Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for CNC machines

used in GG Valves Industry

जी जी वाल्व उद्योग में सीएनसी मशीनों के लिए ववफिता

मोड पर प्रभाव ववश्िेषण

Raj Kumar Salvi

Thesis

Masters of Technology

In

Mechanical Engineering (CAD/CAM)

2017

Department of Mechanical Engineering

College of Technology and Engineering
Maharana Pratap University of Agriculture and Technology
Udaipur-313001 (Rajasthan)
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for CNC machines
used in GG Valves Industry

जी जी वाल्व उद्योग में सीएनसी मशीनों के लिए ववफिता

मोड पर प्रभाव ववश्िेषण

Thesis

Submitted to the

Maharana Pratap University of Agriculture & Technology, Udaipur

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for

The Degree of

Master of Technology

In

Mechanical Engineering

(CAD/CAM)

By

Raj Kumar Salvi

2017
 MAHARANA PRATAP UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE & TECHNOLGY,
UDAIPUR
COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING

CERTIFICATE - I

Date: / /2017

This is to certify that Mr. Raj Kumar Salvi had successfully completed the
comprehensive/preliminary examination held on 25/08/2014 as required under the
regulations for the Master of Technology in Mechanical Engineering (CAD/CAM).

(Dr. M. A. Saloda)
Associate Professor and Head
Department of Mechanical Engineering
C.T.A.E., Udaipur
MAHARANA PRATAP UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE & TECHNOLGY,
UDAIPUR
COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING

CERTIFICATE – II

Date: / /2017

This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for
CNC machines used in GG Valves Industry” submitted for the degree of Master of
Technology in the subject of Mechanical Engineering, (CAD/CAM) embodies
bonafide research work carried out by Mr. Raj Kumar Salvi under my guidance and
supervision and that no part of this thesis has been submitted to any other degree. The
assistance and help received during the course of investigation have been fully
acknowledged. The draft of the thesis was also approved by the advisory committee on
……………

(Dr. M. A. Saloda) (Dr. Chitranjan Agarwal)

Associate Professor and Head Major Advisor
Department of Mechanical Engineering Department of Mechanical Engineering
C.T.A.E., Udaipur C.T.A.E., Udaipur

(Dr. S. S. Rathore)
Dean
C.T.A.E., Udaipur
 MAHARANA PRATAP UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE & TECHNOLGY,
UDAIPUR
COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING

CERTIFICATE- III

Date: / /2017

This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for CNC
machines used in GG Valves Industry” submitted by Mr. Raj Kumar Salvi to Maharana
Pratap University of Agriculture & Technology, Udaipur in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the award of degree of Master of Technology in the subject of Mechanical Engineering
after recommendation by the external examiner was defended by the candidate before the
following members of the examination committee. The performance of the candidate in the oral
examination is satisfactory. We, therefore recommend that the thesis be approved.

(Dr. Chitranjan Agarwal) (Dr. B. P. Nandwana)

Major Advisor Advisor

(Dr. M. A. Saloda) (Dr. S. K. Jain)

Advisor DRI Nominee

(Dr. M. A. Saloda) (Dr. S. S. Rathore)

Associate Professor and Head Dean
Department of ME C.T.A.E., Udaipur
C.T.A.E., Udaipur

Approved
Director Resident Instruction
M. P.U.A.T., Udaipur
 MAHARANA PRATAP UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE & TECHNOLGY,
UDAIPUR
COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING

CERTIFICATE- IV

Date: / /2017

This is to certify that Mr. Raj Kumar Salvi student of Master of Technology in the
subject of Mechanical Engineering, Department of Mechanical Engineering, College of
Technology and Engineering has made all corrections/ modifications in the thesis entitled
“Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for CNC machines used in GG Valves Industry” which
was suggested by the external examiner and the advisory committee in the oral examination held
on …………. The final copies of the thesis duly bound and corrected were submitted
on.….……… are enclosed here with for approval.

(Dr. M. A. Saloda) (Dr. Chitranjan Agarwal)

Associate Professor and Head Major Advisor
Department of Mechanical Engineering Department of Mechanical Engineering
C.T.A.E., Udaipur C.T.A.E., Udaipur
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take it to be my proud privilege to avail this opportunity to express my

sincere and deep sense of gratitude to my major advisor Dr. Chitranjan Agarwal for
his stimulating guidance, constructive suggestions, keen and sustained interest and
incessant encouragement bestowed during the entire period of investigation, as well
as critically going through the manuscript.

I am gratified to record sincere thanks to the members of the advisory

committee, Dr. B. P. Nandwana, Professor, Dr. M. A. Saloda, Associate Professor
and Head, Department of Mechanical Engineering and Dr. S. K. Jain, Professor,
Department of Processing and Food Engineering, DRI Nominee for their generous
gestures and valuable suggestions end execution of the study.

The author is indebted to Dr. S. Jindal, Professor, Department of Mechanical

Engineering, College of Technology and Engineering, Udaipur for his ever helping
nature and precious guidance that he provided me throughout my work.

With profound respect, I hereby express my thanks to Dr. S. S. Rathore,

Dean, College of Technology and Engineering, Udaipur for providing me the
necessary facilities to carry out my work.

I am highly thankful to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of GG Valves Pvt.

Ltd., Udaipur Mr. S. K. Dora for allowing me the opportunity to carry out my
present work there and cooperating with me throughout.

I am also thanks to my friends Ved Prakash Singh Parihar and Mayank

Mehta for their moral support and encouragement.

I also gratefully acknowledge all the teaching and non teaching staff members
Department of Mechanical Engineering CTAE, Udaipur for their support and help I
feel privileged to express my deep sense of gratitude to my parents and my beloved
ones for their inspiration, affection, moral support and co-operation without which it
was impossible to complete the research work.

Place: Udaipur

Date: ________ (Raj Kumar Salvi)

i
 CONTENTS

PAGE
CHAPTER TITLE
NO.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i
CONTENTS ii
LIST OF TABLES iv
LIST OF FIGURES v
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS vi
1 INTRODUCTION 01-11
1.1 Motivation 01
1.1.1 GG Valves Industry 01
1.2 Basics of CNC Lathe Machine 02
1.2.1 Common Failures in CNC Lathe Machine 05
1.3 Techniques of Failure Data Analysis 06
1.4 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 07
1.4.1 Conventional FMEA Approach 08
1.4.2 Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) 09
1.5 Objectives 10
1.6 Thesis Overview 10
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 12-28
2.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) Approaches 12
2.2 Mathematical Programming Approaches 17
2.3 Artificial Intelligence Approaches 18
2.3.1 Rule-Base System 18
2.3.2 Fuzzy Rule Base System 19
2.3.3 Fuzzy ART Algorithm 20
2.3.4 Fuzzy Cognitive Map 21
2.4 Integrated Approaches 21
2.5 Other Approaches 23
2.6 Research Gap 28
3 METHODOLOGY 29-37
3.1 CNC Machine 29
3.2 Analysis Approach 30
3.2.1 Conventional FMEA Approach 31

ii
 3.2.2 Grey Relational Analysis Approach 34
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 38-50
4.1 Data Collection 38
4.2 Grey Relational Analysis Approach 43
The Verification of Conventional FMEA and GRA
4.3 46
Approach
Recommended Maintenance Schedule for CNC Lathe
4.4 47
Machines
5 CONCLUSIONS 51-52
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 53
SUMMARY 54-55
REFERENCES 56-63
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 64
ABSTRACT (HINDI) 65-66
APPENDIX-1 67
APPENDIX-2 68
APPENDIX-3 69
APPENDIX-4 70
APPENDIX-5 71
APPENDIX-6 72
APPENDIX-7 73-76
APPENDIX-8 77-78
APPENDIX-9 79

iii
 LIST OF TABLES
PAGE
TABLE TITLE
NO.
3.1 Specifications of CNC Machines 30
4.1 Failure Data of CNC Machines 38-40
4.2 Machine Downtime and Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) 40
4.3 Conventional FMEA Results and RPN Rank 42
4.4 The GRA Results and RPN Rank 45
Verification of Conventional FMEA and Grey Relational
4.5 46
Analysis
4.6 Maintenance Schedule for CNC Lathe Machines 48-49

iv
 LIST OF FIGURES

PAGE
FIGURE TITLE
NO.
1.1 Systematic Block Diagram of CNC Lathe Machine 3
1.2 CNC Lathe Machine 3
1.3 CNC Lathe Machine Parts 4
3.1 Flowchart of Conventional FMEA and Grey Relational Analysis 32

v
 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
S. NO. ABBREVIATION MEANING
1. AC Alternative Current
2. AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process
3. AI Aggregated Impact
4. AI Artificial Intelligence
5. APC Automatic Pallet Changer
6. CI Cost Impact
7. CNC Computer Numerical Control
8. CR Correction Ratio
9. CRT Cathode Ray Tube
10. CSTN Color Super Twisted Pneumatic
11. D Detection
12. DC Direct Current
13. DEA Data Envelopment Analysis
14. DM Degree of Match
15. ER Evidential Reasoning
16. FCM Fuzzy Cognitive Map
17. FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
18. FRPN Fuzzy Risk Priority Number
19. GRA Grey Relational Analysis
20. HOQ House of Quality
21. HOR House of Reliability
22. i Number of Failure Modes
23. I/O Input and Output
24. IFS Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set
25. ISM Interpretive Structural Model
26. k Number of Risk Factors
Linguistic Ordered Weighted Averaging
27. LOWA
Operator
28. MAFMA Multi-Attribute Failure Mode Analysis
29. MCDM Multi-Criteria Decision Making
30. MCS Minimum Cut Set

vi
31. MDI Manual Data Input
32. MOI Method of Imprecision
33. MPG Manual Pulse Generator
34. MP Mathematical Programming
35. MRA Mini-max Regret Approach
36. MTBF Mean Time between Failure
37. MTTR Mean Time to Repair
38. O Occurrence
39. OWGA Ordered Weighted Geometric Averaging
40. Pd Probability of Failure not to be Detected
41. Pf Probability of Failures
42. PA Product Architecture
43. PCB Printed Circuit Board
44. PLC Programmable Logic Controller
45. QFD Quality Functional Deployment
46. RCA Risk Criticality Analyzer
47. RPC Risk Priority Code
48. RPN Risk Priority Number
49. S Severity
50. TI Time Impact
51. UPN Utility Priority Number
52. WLSM Weighted Least Square Method
53. WMoMM Weighted Mean of Maximum Method
54. Xi (k) Comparative Series Notation
55. Xo (k) Standard Series Notation
56. βk Weighting Coefficient of Risk Factor
57. ζ Grey Relation Coefficient
58. ∆ Degree of Grey Relational-ship
59. γ Grey Correlation Coefficient
60. τ Degree of Relation

vii
 CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an introduction towards the present work, the problem
statement, objectives and scopes of the present work. A brief overview is also
included in this chapter about the steps towards the initiative for the present research
work.

1.1 MOTIVATION
The CNC machine is the main equipment for advanced/modern manufacturing
technology. The uses of CNC machines are increasing in modern machining
processes due to inherent flexibility, machining accuracy and high productivity.

However, even a single breakdown in CNC machine leads to stoppage of

whole production process. Even the repair of the CNC machines is more difficult and
expensive when a breakdown occurs. Thus, CNC machines are prone to create lot of
troubles to the users. The reliability of CNC machines are utmost important because
any breakdown may affect normal production.

Therefore, there is need to improve the reliability of CNC machines.

Manufacturers have to collect and analyze machine failure data and take measures to
reduce downtime.

Nowadays, great efforts have been given to develop advanced manufacturing

technology and CNC machine worldwide to improve manufacturer ability, which is
seen as an important way to accelerate economic development and improve national
power and status.

1.1.1 GG Valves Industry

GG Valves Pvt. Ltd., E-262, Mewar Industrial Area, Madri, Chamber Marg,
Udaipur-313003, Rajasthan, India and was established in 1943. GG Valves have been
producing Bronze, SS and CS Valves (Gate, Globe, Ball Check and Cryogenic
Valves) under GG Brand for nearly six decades. Over period of time, GG valves
became well known for its superior quality valves. The Company is an ISO 9000
certified and with its strong quality parameters, the Company has been successful in
obtaining CE marking for exports to European countries. It basically produces valves

1
following strict quality measures at each stage from checking raw materials, stage
inspection to the final components and assembly. Each valve passes through final
physical inspection including hydrostatic test before final issue. In the tradition of GG
brand, GG valves industry has been continuously upgrading their products and using
newer technologies, equipment and materials to meet international standards.

The products ranges in the industry are given below:

 Steam valve
 Globe valve
 Stainless steel valves
 Check valve
 Cryogenic valve
 Durable cryogenic valve
 Drain valve
 Durable drain valve
 Gate valve

With continuous improvements in the infrastructure and additions of new

machines and products each year the Company has obtained a respectful position in
the industry. Presently, GG valves exports valves to over 20 countries with production
capacity of 150,000 valves per annum and having an employee base of 150.

Groups companies of GG valves are:

 Western Drugs Private Limited.
 Ranka Organics Private Limited.
 Shah Khetaji Dhanji and Company.
 Translloy India Private Limited.

1.2 BASICS OF CNC LATHE MACHINE

A CNC lathe machine is a complex system, with high-level automation and
complicated structure, which employs mechanics, electronics, hydraulics and
electrical mechanism. It is mainly composed of the mechanical system, Computer
Numerical Control (CNC) system, hydraulic system and air feed system. The
systematic diagram and their subsystems of a typical CNC lathe machine is given in
figure 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. The mechanical system includes spindle and its transmission

2
(fixed in a headstock), two slide axes (X, Z), carriage apron, turret or tool-holder,
tailstock, bed and pedestal. The spindle, with continuous or stepped continuous speed
change is driven by AC or DC spindle motor directly or through main transmission
and there is a photoelectric encoder on the spindle for thread turning. X axis and Z-
axis are driven by AC or DC servomotors through ball lead screws and controlled
simultaneously.

Figure 1.1 Systematic Block Diagram of CNC Lathe Machine

1 3
2
4 5

1. Head stoke, 2. Chuck/spindle, 3. CRT, 4. Programmable Logic Controller, 5. Tail

stoke 6. Guide way
Figure 1.2 CNC Lathe Machine

3
 1

6
5

1. Coolant system, 2. Turret or tool holder, 3. Turret guide way, 4. Dead centre, 5.
Job holder, 6. Hydraulic system

Figure 1.3 CNC Lathe Machine Parts

The turret or tool-holder may exchange tools automatically. All of these are
controlled by CNC system. A CNC system is the important part of modern
manufacturing industry and its main functions are given below. The CNC lathe
machine comprises of:

 Power supply unit i.e. main Printed Circuit Board (PCB), usually a micro-
computer.
 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) I/O PCB which connects the control
panel, limit-switch, button, magnets and turret etc.
 Axis PCB which controls the slide axes and the spindle through semi-closed
or closed loop electronic control– motor drive and photoelectric encoder.
 Memory PCB which connects additional encoder, CRT/MDI manual data
input.
 Manual pulse generator (MPG), backup battery and RS-232 serial
communication device.

