan‟s dependence on Western
aid, particularly in view of the US‟ „stalled military sales to Pakistan‟4 as

1
Rehan Aqil Khan, “Pakistan– Russia Relations and Future Prospects,” Opinion 2, no. 2
(2014): 14-25 (14-16), http://www.ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/OPINION-Vol.2-No.2.pdf.
2
Regional affiliate of the Islamic State (IS).
3
“Pakistan, Russia to Go for FTA, Currency Swap Agreement,” Express Tribune,
November 8, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/289029/pakistan-russia-to-go-for-fta-
currency-swap-agreement/.
4
Frud Bezhan, “Trump‟s Tool Kit: U.S. Options for Pressuring Pakistan,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, August 24, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-pakistan-
strategy-pressure/28695060.html. Also see, “Pakistan Considers Canceling U.S. F-16
Deal, Buying from Jordan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 15, 2016,
https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-considers-cancelling-us-f16-fighter-jet-deal-buying-
used-planes-jordan/27798427.html.

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 Muhammad Nawaz Khan

well as minimise the latter‟s international isolation and diversify its

diplomatic focus beyond China. Given Russia‟s role as a major world
power, its importance as a regional partner for Pakistan cannot be
overstated. Another reason behind the reset in relations is President
Putin‟s policy of expanding his country‟s influence over its immediate
(the Baltics, Caucasus and Eastern Europe), and distant (South Asia and
Middle East) regions of interest.5
Determinants of this relationship also include inter-regional
economic prospects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)6, Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC),7 and its successor the Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU).8 The emerging strategic disequilibrium,
especially in South Asia; Pakistan‟s crucial role in Afghanistan‟s security;
containment of Russia‟s resurgence; US sanctions on Pakistan; and the
growing threat of extremism are also likely to endanger the stability of
South and Central Asia, in particular, and the Eurasia region, in general.
Indubitably, challenges are visible in determining the structure of this
rapprochement. For instance, the US and India have expressed displeasure
over this deepening relationship.
Based on secondary review of academic sources, this article
explores how Pakistan-Russia relations evolved from estrangement to
institutional engagement, with a special focus on why this relationship is
significant for both. Economic, energy, defence, counterterrorism, and
socio-cultural domains are the important variables that are studied. Given
existing geopolitical compulsions like Moscow‟s quest for playing a
decisive role in Afghanistan‟s security calculus independent of the US;
5
Nazir Hussain and Khurshid Ali Sangay, “The Russian Resurgence and South Asian
Region,” IPRI Journal XII, no. 2 (2012): 15-34, http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/art2nazs12.pdf.
6
LehmanBrown, “The Belt and Road Initiative” (paper, LehmanBrown International
Accountants, Beijing, 2017), https://www.lehmanbrown.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.pdf.
7
Georgios L. Vousinas, “Eurasian Economic Community: Towards Integration.
Economic Challenges and Geostrategic Aspects,” Modern Economy 5 (2014): 951-966,
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2014.59088. EurAsEC (2000) [its successor Eurasian
Economic Union (2014)] is a regional integration initiative of Russia. It is an economic
bloc consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.
8
EEC, Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures (Moscow: Eurasian Economic
Commission, 2016), https://bit.ly/2hi6ZBN.

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Pakistan‟s pursuits for coming out of the US straitjacket9 and finding

alternative regional actors offer the reasons, challenges and prospects in
shaping prospective ties. It is argued that Pakistan-Russia ties are likely to
improve in the future, especially in terms of economic and defence
cooperation and enhanced collaboration in the area of counterterrorism.

From Estrangement to Institutional Engagement: A Historical

Perspective
After the creation of Pakistan, the country could have chosen either to
align with the communist bloc or the capitalist camp based on its colonial
legacy.10 Decision-makers thought the level of economic support they
were seeking in the Cold War era could not be accessed from Moscow.
Moreover, Pakistan had to weigh its rising concern of procuring
military/defence assistance in view of its volatile eastern border.11 It was
Pakistan‟s quest to seek balance of power and to counteract hostile India‟s
designs that shaped a pro-US approach as the centrepiece of its foreign
policy during this time.
Despite joining the Western camp, diplomatic relations with the
then-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were established in
1948.12 In 1965, President Ayub Khan visited the USSR for the first
time.13 During this era, Moscow played a key mediatory role in the

9
Muhammad Nawaz Khan and Beenish Altaf, Pakistan-Russia Rapprochement and
Current Geo-Politics, IPRI Journal XIII, no.1 (2013): 125-134,
http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/std4naww13.pdf.
10
Nazir Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options,” Journal
of Political Studies 19, no. 1 (2012): 79-89 (80),
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Pak-
russia%20relations,%20opportunities%20Nazir_Vol_19_Issue_1_2012.pdf.
11
Muhammad Hanif, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints,”
IPRI Journal XIII, no. 2 (2013): 63-86, http://www.ipripak.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/art4han.pdf.
12
Ardeshir Cowasjee, “A Recap of Soviet-Pakistan Relations,” Dawn, March 12, 2011,
https://www.dawn.com/news/612610.
13
Syed Waqar Ali Shah and Shaista Parveen, “Disintegration of Pakistan – The Role of
Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR): An Appraisal,” Journal of the
Research Society of Pakistan 53, no. 1 (2016): 171-190 (171),
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/13%20Paper_v53_1_16.pdf.

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 Muhammad Nawaz Khan

Tashkent Agreement (1966), which ended the Indo-Pak war.14 This was
followed by the first ever visit of Prime Minister Kosygin to Pakistan on
April 17, 1968.15 During the 60s, Pakistan was offered to join „Kosygin‟s
plan for a regional economic grouping, comprising Afghanistan, India,
Iran, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, and Breznev‟s idea of an Asian
Collective Security arrangement.‟16 Pakistan did not accept this security
proposal because it „saw that Russian motives behind the proposal were to
contain Chinese influence in the region and also to jeopardize its
friendship with China.‟17 Consequently, the Kremlin made it clear to
Islamabad that „without its [Pakistan] support, it would be very difficult
for the former [Russia] to maintain its position in Asia.‟18 This put an end
to the short-lived period of friendly relations between the two countries.
This was also the time when policymakers in Pakistan started asserting
that it was Indo-Soviet joint ventures under the Treaty of Friendship,
Peace, and Cooperation of August 1971, which encouraged India to
dismember Pakistan‟s Eastern Wing into today‟s Bangladesh.19 Pakistan‟s
bilateral relations with Soviet Russia began to worsen even further.
The government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attempted to compensate the
traumatic fall of Dhaka coupled with the „duplicity of the US‟20 by

14
Tashkent Agreement, India-Pakistan, January 10, 1966,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Tashkent-Agreement.
15
Shah and Parveen, “Disintegration of Pakistan – The Role of Former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic (USSR): An Appraisal,”179.
16
Ibid., 180.
17
Ibid., 181.
18
Ibid., 182.
19
Khan, “Pakistan– Russia Relations and Future Prospects,”16.
20
See, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Regional Imperative: The
Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy towards South Asian States under Presidents
Johnson and Nixon (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 1980), 147-48; and Raghavendra
Mishra, “Revisiting the 1971 „USS Enterprise Incident‟: Rhetoric, Reality and Pointers
for the Contemporary Era,” Journal of Defence Studies 9, no. 2 (2015): 49-80. The US‟
delays in provision of military supply to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars with
India developed a perception in the country that Washington was not a trustworthy
friend, especially the US taskforce of the Seventh Fleet along with a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier did not reach the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war. Besides, on August
3, 1971, the US House of Representatives passed the Gallagher and Church/Saxbe
Amendments to the Foreign Aid Bill and suspended economic assistance till resolution
of the East Pakistan crises.

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assuming the Look East policy under bilateralism.21 This led to temporary
improvement in relations, as evident by the state visit by Bhutto in 1974,
recorded as the first Pakistani Prime Minister to visit Moscow.22 However,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 197923 terminated this short-term
improvement of relations,24 dragging Pakistan into the proxy war of the
US against the former USSR.
Following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and America‟s
unanticipated abandonment coupled with sanctions under the Pressler and
Glenn Amendments, forced Islamabad to reconsider its view of
Moscow.25 Eventually, the following decade witnessed a gradual
convergence, as manifested in the bilateral exchange of high-level official
visits between the two countries.26 An important visit in this regard came
in April 1999 of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Moscow after
nearly 25 years.27
Nevertheless, when Pakistan backed the Taliban in Kabul,28 fighting
against the pro-Russia Northern Alliance, relations became cloudy.
However, the obvious turn in revitalising relations came when the country
became part of the US-led War on Terror (WoT) in 2001, thereby de-
aligning itself from the then-Taliban regime. The formal drive to
21
Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options,” 5.
22
“Pak-Russia Relations,” Jahangir’s World Times, October 4, 2014,
http://jworldtimes.com/jwt2015/magazine-archives/jwt-2014/october2014/pak-russia-
relations/.
23
Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Cress, eds., The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower
Fought and Lost (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 1.
24
Hanif, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints,” 68.
25
“US Created Taliban and Abandoned Pakistan, says Hillary,” Dawn, April 25, 2009,
https://www.dawn.com/news/847153. Also see, Ferrukh Mir, Half Truth (Bloomington:
iUniverse, 2011), 402-403, and John Gennace, “US-Pakistan Relations after the Soviet
Withdrawal from Afghanistan: The Bush and Clinton Years,” Daily Journalist, January
21, 2017, http://thedailyjournalist.com/the-historian/us-pakistan-relations-after-the-
soviet-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-the-bush-and-clinton-years/.
26
Khan, “Pakistan– Russia Relations and Future Prospects,”16-18.
27
Ibid.
28
“The Taliban,” Mapping Militant Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University, 2016),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/367.The Afghan
Taliban got rise in 1994 and its fall was witnessed in 2001. “Three countries recognized
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan between 1997 and 2001 such as Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.”

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institutionalise relations emerged when then-President Musharraf met

Vladimir Putin at the multinational security summit in Almaty on June 4,
2002.29 This led to formation of the Joint Working Group on Counter-
Terrorism and, the Joint Working Group on Strategic Stability30 during the
same year to handle possible challenges to regional stability like
extremism, terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, and arms
control. Another modest move was observed in 2011 when the „joint
session of Parliament criticised the US unilateralism in the arbitrary
Abbottabad raid killing Osama bin Laden in May 2011 and in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes on Salala Check Post
killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. Subsequently, Islamabad‟s new foreign
policy guidelines visualised reaching out to Moscow.‟31 It was in 2013
when both countries launched an all-inclusive collaboration, and
celebrated 65 years of diplomatic relations on initiating the first strategic
bilateral dialogue.32

Significance of ‘Pakistan’ for Moscow

Pakistan is important for us in trade and economy and is an
important country of South Asia and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, and can play an important role in the
promotion of peace and security in the region.
- Vladimir Putin33

Moscow‟s current inclination to Islamabad is in line with its

conceptual „multi-vectored pursuits in South Asia‟34 indicated by

29
“President Vladimir Putin met with Pakistan‟s President Pervez Musharraf,” President
of Russia, June 4, 2002, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/27120.
30
Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options,” 86.
31
Kamran Yousaf, “In a First, Pakistan, Russia to Hold Joint War Games,” Express
Tribune, September 12, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1180917/first-pakistan-
russia-hold-joint-war-games/.
32
Tahir Mahmood Azad, “Pakistan-Russia Strategic Partnership: New Horizons for
Cooperation” (brief, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 2016),
http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Final-Issue-brief-Tahir-Azad-dated-26-
12-2016.pdf; and Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan, Russia to Enhance Cooperation,” Dawn,
October 22, 2014, https://www.dawn.com/news/1139575.
33
“Pakistan, Russia to Go for FTA, Currency Swap Agreement,” Express Tribune.

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President Putin‟s readiness to acclimatise his country‟s foreign policy to

the shifting regional milieu. In fact, Moscow is proactively exploring
prospective markets to export its military equipment and investments to
sustain its economy buoyancy. Pakistan may likely be a potential buyer of
Russian military hardware, besides offering Moscow investment
opportunities in infrastructure, industrial sectors, agriculture, particularly
drip irrigation and desert farming in areas suffering acute water shortage.
Russia also acknowledges Pakistan‟s indispensability in stabilising
Afghanistan. Continuous violence and instability in Kabul is threatening
Central Asia and North Caucasus – Russia‟s backyard. Likewise, falling
global oil prices in 201435 leading to substantial revenue decline in
energy-exporting states have possibly pushed the Kremlin to explore more
venues in politico-economic and strategic realms with other regions of the
world, including South Asia.

Islamabad’s Lucidity
Changing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia as evident in the growing
instability in Afghanistan,36 greater role of India in the region under the
US umbrella,37 and Pakistan‟s quest for maintaining the delicate strategic
equilibrium in the region and economic imperatives of the country are
factors which are shaping the Pakistan-Russia relations, specifically in
view of the US‟ unilateral actions and tightening conditions, more

34
Himani Pant, “The Changing Contours of Russia‟s South Asia Policy” (brief no. 193,
Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2017), http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/ORF_IssueBrief_193_India-Russia.pdf.
35
Tim Bowler, “Falling Oil Prices: Who are the Winners and Losers?” BBC News, January
19, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29643612.
36
Saima Perveen, Jehanzeb Khalil, Manzoor Ahmad and Jehangir Khalil, “Post 2014
Spillover Effects of Afghanistan‟s Crisis on Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy,” special issue,
FWU Journal of Social Sciences, 1, no.1 (2015): 1-8 (2),
http://www.sbbwu.edu.pk/journal/special%20issue/2.Post_2014_Spillover_Effects_of_
Afghanistan_s_Crisis_on_Pakistan_s.pdf.
37
“Full Texts of Donald Trump‟s Speech on South Asia Policy,” Hindu, August 22, 2017,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/full-texts-of-donald-trumps-speech-on-
south-asia-policy/article19538424.ece.

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precisely under Trump‟s new South Asia policy.38 More specifically,

Washington‟s unilateral action in the Abbottabad raid and drone strikes,
„redefining rules of engagement‟ in the WoT,39 indefinite presence of US
forces in Afghanistan,40 suspension of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF)41
and military assistance, and blaming Pakistan for providing safe havens to
the Afghan Taliban42 are the reasons Pakistan is striving to diversify its
foreign relations, seek viable alternative solutions43 and rethink its rules of
economic, foreign and defence engagements44 in order to eventually
dismiss the impression that Pakistan is a US-proxy in the region.
Pakistan‟s ties with Russia are also likely to strengthen its position at
multilateral forums like the Heart of Asia Conference and Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and help the country in evolving a more

38
Ibid.; Muhammad Nawaz Khan, “Pak-US Ties: War of Words to Actions,” Regional
Rapport, January 9, 2018, http://regionalrapport.com/2018/01/09/pak-us-ties-war-
words-actions/; and “US Pushes Motion to Put Pakistan on Global Terrorist-Financing
Watchlist,” News International, February 14, 2018,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/280637-us-pushes-motion-to-put-pakistan-on-
global-terrorist-financing-watchlist. Since the strained Pakistan-US relations are seen in
continuing mistrust and mutual suspicion, therefore it seems that the US would pursue
harder approach towards Islamabad in its war against terrorism that is evident in
Trump‟s new SA policy followed by his alleged accusation on Islamabad of “„lying and
deceit‟ and providing safe havens to terrorists,” especially the Haqqani network.
Resultantly, the new US administration has suspended the Coalition Support Fund and
security assistance to Pakistan, and “it pushed motion to put Pakistan on global terrorist-
financing watch list.”
39
Adam Linehan, “What Mattis‟ New Rules of Engagement Mean for The War in
Afghanistan,” Task & Purpose, October 4, 2017, https://taskandpurpose.com/what-
mattis-new-rules-of-engagement-mean-for-the-war-in-afghanistan/.
40
Nora Kelly, “Full Transcript: Donald Trump Announces His Afghanistan Policy,”
Atlantic, August 21, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-
transcript-donald-trump-announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/; and “Why is Russia
Warming up to Pakistan,” Times of Islamabad, February 27, 2018,
https://timesofislamabad.com/27-Feb-2018/why-is-russia-warming-up-to-pakistan.
41
“Ambassador to US Says Withheld Coalition Support Funds were „Reimbursement‟, not
„Assistance‟,” Dawn, July 22, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1346930.
42
“Trump Accuses Pakistan of „Lies and Deceit,‟ Threatens to Cut Aid,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 2, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-us-trump-
acuses-lies-deceit-threatens-pull-billions-aid/28949804.html.
43
Hussain and Sangay, “The Russian Resurgence and South Asian Region,”31.
44
Sabena Siddiqi, “The Russia Pakistan Equation,” Katehon, June 1, 2017,
http://katehon.com/article/russia-pakistan-equation.