The CNC system and related electronic components such as contactor

switches, relays, regulators and buttons etc. are fixed in a cabinet. Other electronic

4
components, such as limit switches, proximity switches and encoders etc. are located
on the machine. The basic and optional functions of a CNC system are linear and
circular interpolation, backlash compensation, automatic co-ordinate system setting,
tools offset, cutter compensation, background edit, self diagnosis and canned cycles,
which is different from economical to whole functional model.

1.2.1 Common Failures in CNC Lathe Machine

The failure caused by weak subsystems such as mechanical system, hydraulic
system, main transmission system, electrical and electronic system and coolant
system.

 The CNC machine failures from mechanical hand are leakage of liquid, noise
over proof, overload, indexing or slider incorrect position, irregular feeding,
large impact of motion parts and damaged of components. The poor quality of
gasket seals causes the leakage of liquid. The main failure zone is turret and
spindle of the machine.
 The failures caused by the hydraulic and pneumatic system are leakage,
breakdown of components, overpressure, overflow, overheating, noise over
proof, standard and bought-in components. The poor quality of oil pipes and
connections causes the leakage and oil pipes split under high pressure.
 The failures caused by the transmission system are noise over proof, overload,
disadjustment of flux, scratch of gear teeth or unbalance of transmission parts.
 The failures caused by the electrical and electronic system are motion parts in
an incorrect position of Automatic Pallet Changer (APC) and motion parts
that are jammed, damaged or burn contactor switches, relays, magnets,
buttons and limit switches. This is the indication that there is a lack of
reliability allocation and reliability screening when the CNC machine was
designed and manufactured.

The failure takes place in any of the given components/systems stops the
production process. The identification of any of the failure requires the profound
knowledge of functioning of the components. The analysis of failure at regular
interval demands establishment for different techniques.

5
1.3 TECHNIQUES OF FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS
The classification of failures is categorized into two groups: Malfunction
failures and Accuracy failures. These two groups are affected by intrinsic reliability
of CNC machines. Besides, the former is usually affected by operating conditions,
e.g. dust, humidity, skill of operators, etc. The latter is mainly affected by operational
requirements such as surface finish and tolerance. The general techniques used for
failure mode analysis of CNC machines are listed as below:

1. Linear Regression Methods - Exponential Distribution Method (EDM),

Weibull Distribution Method (WDM), Reyleigh Distribution Method (RDM),
Guass Distribution Method (GuDM), Gamma Distribution Method (GaDM),
Least Square Method (LSM), Lognormal Distribution Method (LDM)
2. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
3. Kernel Method
4. G-R Curves Analysis
5. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) -
i. Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) - ME-MCDM, Evidence
Theory, Fuzzy AHP/ANP, Fuzzy TOPSIS, D-S Theory and Prospect
Theory, Grey Theory, DEMATEL, Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set, D-S Theory
and D-Numbers, Ranking Technique VIKOR
ii. Mathematical Programming (MP) - Linear Programming DEA/Fuzzy
DEA
iii. Artificial Intelligence (AI) - Rule-Base System, Fuzzy Rule-Base System,
Fuzzy ART Algorithm, Fuzzy Cognitive Map
iv. Integrated Approaches (IA) - Fuzzy AHP-Fuzzy Rule-Base System,
WLSM-MOI-Partial Ranking Method, OWGA Operator-DEMATEL,
IFS-DEMATEL, Fuzzy OWA Operator-DEMATEL, 2-Tuple-OWA-
Operator, FER-Grey Theory, Fuzzy AHP-Fuzzy TOPSIS, ISM-ANP-UPN
v. Other approaches – Cost Based Model, Monte Carlo Simulation,
Minimum Cut Set-theory (MCS), Boolean Representation Method (BRM),
Digraph and Matrix approach, Kano Modal, Quality Functional
Development (QFD) Probability Theory

6
 Failure data can be reconstructed and retrieved according to specific machine,
batch of machines, manufacturer, user, failure mode, failure position and so on to fit
for different analytical purposes. The major tasks in reliability analyses can be
performed according to the data as follows:

a) Calculation of reliability characteristics, such as MTBF (Mean Time between

Failures), MTTR (Mean Time to Repairs), availability, for a given machine.
b) Graphical analysis techniques, such as histogram of frequency of failure,
cause and effect system etc.
c) Distribution patterns of failure and maintenance.

1.4 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA)

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a widely used engineering
technique for identifying and prioritizing potential failure modes in systems, designs,
processes and services before they occur, with the intent to eliminate them or
minimize the risk associated with them. Furthermore, FMEA is an inductive approach
to support risk assessment studies and the principle of FMEA is to identify potential
hazards along with the focused system and to prioritize the required corrective actions
or strategies. When it is used for a criticality analysis, it is also referred to as failure
mode, effects and criticality analysis. Today FMEA is mainly applied in industrial
production of machinery, motor cars, mechanical and electronic components.

The major concern of FMEA is to emphasize the prevention of the problems

linked to the proactive treatment of the system, rather than findings a solution after
the failure happens. Due to its visibility and simplicity, FMEA is probably one of the
most popular safety and reliability analysis tools for products and processes, which
has been widely used in a number of industries as a solution to various reliability
problems.

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is not only a method that aims to
show potential failure modes, but also shows the causes and the effects of these
modes. The FMEA methodology is also used in identifying controls in order to
reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the failures. From the manufacturing
perspective, FMEA methodology studies the equipments and the occasions in which
the equipments can malfunction. It also studies the possible problems and their effects

7
in the manufacturing process. FMEA helps to identify potential failures in the early
stages.

FMEA was first developed as a formal design methodology in the 1960s by

the aerospace and automotive industry with their obvious reliability and safety
requirements. It can be employed to improve the safety and reliability of a system by
identifying the critical potential failure modes and taking necessary preventive actions
in the redesign stage of the system. This method enables to identify and analyze the
effects of the failure modes as the way customers perceive them. In the FMEA
application, possible failure modes, possible effects of these failure modes,
prioritization of these failure modes and the corrective measures are identified with
the help of a template.

There are many advantages of FMEA as given below:

 Identify and prevent safety hazards

 Minimize loss of product performance or performance degradation
 Improve test and verification plans
 Improve Process Control Plans
 Consider changes to the product design or manufacturing process
 Identify significant product or process characteristics
 Develop Preventive Maintenance plans for in-service machinery and
equipment
 Develop online diagnostic techniques

FMEA is an engineering analysis done by a cross functional team of subject

matter experts that thoroughly analyzes product designs or manufacturing processes,
early in the product development process. Its objective is finding and correcting
weaknesses before the product gets into the hands of the customer. FMEA can be the
guide for the development of a complete set of actions that will reduce risk associated
with the system, subsystem, and component or manufacturing/assembly process to an
acceptable level.

1.4.1 Conventional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

The conventional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach is a
pro-active quality tool for evaluating potential failure modes and their causes. It helps

8
in prioritizing the failure modes and recommends corrective measures for the
avoidance of catastrophic failures and improvement of the quality of product. The
conventional FMEA approach is a step-by-step process for the prioritization of
different failures. The approach beings with the identification of all the ways for
which failure can happen, these are called potential failure modes.

The potential failure mode identifies different factors by which the

prioritization is obtained. The machine downtime (time for which the machine
remains stop) identifies the Severity (S). The mean time between failure determine
the frequencies of the same failure mode called Occurrence (O). Then determine the
Detection (D) chance of controls can detect either the cause or its failure mode after
they have happened but before the customer is affected. All the obtained factors are
listed for different ranking according to suitable standard nominations. Finally,
Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) using the factors discussed. These
numbers prioritize the potential failures for the given system.

1.4.2 Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) Approach

Grey Relational Analysis uses a specific concept of information. It defines
situations with no information as black, and those with perfect information as white.
However, neither of these idealized situations ever occurs in real world problems. In
fact, situations between these extremes are described as being grey, hazy or fuzzy.
Therefore, a grey system means that a system in which part of information is known
and part of information is unknown. With this definition, information
quantity and quality form a continuum from a total lack of information to complete
information from black through grey to white. Since uncertainty always exists, one is
always somewhere in the middle, somewhere between the extremes, somewhere in
the grey area.

Grey analysis then comes to a clear set of statements about system solutions.
At one extreme, no solution can be defined for a system with no information. At the
other extreme, a system with perfect information has a unique solution. In the middle,
grey systems will give a variety of available solutions. Grey analysis does not attempt
to find the best solution, but does provide techniques for determining a good solution,
an appropriate solution for real world problems.

9
 Grey analysis uses the factors (Severity, Occurrence and Detection) to
prioritize the failure mode with a different mathematical step. Grey analysis is used
because of the prioritization of failure modes with more accurate values than of
conventional FMEA approach. The prioritization of the failure modes for grey theory
helps in the present study needs high accuracy.

1.5 OBJECTIVES
Looking to the desired need of prioritization of different failure modes in the
CNC machines the following objectives are shortlisted:
 To accumulate the machine failure data for CNC machines in GG Valves
industry.
 To apply conventional FMEA approach on failure data for categorization of
failure modes.
 To apply Grey Relational Analysis for verification of conventional FMEA
approach.

1.6 THESIS OVERVIEW

The present work aims to achieve predicted failure modes of CNC machines
using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis techniques. The present thesis work is
organized in the following manner as discussed below.

Chapter 1 briefly introduces the problems associated with CNC failures,

characteristics of FMEA and summaries the specific objectives of the project.

Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the literature of current research

activities related to FMEA. This includes the knowledge of multi-criteria decision
making, mathematical programming, artificial intelligence, integrated approaches and
also the improvement of product quality. The deficiencies and limitations of
theories/methods are also discussed and the limitations in the literature were then
used to deduct a research gap.

Chapter 3 describes both conventional FMEA and Grey Relational Analysis

approaches that have been used to achieve the objectives raised throughout the
project.

10
 Chapter 4 gives the discussions of the results obtained for the calculated
values of RPN from FMEA approach. The results of conventional FMEA are further
verified using GRA approach.

Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of this study for the understanding of

the prioritization of failure modes and improvement of production rate for the
industry.

At last, suggestions for future work, summary, references and abstract has
been presented.

11
 CHAPTER-II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature survey is the brief review of the accredited research on CNC
machines failure mode. The purpose of the literature review is conveying about the
ideas and knowledge established on the present topic with a view of strengths and
weakness. In this section, the literature search on risk evaluation in FMEA for priority
ranking of failure modes. The source used for this study was academic journal articles
published between 1992 and 2016. The present chapter includes articles that report on
a method or technique that specifically aims at overcoming some of the drawbacks of
the conventional FMEA.

Vast majority of risk priority models are found in the literature to improve the
criticality analysis process of FMEA. Therefore the study proposes a framework for
classifying the reviewed papers depending upon the failure mode prioritization
methods that have been identified. In this review, the study divides the methods used
in the literature into five main categories, which are Multi-Criteria Decision Making
(MCDM), Mathematical Programming (MP), Artificial Intelligence (AI), Hybrid
Approaches and others.

2.1 MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING (MCDM) APPROACHES

Franceschini and Galetto (2001) presented a Multi-Expert MCDM (ME-
MCDM) technique for carrying out the calculation of the risk priority of failures in
FMEA, which is able to deal with the information provided by the design team,
normally given on qualitative scales, without necessitating an arbitrary and artificial
numerical conversion. The method considered each decision-making criterion as a
fuzzy subset over the set of alternatives to be selected. After the aggregation of
evaluations expressed on each criterion for a given alternative, the failure mode were
determined with the maximum Risk Priority Code (RPC). If two or more failure
modes have the same RPC a more detailed selection was provided to discriminate
their relative ranking.

Wu et al. (2016) used the Computer numerical control (CNC) machines for
performing a Multi- Criteria Group Decision Making (MCGDM) technique based on
the fuzzy VIKOR method. Linguistic variables represented by triangular fuzzy

12
numbers are used to reflect the preferences of decision maker for the criteria
importance weights and the performance ratings. After the individual preferences are
aggregated or after the separation values are computed, they are then defuzzified.

Yang et al. (2010) described a new fuzzy FMEA model integrated with fuzzy
linguistic scale method for the analysis of a type of CNC lathe. The model proposed a
risk-space diagram to explicit the relationship of S, O and D where the risk priority
number is calculated by weighted Euclidean Distance formula and centroid
defuzzification based on Alpha-level. The results indicated that the fuzzy FMEA used
in CNC lathe is a reasonable method corresponding to the manufacturing with a
supporting plan for manufacturing.

Wang et al. (2016) proposed the Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) which does not take opinions of different team members when
considering the assignment of criticality. In this paper, improved criticalities (ICR)
were calculated and failures of feed systems were prioritized by IFMECA based on
the failure data of the feed system. It is observed in the results that vibration or
oscillation, motion parts output failure, and inaccurate re-home have more negative
impacts on the feed system.

Li et al. (2016) proposed a study on the expert judgment of failure mode

analysis method where the possible distribution of the attribute of the judgment were
established and the information fusion of the possibility distribution were
implemented using the comprehensive analysis method. The values are assigned to
the weights which combines the variation coefficient method and the subjective
weighting method. The possibility values of the RPN are calculated on a machining
centre and then ranked.

Gupta G. and Mishra R.P. (2016) did study on the maintenance strategies for
each failure mode of functionally significant item of conventional milling machine.
This paper presents a study on reliability-centered maintenance with fuzzy logic and
its comparison with conventional method where failure mode and effect analysis were
introduced integrating with fuzzy linguistic scale method. The results for risk priority
number were based on weighted Euclidean distance formula and centroid
defuzzification where the criticality ranking was decided, and appropriate
maintenance strategies were suggested for each failure mode.

13
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been extensively used for
examining potential failures in many industries. Unlike the traditional FMEA, the risk
factors of Occurrence (O), Severity (S) and Detection (D) of each failure mode are
evaluated by linguistic terms and fuzzy ratings in this research, and their relative
weights are considered, which make the results more useful and practical. Both grey
theory and fuzzy theory are applied in FMEA, in which fuzzy set theory is used to
calculate the Fuzzy Risk Priority Numbers (FRPNs), and grey theory is applied to
calculate the grey relational coefficient. The rankings of the failure modes are both
determined by FRPNs and the grey theory by Zhou and Thai (2016).

Ambekar et al. (2013) worked on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
which is a procedure of product development and operations management for analysis
of potential failure modes within a system for classification by the severity and
likelihood of the failures. A successful FMEA activity helps a team to identify
potential failure modes based on past experience with similar products or processes,
enabling the team to design those failures out of the system with the minimum of
effort and resource expenditure, thereby reducing development time and costs.

The purpose of FMEA for prioritizing failure modes is presented by

Sofyalioglu and Ozturk (2012) for three different methods. These methods are
traditional approach, Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) and Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy
Process (FAHP) to estimate weights for the risk factors. According to the findings,
integration of GRA and fuzzy AHP revealed a difference in prioritizing failure modes
from the methods with the assumption of equal weights.

An FMEA using the group-based Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach to

capture FMEA team members’ diversity opinions and prioritize failure modes under
different types of uncertainties such as incomplete assessment, ignorance and
intervals was presented by Chin et al. (2009b). The risk priority model was developed
using the group-based ER approach, which includes assessing risk factors using belief
structures, synthesizing individual belief structures into group belief structures,
aggregating the group belief structures into overall belief structures, converting the
overall belief structures into expected risk scores, and ranking the expected risk
scores using the Mini-max Regret Approach (MRA).

14
 The study of breakdown maintenance for the machinery failure was performed
by Degu and Moorthy (2014). The failure modes and their causes were identified for
each machine, the three key indices (Severity, Occurrence and Detection) reassessed
and the analysis was carried out with the help of Machine Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (MFMEA) Worksheet. The research work results in a considerable machine
downtime and disrupting the continuous production of pipes.

Yang et al. (2011) also adopted evidence theory to aggregate the risk
evaluation information of multiple experts. However, all individual and interval
assessment grades were assumed to be crisp and independent of each other in the
proposed model. It did not considerate the occasion in FMEA where an assessment
grade may represent a vague concept or standard and there may be no clear cut
between the meanings of two adjacent grades.

Mhetre and Dhake (2012) studied to identify and eliminate current and
potential problems from a bending process of a company. Ishikawa Diagram and the
Failure mode Effect Analysis is aimed to reduce errors and shorten the development
duration and increase product reliability. It prioritizes potential failures according
to their risk and drives actions to eliminate or reduce their likelihood of
occurrence.

They worked on the goal of quality and reliability systems to achieve

customer satisfaction. A system cannot be reliable if it does not have high quality.
Likewise, a system cannot be of high quality if it is not reliable. FMEA provides an
easy tool to determine which risk has the greatest concern and therefore an action to
prevent a problem before it arises. The development of these specifications will
ensure the product will meet the defined requirements studied by Waghmare et al.
(2014).

Braglia (2000) developed a Multi-Attribute Failure Mode Analysis (MAFMA)

approach based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique, which views the
risk factors (O, S, D and expected cost) as decision criteria, possible causes of failure
as decision alternatives and the selection of cause of failure as decision goal. The pair
wise comparison matrix was used to estimate criterion weights and the local priorities
of the causes in terms of the expected cost attribute. The conventional scores for O, S
and D were normalized as the local priorities of the causes with respect to O, S and D

15
respectively, and the weight composition technique in the AHP was utilized to
synthesize the local priorities into the global priority, based on which the possible
causes of failure were ranked. Making reference to Braglia (2000), Carmignani
(2009) presented a priority-cost FMECA (PC-FMECA), which allows for the
calculation of a new RPN and the introduction of the concept of profitability taking
into consideration the corrective action cost. On the other hand, Hu et al. (2009)
presented a green component risk priority number (GC-RPN) to analyze the risks of
green components to hazardous substance. Fuzzy AHP was applied to determine the
relative weightings of risk factors. Then the GC-RPN was calculated for each one of
the components to identify and manage the risks derived from them.

An advanced version of the FMECA, called Analytic Network Process

(ANP)/RPN, which enhances the capabilities of the standard FMECA taking into ac-
count possible interactions among the principal causes of failure in the criticality
assessment worked by Zammori and Gabbrielli (2011). According to the ANP/RPN
model, O, S and D were split into sub-criteria and arranged in a hybrid
(hierarchy/network) decision structure that, at the lowest level, contains the causes of
failure. Starting from this decision-structure, the RPN was computed by making pair-
wise comparisons. In order to clarify and to make evident the rational of the final
results a graphical tool was also presented in the paper.

An alternative multi-attribute decision-making approach called fuzzy

technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) approach for
FMECA, which considers the failure causes as the alternatives to be ranked, the risk
factors O, S and D related to a failure mode as criteria. The failures were prioritized
based on the measurement of the Euclidean distance of an alternative from an ideal
goal. In the proposed fuzzy TOPSIS approach, the three risk factors and their
corresponding weights of importance were allowed to be assessed using triangular
fuzzy numbers rather than precise crisp numbers, giving a final ranking for failure
causes that are easy to interpret presented by Braglia et al. (2003b).

Chang et al. (1999) used Fuzzy method and Grey theory for FMEA, where
fuzzy linguistic variables were used to evaluate the risk factors O, S and D, and Grey
Relational Analysis was applied to determine the risk priority of potential causes. To
carry out the Grey Relational Analysis, fuzzy linguistic variables were defuzzified as

16
crisp values, the lowest levels of the three risk factors were de-fined as a standard
series, and the assessment information of the three risk factors for each potential
cause was viewed as a comparative series, whose grey relational coefficient and
degree of relational with the standard series were computed in terms of the grey
theory. Stronger degree of relational means smaller effect of potential cause. In
Chang et al. (2001), they also utilized the grey theory for FMEA, but the degrees of
relational were computed using the traditional scores 1–10 for the three risk factors
rather than fuzzy linguistic variables. Similar applications of fuzzy method and grey
theory for prioritization of failure modes in FMEA can also be found in Sharma,
Kumar, and Kumar (2008b, 2007d), Pillay and Wang (2003) and Sharma and Sharma.

Geum et al. (2011) proposed a systematic approach for identifying and

evaluating potential failures using a service specific FMEA and Grey Relational
Analysis. Firstly, the service-specific FMEA was provided to reflect the service-
specific characteristics, incorporating 3 dimensions and 19 sub-dimensions to
represent the service characteristics. As the second step, under this frame-work of
service-specific FMEA, the risk priority of each failure mode was calculated using
Grey Relational Analysis. In this paper, Grey Relational Analysis was applied with a
two-phase structure: one for calculating the risk score of each dimension: O, S and D,
and the other for calculating the final risk priority.

The VIKOR method, which was developed for multi-criteria optimization for
complex systems, to find the compromise priority ranking of failure modes according
to the risk factors in FMEA applied by Liu et al. (2012). In the methodology,
linguistic variables, expressed in trapezoidal or triangular fuzzy numbers, were used
to assess the ratings and weights for the risk factors O, S and D. The extended
VIKOR method was used to determine risk priorities of the failure modes that have
been identified.

2.2 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING APPROACHES

Wang et al. (2009b) proposed Fuzzy Risk Priority Numbers (FRPNs) for
prioritization of failure modes to deal with the problem that it is not realistic in real
applications to determine the risk priorities of failure modes using the RPNs because
they require the risk factors of each failure mode to be precisely evaluated. In the
paper, the FRPNs were defined as fuzzy weighted geometric means of the fuzzy

17
ratings for O, S and D, and can be computed using a level sets and linear
programming models. Finally, the FRPNs were defuzzified using Centroid
Defuzzification Method for ranking purpose. In addition, Gargama and Chaturvedi
(2011) employed a benchmark adjustment search algorithm, rather than the linear
programming approach, to determine the weighted fuzzy geometrical means of a level
sets to compute the FRPNs. In Chen and Ko (2009a and 2009b), the FRPNs was
defined as Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Geometric Averaging (FOWGA) (Xu and Da,
2003) of the three risk factors.

Garcia et al. (2005) presented a fuzzy Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

approach for FMEA in which typical risk factors O, S and D were modeled as fuzzy
sets, and the fuzzy possibility DEA model introduced by Lertworasirikul et al. (2003)
was used for determining the ranking indices among failure modes. Chang and Sun
(2009) also applied DEA to enhance the assessment capability of FMEA; however,
the inputs (O, S and D) of FMEA were crisp values (from 1 to 10) instead of fuzzy
sets in their proposed model.

Chin et al. (2009a) argued that Garcia et al. (2005) approach is

computationally very complicated and also could not produce a full ranking for the
failure modes to be prioritized. Based on these arguments, they proposed a DEA
based FMEA which takes into account the relative importance weights of risk factors,
but has no need to specify them subjectively. The two risks were then geo-metrically
averaged to reflect the overall risks of the failure modes, based on which the failure
modes can be prioritized. Incomplete and imprecise information on the evaluation of
risk factors was also considered in the FMEA.

2.3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACHES

2.3.1 Rule-Base System
A modified approach for prioritization of failures in a system FMEA, which
uses the ranks 1–1000, called Risk Priority Ranks (RPRs), to represent the increasing
risk of the 1000 possible Severity, Occurrence and Detection combinations. These
1000 possible combinations were tabulated by an expert in order of increasing risk
and can be represented in the form of ‘if-then’ rules. The failures having a higher rank
were given a higher priority than those having a lower rank presented by Sankar and
Prabhu (2001).

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2.3.2 Fuzzy Rule-Base System
Bowles and Pelaez (1995) described a fuzzy logic based approach for
prioritizing failures in a system FMECA, which uses linguistic variables to describe
O, S, D and the riskiness of failure. The relationships between the riskiness and O, S,
D were characterized by a fuzzy ‘if-then’ rule base which was developed from expert
knowledge and expertise. Crisp ratings for O, S and D were fuzzified to match the
premise of each possible ‘if-then’ rule. All the rules that have any truth in their
premises were fired to contribute to the fuzzy conclusion set. The fuzzy conclusion
was then defuzzified by the Weighted Mean of Maximum Method (WMoMM) as the
ranking value of the risk priority. Moss and Woodhouse (1999) also suggested a
similar fuzzy logic approach for criticality analysis. Based on the fuzzy logic
approaches described above, Xu et al., (2002) developed a fuzzy FMEA assessment
expert system for diesel engine’s gas turbocharger, Zafiropoulos and Dialynas (2005)
presented a fuzzy FMECA assessment system for a power electronic devices such as
a Switched Mode Power Supply (SMPS), Chin et al. (2008) developed a fuzzy
FMEA based product design system called EPDS-1, and Nepal et al. (2008) presented
a general FMEA frame-work for capturing the failures due to system/component
interactions at the Product Architecture (PA) level.

A criticality assessment approach based on qualitative rules which ranks the

risks of potential causes of failure presented by Puente et al. (2002). The
methodology assigned a risk priority class to each cause of failure in an FMEA,
depending on the importance given to the three risk factors (O, S and D) related to a
failure mode. The structure of the qualitative rules was of the if-then rule type and all
the 125 rules in the FMEA were shown in the form of a three-dimensional graph. In
order to optimize the risk-discrimination capabilities of the different causes of failure,
a modified version of the technique integrating with fuzzy logic was also proposed by
the authors.

Pillay and Wang (2003) proposed a fuzzy rule base approach that does not
require a utility function to define the O, S and D considered for the analysis. This
was achieved by using information gathered from experts and integrating them in a
formal way to reflect a subjective method of ranking risk. The proposed approach
needs to set up the membership functions of the three risk factors O, S and D first.

19
Each of the failure modes was then assigned a linguistic variable representing the
three risk factors. Using the fuzzy rule base generated, these three variables were
integrated to pro-duce linguistic variables representing the risk ranking of all the
failure modes.

Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FuRBaR) approach for prioritizing

failures in FMEA. The technique was specifically developed to deal with some of the
drawbacks concerning the use of conventional fuzzy logic (i.e. rule-based) methods in
FMEA. In their approach, subjective belief degrees were assigned to the consequent
part of the rules to model the incompleteness encountered in establishing the
knowledge base. A Bayesian Reasoning mechanism was then used to aggregate all
relevant rules for assessing and prioritizing potential failure modes proposed by Yang
et al. (2008).

A fuzzy FMEA model for prioritizing failures modes based on the degree of
match and fuzzy rule-base to overcome some limitations of traditional FMEA. The
proposed model employed the belief structure for the assessment of risk factors, and
then converted randomness in the assessed information into a convex normalized
fuzzy number proposed by Gargama and Chaturvedi (2011). The Degree of Match
(DM) was used thereafter to estimate the matching between the assessed information
and the fuzzy sets of risk factors. This computed DM then became the inputs to the
fuzzy rule-based systems where rules were processed resulting in failure classification
with degree of certainty.

2.3.3 Fuzzy ART Algorithm

Keskin and Ozkan (2009) applied the Fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory
(Fuzzy ART) neural networks to evaluate RPN in FMEA. In the study, Occurrence,
Severity and Detection values constituting RPN value were evaluated separately for
each input. RPN values composed inputs and each input in its own was presented as
O, S and D to the system. In each case, an input composed of three data (O, S and D)
was presented to the system by efficient parameter results obtained from application
of FMEA on test problems and similar inputs were clustered according to the three
parameters. Finally, arithmetic mean of the input values in each obtained failure class
was used for prioritization.

20
2.3.4 Fuzzy Cognitive Map
Pelaez and Bowles (1996) applied Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) to model
the behavior of a system for FMEA. The FCM was a diagram to represent the
causality of failures with failure node and causal relation path. The path was
described by using linguistic variables such as ‘some, always, often’ and relative
scales were assigned for each term. Then min-max inference approach was used to
evaluate the net causal effect on any given node and weighted mean of maximum
method was used as defuzzification technique to extract the resulting confidence
values on linguistic variables.

2.4 INTEGRATED APPROACHES

A fuzzy-RPNs-based method for FMEA under uncertainty integrating
Weighted Least Square Method (WLSM), the Method of Imprecision (MOI) and
partial ranking method. In this study, multi-granularity linguistic term sets were
adopted by decision makers in FMEA team for expressing their judgments; a fuzzy
WLSM was cited for aggregating these judgments in order to form a consensus group
judgment; the MOI incorporated with a nonlinear programming model was used for
calculating the fuzzy RPNs based on the group judgment; the partial order method
based on fuzzy preference relations was employed for the final ranking of failure
modes according to their scores of fuzzy RPNs described by Zhang and Chu (2011).