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„regional approach‟ to resolve the Afghan conundrum.45 Moscow‟s

importance for Islamabad lies in its strong credentials as a regional and
world power, its leading role in SCO and its privileged right to veto at the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Vital Areas of Pakistan-Russia Cooperation

Economy
In 1956, Russia and Pakistan established trade relations under an
agreement in which Pakistan exported cotton, jute and leather,46 and the
Soviet Union founded Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) on December 30, 1973
with a loan of USD 200 million.47 In 1999, both countries also agreed to
establish an Inter-Governmental Commission for Trade and Economy;
concluded a bilateral agreement on trade and economic cooperation to
replace the 1956 agreement.48 Subsequently, in 2009, the Pakistan-Russia
Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) on Trade, Economic, and Scientific
and Technical Cooperation was formed.49 Likewise, to stimulate
commerce and tourism the Pakistan-Russia Business Forum (PRBF) was

45
“International Afghanistan Peace Conference Starts in Moscow,” Express Tribune, April
14, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1383473/international-afghanistan-peace-
conference-starts-moscow/. Pakistan‟s efforts, with the cooperation of Russia and China,
were evident in the International Afghanistan Peace Conference held in Moscow on
April 14, 2017.
46
George Ginsburgs, The Soviet Union and International Cooperation in Legal Matters,
Law in Eastern Europe no. 38 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 73, and
Nazir Hussain and Quratulain Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and
New Beginnings,” Central Asia, no.72 (2013): 1-15 (6).
47
“A Look Back at History of PSM,” Express Tribune, November 10, 2013,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/630036/a-look-back-at-history-of-psm/; and Hanif,
“Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints,” 14-15.
48
Adnan Ali Shah, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Post-Cold War Era,” Strategic Studies
XXI, no. 2 (2001).
49
“Pakistan, Russia Agree to Promote Trade, Investment,” Dawn, May 12, 2011,
https://www.dawn.com/news/628117; and “Russian – Pakistani Relations,” Consulate
General of the Russian Federation in Karachi,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130315070730/http://www.rusconsulkarachi.mid.ru/RUS
SIA-PAKISTAN.htm.

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established in 2009,50 followed by the Business Council for Promotion of

Trade with Pakistan in 2011.51
Pakistan can also seek FDI in technology, research, innovation and
energy. To this end, a Russian delegation visited Pakistan in September
2012 and concluded Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) to invest in
PSM, metallurgy, railways, power, science and technology.52 These MoUs
were aimed at enlarging and up-grading PSM to increase its productivity
from one to three million tonnes,53 and the up-gradation of Pakistan
Railways, improving railroad infrastructure and, developing trans-regional
rail links with Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Iran.54 These
economic linkages were further institutionalised during the fourth meeting
of the IGC in 2015 with the formation of five Joint Working Groups
(JWGs) on trade and finance; energy; food and agriculture; banking; and
industries.55 Moreover, the State Bank of Pakistan and the Central Bank of
Russian Federation signed an MoU in Moscow on January 15, 2018 for
„promoting cooperation in the fields of financial systems‟ development,
payment systems, financial infrastructure, and financial institutions‟
supervision.‟56 At present, Pakistan exports cotton yarn, fabrics, rice, nuts,
textile goods, sports goods, leather, leather products, pharmaceutical
50
Abdul Rauf Tabani, “Message of President of the Pakistan-Russia Business Forum”
(speech, Karachi, June 12, 2009), Pakistan Russia Business Forum,
http://www.prbf.org/speeches4.html.
51
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New Beginnings,” 9.
52
“Russian Businessmen Interested to Invest in many Projects of Pakistan,” Nihao-Salam,
October 3, 2012, accessed September 14, 2017, http://www.nihao-salam.com/news-
detail.php?id=Mjc3Mw==.
53
“$1 Billion Pakistan Steel Mills Expansion in Four Years,” MESTEEL, October 13,
2004, http://www.mesteel.com/cgi-bin/w3-msql/goto.htm?url=http://www.mesteel.com/
countries/pakistan/steelnews19.htm.
54
“Pakistan, Russia Sign MoUs in Power, Railways and Steel Sectors,” News
International, October 3, 2012, https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/388589-
pakistan-russia-sign-mous-in-powerrailways-and-steel-sectors.
55
Board of Investment, GoP, “Pakistan, Russia Agree to Form Five Working Groups”
(Government of Pakistan, 2015), http://boi.gov.pk/ViewNews.aspx?NID=758; and
“Pakistan, Russia Agree on Forging Multidimensional Partnership at SCO Summit,”
Geo News, December 1, 2017, https://www.geo.tv/latest/170041-pakistan-russia-agree-
on-forging-multidimensional-partnership-at-sco-summit. Since the inspection of IGC,
five meetings have been held, the latest one in November 2017.
56
“Russian Central Bank, SBP Sign MoU,” Dawn, January 16, 2018,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1383183.

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products,57 tangerines and potatoes to the Russian Federation.58 Russian

exports to Pakistan include fertilisers, paperboard, raw ferrous and ferrous
products.59
Pakistan-Russia trade has witnessed a gradual rise from USD 95
million in 198060 to USD 660 million in 2018.61 According to Yury
Kozlov, Russia‟s trade representative, trade between both countries is
expected to grow up to approximately USD 750-800 million by the end of
2019.62 To further strengthen economic relations, Islamabad and Moscow
are considering signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).63 In this regard,
Pakistan‟s Ministry of Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs, coupled
with other relevant ministries, were tasked to prepare recommendations
when Islamabad accepted Moscow‟s proposal to enter into a FTA during
the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif‟s visit to Astana during the 17 th
meeting of the Heads of the State Council of the SCO on June 7, 2017.64

57
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New Beginnings,” 8.
58
Muhammad Naseer, Export of Kinnow, report (Karachi: Trade Development Authority
of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan, 2010), 21,
https://www.tdap.gov.pk/doc_reports/TDAP_REPORT_ON_EXPORT_%20OF_KINN
OW.pdf.
59
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New Beginnings,” 8.
60
“Russia Eyes $ 600 million Trade with Pakistan,” Pakistan Today, December 27, 2012,
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/12/27/russia-eyes-600-million-trade-with-
pakistan/.
61
“Pakistan-Russia Trade Likely to Reach $800m,” Express Tribune, December 29, 2018,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1876880/2-pakistan-russia-trade-likely-reach-800m/; and
Almas Haider Naqvi and Yasir Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations:
Discernable Trends and Future,” Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2017): 18-38 (30),
http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2-SS_Almas_and_Yasir-_No-4_2017.pdf;
and “Pakistani-Russian Bilateral Trade in 2015,” Russian Exports, August 11, 2016,
accessed September 30, 2016,
http://www.rusexporter.com/research/country/detail/4868/.
62
“Russia-Pakistan Bilateral Trade to Reach US$800 million by Year End: Yuri Kozlov,”
Mettis Global, December 28, 2018, https://mettisglobal.news/russia-pakistan-bilateral-
trade-to-reach-us800-million-by-year-end-yuri-kozlov/.
63
Ghulam Abbas, “Pak-Russia Seek Trade Liberalisation,” Pakistan Today, December 8,
2011, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/12/08/pak-russia-seek-trade-
liberalisation/.
64
Asif Bhatti, “Pakistan, Russia to Sign Free Trade Agreement,” Geo News, June 22,
2017, https://www.geo.tv/latest/146752-pakistan-russia-to-sign-fta; and “PM Nawaz
Arrives in Kazakhastan to Attend SCO Summit,” Express Tribune, June 8, 2017,