The application of FMEA to risk management in the construction industry

using combined fuzzy FMEA and fuzzy AHP. In the study, Severity (S) was referred
to as Impact (I) and had three dimensions: Cost Impact (CI), Time Impact (TI) and
Scope/quality Impact (SI) extended by Abdelgawad and Fayek (2010). Fuzzy AHP
was con-ducted to aggregate CI, TI and SI into a single variable entitled Aggregated
Impact (AI). Based on the assigned values for O and D together with the calculated
AI, fuzzy FMEA expert system sup-ported by fuzzy if-then rules was used to analyze
and prioritize different risk events. Besides, a software system entitled ‘‘Risk
Criticality Analyzer’’ (RCA) was developed to implement the pro-posed framework.

Liu et al. (2011) proposed a risk priority model for FMEA using Fuzzy
Evidential Reasoning (FER) approach and Grey Theory. The FER approach was used
to model the diversity and uncertainty of FMEA team members’ assessment
information, and the Grey Relational Analysis was utilized to determine the risk

21
priorities of failure modes. The core of the proposed FMEA includes assessing risk
factors using belief structures, synthesizing individual belief structures into group
belief structures, aggregating defuzzified group belief structures into overall belief
structure, establishing comparative series standard series, obtaining the difference
between comparative series and standard series, computing grey relational coefficient
and degree of relation and ranking the failure modes using the degree of relation.

Chang and Cheng (2011, 2010) and Chang (2009) argued that, when each
cause of failure is assigned to only one potential failure mode, the risk ranking orders
obtained by DEMATEL approach (Seyed-Hosseini et al. 2006) correspond with the
ones obtained by the conventional RPN method. In order to solve the problem, Chang
(2009) proposed a general RPN methodology, which com-bines the Ordered
Weighted Geometric Averaging (OWGA) operator and the DEMATEL approach for
prioritization of failures in a product FMEA; Chang and Cheng (2010) proposed a
technique combining the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IFS) and DEMATEL approach to
evaluate the risk of failure, and Chang and Cheng (2011) proposed an algorithm,
which utilizes fuzzy ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator and the
DEMATEL approach, to evaluate the orderings of risk for failure problems.

A technique, combining 2-tuple and the OWA operator for prioritization of

failures in a product design failure mode and effect analysis (DFMEA) proposed by
Chang and Wen (2010). The 2-tuple method was used to solve the problem that the
conventional RPN method loses some information which the experts provide to have
the valued information. The OWA operator was used to overcome the issue that the
conventional RPN method does not consider the ordered weight, which may cause
biased conclusions. A case of the Color Super Twisted Nematic (CSTN) was adopted
to verify the proposed approach, and the result was compared with the conventional
RPN and Linguistic Ordered Weighted Averaging operator (LOWA) methods.

Kutlu and Ekmekcioglu (2012) considered a fuzzy approach, allowing experts

to use linguistic variables for determining O, S and D, for FMEA by applying fuzzy
TOPSIS integrated with fuzzy AHP. Fuzzy AHP was utilized to determine the weight
vector of the three risk factors. Then by using the linguistic scores of risk factors for
each failure modes, and the weight vector of risk factors, fuzzy TOPSIS was utilized

22
to get the scores of potential failure modes, which were ranked to prioritize the failure
modes.

In addition to the measurement of risks, it is important to involve the utility of

potential corrective actions. Therefore, they proposed a new approach to determine
the priority order of FMEA, which aims to evaluate the structure of hierarchy and
interdependence of corrective action by Interpretive Structural Model (ISM), then to
calculate the weight of a corrective action through the ANP, then to combine the
utility of corrective actions and make a decision on improvement priority order of
FMEA by Utility Priority Number (UPN) pointed out by Chen (2007).

2.5 OTHER APPROACHES

Gilchrist (1993) modified the conventional criticality assessment of FMECA
and proposed an expected cost model: EC = CnPfPd, where EC is the expected cost to
the customer, C the failure cost, n the annual production quantity, Pf the probability of
a failure and Pd the probability of the failure not to be detected. Ben-Daya and Raouf
(1996) argued that the probabilities Pf and Pd in the expected cost model are not
always independent and very difficult to estimate at the design stage of a product, and
the severity is completely ignored by the expected cost model. They therefore
proposed an improved FMECA model which addressed Gilchrist’s criticisms and
combined it with the expected cost model to provide a quality improvement scheme
for the production phases of a product or service.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as a risk assessment tool that
mitigates potential failures in systems, processes, designs or services and has been
used in a wide range of industries studied by Liu et al. (2013). The conventional Risk
Priority Number (RPN) method has been criticized to have many deficiencies and
various risk priority models have been proposed in the literature to enhance the
performance of FMEA. They reviewed 75 FMEA papers published between 1992 and
2012 in the international journals and categorized them according to the approaches
used to overcome the limitations of the conventional RPN method. They by proposed
work an indication of current trends in research and the best direction for future
research in order to further address the known deficiencies associated with the
traditional FMEA.

23
 Von Ahsen (2008) argued that internally detected faults may also lead to very
substantial failure costs and it is all ignored in conventional FMEA and Gilchrist’s
approach. To deal with the problem, they proposed a cost-oriented FMEA, which not
only includes the costs of external faults, but also the costs of internal faults and those
of false positive inspection results in the evaluation of potential failures. In addition,
Kmenta and Ishii (2004) proposed a scenario-based FMEA using expected cost,
where probability and cost provide a consistent basis for risk analysis and decision
making, and failure scenarios provide continuity across system levels and life cycle
phases.

It worked on a failure analysis of real industry case using FMECA method.

The case study was conducted in a Tyre manufacturing industry by focusing on the
machine components mechanism failures. Field failures record data were
systematically analyzed to identify and classify the failure modes, effects and
determined the criticality index on the subject under study. The details of step-by-step
process in applying FMECA according to the case study, the results and discussion
have been presented accordingly. It is then concluded and proved that the FMECA
method is beneficial to rank and prioritize failures systematically and thus help
engineering team to perform the improvement project based on the right problem by
Ahmad (2015).

The study to identify and eliminate potential problems from a system,

subsystem, component or a process Filip (2011) studied on CNC machines. So, the
potential risks are identified, current controls evaluated and risk reducing actions
defined in advanced to avoid that the potential risks become reality. It is a structured
approach to the analysis, definition, estimation and evaluation of risks (product and
process risks).

Kulkarni and Shrivastava (2013) attempted to work on Failure Mode Effect

Analysis (FMEA) to adapt the innovative technologies integrated with the operational
aspects in order to enhance the process capability. The main objective of the study is
to improve machinery system reliability and to enhance operational safety concept of
CNC grinding machine. FMEA tend to give importance to the prevention efforts to
prevent or decrease the probability of affecting machine performance.

24
 A FMEA analysis tool based on fuzzy utility cost estimation to overcome the
disadvantages of the traditional FMEA that the cost due to failure is not defined
provided by Dong (2007). This approach used utility theory and fuzzy membership
functions for the assessment of O, S and D. The utility theory accounted for the
nonlinear relationship between the cost due to failure and the ordinal ranking. The
application of fuzzy membership functions represented the team opinions. The Risk
Priority Index (RPI) was developed for the prioritization of failure modes.

Rhee and Ishii (2003) introduced a life cost-based FMEA, which measures
risk in terms of cost. Life cost-based FMEA was used for comparing and selecting
design alternatives that can reduce the overall life cycle cost of a particular system. A
Monte Carlo simulation was applied to the cost-based FMEA to account for the
uncertainties in: detection time, fixing time, occurrence and delay time, down time
and model complex scenarios.

It has been a challenging engineering problem particularly in multistage

manufacturing, where maximum number of processes and activities are performed
mainly using CNC machines. Mahto and Kumar (2008) worked on conventional root
cause method that was implemented to optimize the efficiency of these machines.
Thus, provide the platform of human event in problem solving. This work gave the
stock holder a clear idea to promote the effective solution for long time.

Peng et al. (2013) gave more attention towards the core of manufacturing and
its reliability of CNC systems. They stated that soft fault of CNC system occupies a
large proportion in failure, but it is hard to diagnose. The criteria to distinguish soft
fault data from abnormal data of multi-sample CNC systems, uses Failure Mode. At
the concluded that end, the weak module, main reason and fault effect of CNC system
have great significance for the reliability growth technology of CNC system.

The computerized numerical control lathe which is a part of CNC machines

analyzed by Wang et al. (1999). They also collected the failure data over a period of
two years on approximately eighty CNC lathes. They also analyzed the collected data
using Weibull distribution method which provided them the suitable vehicles for the
analyzing the failure patterns of those CNC lathes. Thus, results that the Weibull
distribution provides the best fit suggestion to describe how to reduce the failure of
CNC lathes.

25
 The study on CNC machines is done to eliminate the early failures and
improve the reliability. During the course of work a database was constructed based
on the collection of field early failure data by codification of data. The work finalized
that the reliability screening and quality control may improve the reliability of
machining centers in the burn-in phase conditions Wang et al. (2001).

FMEA serves as a better way to maintain the equipment as defect free through
integrated approach. Aravinth et al. (2012) found that most important parts with
higher risks are compressed cylinders and grounded. The causes, effects and
preventive measures of all the possible failures are given along with the priorities.
The risk priority numbers of the defects are given which indicates the necessity of the
care for welding processes for a defect free weld.

Bevilacqua et al. (2000) proposed a methodology based on the integration

between a modified FMECA and a Monte Carlo simulation as a method for testing
the weights assigned to the measure of the RPNs. The modified RPN consisted of a
weighted sum of six parameters (safety, machine importance for the process,
maintenance costs, failure frequency, downtime length and operating conditions)
multiplied by a seventh factor (the machine access difficulty), where the relative
importance of the six attributes was estimated using pair-wise comparisons. By using
the simulation of the weights, a deterministic assignment was not required and a
stochastic final priority rank was obtained.

A FMEA method to combine multiple failure modes into single one,

considering importance of failures and assessing their impact on system reliability.
The proposed method was established upon the Minimum Cut Sets (MCS) theory,
which was incorporated into the traditional FMEA for assessing the system reliability
in the presence of multiple failure modes. Additionally, they extended the definition
of RPN by multiplying it with a weight parameter, which characterizes the
importance of the failure causes within the system. Following the weighted RPN, the
utility of corrective actions was improved and the improvement effect brought the
favorable result in the shortest time by Xiao et al. (2011).

Wang et al. (1995) proposed an inductive bottom-up risk identification and

estimation methodology combining FMECA and the Boolean Representation Method
(BRM). It can be used to identify all possible system failure events and associated

26
causes, and to assess the probabilities of occurrence of them particularly in those
cases where multiple state variables and feedback loops are involved. In addition, the
inductive BRM was used to process the information produced from FMECA to close
the loop between risk identification and risk estimation.

Gandhi and Agrawal (1992) presented a method for FMEA of mechanical and
hydraulic systems based on a digraph and matrix approach. A failure mode and
effects digraph, derived from the structure of the system, was used to model the
effects of failure modes of the system and, for efficient computer processing matrices
were defined to represent the digraph. A function characteristic of the system failure
mode and effects was obtained from the matrix, which aids in the detailed analysis
leading to the identification of various structural components of failure mode and
effects. An index of failure mode and effects of the system was also obtained.

An approach to enhance FMEA capabilities through its integration with Kano

model proposed by Shahin (2004). This approach determined severity and RPN
through classifying severities according to customers’ perceptions, which supports the
nonlinear relationship between frequency and severity of failure. Also a new index
called ‘‘Correction Ratio’’ (CR) was proposed to assess the corrective actions in
FMEA. The proposed approach can enable managers/ designers to prevent failures at
early stages of design, based on customers who have not experienced their
products/services yet.

Braglia et al. (2007) extended the Quality Functional Deployment/House of

Quality (QFD/HoQ) concepts to FMEA and built a new operative tool, named House
of Reliability (HoR), which is able to translate the reliability requisites of the
customer into functional requirements for the product in a structured manner, based
on a failure analysis. It enhanced the standard FMEA analyses, introducing the most
significant correlations among failure modes. Besides, using the results from HoR, a
cost worth analysis can be performed, making it possible to analyze and to evaluate
the economical consequences of a failure. The integrated usage of QFD and FMEA
can also be found in Tan (2003).

Thus, from the literature reviewed it has clearly identified that, the category of
method most frequently applied to FMEA was found to be AI is higher and MCDM
approaches were the next most applied methods of the researchers and scholars to

27
optimize their work and these methods serve all the intended purpose to fulfill their
objectives.

2.6 RESEARCH GAP

This study is to critically analyze the identified approaches and try to find out
some drawbacks. Instead of analyzing every single approach, the main focus of this
section is confined to Failure Mode and Effect Analysis approach, which is the most
popular approach. In essence, any FMEA system is composed of three processes
referred to as the risk factors i.e. O, S and D, are using appropriately.

Due to the disadvantages of the FMEA and the uncertainty of the risk factors,
many risk priority models were proposed for prioritization of failure modes aiming at
accurate and robust risk evaluation. First, it was observed that the conventional
FMEA based on crisp RPN is not supportive and robust enough in priority ranking of
failure modes. Of the shortcomings described in the reviewed literature, the ones that
have received significant attention from the literature can be seen as being risk factor
and RPN related issues. For instance, the relative importance among the three factors
(O, S and D) is not considered; different combinations of O, S and D may produce
exactly the same value of RPN; and the three factors are difficult to be precisely
estimated.

Second, it was found that numerous alternative approaches were proposed to

overcome the shortcoming of the conventional FMEA. They are all capable of
addressing some of the problems associated with the conventional RPN method. It
can be observed from the literature that FMEA system is the most popular method for
prioritizing the failure modes, followed by grey theory, cost based model, AHP/ANP
and linear programming.

Third, the fuzzy rule based methods proposed in the FMEA literature improve
the accuracy of the failure criticality analysis by compromising the easiness and
transparency of the conventional method. But some doubts remain concerning an
actual applicability of fuzzy rule-base system to real-life circumstances, by reason of
the difficulties which arise during the fuzzy model design, i.e. in defining the
(numerous) rules and membership functions required by this methodology.

28
 CHAPTER-III

METHODOLOGY

The present work is on the failure mode analysis of the CNC machines used in
a manufacturing industry. The CNC machines used for the study are CNC lathe
machines. The failures of CNC machines normally occur in the failure of mechanical
or electronic components which results in reduction in production rate.

The failures of CNC machine components are due to accident, faulty power
supply or mishandling of machine operator etc. Therefore, the prediction of
equipment failure is inevitable particularly for CNC machine. The failure of CNC
machines during operation not only reduces the production rate but also leads to
wastage of resources.

The practical applications of conventional FMEA and Grey Relational

Analysis approach proposed in this chapter help to enhance the reliability of the
prediction. The predicted ranking of equipment failure can be used for better
decision-making, inspection and maintenance of the CNC machines.