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 Muhammad Nawaz Khan

These economic prospects are likely to be cemented under

transnational mega projects like the BRI and its pilot project China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), EurAsEC,65 the Central Asia
Regional Economic Cooperation,66 and Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline (IP).67
Pakistan‟s geostrategic location is central to the restoration of the Silk
Route and Eurasian integration;68 and its significance in Pan-Eurasian
assimilation cannot be sidelined in Kremlin. Hence, it is not surprising
that Russia has shown interest in becoming part of the CPEC project,
manifested in the Russian Ambassador to Pakistan, Alexey Y. Dedov‟s
statement, „Russia „strongly‟ supported CPEC as it was important for
Pakistan‟s economy and also regional connectivity.‟69 Any Indian
endeavours to sabotage the initiative could likely be counteracted by
Moscow‟s formal presence in the project as a strong stakeholder. This was

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1430418/pm-nawaz-arrives-kazakhastan-attend-sco-
summit/.
65
Alexander Mercouris, “Putin‟s Grand Strategy: The Greater Eurasia Project,” Duran,
June 30, 2016, http://theduran.com/putins-grand-strategy-greater-eurasia-project/; and
Marlene Laruelle, “Russia‟s Eurasianist Soft Power in Central Asia” (Moscow: Eurasian
Studies, 2017), http://greater-europe.org/archives/3190. This is an encouraging sign for
a potential collaboration with the BRI and CPEC that would increase Pakistan‟s
importance for Russia. Creating anarchy and establishing peace are two competing
forces in the global political arena which states use for maintaining their unilateralism,
while at the same time achieving regional economic integration through multilateralism.
It seems that the US and India are struggling to maintain their status quo power and
hegemonic status evident in the US intervention in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan,
and India‟s stubbornness in not resolving the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand,
Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran believe in regional integration in which regional peace
is prerequisite for achieving economic integration through initiatives like BRI, CPEC
and EurAsEC.
66
ADB, Proposed Multitranche Financing Facility Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridor Development Investment Program,
report (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 2017),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/48404/48404-002-rrp-en.pdf .
67
Naqvi and Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations: Discernable Trends and
Future,” 25.
68
Yasir Masood, “Rekindled Pak-Russia Relations,” Express Tribune, August 9, 2016,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1159081/rekindled-pak-russia-relations/.
69
Sachin Parashar, “Russia Supports China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Project: Russian
Envoy Alexey Y. Dedov,” Economic Times, December 19, 2016,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/russia-supports-
china-pakistan-economic-corridor-project-russian-envoy-alexey-y-
dedov/articleshow/56037725.cms.

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reflected in the 15th Russia, India, China Foreign Ministerial Meeting in

December 11, 2017,70 where Russia‟s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
„advised Delhi to find ways to join the CPEC and benefit from the BRI.‟71

Energy
A prominent area of cooperation during the Cold War was energy.
Moscow established an oil consortium „Pakistani Oilfields‟ in 1958;72 and
the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) by lending
Rubles 27 million in 1961.73 The same trend was witnessed in the post-
Cold war era when both signed MoUs in 2012 that involved extending
technical assistance to the Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants, the 500
mega watts (MW) New Jamshoro power plant (GENCO) and Tarbela-4
project.74 Other MoUs pertained to electricity transmission projects from
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (CASA-1000).75
Efforts are still underway for establishing the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline
and involving Russia in coal gasification technology for the Thar coal
project.76 Likewise, in 2015, in order to construct the North-South gas

70
Embassy of India, Moscow, Russia, “15th Russia-India-China Trilateral Foreign
Ministers‟ Meeting New Delhi,” press release, December 11, 2017,
https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/15th_Russia_India.php.
71
Ume Farwa, “Pakistan-Russia Relations on Upward Trajectory,” Asia Times, December
19, 2017, accessed January 9, 2018, http://www.atimes.com/pakistan-russia-relations-
upward-trajectory/.
72
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New Beginnings,” 7.
73
Ibid., 6.
74
“Pakistan, Russia Sign MoUs in Power, Railways and Steel Sectors,” News
International.
75
Muhammad Farooq Afzal, “Pakistan-Russia Relations Warm up,” Business Recorder,
June 12, 2013, https://fp.brecorder.com/2013/06/201306121198009/; “Interconnection
Grid to be Built between Pakistan and China,” Business Recorder, April 1, 2016,
https://fp.brecorder.com/2016/04/2016040131376/; and “Russia Reportedly Ready to
Participate in CASA 1000 Project,” Asia Plus, June 13, 2017,
https://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20170613/russia-reportedly-ready-to-
participate-in-casa-1000-project. Reportedly, Moscow has recently showed its interest
to finance in the CASA project during the international exhibition XPO 2017 in Astana.
76
Board of Investment, GoP, “Pakistan, Russia Agree to Form Five Working Groups.”

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pipeline from Lahore to Karachi, Russia agreed to invest USD 2 billion.77

Russian firm Gazprom International won the Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) pipeline contract in 2016.78 On January 31, 2017, the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Oil and Gas Company Limited and a Russian consortium of
investors (Inter-Rao Engineering and Himmash Apparat partnered with
Orpheus Energy) concluded an agreement to establish an oil refinery
having capacity to purify 200,000 barrels oil per day.79 Gazprom
International and OGDCL concluded another memorandum on July 3,
2017, which would bring around USD 4 billion capital inflows to
Pakistan.80 The more recent of these projects are especially important for
the Kremlin in the backdrop of its trailing oil and gas market in Europe
because of sanctions. The country manages huge gas reserves in Iran and
is keen to export gas to Pakistan but US opposition had been delaying the
project.81 The mutual leanings in Pakistan-Russia relations have unfolded
opportunities for striking lucrative business deal, benefitting both states.
This was evident in the sideline meeting between former Prime Minister
Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the
Council of the Heads of Government (CHG) summit of the SCO in
December 2017, where they agreed on the construction of an offshore gas
pipeline.82 Resultantly, both countries signed an agreement to conduct a
feasibility study for building the USD ten billion offshore gas pipeline on
September 27, 2018.83 Such investments will potentially meet Pakistan‟s
77
“Pakistan, Russia Sign Agreement for Construction of North-South Gas Pipeline,”
Dawn, October 16, 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1213460.
78
Zafar Bhutta, “Russia‟s Gazprom and OGDC of Pakistan Sign Joint Venture Deal,”
Express Tribune, July 7, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1452021/russias-gazprom-
ogdc-pakistan-sign-joint-venture-deal/.
79
“Russia to Establish Oil Refinery in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan,” Times of
Islamabad, February 1, 2018, https://timesofislamabad.com/01-Feb-2018/russia-to-
establish-oil-refinery-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-pakistan.
80
Bhutta, “Russia‟s Gazprom and OGDC of Pakistan Sign Joint Venture Deal.”
81
Farwa, “Pakistan-Russia Relations on Upward Trajectory”; and “Route Survey for
North-South Gas Pipeline Completed, Tariff Being Finalized,” Associated Press of
Pakistan, January 28, 2018, http://www.app.com.pk/route-survey-north-south-gas-
pipeline-completed-tariff-finalized/. In January 2018, the road survey of the North-
South gas pipeline was completed.
82
Farwa, “Pakistan-Russia Relations on Upward Trajectory.”
83
Israr Khan, “$10 bn Offshore Gas Pipeline: Pakistan, Russia Sign MoU for Feasibility
Study,” News International, September 28, 2018,

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energy needs, while contributing to economic buoyancy that would

ultimately pave way for regional integration, specifically through
transnational energy cooperation.