The continuous production of the company gets affected due to the machine
failure and the starting the process again may take precious time. The systematic
procedure given in the research work gives a pre-indication for the parts of the
machine where the failure may takes place. Also the company can restore new parts
for the machines where the failures take place frequently.

The repairing time for the machine can be reduced so that continuity of the
production is not disturbed. The workers also have an idea of the failures that may
happen in the future. From the production point of view, this will help the company’s
growth in reduced time.

3.1 CNC MACHINE

The specification of CNC machines that are available in GG Valves industry
and used for study in the present work are given below in Table 3.1.

29
 Table 3.1: Specifications of CNC machines

Specification
Machine Name of CNC Max. Max. Length
No. of Turning
No. Lathe turning turning between
tools on speed
length Diameter centres
Turret (RPM)
(mm) (mm) (mm)
L-01 D-Puma 10-HC 525.8 370.8 525.8 10 35-3500
L-02 LMW-P20T.L3 250 320 350 8 45-4300
L-03 LMW- P20T.L5 440 380 550 8 35-3500

In the present work, the failure data of CNC machines have been collected and
analysis by using conventional FMEA approach and Grey Relational Analysis (GRA)
approach. The data of CNC machine failures are collected for a time period of 1 year.

The following parameters pertaining to the failures of the CNC machines are
record for the failure mode analysis.

 Failure date and time

 Failure phenomenon
 Cause of failure
 Repair of equipment
 Repair time of machine
 Downtime of machine
 Model, size and numbers of the breakdown component
 Prevention of recurring failures
 Number of service engineers or repair engineers employed

3.2 ANALYSIS APPROACH

The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is widely used technique due
to enhance reliability and safety of complex system to identify and eliminate known
or potential failure modes. The FMEA is also intended to provide information for
making risk management decisions. The predicting failure on CNC machine is
complicated, and it is not easy to keep in good working condition. The failure,
especially the failure of key equipment and systems, may cause accidents even
disaster to the CNC machines. Therefore, the prediction of failure based on Failure

30
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is necessary for failure mode analysis of CNC
machines, as safety is critical to the well-being and reputation of the industry.

In the present work, the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis were performed
with two approaches which are given below:

(1) Conventional FMEA Approach

(2) Grey Relational Analysis Approach

A brief description of both approaches is given below.

3.2.1 Conventional FMEA Approach

The conventional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach is a
pro-active quality tool for evaluating potential failure modes and their causes. It helps
in prioritizing the failure modes and recommends corrective measures for the
avoidance of catastrophic failures and improvement of the quality of product. The
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a step-by-step approach for
identifying all possible failures in a design, manufacturing, assembly process, product
or services. Failures are any error or defect in the product which can be potential or
actual that affects the consumer. In this approach failures are prioritized according to
its consequences, frequent appearance and its detection.

A process of conventional FMEA is as follows:-

Step 1: Identification of components and associated functions

This step is to identify the main components of the process and determine the
functions of the components. It describe technical terms i.e. cracked, deformed,
loosened, short circuited, fractured, leaking, sticking, oxidized etc.

Step 2: Identification of Potential failure modes

Failure mode means the way in which a component fails. Effects analysis is
the study of the consequences of failures. The identification of failure mode has been
carried out for the mechanical system, electrical system, hydraulic system or
electronic system etc. For example erratic operation, poor appearance, noise, impaired
functions, deterioration etc.

31
 The flowchart of the FMEA approach is shown in figure 3.1:

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS

Conventional FMEA Approach Grey Relational Analysis

Approach

Potential failure mode

Effect analysis

Reason analysis

Control and Inspection

Severity (S) Detection (D) Occurrence (O)

RPN = S × O × D

S, O and D obtained from conventional approach

Establish comparative series Establish standard series

Calculate different sequence

Calculate Grey Relation coefficient

Calculate degree of relation

Prioritize the failure modes

Figure 3.1: Flowchart of Conventional FMEA and Grey Relational Analysis

32
 When the CNC machine stop working means some problems has happened
technically in the process. To identify the specific problem in CNC machine helps by
showing an alarm at the particular part. This can be indication to the failure part and
hence the specific failure mode. The experience person/machine operator can identify
the stoppage of machine according to the past experience and technical knowledge. If
the machine is not working even after general maintenance means that there should
be some technical fault which is required to be corrected. This technical fault can be
placed into failure mode.

Step 3: Identification of Effect analysis (Severity, S)

Severity is the assessment of the seriousness of the effect of the potential
failure mode. The effects of failure mode were on the CNC machines. In this process,
all failure modes based on the functional requirements and their effects are
determined.

The severity of the failure was estimated using an evaluation scales from 1-10
for machine downtime in hours as shown in Appendix 1. The low rank indicates a
low control limits, whereas a high rank indicates high severity of failure.

Step 4: Identification of Reason analysis (Occurrence, O)

In this step cause for temporary or permanent failure was identified. The cause
of failure depended on inadequate design, incorrect material composition, inaccurate
life assumption, poor environmental protection, over stressing, insufficient lubrication
etc. whereas the failure mechanisms are fatigue, wear, corrosion, yield, creep etc.

The occurrence was determined based on knowledge of the failure mode and
prioritize for an evaluation scale from 1-10 for Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
in hours as shown in Appendix 2. The scale 1 indicates a low probability of
occurrence whereas scale 10 indicates very high probability to the occurrence of
failure.

Step 5: Control and inspection (Detection, D)

The chance of detection of the potential failure before it reaches to the
customer. The detection is the term that defines the failure related to the
manufacturing of CNC machine. The CNC machine manufacturing is based on the
design, assembly, material, complexity of parts etc. The detection is the failure which

33
occurs due to problem in any one of the parameter discussed. The control of
Preventive Measures, Design Validation and Verification that are supported by
physical tests, mathematical modelling, prototype testing and feasibility reviews etc.

The use of evaluation scale is shown in Appendix 3, the scale 1 shows the
chance of detection is so high and the possibility of failure reaching to the customer is
very low. The scale 10 indicates the chance of detection is too low and the possibility
of failure reaching to the customer is very high.

Step 6: Calculation for Risk Priority Number (RPN)

After deciding the Severity, Occurrence and Detection numbers, the RPN is
calculated by multiplying of Severity (S), Occurrence (E) and Detection (D).

RPN=S×O×D …. (3.1)

The FMEA format for arranging the potential failure modes, severity,
occurrence and detection, and calculating the RPN values is shown in Appendix 4.
The RPN is the indicator for the determination of proper corrective action on the
failure modes. The RPN categorizes the ranking of CNC machines failure. The small
value of RPN is always better than the high value of RPN. The RPN ranking of
Conventional FMEA approach is shown in Appendix 5. According to the values of
RPN, the failure mode was categorized and then proper remedial action was taken on
the CNC machine failures with high level of risks.

The Conventional FMEA method cannot assign different weights to the risk
factors of S, O and D, and therefore may not be suitable for the real situation.
Introducing Grey Theory to the Conventional FMEA enables to allocate the relative
importance to the risk factors S, O and D based on the research review.

3.2.2 Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) Approach

Grey theory was first proposed by Julong Deng (1982), aiming to make
decisions under incomplete information. The information which is either incomplete
or undetermined is called Grey. A system having incomplete information is called the
Grey system. The Grey number in the Grey system represents a number with less
complete information. The quantification of influences of various factors and their
relations is called the whitening of factor relation in the Grey Relational Analysis.

34
The steps used in the approach are as the follows:

(a) Linguistic Terms of S, O and D

The linguistic terms describing the decision factors of S, O and D for
example, low, moderate, high etc. can be referred from the previous discussion i.e.
conventional FMEA approach.

(b) Establish of Comparative Series

An information series which includes value of likelihood of Severity (Xi (1)),
Occurrence (Xi (2)) and Detection (Xi (3)) is the comparative series. The comparative
series applied to FMEA is given as:

Xi (k) = [Xi (1) Xi (2) Xi (3)]

where, k = 1, 2 and 3 (Number of risk factors) and i = 1, 2,..n (n is the number

of failure modes)

If all series are comparative series, the n information series was arranged in
the matrix as given below, in which n is the number of failure modes;

𝑋1 (1) 𝑋1 (2) 𝑋1 (3)

𝑋1 (𝑘)
𝑋2 (1) 𝑋2 (2) 𝑋2 (3)
𝑋2 (𝑘)
.
Xi (k) = . = .… (3.2)
.
.
.
[𝑋n (𝑘)]
[ 𝑋𝑛 (1) 𝑋𝑛 (2) 𝑋𝑛 (3) ]

(c) Establish of Standard Series

An objective series called as the standard series which was expressed as the
following:
Series notation: X0 (k) = {X0 (1), X0 (2), X0 (3)}
Matrix notation as: X0 (k) = [X0 (1) X0 (2) X0 (3)]
In FMEA, the smallest score represents the smallest risk. Thus, the standard
series should be the lowest score of likelihood of Severity (X0 (1)), Occurrence (X0
(2)) and Detection (X0 (3)) factors which is shown below:

Matrix notation is: X0 (k) = {X0 (1), X0 (2), X0 (3)} = {1, 1, 1} .… (3.3)
X0 (k) = [1 1 1] (Sofyalioglu and Ozturk, 2012)

35
 The purpose of defining standard series is to estimate the relationship between
standard series and comparative series. The magnitude of this relationship is called as
a “Degree of Relation”. As the Degree of Relation goes higher the score comes closer
to the desired value.

(d) Calculate the Different Sequence

The Degree of Grey Relationship, the difference between the scores of risk
factors and scores of standard series should be calculated. ∆i (k) is calculated as the
following:

∆0i (k) = ‫׀‬X0 (k) – Xi (k)‫׀‬ …. (3.4)

The result of this calculation is expressed as the follows:
∆01 (1) ∆01 (2) ∆01 (3)
∆01 (𝑘)
∆02 (1) ∆02 (2) ∆02 (3)
∆02 (𝑘)
.
∆i (k) = . = …. (3.5)
.
.
.
[∆0n (𝑘)]
[ ∆0n (1) ∆0n (2) ∆0n (3) ]

where, i = 1, 2,....n (n is the number of failure modes)

(e) Calculate the Grey Relationship Coefficient

The Grey Relationship Coefficient, three risk factors of the failure modes are
compared with the standard series. The correlation coefficient is calculated as the
following:

∆ 𝜁∆
γ [X0 (k), Xi (k)] = ∆min + 𝜁 ∆𝑚𝑎𝑥 ….(3.6)
𝑖 (𝑘)+ 𝑚𝑎𝑥

where, X0 (k); standard series, Xi (k); comparative series, i = 1, 2, 3…..n (n is

the number of failure modes), k = 1, 2 and 3 (number of risk factor), ∆min = minimum
value of all ∆i (k), ∆max = maximum value of all ∆i (k), ζ (0,1) identifies coefficient and
if affects the relative value of the risk without changing its priority. The value of ζ is
0.5.

(f) Calculate the Degree of Relation

The degree of relation, first the relative weight of the risk factors should be
decided. The relative weight used in following formulation is given below:

36
 τ i (k) = β k ∑3𝑘=1 ∆i (k)
where, i =1, 2,….n (n is the number of failure modes), k =1, 2 and 3 (number
of risk factors), β k = the weighting coefficient of the risk factors and ∑3𝑘=1 𝛽 k = 1

If all factors are equally important, stated formula can be changed as follows:

1
τ i (k) = 3 ∑3𝑘=1 ∆i (k) …. (3.7)

(g) Prioritize the Failure Mode

The relational series are established based on the “Degree of Relation”
between comparative series and standard series. The RPN ranking of Grey Relational
Analysis approach is shown in Appendix 6. The Degree of Relation closer to 1 means
the failure mode is closer to the optimal value. The failure mode which has the lowest
degree of relation should be the first one to improve. Therefore the lower degree of
relation represents the higher risk priority.

GRA was applied to analyze relationships between discrete quantitative and

qualitative series, whose components are existent, countable, extensible and
independent. Since factors of FMEA have all of these properties, therefore GRA was
applied to FMEA. The FMEA using conventional approach and GRA approach was
presented for the selected CNC machines. The characteristics of both approaches
were discussed for the failure modes occur in selected CNC machines.

The next chapter will involve all the work related to data collection of CNC
machines and further their analysis using conventional FMEA and Grey Relational
Analysis approach as discussed in this chapter.

37
 CHAPTER-IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this chapter data collection of failure modes in CNC machines and their
analysis has been carried out using conventional FMEA approach and their
verification was done using GRA approach which was discussed in chapter 3.

4.1 DATA COLLECTION

For the present work CNC machine failure database were collected from GG
Valves industry as shown in Appendix 7 for a time period of 1 year (11th July, 2014
and 10th August, 2015). A number of failure modes were obtained and their failure
frequencies were calculated which are arranged in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Failure Data of CNC Machines

S. Part Frequ-
Failure Mode Repairing Process
No. Description ency
O-ring changed for hydraulic
Alignment system, Gear Key, guide pin,
1 12
disordered gun- metal bush replaced and
Grease applied
Indexing time I/O parameter adjusted, Sensor
2 4
mismatched setting adjusted
Turret head
Guide pin and coupling bearing
dismantling
3 Play in coupling changed, Tight all coupling 4
fasteners
Job centre CAM setting adjusted, Band/
4 4
disorder rubbed guide pin changed
Turret Guide Coupling alignment adjusted,
5 2
disorder Greased & reassembled
Low viscosity lubricant changed,
Low pressure of Remove chip present in lubricant,
6 5
coolant Coolant flow line cleaned, Filter
Coolant tank cleaned
Pump re-winded, Oil temperature
Improper work
7 readjusted, Contactor relay 3
of coolant pump
changed
PLC unit reordered, I/O
Feed Servo Parameter
8 parameters adjusted, Drive alarm 4
System disordered
code with standard code adjusted

38
 Connections and supply unit
Power
9 checked, Stabilizer card checked, 7
fluctuated
Contactor relay changed
Motor does not Servo motor check and stabilizer
10 2
work card changed
Sensing
Sensors & improper components
11 component 1
adjusted
disorder
Changing table Damaged oil seals replaced, Top-
12 4
turns slowly up oil and filter cleaned
Hydraulic distributor flow line
Clamping
checked, Hydraulic power pack
13 accessory 2
and transmission gear box oil
doesn’t work
change
Hydraulic Oil leaks from Oil pipes cleaned, Damaged oil
14 4
system cylinder seals replaced
Hydraulic pump cleaned,
Oil pressure is
15 Damaged oil seals replaced, 3
not stable
Hydraulic hose changed
Hydraulic main motor ball
Hydraulic pump
16 bearing change, Hydraulic pump 5
dismantling
shaft key fitting
Spindle Blower fan not Check loose connection, Burnt
17 2
Motor working fan motor replaced
18 Blower Fan Unwanted noise Spindle motor bearing changed 2
Revolving 2-3 times bearing cleaning,
19 centre bearing Greasing applied and bearing 2
Tail Stoke Jam replaced
Centre-out Centre
Non linear job finishing, Play in
20 alignment 4
bearing, Alignment adjusted
disorder
Centre Damage parts(gear/bearing)
21 alignment changed, Greasing applied and 5
disorder realigned
Head stoke
Tool changed and alignment
22 centre-out Tool break 1
adjusted
High Spindle
23 Live centre alignment adjustment 2
rpm
Sensor does not Stabilizer and Loose connections
24 1
Bar Ejecting work checked
Sensor Improper work Sensor, proximity switch checked
25 2
in bar selection and replaced

39
 Delay process-
26 PLC parameter reset 1
ing of bar
Poor precision Wear out of the bearing, Bearing
27 2
of spindle changed and greased
Jam of the bearing cleared,
Spindle The spindle
28 Oiliness of spindle box, Damage 6
system doesn’t work
belt and replaced
Abnormal sound
29 Damage oil cooler repaired 2
in spindle

It can be seen from Table 4.1 that some of the failure modes occur repeatedly
during a year while some of the failure modes are rare. The failure mode with lower
frequency has lesser effect on the production process as compared to the failure
modes with higher frequency. The frequencies which were more than 20% of the
highest frequency were considered as major failures as shown in Table 4.2 and rest
were taken as minor failure.

Table 4.2: Machine Downtime and Mean Time between Failures (MTBF)

S. Downtime MTBF
Parts Description Failure Mode
No. (Hours) (Hours)
1 Alignment disordered 13-14 778
2 Turret head Indexing time mismatched 9-10 1758
3 dismantling Play in coupling 11-12 1542
4 Job centre disorder 13-14 1806
5 Low pressure of coolant 5-6 1867.2
Coolant tank
6 Improper work of pump 2-3 1848
7 Parameter disordered 3-4 822
Feed Servo System
8 Power fluctuated 5-5.5 1025
9 Changing table turn slowly 3-3.5 1704

10 Oil leaks from cylinder 3-3.5 1326

Hydraulic system
11 Oil pressure is not stable 3-3.5 1161.6
12 Pump dismantling 5-6 897.6
13 Tail Stoke Centre alignment disorder 3-3.5 1460
14 Head stoke Centre alignment disorder 7-8 952
15 Spindle system Spindle does not work 4-5 816

40
 The minor failures are not considered in the present work. The machine
downtime is the time during which the machine does not work and the manufacturing
process stops. The downtime of failure modes were obtained from the company
database and Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) was calculated from the obtained
data which are shown in Table 4.2.

Finally, S, O and D values are calculated using Appendix 1, 2 and 3

respectively and FMEA worksheet was developed which is shown in Appendix 8.
The RPN value for the failure modes was calculated by using equation (3.1).

From appendix 8, it can be seen that the alignment disorder failure mode of
turret head has machine downtime of 13-14 hours so severity ranking was given 9,
MTBF was calculated 778 hours so occurrence ranking was 6 and the failure was
detected moderately high so ranking was 4. The calculated RPN value is 216. This
value is the second highest RPN of all the machine failures. The play-in coupling
failure mode of turret head has machine downtime of 11-12 hours so severity ranking
was given 9, MTBF was calculated 1542 hours so occurrence ranking was 5 and the
failure was detected moderately high so ranking was 5. The calculated RPN value is
225. This value is the highest RPN of all the machine failures.

The low pressure of coolant tank failure mode of coolant system has machine
downtime of 5-6 hours so severity ranking was given 7, mean time between failure
was calculated 1867 hours so occurrence ranking was 5 and the failure was detected
high chance a machinery controlled of the failure mode, machinery controls may be
required so ranking was given 3. The calculated RPN value is 105. This value is the
lower RPN of the machine failures. Improper work of spindle system has machine
downtime of 4-5 hours so severity ranking was given 7, mean time between failure
was calculated 816 hours so occurrence ranking was 6 and the failure was detection
very high chance a machinery controlled of the failure mode, machinery controls not
necessary so ranking was given 2. The calculated RPN value is 84.

Similarly, input/output parameter disorder failure mode of feed servo system

has machine downtime of 3-4 hours so severity ranking was given 7, mean time
between failure was calculated 822 hours so occurrence ranking was 6 and the failure
was detection was almost certainly chance a machinery controlled of the failure

41
mode, machinery controls not necessary so ranking was given 1. The calculated RPN
value is 42. This value is the lowest RPN of all the machine failures.

The RPN values are used to rank the failure modes which are shown in Table
4.3.

Table 4.3: Conventional FMEA Results and RPN Rank

S. No. Part Function Failure Mode S O D RPN Rank

1 Turret Head Play in coupling 9 5 5 225 I
2 Turret Head Alignment disorder 9 6 4 216 II
3 Turret Head Job centre disorder 9 5 4 180 III
4 Tail stoke Centre out 6 5 5 150 IV

5 Head stoke Centre out 8 6 3 144 V

6 Coolant pump Improper work 7 5 4 140 VI

Indexing time
7 Turret Head 9 5 3 135 VII
mismatch
8 Hydraulic pump Improper work 7 6 3 126 VIII
Hydraulic Oil pressure is not
9 6 5 4 120 IX
pressure stable
Low pressure of
10 Coolant Tank 7 5 3 105 X
coolant
Hydraulic Oil leaks from
11 6 5 3 90 XI
function cylinder
12 Spindle system Improper work 7 6 2 84 XII
Feed Servo
13 Power fluctuated 7 5 2 70 XIII
System
Changing table
14 Hydraulic table 6 5 2 60 XIV
turns slowly
Feed Servo
15 Parameter disorder 7 6 1 42 XV
System

It can be seen that the problems related to turret head are prominent and must
be given highest priority i.e. play in coupling, alignment disorder and job centre
disorder ranks are I, II and III respectively. Similarly, problems in tail stoke, head
stoke, hydraulic system, coolant tank, spindle system and the lower priority must be
given to feed servo system.

42
 For the individual failures industry can emphasize on these failures to reduce
the amount of failure in a machine components play-in coupling is given the highest
priority and it plays an important role in the CNC machine, it must be maintained
periodically to avoid abrupt accident. Centre out failure mode of tail stock, is also
given high priority, periodic grease lubrication and bearing of high quality should be
used to avoid failures. Failure mode of hydraulic pump can be improvised by proper
monitoring of hydraulic chamber, supplying cleaned and filtered hydraulics and
periodic maintenance of chamber. The alignment disordered of turret head can be
improvised by providing less defective casting pieces. All casting pieces should be
tested through Ultra-sonic process witch avoids abrupt accident. An average periodic
maintenance of 1000 hours should be maintained for each CNC machine so as to
minimize the failures.

4.2 GREY RELATIONAL ANALYSIS APPROACH

The Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) approach verifies the results obtained
from conventional FMEA approach with more accuracy (Zhou and Thai, 2016). The
determined values of Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detection (D) which are
discussed earlier in the chapter (Appendix 8) is used for further calculation in the
GRA approach. The application of the GRA applied to FMEA is given below.

The obtain comparative series, includes value of Severity (Xi (1)), Occurrence
(Xi (2)) and Detection (Xi (3)) of all failure modes are using equation (3.2).

𝑋1 (1) 𝑋1 (2) 𝑋1 (3)

𝑋2 (1) 𝑋2 (2) 𝑋2 (3) 9 6 4
9 5 5
𝑋3 (1) 𝑋3 (2) 𝑋3 (3)
9 5 3
𝑋4 (1) 𝑋4 (2) 𝑋4 (3) 9 5 4
𝑋5 (1) 𝑋5 (2) 𝑋5 (3) 7 5 3
𝑋6 (1) 𝑋6 (2) 𝑋6 (3) 7 5 4
𝑋7 (1) 𝑋7 (2) 𝑋7 (3) 7 6 1
Xi (k) = 𝑋8 (1) 𝑋8 (2) 𝑋8 (3) = 7 5 2
𝑋9 (1) 𝑋9 (2) 𝑋9 (3) 6 5 2
𝑋10 (1) 𝑋10 (2) 𝑋10 (3) 6 5 3
𝑋11 (1) 𝑋11 (2) 𝑋11 (3) 6 5 4
𝑋12 (1) 𝑋12 (2) 𝑋12 (3) 7 6 3
𝑋13 (1) 𝑋13 (2) 𝑋13 (3) 7 6 2
8 6 3
𝑋14 (1) 𝑋14 (2) 𝑋14 (3) [6 5 5]
[𝑋15 (1) 𝑋15 (2) 𝑋15 (3) ]

43
 In FMEA, the smallest score represents the smallest risk. Thus, the standard
series should be the lowest score of Severity (X0 (1)), Occurrence (X0 (2)) and
Detection (X0 (3)) factors using equation (3.3) which is shown in below:

Matrix notation is: X0 (k) = [1 1 1]

The degree of Grey Relationship must be calculated using equations (3.4) and
(3.5) expressed as the follows:

∆01 (1) ∆01 (2) ∆01 (3)

∆02 (1) ∆02 (2) ∆02 (3) 8 5 3
8 4 4
∆03 (1) ∆03 (2) ∆03 (3)
8 4 2
∆04 (1) ∆04 (2) ∆04 (3)
8 4 3
∆05 (1) ∆05 (2) ∆05 (3) 6 4 2
∆06 (1) ∆06 (2) ∆06 (3) 6 4 3
∆07 (1) ∆07 (2) ∆07 (3) 6 5 0
∆0i (k) = ∆08 (1) ∆08 (2) ∆08 (3) = 6 4 1
∆09 (1) ∆09 (2) ∆09 (3) 5 4 1
∆10 (1) ∆10 (2) ∆10 (3) 5 4 2
∆11 (1) ∆11 (2) ∆11 (3) 5 4 3
∆12 (1) ∆12 (2) ∆12 (3) 6 5 2
∆13 (1) ∆13 (2) ∆13 (3) 6 5 1
7 5 2
∆14 (1) ∆14 (2) ∆14 (3) [5 4 4]
[∆15 (1) ∆15 (2) ∆15 (3) ]

According to the equation (3.6) the Grey relation coefficient was calculated,
the values are ∆min = 0, ∆max = 8 and ζ = 0.5.

γ01 (1) γ01 (2) γ01 (3)

γ02 (1) γ02 (2) γ02 (3) 0.33 0.44 0.57
0.33 0.50 0.50
γ03 (1) γ03 (2) γ03 (3)
0.33 0.50 0.67
γ04 (1) γ04 (2) γ04 (3)
0.33 0.50 0.57
γ05 (1) γ05 (2) γ05 (3) 0.40 0.50 0.67
γ06 (1) γ06 (2) γ06 (3) 0.40 0.50 0.57
γ07 (1) γ07 (2) γ07 (3) 0.40 0.44 1.00
γ0i (k) = γ08 (1) γ08 (2) γ08 (3) = 0.40 0.50 0.80
γ09 (1) γ09 (2) γ09 (3) 0.44 0.50 0.80
γ10 (1) γ10 (2) γ10 (3) 0.44 0.50 0.67
γ11 (1) γ11 (2) γ11 (3) 0.44 0.50 0.57
γ12 (1) γ12 (2) γ12 (3) 0.40 0.44 0.67
γ13 (1) γ13 (2) γ13 (3) 0.40 0.44 0.80
0.36 0.44 0.67
γ14 (1) γ14 (2) γ14 (3) [0.44 0.50 0.50]
[γ15 (1) γ15 (2) γ15 (3) ]

44
 At the final stage, if all three risk factor is considered to have equal weights,
following equations can be applied to determine the Degree of Relation using
equation (3.7) as shown in Appendix 9. From appendix 9 it can be seen that τ is the
RPN value in GRA approach, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each failure mode
are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: The GRA Results and RPN Rank

S. No. Part function Failure mode S O D RPN Rank

1 Turret Head Play in coupling 9 5 5 0.4433 I
2 Turret Head Alignment disorder 9 6 4 0.4467 II
3 Turret Head Job centre disorder 9 5 4 0.4667 III
4 Tail stoke Centre out 6 5 5 0.4800 IV
5 Coolant pump Improper work 7 5 4 0.4900 V
6 Head stoke Centre out 8 6 3 0.4900 V
7 Turret Head Indexing time mismatch 9 5 3 0.5000 VI
8 Hydraulic pump Improper work 7 6 3 0.5033 VII
Hydraulic Oil pressure is not
9 6 5 4 0.5033 VII
pressure stable
10 Coolant Tank Low pressure of coolant 7 5 3 0.5233 VIII
Hydraulic
11 Oil leaks from cylinder 6 5 3 0.5367 IX
function
12 Spindle system Improper work 7 6 2 0.5467 X
Feed Servo
13 Power fluctuated 7 5 2 0.5667 XI
System
Changing table turns
14 Hydraulic table 6 5 2 0.5800 XII
slowly
Feed Servo
15 Parameter disorder 7 6 1 0.6133 XIII
System

It can be also seen that the problems related to turret head are prominent and
must be given highest priority i.e. play in coupling, alignment disorder and job centre
disorder ranks are I, II and III respectively. Similarly, then problems in tail stoke,
head stoke, hydraulic system, coolant tank, spindle system and the lower priority
must be given to feed servo system.

45
 4.3 VERIFICATION OF CONVENTIONAL FMEA AND GREY
RELATIONAL ANALYSIS

The predicted failure modes of RPN values as obtained by the conventional

FMEA and GRA approach are shown in Table 4.5. The “Degree of Relation”
equation (3.7) was used to predict the response values for the Grey Relational
Analysis (GRA) approach.