Defence
Historically, Pakistan has not had formal defence relations with Russia,
except for the maverick helicopter deal of 1969.84 The Twenty-first
Century witnessed an improvement in defence collaboration in the wake
of the former Russian Military Chief Col. Gen. Aleksandr Postnikov‟s
visit in 201185 and the reciprocal visits to Moscow by former Air Chief
Marshal Tahir Rafiq Butt in August 2012,86 subsequently by the former
Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in October 2012.87
These visits laid the ground for future defence cooperation between the
two sides, especially when Postnikov, floated the „possibility of
expanding defence ties by holding joint military drills, exchanging
trainees and trainers and selling and buying weapons,‟88 which thereafter
led to defence ventures in these three directions. In line with this
approach, for the very first time in April 2013, Commander of the Russian
Air Force Viktor Bondarev visited Islamabad to have deliberations for
military deals. Major progress in defence relations was observed when the
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Islamabad to conclude

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/373942-10-bn-offshore-gas-pipeline-pakistan-russia-
sign-mou-for-feasibility-study.
84
Hanif, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints,” 69.
85
“Pakistan, Russia to Boost Military Cooperation,” Pakistan Today, August 5, 2013,
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/08/05/pakistan-russia-to-boost-military-
cooperation/.
86
Pakistan Air Force, GoP, “Commander-In-Chief, Russian Federation Air Force Visits
Air Headquarters,” press release, April 15, 2013,
http://www.paf.gov.pk/press_release/uploaded/1366207051.pdf.
87
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Kayani to Visit Russia from Oct 3,” Dawn, September 29, 2012,
https://www.dawn.com/news/752938.
88
“Islamabad, Moscow Set Sights on New Era in Relations,” Dawn, September 17, 2011,
https://www.dawn.com/news/659642/islamabad-moscow-set-sights-on-new-era-in-
relations; and Syed, “Kayani to Visit Russia from Oct 3.”

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the Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014.89 Consequently, when

Moscow lifted its arms embargo against Pakistan, the agreement for the
sale of gunship helicopters was signed, and four Russian Mi-35M Hind-E
attack helicopters were delivered on August 29, 2017, with Islamabad
showing interest in buying 20 more attack helicopters.90
Joint military drills are another feature of mutual interests as evident
in the 2014 and 2015 Arabian Monsoon naval drills;91 followed by joint
military exercises in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, the multinational joint
Naval AMAN exercise was held in Karachi including 35 countries‟ naval
forces, in which Russian Navy‟s largest anti-submarine warship
Severmorsk also participated,92 substantiating the converging inclination.
Both countries took part in the Friendship-2017 military exercise held on
the mountain training range near Nizhny Arkhyz settlement in Karachay-
Cherkessia during September 2017, with more than 70 Pakistani
mountaineers and over 100 soldiers of Russia‟s mountain infantry division
of the Southern Military District.93 In early 2018, both countries agreed to

89
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Defence Cooperation Agreement,”
Dawn, November 21, 2014, https://www.dawn.com/news/1145875.
90
Franz-Stefan Gady, “Pakistan Receives 4 Advanced Attack Helicopters from Russia,”
Diplomat, August 29, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/pakistan-receives-4-
advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/. Also see, Gabriel Dominguez, “Pakistan to
Receive Four Mi-35M Helos from Russia in 2017, Says Report,” The Military and
Asian Region, December 21, 2016,
https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.wordpress.com/2016/12/24/pakistan-to-receive-four-
mi-35m-helos-in-2017/
91
“Are Pakistan and Russia Forming an Alliance? Not without China, Says Expert,”
Dawn, April 1, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1324187.
92
“Naval Exercise AMAN 2017 Continues in Karachi,” Pakistan Today, February 12,
2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/02/12/multinational-naval-exercise-
aman-2017-continues-in-karachi/.
93
Kamal Alam, “Growing Pakistan-Russia Military Ties Reflect Central Asia‟s Changing
Geopolitics,” commentary (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2017),
https://rusi.org/commentary/growing-pakistan%E2%80%93russia-military-ties-reflect-
central-asia%E2%80%99s-changing-geopolitics. Also see, “Over 70 Pakistani
Mountaineers Reach Russia for „Friendship-2017‟ Military Exercise,” Pakistan Today,
September 24, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/09/24/over-70-pakistani-
mountaineers-in-russia-for-friendship-2017-military-exercise/.

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form a Joint Military Commission.94 On August 7, 2018, Pakistan and

Russia signed a Security Training Agreement at the conclusion of the first
meeting of Russia-Pakistan Joint Military Consultative Committee
(JMCC),95 which opened the doors for the forces of Pakistan to get
training from Russian military institutions.
These ongoing trends indicate that the limited defence ties may
gradually turn into broader defence cooperation in the future. Such a
possibility appeared when Russian diplomat Pavel Didkovsky‟s (First
Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Islamabad) indicated Moscow‟s
backing of the criterion-based approach for new members of Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT),96 which validates Islamabad‟s NSG membership application.
However, it is yet to be seen how Moscow will incorporate this indication
into its foreign policy pursuits.
The rationale behind Pakistan‟s quest of enhancing its defence
capability is to maintain strategic equilibrium against India‟s massive
military build-up, which has rendered South Asia‟s strategic environment
very fragile, particularly under its Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces
2017.97 The test of Agni V (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile with the
range of 5,000 km)98 is in pursuance of this doctrine, which has upset the

94
Shafqat Ali, “Pak-Russia Commission on Military Co-Op Set Up,” Nation, February 21,
2018, https://nation.com.pk/21-Feb-2018/pak-russia-commission-on-military-co-op-set-
up.
95
Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan, Russia Sign Rare Military Cooperation Pact,” Voice of America,
August 8, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-russia-sign-military-cooperation-
pact/4519031.html; and “Pakistani Troops to Receive Training at Russian Military
Institutes,” Times of India, August 8, 2018,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistani-troops-to-receive-training-
at-russian-military-institutes/articleshow/65322023.cms.
96
“Russia Supports Pakistan‟s Bid to Join Elite Nuclear Trading Club,” Express Tribune,
December 15, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-supports-pakistans-
bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/.
97
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, GoI, Joint Doctrine Indian
Armed Forces (JDIAF) (Government of India, 2017), https://bharatshakti.in/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf.
98
“Agni-V Missile Successfully Test-Fired,” Indian Express, January 18, 2018,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-test-fires-agni-5-missile-with-a-surface-

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Eurasia-Pacific strategic equilibrium. India is intentionally inciting a

security impasse with the US‟ blessing, rationalising the Indo-US military
cooperation on the pretext of Pakistan-Sino strategic collaboration. This
also „provides an opportunity for a more inclusive implementation of the
US Pivot to Asia,‟99 evident in the Indo-US Bilateral Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement 2016,100 which sees New Delhi as
Washington‟s crucial defence partner. This may spoil Russia‟s vision of
multipolar Eurasian integration, while creating more regional insecurity.
Moscow could be encouraged to maintain balance against such anti-
integration forces by further moving towards Islamabad.
The aim of Moscow‟s grand strategic vision of EurAsEC101 is an
attempt towards regional integration in the Eurasian region. In contrast,
New Delhi‟s aim of becoming a major power at the cost of regional

range-of-5000-kms-5029731/; Indrani Bagchi, “Seychelles Allows India Military Infra

on Island,” Times of India, January 28, 2018,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-seychelles-sign-revised-agreement-over-
building-infrastructure-on-assumption-island/articleshow/62674542.cms; and “India
Gets a Blow in its Dream of Building First Overseas Military Base,” Times of
Islamabad, March 4, 2018, https://timesofislamabad.com/04-Mar-2018/india-gets-a-
blow-in-its-dream-of-building-first-overseas-military-base. India plans to build a
military base on the remote Seychelles Island. Both countries signed a military
cooperation agreement in 2003 that would allow New Delhi to use the Assumption base
for 30 years. In principle, the agreement of building an Indian overseas military base
was signed in 2015, and a revised agreement was signed in June 2018. The agreement
would increase India‟s strategic reach in the Indian Ocean. Major details of the
agreement are classified. Apparently, the military base would safeguard the exclusive
economic zone for illegal fishing, drug trafficking and piracy but the issues such as
prohibition of nuclear use and weapons storage on the Island are not public. Therefore,
there is considerable controversy and dissent in Seychelles against the agreement. The
fear is that India may likely use the agreement for storage of its missiles like Agni V on
the Island. In such a scenario, there would be ramifications for Pakistan because the
distance between Assumption Island and Karachi is 4475 km.
99
Andrew Korybko, “3 Reasons Why Russia Should Sell S-400 Missiles to Pakistan,”
Regional Rapport, January 21, 2018, http://regionalrapport.com/three-reasons-russia-
sell-s-400-missiles-pakistan/.
100
Varghese K. George, “India, US Sign Military Logistics Pact,” Hindu, October 18,
2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-logistics-
pact/article14598282.ece.
101
S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, eds., Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian
Union and Its Discontents (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk
Road Studies Program, 2014), 179-190,
http://silkroadstudies.org/resources/1409GrandStrategy.pdf.

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security is a worrisome element, which is not only likely to disrupt the

delicate strategic balance in South Asia,102 but also the strategic
equilibrium of Eurasia-Pacific region with the US‟ blessing. Arguably, it
would be in Moscow‟s interests to stabilise South Asia‟s strategic
imbalance by expanding defence cooperation with Islamabad, which
could contribute in maintaining the greater strategic equipoise in the
Eurasia-Pacific region.

Counterterrorism
The field of counterterrorism offers a lot of scope to Islamabad and
Moscow in enhancing their cooperation for countering the emerging threat
of violent radicalisation. In this regard, both countries have established a
Bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism for regional
security. Simultaneously, President Putin backs Pakistan‟s position on the
war against terrorism, besides agreeing on mutual regional efforts for
eradicating extremism.103 Following the Quetta blast on the Police
Training College in 2016, President Putin offered support to Pakistan in
combatting terrorism, in addition to showing readiness for the sale of
Russia‟s advanced military hardware.104 In fact, achievements of the
Pakistan Army to bring regional peace are recognised by Moscow
contrary to the prevalent attitude of Washington, which is skeptic of
Pakistan accusing it of providing safe havens to the Afghan Taliban.
Despite New Delhi‟s opposition, a joint counterterrorism exercise

102
Especially the testing of K-4, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) with a
range capability of 3,500 km (intermediate range) by India has impacted the delicate
strategic balance of South Asia. It has resulted in the nuclearisation of the Indian
Ocean. The test has also taken India closer to the second-strike capability. It will
ultimately lead India to enhance the range of its SLBM up to 5500 KM and more,
which may allow the country in future to have the capacity of launching a strike
through submarine not only on Pakistan but also the Eurasia-Pacific region (China)
from the far flung area of the Indian Ocean and beyond.
103
“Russia Endorses Full SCO Membership for Pakistan,” Dawn, November 7, 2011,
https://www.dawn.com/news/671932.
104
“Putin Offers Pakistan Help in Fighting Terrorism after Quetta Blast,” Nation, October
26, 2016, http://nation.com.pk/international/26-Oct-2016/putin-offers-pakistan-help-in-
fighting-terrorism-after-quetta-blast.

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 Muhammad Nawaz Khan

Druzhbha (Friendship) was held between Russian and Pakistani Special

Operations Forces in Cherat in September 2016.105 It was the very first
counterterrorism military exercise.106 More recently, two-week long joint
military drills in the mountains of Nowshehra district (Pakistan) were
conducted from October 22 to November 4, 2018 to strengthen the
existing military relations.107

Social and Cultural

Pakistan-USSR social and cultural relations were established in 1964
when both counties signed a one-year educational exchange programme.
Another agreement was concluded on June 5, 1965. Consequently,
exchange including dance performances, film shows and festivals were
conducted in both countries. The Pakistan cultural show in Dushanbe
(1967) was one of the landmarks.108 A bilateral agreement on Cultural and
Scientific Cooperation was signed in 1968 during the former Prime
Minister Kosygin‟s visit to Pakistan.109 The Soviet magazine Tulu was
also printed from Pakistan during the 1960s.110 Such activities
discontinued following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even at
present, they seem to be limited, which appears to be the stumbling block
in getting an insight into each other‟s respective values, traditions and
cultures. The language barrier is also a problem. To overcome these
hurdles, the following initiatives have been taken:

105
“Joint Exercise with Russia Progressing Well: ISPR,” Dawn, September 28, 2016,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1286616.
106
Ali, “Pak-Russia Commission on Military Co-op Set Up.”
107
“Joint Military Drill with Russia has Reinforced Our Ties: Pakistan Army Chief,”
Economic Times, November 5, 2018,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/joint-military-drill-with-russia-
has-reinforced-our-ties-pakistan-army-chief/articleshow/66513026.cms.
108
M. Iqbal, Falak Sher, Rehmat Ullah Awan and Khalid Javed, “Economic and Cultural
Relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union during Ayub Khan‟s Period,” A
Journal of Pakistan Studies 3, no. 3 (2011): 1-13 (4, 6, 7),
http://pakistaniaat.org/index.php/pak/article/view/137.
109
Shah and Parveen, “Disintegration of Pakistan – The Role of Former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic (USSR): An Appraisal,” 179.
110
Hafeez Malik, ed., Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan
(New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1987), 194.

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 Moscow State University and Pakistan‟s National University of

Modern Language (NUML) appointed Urdu-language and
Russian language faculty, respectively.
 An agreement on student exchange was concluded between the
Punjab University and the Moscow State University.111
 In 2012, the first Urdu-Russian dictionary was published by
Pakistan-based Russian Dr Tashmirza Khalmirev.112
 A Pakistan Study Center has been established in Moscow.113
 Association of Pakistani Graduates from Russia is quite active in
the country.114
 Voice of Russia held the 4th All-Pakistan Voice of Russia
Conference in Lahore in December 2013.115
 A well-reputed restaurant in Moscow „Gandhara‟ is famous for
showcasing the Gandhara civilisation and Pakistani food.116

The growing renaissance in social and cultural ties between the two
countries is another sign of strengthening relations.

Russia’s Balancing Act in South Asia

Washington‟ backing of India as the regional power has raised serious
concerns in Pakistan since it strengthens the perception among
policymakers that the US‟ traditional role as balancer between India and

111
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New
Beginnings,” 10-11.
112
“Urdu-Russian Dictionary Launched,” News International, August 3, 2012,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/377691-urdu-russian-dictionary-launched.
113
“Pakistan Study Centre Opens in Moscow,” Pakistan Times, July 16, 2012,
http://archive.is/pQhV#selection-415.0-415.38.
114
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New
Beginnings,” 9-11.
115
“Pakistani Listeners of „The Voice of Russia‟ Run Conference in Lahore,” Voice of
Russia, December 15, 2013, accessed January 12, 2018,
https://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2013_12_15/Pakistani-listeners-of-The-
Voice-of-Russia-run-conference-in-Lahore-9360/.
116
Hussain and Fatima, “Pak-Russian Relations: Historical Legacies and New
Beginnings,” 9-11.