Table 4.5: Verification of Conventional FMEA and Grey Relational Method

S. Part Conventional Grey

Failure Mode Rank Rank
No. function FMEA RPN RPN
1 Turret Head Play in coupling 225 I 0.4433 I
2 Turret Head Alignment disorder 216 II 0.4467 II
3 Turret Head Job centre disorder 180 III 0.4667 III
4 Tail stoke Centre out 150 IV 0.4800 IV
Coolant
5 Improper work 144 V 0.4900 V
pump
6 Head stoke Centre out 140 VI 0.4900 V
Indexing time
7 Turret Head 135 VII 0.5000 VI
mismatch
Hydraulic
8 Improper work 126 VIII 0.5033 VII
pump
Hydraulic Oil pressure is not
9 120 IX 0.5033 VII
pressure stable
Low pressure of
10 Coolant Tank 105 X 0.5233 VIII
coolant
Hydraulic Oil leaks from
11 90 XI 0.5367 IX
function cylinder

12 Spindle 84 XII
Improper work 0.5467 X
system
Feed Servo
13 Power fluctuated 70 XIII 0.5667 XI
System
Hydraulic Changing table turns
14 60 XIV 0.5800 XII
table slowly
Feed Servo
15 Parameter disorder 42 XV 0.6133 XIII
System

46
 These values were verified with the conventional FMEA in the similar manner
as performed in GRA approach. From Table 4.5 can be seen that play in coupling,
alignment disorder and job centre disorder of turret head are given rank I, II and III
respectively in conventional FMEA and a similar pattern can be seen in GRA
approach. Failures in tail stoke is next which is also same in conventional FMEA and
GRA approach i.e. rank IV. Failures in head stoke and coolant pump are given V and
VI rank respectively in conventional FMEA and have a same rank in GRA as they
can be considered at same priority.

Indexing time mismatch of turret head is then given next priority in both
Conventional FMEA and GRA approach i.e. rank VII. Improper work of hydraulic
pump and oil pressure instability of the hydraulic pressure are then given the VIII and
IX rank respectively in conventional FMEA and same rank in GRA approach. Low
pressure of coolant tank, oil leaks from cylinder, improper work of spindle system,
power fluctuation of feed servo system, slow table turn of hydraulic table and
parameter disordered of feed servo system are then ranked in both conventional
FMEA and GRA approach.

From Table 4.5 can be seen that for the GRA approach some ranks are
repeated and must be given equal priority. The repeated values of the GRA approach
are consecutive in the FMEA approach too and have a little difference in the RPN
values (conventional FMEA approach).

4.4 RECOMMENDED MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE FOR CNC LATHE

MACHINE
It has been observed that the following Table 4.6 is presented as a guide to
maintenance of the CNC Lathe. There is not maintenance schedule available at GG
Valves Pvt. Ltd., Udaipur for maintaining the CNC machines.

Therefore, maintenance schedule for the effective and efficient operation of

the CNC machines are proposed. Ensure that this maintenance schedule is attached in
the front cover of the machine LOG BOOK so that it is referred to each time the
machine is operated.

47
 Table 4.6: Maintenance Schedule for CNC Lathe Machines

Part Des- Failure 6 month or 1000

Daily Weekly Monthly
cription mode hours
Check for Check O- Grease tool cha-
abnormal noise ring, guide nger fittings, Add
Alignment or vibration pin, Gun /replace drawbar
disordered metal bush, oil, Check rotary
replace if gear oil, add if
necessary necessary

Indexing Verify operati-

Turret time on of auxiliary
head mismatch safety devices
dismantli
ng Clean chips Check input Verify mac- Grease tool-
from way voltage hine level, changer fittings
Play in
covers Remove sed-
coupling
iment from
coolant tank

Inspect axis Inspect ways/gibs

Job centre
drive belt for for adequate
disorder
tension/wear lubrication

Check coolant Check/ clean Remove Replace coolant

level, top off chip auger sediment and thoroughly
Low with water if filter from coolant clean coolant
pressure necessary, Che- tanks. tanks, Replace air
of coolant ck way lube regulator filter
Coolant tank level, Fill
tank if necessary

Check input Check all hoses

Improper
voltage, Ins- and lube lines for
work of
pect ground damage/leaks
coolant
connection
pump

Verify Verify operati- Check input Parameter

Parameter operation of on of auto lube voltage disordered
disordered ESTOP system, Verify
Feed
control setting
Servo
System
Verify operati- Check input Power fluctuated
Power
on of auxiliary voltage
fluctuated
safety devices

48
Part Des- Failure 6 month or 1000
Daily Weekly Monthly
cription mode hours
Clean chips Verify operati- Check rotary gear
Changing from tilt-table on of auto lube oil, add if
table turns and tool system, Max. necessary
slowly changer, Empty prn, time to bu-
chip/swarf tray ild to max prn

Oil leaks Check all hoses

from and lube lines for
Hydraulic cylinder damage/ leaks
system
Check way Inspect way Check all hoses
Oil lubes tank cover opera- and lube lines for
pressure is level, Fill if tion, oil damage/ leaks
not stable necessary lightly

Hydraulic Clean chips Check/clean Inspect/clean Inspect ways/gibs

pump dis- from way chip auger way oil filter for adequate
mantling covers filter lubrication

Check for Verify mac-

Tail abnormal noise hine level,
Centre
Stoke or vibration Inspect/
alignment
Centre clean way
disorder
out Verify drawbar oil filter
operation

Check for Verify mac-

Head Centre abnormal noise hine level,
stoke alignment or vibration, Inspect/
centre out disorder Verify drawbar clean way
operation oil filter

Clean chips Inspect spindle

from way cov- drive belt(s),
The ers, spindle no- replace if
Spindle spindle se, Wipe spin- necessary
system doesn’t dle taper, light-
work ly oil,Check for
abnormal noise
or vibration

Note: - Maintenance Annually or 2000 hours - Replace rotary gear oil,

Replace fan filters on, electrical cabinet, Replace way oil filter and Replace air
regulator filter

49
 Thus, the results prove to be appropriate with the failure modes, the ranking
can be used by the decision making managers for arranging the inspection and
maintenance of the equipment properly. Optimization of maintenance resources can
also be done to avoid the risk.

Furthermore, with the help of analyzed results, final conclusions for the
present work have been drawn in the next chapter. At last, future scope, summary and
references are presented.

50
 CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the present work was to depict the importance of failure modes of
CNC machines for specifying its relation to key competitive factors and performance
indicators. Research in the present work has principally addressed technical issues
related to failures of the CNC machines. The aim of this thesis was to synthesize the
multidisciplinary nature of CNC machine failures from a performance perspective
and highlight some of the more important aspects. The method was presented for
calculating Risk Priority Number based on FMEA, which can be used to prioritization
of failure modes of CNC machines.

The principal approach that has been proposed throughout this work to
increase production rate performance through the prioritization of the failures occurs
in CNC machines. The main findings and conclusions are stated here under.

 The conventional FMEA approach has a lower duplication rate than the GRA
approach.
 The results obtained from the GRA approach are similar to the results of
conventional approach.
 In GRA approach, some ranks are repeated because the RPN values have little
difference and hence must be given equal priority.
 Risk factors and relative importance weight is evaluated in a linguistic manner
rather than in precise numerical values. This makes the assessment easier to
be carried out.
 Both conventional FMEA and GRA approach confirm that turret head failures
are more prominent and servo system failures are least prominent.
 The GRA approach is proven to be best choice because it involves all the
possible combination of parameter values and gives minimum error rate hence
shows accuracy of the failure modes and RPN values can be predicted up to
close level of accuracy and precision.
 Limited industrial use of prioritization of failure mode was one of the main
findings in the present work.

51
Recommendation Actions:

For the individual failures industry need to work on the certain step that can
reduce the amount of failure in a machine components the steps given below:

a) Play-in coupling failure mode is the part of turret head, is given the highest
priority and it plays an important role in the CNC machine. So, to avoid
abrupt accident, bearings of high quality should be used and along with the
periodic maintenance schedule.
b) Centre out failure mode of tail stock, is given higher priority where the failure
can be reduced. So, apply periodic grease lubrication and bearing of high
quality should be used.
c) Failure mode of hydraulic pump can be improvised by proper monitoring of
hydraulic chamber, supplying cleaned and filtered hydraulics and periodic
maintenance of chamber.
d) The alignment disordered of turret head can be improvised by providing less
defective casting pieces. All casting pieces should be tested through Ultra-
sonic process witch avoids abrupt accident.

52
 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

Through the results and conclusions obtained from analysis work numerous
suggestions can be recommended which will be fruitful for the future work related to
the prediction of CNC machine failure modes.

In this study, all of the failure modes are carried out at specified levels which
are in the scope of this study. For proper and complete analysis of performance and
results, the CNC machine failure modes of the controlled factors can be chosen so as
to get a robust data with high accuracy.

GRA approach is used to verify the conventional FMEA approach in the

present work, in future other techniques i.e. fuzzy AHP, fuzzy VIKOR, D-Number
theory etc. be used to verify the work.

53
 SUMMARY

The present work based on the research objectives was developed by in depth
analysis of literature reviewed and a research gap that fulfills the objectives. The
work was motivated by present scenario of the market, mass customization,
manufacturing and automation technologies and their drawbacks. The complete task
was an accomplished analysis and after successfully completion of the work, a
statistical data analysis has been successfully developed taking into considerations all
the key factors affecting the CNC machine failures.

Initially the work started with the selection of the CNC machines and their
failures which were to be used in performing analysis experimentation. Furthermore,
the analysis was performed in accordance with a simple Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) approach for limiting the number of experimentations. After the
successful completion of the task, work was verified to the Grey Relational Analysis
(GRA) approach in which all the parameter combination was used for detailed
analysis of the prioritization of failure modes. In FMEA, the conventional FMEA
approach was chosen to perform the analysis of the CNC machine failures for specific
parameter combinations while in verification the GRA (Risk factors have equal
weight) approach was performed at each level of each parameter considering all the
possible combinations.

In conventional FMEA approach, work was analyzed by choosing values of

Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detection (D) and finally multiplying these values
to obtain the RPN values for prioritization of failure modes. The S, O and D were
estimated on an evaluation scales 1-10, the low rank indicates a low control limits,
whereas a high rank indicates high level of failure. Similar methodology was applied
to the GRA approach using the linguistic terms describing the decision factors of S, O
and D. For example low, moderate, high etc. can be referred from the conventional
FMEA approach. Thereafter, all steps were formulated for obtaining predicted RPN
values same way as performed in conventional FMEA approach.

Finally, the present work shows that the results obtained from GRA approach
was excellent and proved to justify the objectives of the present work with greater
accuracy. GRA approach was proved to be the best choice in comparison to
conventional FMEA approach to reduce the rate of failure. Therefore, the CNC
54
machine parameters considered for the present work are expected to be significant
and prove to be appropriate choice for the prediction of failures on the CNC machine.

55
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63
 ABSTRACT

A machine failure analysis of Computerized Numerical Control (CNC)

machines failure data was collected over a period of one year and failure data was
analyzed to prioritize the weak failure mode or subsystem. The prioritization of
failure modes were used Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) techniques. The
FMEA is widely used technique due to enhance reliability and safety of complex
system to identify and eliminate potential failure modes and their causes. It helps to
prioritization of the failure modes and to corrective measures for the avoidance of
cataclysmic failures and improvement of the quality.

In the present work, the FMEA were performed with two approaches. (1)
Conventional FMEA approach and (2) Grey Relational Analysis approach. In
conventional FMEA approach, the failure modes and their causes identifying for all
CNC machine failures, the three key indices (Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and
Detection (D)) for reassessed and the prioritization of failure modes was carried out
with help of Machinery Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (MFMEA) worksheet.
For verification, obtained results of conventional FMEA approach, Grey Relational
Analysis approach was used.

The results obtained from the GRA approach are similar to the results of
conventional approach. The conventional FMEA approach has a lower duplication
rate than the GRA approach. In GRA approach, some ranks are repeated because the
RPN values have little difference in conventional FMEA and hence must be given
equal priority.

Thus, the results prove to be appropriate with the failure modes, the ranking
can be used by the decision making managers for arranging the inspection and
maintenance of the equipment properly. Optimization of maintenance resources can
also be done to avoid the risk.

Keywords: CNC machine failures; FMEA; RPN; Grey Relational Analysis

64
 साराांश

कम्प्यट
ू रीकृत सांख्यात्मक नियांत्रण (सीएिसी) मशीि विफलताओां के ललये एक िर्ष

की अिधि का मशीि विफलता विश्लेर्ण जािकारी एकत्र ककया गया है और कमजोर विफलता

मोड की जािकारी करिे के ललए प्राथलमकता विश्लेर्ण ककया गया है । विफलता मोड की

प्राथलमकता के ललये विफलता मोड पर प्रभाि विश्लेर्ण (FMEA) तकिीक का इस्तेमाल

ककया गया है । FMEA की विश्िसिीयता बढािे के कारण और जटटल प्रणाली की सुरक्षा की

सांभावित विफलता मोड और उिके कारणों की पहचाि करिे के ललए FMEA व्यापक रूप से

इस्तेमाल ककया जाता है । यह विफलता मोड की प्राथलमकता में मदद करता है और दर्
ु टष िा

विफलताओां और गण
ु ित्ता के सि
ु ार से बचाि के ललए सि
ु ारात्मक उपाय करिे के ललए भी

मदद करता है ।

ितषमाि काम में , FMEA दो दृष्टटकोण के साथ दशाषया गया है । (1) पारां पररक FMEA

दृष्टटकोण और (2) ग्रे सांबांिपरक विश्लेर्ण दृष्टटकोण । पारां पररक FMEA दृष्टटकोण में ,

विफलता मोड और उिके कारणों के ललए, सभी सीएिसी मशीि विफलताओां की पहचाि,

पुिमल
ूष याांकि और विफलता मोड की प्राथलमकता के ललए तीि प्रमुख सूचकाांक (गांभीरता (एस)

, र्टिा (ओ) और जाांच ( डी)) मशीिरी विफलता मोड पर प्रभाि विश्लेर्ण (MFMEA)

िकषशीट की मदद से स्िीकार ककया गया है ।

सत्यापि के ललए, प्रा्त पारां पररक FMEA दृष्टटकोण के पररणाम के ललए ग्रे

सांबांिपरक विश्लेर्ण दृष्टटकोण का इस्तेमाल ककया गया है । GRA दृष्टटकोण से प्रा्त

पररणाम, पारां पररक FMEA दृष्टटकोण के पररणामों के समाि हैं। GRA दृष्टटकोण की तुलिा

में पारां पररक FMEA दृष्टटकोण कम दोहराि दर है । GRA दृष्टटकोण में , कुछ रैंकों दोहराया

जाता है क्योंकक आर.पी.एि. मूलयों (पारां पररक FMEA) में थोडा अांतर है और इसललए बराबर

प्राथलमकता दी जािी चाटहए ।

65
 इस प्रकार प्रा्त पररणाम, विफलता मोड के साथ उधचत साबबत है , रैंककांग निरीक्षण

और उपकरणों के रखरखाि की ठीक से व्यिस्था करिे के ललए निणषय लेिे के प्रबांिकों द्िारा

इस्तेमाल ककया जा सकता है । रखरखाि के सांसाििों का अिुकूलि, जोखखम से बचिे के ललए

भी ककया जा सकता है ।

शब्दकांु जी: सीएिसी मशीि विफलता; FMEA; आर.पी.एि.; ग्रे सांबांिपरक विश्लेर्ण

66
 Appendix-1
Criteria for Ranking Severity (S) in FMEA

Effect Severity Criteria Ranking

Very high severity ranking: Affects operator, plant or

Hazardous
maintenance personnel; safety and/or effects non- 10
without warning
compliant.
High severity ranking: Affects operator, plant or
Hazardous with
maintenance personnel; safety and/or effects non- 9
warning
compliant.
Very high
downtime or Downtime of more than 8 hours. 8
defective parts
High downtime
Downtime of more than 4-7 hours. 7
or defective parts
Moderate
downtime or Downtime of more than 1-3 hours. 6
defective parts
Low downtime
Downtime of 30 minutes to 1 hour. 5
or defective parts

Very low Downtime up to 30 minutes and no defective parts 4

Process parameters variability exceeds upper/lower control

Minor effect limits; adjustments or process controls need to be taken. 3
No defective parts.
Process parameters variability within upper/lower control
Very minor
limits; adjustments or process controls need to be taken. 2
effect
No defective parts.
Process parameters variability within upper/lower control
limits; adjustments or process controls not needed or can
No effect 1
be taken between shifts or during normal maintenance
visits. No defective parts.