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Pakistan might have ended, thereby creating a vacuum in the region. To

fill this vacuum, it appears that Moscow has assumed the role of
performing this delicate act to ensure that its diplomacy towards
Islamabad and New Delhi remains pertinent.117 It not only seeks to
preserve its traditional ties with New Delhi, a key US strategic partner, but
also built linkages with the pro-China Pakistan. In the past, Russia has
been favouring India at the UNSC while frequently vetoing resolutions on
the Kashmir dispute. However, more recently in December 2017, it signed
the joint declaration issued at the Six-nation Speaker‟s Conference in
Islamabad supporting Pakistan‟s stance on Kashmir. The declaration
underscored that for ensuring global and regional peace and stability, the
dispute of Jammu and Kashmir needs a peaceful resolution in accordance
with the UNSC resolutions.118
Thus, Moscow is engaging diplomatically with Islamabad and New
Delhi, with the former progressively getting substantial place in its foreign
policy reflected in the statement of Zamir Kabulov, Presidential Special
Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan „urging that Russia‟s South Asia
policy should expand beyond its historic Indian-centric links to equally
include into its fold the Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan.‟119
There appears to be a strategic shift in the language coming out of the
Kremlin vis-à-vis Kashmir moving away from calls for „dismantling the
terrorist infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir in 2002,‟120 to declaring in
2017 that „Russia will use its influence to get Pakistan to stop alleged
attacks in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Pakistan is taking immense steps to
stabilize the situation in the country.‟121 Pakistan accepted Putin‟s
117
Andrew Korybko, “Indian Fears: Is Russia Joining Pakistan China in CPEC?” Global
Village Space, February 25, 2017, https://www.globalvillagespace.com/indian-fears-is-
russia-joining-pakistan-china-in-cpec/.
118
Harsh V. Pant, “Why Russia no Longer Cares for Friendship with India,” DailyO.in,
March 29, 2018, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/china-russia-vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-
pakistan-collusion-india/story/1/23153.html.
119
Korybko, “Indian Fears: Is Russia Joining Pakistan China in CPEC?”
120
Mark A. Smith, Russia’s Relations with India & Pakistan, Russian Series no. 4/24
(Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2004),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96157/04_Sep.pdf.
121
“Growing Ties with Pakistan will not Affect Relationship with India: Putin,” Express
Tribune, June 2, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1425491/growing-ties-pakistan-
will-not-affect-relationship-india-putin/.

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intermediary offer for reducing the India-Pakistan tensions following

India‟s aggression along the Working Boundary and the Line of Control
(LoC).122 US President Trump‟s Afghan strategy relying on a military
solution instead of a negotiated settlement was also criticized by Russia
which supported Islamabad‟s crucial role in regional security.123 It has
been asserted that Islamabad is „a key regional player to negotiate with...
Putting pressure (on Pakistan) may seriously destabilize the region-wide
security situation and result in negative consequences for Afghanistan.‟
Likewise, during the Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference in Amritsar,
Russian diplomats dismissed Indian and Afghan lambasting against
Pakistan remarking, „..it is wrong to criticize Pakistan.‟124 Such diplomatic
overtures are indicative that both countries are seeing „each other as
complementary partners for regional balance.‟125

New Geopolitical Realities and Regional Fragility

The emerging geopolitical realities are likely to influence the contours of
Pakistan-Russia relations. First, the rise of China from a lingering agrarian
economy to a global industrial giant, and the resurrection of Russia have
dramatically changed the global geopolitical and economic landscape.
They have transformed the scope of cooperation and conflict, along with
generating strategic opportunities and challenges. For instance, with the
imposition of economic sanctions against Moscow by the US and the
European Union (EU) in wake of the East Ukraine crisis and the Crimean

122
“Regional Peace: Pakistan Welcomes Russia‟s Mediation Offer on Kashmir,” Express
Tribune, June 15, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1436324/pakistan-welcomes-
putins-offer-mediate-islamabad-new-delhi/.
123
“Russia Warns Trump against Piling up Pressure on Pakistan,” Express Tribune,
August 24, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1490141/new-us-afghan-plan-futile-
course-russian-foreign-minister/; and Ali, “Pak-Russia Commission on Military Co-Op
Set Up.”
124
“Russia Rejects Indian, Afghan Criticism on Pakistan,” News International, December
5, 2016, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/169900-Russia-rejects-Indian-Afghan-
criticism-on-Pakistan.
125
“Russian Honorary Consulate to Renew Pak-Russia Diplomatic Ties: Jhagra,” Pakistan
Today, February 21, 2018, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/21/russian-
honorary-consulate-to-renew-pak-russia-diplomatic-ties-jhagra/.

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annexation,126 Moscow is finding recourse with Beijing and other

countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. However,
Washington is driving hard to deprive Russia of its European energy
market,127 while at the same time firming US support to the Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline project.128 These
competing interests over energy between the US and Russia encouraged
the latter to widen its zone of foreign relations and include Pakistan in its
„multivectored‟ pursuits in South Asia. Also, given greater Indo-US
alignment, in the coming years, Moscow‟s role as a major defence arsenal
supplier to India may become weaker.129 In this case, Pakistan could be
one of the prospective options for Russia.
Second, there has been an ideological shift in Moscow‟s stance
towards the Afghan Taliban by acknowledging them as a reality not to be
dismissed, as demonstrated in a statement of Zamir Kabulov in 2015
remarking, „our interests are the same as the Taliban in fighting Daesh.‟130
This shift is also drawing Moscow closer to Islamabad and seeing the
latter as a major stakeholder in the Afghan conundrum. Moscow is
anxious to play a decisive role in the post-2014 regional security calculus
independent of the US, specifically in the context of spillover from
Afghanistan‟s instability. Moreover, the Moscow Conference on

126
Aleksandar Vasovic and Adrian Croft, “U.S., EU Set Sanctions as Putin Recognizes
Crimea „Sovereignty‟,” Reuters, March 17, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
ukraine-crisis/u-s-eu-set-sanctions-as-putin-recognizes-crimea-sovereignty-
idUSBREA1Q1E820140317; and Ali, “Pak-Russia Commission on Military Co-Op
Set Up.”
127
Zafar Bhutta, “North-South Pipeline: Pakistan, Russia Reach LNG Price Accord,”
Express Tribune, December 1, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1249730/north-
south-pipeline-pakistan-russia-reach-lng-price-accord/.
128
Ibid.
129
“US Narrows Gap with Top Supplier Russia, Arms Sales to India Soar 5-Fold,”
Business Standard, March 17, 2018, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/us-narrows-gap-with-top-supplier-russia-arms-
sales-to-india-soar-5-fold-118031700139_1.html. According to the SIPRI 2018,
Moscow had a 62 per cent share of Delhi‟s arms imports during 2013-17, less than the
79 per cent in 2008-12. On the other hand, arms sale from Washington to Delhi is
increasing every year. During 2013-17, arms sales increased five times.
130
Indrani Bagchi, “Respect State to State Relations: Afghanistan to Russia,” Times of
India, December 14, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-
asia/respect-state-to-state-relations-afghanistan-to-russia/articleshow/55985159.cms .

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Afghanistan frustrated New Delhi given the evolving convergence

between Russia, China and Pakistan, which appears to be awarding
enhanced role to Pakistan in the future of Afghanistan. Whether US troops
completely or partially leave Afghanistan under the current negotiations
taking place,131 Pakistan needs to plan „a regional recalibration of its
foreign policy towards Moscow and Beijing after the suspension of the
US security assistance.‟132
Third, the rise of the Daesh in Afghanistan has set alarm bells
ringing. Extra-regional forces in the country may employ Daesh as a
proxy to undermine resurging Russia, China and Pakistan.133 This
perception is gaining traction in the wake of reports validating the arrival
of thousands of Daesh miscreants from Syria, which is believed to be a
move to destabilise the broader region.134
Fourth, the logic behind cooperative ties between Moscow and New
Delhi is multifaceted and compelling as witnessed in their upgraded
Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.135 The Indo-Russia defence
calculus equally enjoys privileged status. While defence sales may be
declining, New Delhi remains Moscow‟s largest weapons importer,136
which may prevent the latter‟s foreign policy formulation from seeking
broad spectrum entente with Islamabad. Simultaneously, Moscow‟s
traditional support of India for permanent membership of the UNSC, NSG
and the Nuclear Elite Club could have serious implications for Pakistan‟s

131
Mujib Mashal, “U.S. and Taliban Agree in Principle to Peace Framework, Envoy
Says,” New York Times, January 28, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/world/asia/taliban-peace-deal-afghanistan.html.
132
“Pakistan‟s Recalibration of Foreign Policy towards Russia, China,” Times of
Islamabad, January 30, 2018, https://timesofislamabad.com/30-Jan-2018/pakistan-s-
recalibration-of-foreign-policy-towards-russia-china.
133
Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan, Russia and China Inch Closer to Formal Alliance,” Express
Tribune, April 3, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1372490/pakistan-russia-china-
inch-closer-formal-alliance/.
134
Ibid.
135
Hanif, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints,” 81-82.
136
“US Narrows Gap with Top Supplier Russia, Arms Sales to India Soar 5-Fold,”
Business Standard, March 17, 2018, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/us-narrows-gap-with-top-supplier-russia-arms-
sales-to-india-soar-5-fold-118031700139_1.html.

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strategic calculus. When it comes to India, Moscow is playing its cards

very cautiously realising on the one hand that if it „continues to snub
Pakistan in favour of India, it would ultimately run contrary to the
interests of Russia‟s security‟,137 while on the other hand stressing that
„Moscow did not complain about India‟s close cooperation with the US
and so India also should not complain about much low level of
cooperation between Russia and Pakistan.‟138 Here, equally pertinent are
the comments made in 2012 by Ruslan Pukhov, „Delhi‟s attempts to
diversify its supplies of new weapons increasingly from Western countries
are making Russia flinch. Moscow has explained to Delhi… that it can
also diversify its military-technical ties by means of a rapprochement with
Pakistan.‟139

Future Outlook
Building on the above, the prevalent geopolitical landscape seems to be
quite feasible for laying the foundation of progressive relations between
Pakistan and Russia. Contrary to the past, when Islamabad used to ally
with the US at international forums, it now has the option of reaching out
to Russia as a prospective diplomatic associate. This could be parallel to
accessing the other major power China, in garnering support for
Pakistan‟s position on issues such as human trafficking and terrorism at
multilateral fora.140 Institutional engagement with Moscow may enable the
country to procure the relatively cheaper Russian defence equipment for
137
Sergei Strokan, “Pakistan and Russia Move Closer toward Military Cooperation,”
Russia Beyond, October 10, 2012,
https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/10/pakistan_and_russia_move_closer_toward_
military_cooperation_18965.html.
138
Sachin Parashar, “Russia Throws its Weight Behind China-Pakistan Corridor, Keeps
India on Tenterhooks,” Times of India, December 19, 2016,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/russia-throws-its-weight-behind-china-
pakistan-corridor-keeps-india-on-tenterhooks/articleshow/56053869.cms.
139
Joshua Kucera, “Fearing Afghanistan, Russia Gets Closer to Pakistan,” Eurasianet,
October 11, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66040.
140
Atia Ali Kazmi, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Evolving Geopolitics and Strategic
Options,” Hilal, December 1, 2017, https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/pakistan-
russia-relations:-evolving-geopolitics-and-strategic-options/Mzk3.html. On the other
hand, “Moscow Appreciates Islamabad‟s Balanced View on Syria, Ukraine, and
Common View on Afghanistan.”

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which the US tended to charge higher prices than the international market
and that too tied with US-dictated conditions.
In 2011, Moscow – central member of the SCO – explicitly „backed
Pakistan‟s bid to join.‟141 Pakistan and India became full members during
17th meeting of the Heads of the State Council Summit 2017 in Astana.142
Moscow is backing SCO to address issues like terrorism, separatism and
extremism through a combined regional approach. Therefore, despite
tense relations between Pakistan and India, „the latter‟s legal expert‟s
delegation took part in a three-day meeting of Legal Experts Group of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
hosted by the former in May 2018.‟143 Besides, Pakistan and India, for the
first time, participated in a multi-nation military exercise codenamed
Peace Mission 2018 held from August 24 to August 29, 2018 in Russia.144
For Pakistan, the SCO is an appropriate forum that may advance its
financial interests, specifically in curbing its energy crisis. Using the
platform, Pakistan could attract Russia‟s security support to fortify its
domestic security and defence proficiencies, especially in countering
terrorism. Moscow may act to ensure rules-based order in an attempt to
resolving outstanding territorial conflicts. This approach could encourage
the country to maintain a delicate balance between India and Pakistan for
regional stability.145

141
Rashid Siddiqi, “Prospects for Russia-Pakistan Rapprochement,” Strategic Studies 37,
no. 2 (2017): 58-73, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
4-SS_Rashid_Siddiqi_No-2_2017.pdf.
142
Aamir Ilyas Rana, “Historic Day: Pakistan Joins SCO at Astana Summit,” Express
Tribune, June 9, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1431365/pakistan-becomes-full-
member-shanghai-cooperation-organisation/.
143
“3-Day RATS-SCO Legal Experts Meeting Concludes in Islamabad,” Radio Pakistan,
May 25, 2018, http://www.radio.gov.pk/25-05-2018/3-day-rats-sco-legal-experts-
meeting-concludes-in-islamabad.
144
SM Hali, “Peace Mission 2018-Bringing Antagonists Together,” Daily Times,
September 1, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/291048/peace-mission-2018-bringing-
antagonists-together/; and Dawood Rehman, “SCO Peace Mission 2018: Pakistan,
India Conduct First Joint Anti-Terror Exercise in Russia,” Daily Pakistan, August 24,
2018, https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/headline/sco-exercise-peace-mission-2018-
pakistan-india-conduct-first-joint-anti-terror-exercise-in-russia/.
145
Ivan Kessler, “Russian South Asia Complexity,” Regional Rapport, March 6, 2017,
http://regionalrapport.com/2017/03/06/russian-south-asia-complexity/.

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The sudden rise of Daesh in Afghanistan has made it indispensable

for Russia to seek cooperation of convenience between Taliban and
Moscow and likewise between Islamabad and Moscow. The much-desired
goal of achieving stable peace in Afghanistan has necessitated enlarged
Russia-Pakistan diplomatic collaboration.
Moscow also has the potential to interlink the EurAsEC initiatives
with the BRI. After joining CPEC, Moscow may be able to perform an
objective role in South Asia. It may enable Pakistan to capitalise on the
potential inflow of Russian investment in infrastructure, mechanical
goods, chemical products, agriculture,146 metal industry and technological
advancement. This will depend, of course, on the manner in which
Pakistan succeeds in bargaining for more benefits with Russia by
providing it access „to the warm waters of Arabian Sea.‟147 On the
counterterrorism front, both states have to evolve collective level of trust
and collaboration in sharing actionable intelligence and expertise.

Conclusion
The architects of Russia-Pakistan bilateral relations need to be conscious
that their ensuing mutual collaboration should not to be overshadowed by
India. The most pragmatic course of action is to ensure a gradual move in
building a step-by-step relationship for developing long-term strategic
commitments at subsequent phase instead of hastening into a fragile and
inconstant partnership.
To develop economic ties, Islamabad has to attract Moscow‟s
commercial interests into CPEC‟s special industrial zones (SEZs), besides
promotion of regular exchange programmes in the domains of private,
commercial and trade sectors. In this regard, the Pakistan Mission to
Moscow may consider appointing a Commercial Counselor148 dedicated to

146
Saddam Hussein, “Russia and Pakistan‟s Reluctant Romance,” Diplomat, February 25,
2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/russia-and-pakistans-reluctant-romance/.
Pakistan can offer a „US$ 16 billion market in the agriculture sector alone.‟
147
Hussaan Tariq, “Are Those Winds of Change We Detect in Pak-Russia Relations?”
Pakistan Today, April 10, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/04/10/are-
those-winds-of-change-we-detect-in-pak-russia-relations/.
148
At present, this seat is vacant in the trade wing of Pakistan‟s embassy in Moscow.

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trade delegations, organisations and exhibitions. Moreover, Pakistan may

consider connecting the Gwadar Port to Moscow via rail link through
Central Asia. Opening respective branch banking systems in Pakistan and
Russia would be a propellant in increasing business-to-business
connections.
In the defence domain, a Joint Pakistan-Russia Commission on
Defence Cooperation may provide a platform for convening annual
meetings for training, military drills on broader land-sea-mountain
warfare, exchange of military delegations, and up-gradation of heavy
mechanical industries, thus, enhancing shared ventures in these spheres.
Likewise, devising means of permanent interactivities between
Pakistan-Russia parliamentarians, government functionaries, academia,
students, and media entities could act as a stimulant to bring about the
desired turnaround in bilateral relations. The way forward lies in a
pragmatic and robust foreign policy based on viable diplomatic options
duly estimated on need assessment principles. This may help diversify
Pakistan‟s alliances by cultivating relations not only with major powers
like Russia, but also with other significant stakeholders sharing
commonality of interests.

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