(Source: Degu and Moorthy, 2014)

67
 Appendix-2
Criteria for Ranking Occurrence (O) in FMEA

Probability of
Failure Possible Failure Rates Criteria Ranking
Occurrence

Intermittent operation resulting in 1 failure in 100

10
Very high: production piece or MTBF of less than 1 hour.
Failure is almost
inevitable Intermittent operation resulting in 1 failure in 100
9
production pieces or MTBF of less than 2 to 10 hours.

Intermittent operation resulting in 1 failure in 1000

8
High: Repeated production pieces or MTBF of 11 to 100 hours.
failures Intermittent operation resulting in 1 failure in 10,000
7
production pieces or MTBF of 101 to 400 hours.

MTBF of 401 to 1000 hours. 6

Moderate:
Occasional MTBF of 1001 to 2000 hours. 5
failures
MTBF of 2001 to 3000 hours. 4

MTBF of 3001 to 6000 hours. 3

Low: Relatively
few failures
MTBF of 6001 to 10,000 hours. 2

Remote: Failure
MTBF greater than 10,000 hours. 1
unlikely

(Source: Degu and Moorthy, 2014)

68
 Appendix-3
Criteria for Ranking Detection (D) in FMEA

Detection Detection by Design Controls Ranking

Machine controls will not and/or cannot detect potential
Absolute
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no 10
uncertainty
design or machinery control.
Very Very remote chance a machinery/design control will detect a
9
remote potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Remote chance a machinery/design control will detect a potential
Remote cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Machinery 8
control will prevent an imminent failure.
Very low chance a machinery/design control will detect a
Very low potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 7
Machinery control will prevent an imminent failure.
Low chance a machinery/design control will detect a potential
Low cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Machinery 6
control will prevent an imminent failure.
Moderate chance a machinery/design control will detect a
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Moderate 5
Machinery control will prevent an imminent failure and will
isolate the cause. Machinery control may be required.
Moderately high chance a machinery/design control will detect a
Moderately potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
4
high Machinery control will prevent an imminent failure and will
isolate the cause. Machinery control may be required.
High chance a machinery/design control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Machinery
High 3
control will prevent an imminent failure and will isolate the
cause. Machinery control may be required.
Very high chance a machinery/design control will detect a
Very high potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 2
Machinery controls not necessary.
Design control will almost certainly detect a potential
Almost
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Machinery 1
certain
controls not necessary.

(Source: Degu and Moorthy, 2014)

69
 Appendix-4
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) format
Item Control
Part Part Failur Prob. Of Current RPN
/Par Failure Severity Cause Effectiv
Descriptio Functio e Occurrenc Control (S×O×
t Mode (S) s e-ness
n n Effects e (O) s D)
No. (D)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Step
5 9
Alignme
Mechanic- Turret
1 nt
al system Head
disorder
Mechanic- Turret Play in
2
al system Head coupling
Indexing
Mechanic- Turret
3 time
al system Head
mismatch
Job
Mechanic- Turret
4 centre
al system Head
disorder
Coolant Coolant Smell in
5
system Tank oil
Low
Coolant Coolant pressure
6
system Tank of
coolant
Coolant Coolant Improper
7
system pump work
Feed
Electronic Paramete
8 Servo
System r disorder
System
Feed Power
Electronic
9 Servo fluctuate
System
System d
Changing
Hydraulic Hydrau table
10
System lic table turns
slowly
Hydrau Oil
Hydraulic lic pressure
11
System pressur is not
e stable
Hydrau
Hydraulic Improper
12 lic
System work
pump
Mechanic- Spindle Improper
13
al system system work
Mechanic- Head Centre
14
al system stoke out
Mechanic- Tail Centre
15
al system stoke out

70
 Appendix-5
RPN values of Conventional FMEA approach (Format)

S. No. Part Function Potential Failure Mode S O D RPN Rank

1 Turret Head Alignment disorder

2 Turret Head Play in coupling
3 Turret Head Indexing time mismatch

4 Turret Head Job centre disorder

5 Coolant Tank Smell in oil

6 Coolant Tank Low pressure of coolant
7 Coolant pump Improper work
Feed Servo
8 Parameter disorder
System
Feed Servo
9 Power fluctuated
System
Changing table turns
10 Hydraulic table
slowly
Hydraulic
11 Oil pressure is not stable
pressure
12 Hydraulic pump Improper work
13 Spindle system Improper work
14 Head stoke Centre out
15 Tail stoke Centre out

71
 Appendix-6
RPN values of Grey Relational Analysis approach (Format)
Potential Failure
S. No. Part Function S O D RPN Rank
Mode

1 Turret Head Alignment disorder

2 Turret Head Play in coupling

Indexing time
3 Turret Head
mismatch
4 Turret Head Job centre disorder
5 Coolant Tank Smell in oil
Low pressure of
6 Coolant Tank
coolant
7 Coolant pump Improper work
Feed Servo
8 Parameter disorder
System
Feed Servo
9 Power fluctuated
System
Changing table turns
10 Hydraulic table
slowly
Hydraulic Oil pressure is not
11
pressure stable
12 Hydraulic pump Improper work
13 Spindle system Improper work
14 Head stoke Centre out
15 Tail stoke Centre out

72
 Appendix 7
Failure data collection from GG Valves Industry

Part Failure Dates

Failu-
Des- Repairing

10/08/2015
17/07/2015
14/06/2015
29/05/2015
24/04/2015
19/04/2015
03/04/2015
26/03/2015
17/03/2015
11/03/2015
02/03/2015
27/02/2015
30/01/2015
11/01/2015
23/11/2015
12/10/2014
01/10/2014
06/08/2015
28/07/2014
11/07/2014
re Total
crip- Process
mode
tion
O-ring changed for
hydraulic system,
Align
Damaged Gear
ment
Key and guide pin, √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 12
disord
gun- metal bush
ered
replaced and
Grease applied
Indexi- I/O parameter and
ng Sensor setting
time adjusted √ √ √ √ 4
Turr-
mism-
et
atch
head
Guide pin and
disma Play in
coupling bearing
ntling coupli- √ √ √ √ √ 5
changed, Tight all
ng
coupling fastener
Job CAM setting
centre adjusted Band/
√ √ √ √ 4
disord- rubbed guide pin
er changed
Coupling
Guide
alignment
disord- √ √ 2
adjusted, Greased
er
and reassembled

Failure Dates
Parts
Failure
10/08/2015
14/06/2015
19/04/2015
26/03/2015
11/03/2015
06/12/2014
28/10/2014
06/08/2015
11/07/2014

Descri- Repairing Process Total

mode
ption

Low viscosity lubricant changed,

Low
Remove chips present in
pressure of √ √ √ √ √ 5
lubricant, Coolant air flow line
coolant
Coolant cleaned, Filter cleaned
tank Improper
Coolant pump re-winded,
work of
Oil temperature re-adjusted, √ √ √ √ 4
coolant
Contactor relay changed
pump

73
 Failure Dates
Parts
Failure

17/07/2015
02/07/2015
12/05/2015
24/04/2015
03/04/2015
02/03/2015
30/01/2015
18/01/2015
11/01/2015
25/12/2014
23/11/2014
12/10/2014
01/10/2014
18/09/2014
11/07/2014
Descri Repairing Process Total
mode
-ption

PLC reordered I/O

Parameter parameter adjusted, alarm
√ √ √ √ 4
disordered code standard code
adjusted
Power Stabilizer card checked
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 7
fluctuated Contactor relay changed
Feed
Servo Motor
System does not Servo motor check and
√ √ 2
work stabilizer card changed
properly
Sensing
componen Sensors and improper
√ √ 2
t components adjusted
disordered

Parts Failure Dates

Desc Failure Repairing

23/11/2014

06/08/2014
25/07/2015
02/07/2015
14/06/2015
29/05/2015
12/05/2015
24/04/2015
19/04/2015
26/03/2015
17/03/2015
02/03/2015
27/02/2015
19/02/2015
25/12/2014
06/12/2014

28/10/2014

28/07/2014
11/07/2014
Total
ri- mode Process
ption
Changin Damaged oil seals
g table replaced
√ √ √ √ 4
turns Top-up oil and filter
slowly cleaned
Clampin Hydraulic
g distributor flow line
accessor checked, Hydraulic
√ √ 2
y power pack and
doesn’t transmission gear
work box oil change
Hydra Oil leaks Oil pipes cleaned
u-lic from Damaged oil seals √ √ √ 3
syste cylinder replaced
m Hydraulic pump
Oil cleaned
pressure Damaged oil seals
√ √ √ √ √ 5
is not replaced
stable Hydraulic hose
changed
Hydraulic main
Hydrauli
motor ball bearing
c pump
change Hydraulic √ √ √ √ √ 5
dismantl
pump shaft key
ing
fitting

74
 Failure Dates
Parts

10/08/2015

19/04/2015

17/03/2015

18/01/2015

18/09/2014
Descri- Failure mode Repairing Process Total
ption

Blower fan not Check loose connection Burnt fan

√ √ 2
Spindle working motor replaced
Motor
Blower Fan
Unwanted noise Spindle motor bearing changed √ √ √ 3

Failure Dates
Parts

17/07/2015

24/04/2015

11/03/2015

12/10/2014

01/10/2014

11/07/2014
Descri- Failure mode Repairing Process Total
ption

2-3 times bearing cleaning

Revolving centre
Greasing applied and bearing √ √ 2
bearing Jam
Tail Stoke replaced
Centre out
Centre alignment Play in bearing,
√ √ √ √ 4
disorder Alignment adjusted

Failure Dates
Parts
Failure

23/11/2014
25/07/2015
02/07/2015
12/05/2015
19/04/2015
26/03/2015
30/01/2015
11/01/2015

28/07/2014
Descri- Repairing Process Total
mode
ption

Centre Damage parts(gear/bearing)

√
alignment changed √ √ 5
√ √
disorder Greasing applied and realigned
Head
stoke Tool changed and alignment √
Tool break 1
centre out adjusted

High Spindle
Live center alignment adjustment √ √ √ 3
rpm

75
 Failure Dates
Parts

10/08/2015

02/03/2015

19/02/2015

28/10/2014
Descri- Failure mode Repairing Process Total
ption

Sensor does not Stabilizer and Loose connections

√ 1
work properly checked
Bar Improper
Ejecting Sensor, proximity switch checked and
working in bar √ √ 2
Sensor replaced
selection
Delay in
processing of PLC parameter reset √ 1
bar

Failure Dates
Parts
Failure

06/08/2014
25/07/2015
17/07/2015
14/06/2015
24/04/2015
03/04/2015
26/03/2015
27/02/2015
25/12/2014
06/12/2014

11/07/2014
Descri- Repairing Process Total
mode
ption

Poor
Wear out of the bearing, √
precision of √ 3
Bearing changed and greased √
spindle
Jam of the bearing cleared,
Spindle The spindle Oiliness of spindle box, √ √
system √ √ √ 6
doesn’t work Damage of the belt and √
replaced
Abnormal
sound in Damage oil cooler repaired √ √ 2
spindle box

76
 Appendix 8
Worksheet for CNC Machine Failure Modes

S. Sub Failure Potential Potential Current

Parts S O D RPN
No. System Mode Effect Cause Controls
Jerk/accident,
Gun metal I/O parameter Replaced Gun
Turret bush damage, disorder, metal bush,
Mechan- Alignm-
Head Gear key and faulty job gear key,guide
1 ical ent 9 6 4 216
disman- guide pin piece pin, O-ring &
system disorder
tling damage, O- Improper Cleaning guide
ring damage fitment, poor way
quality
Tighten all
Coupling fasteners,clean
Turret Jerk /
Mechan- bearing complete
Head Play in accident,
2 ical damage and 9 5 assembly and 5 225
disman- coupling lubrication
system loose replacing the
tling oil
fasteners damaged
bearing
Turret Indexing I/O parameter High input Reset the I/O
Electro-
Head time & sensor currents and parameter and
3 nic 9 5 3 135
disman- mismat- setting sensor in replacing
system
tling ch disorder fault faulty sensor
Turret CAM setting Replace guide
Mechan- Job Accident due to
Head adjusted, pin & readjust-
4 ical centre 9 defective job 5 4 180
disman- Band/rubbed ment of CAM
system disorder piece
tling guide pin setting
Remove chips
Low viscosity
Low Blockage the present in
Coolant Coolant lubricant
5 pressure 7 coolant flow 5 lubricant, 3 105
system Tank changed,
coolant line Coolant flow
Filter cleaned
line cleaned

Damage/burn Replacing the

Coolant Coolant Improp- motor wind- contactor relay &
6 7 Faulty supply 5 4 140
system pump er work ing & contac- rewinding
tor relays motor coil

Replacing the
PLC unit Faulty supply, stabilizer card,
Electro- Feed Parame-
disorder & I/ stabilizer card replacing the
7 nic Servo ter 7 6 1 42
O parameter & contactor contactor relay &
system System disorder
change relay burn reset the I/O
parameters

77
S. Sub Failure Potential Potential Current
Parts S O D RPN
No. System Mode Effect Cause Controls
Connection & Ensure the
Electro- Feed Power supply unit, Faulty supply, proper power
8 nic Servo fluctuat- Stabilizer car- 7 stabilizer card 5 supply and 2 70
system System ed d, Contactor burn Replacing
relay changed stabilizer card
Changi- Damaged oil Damage oil Ensure proper
Hydrau-
Hydrau- ng table seals replaced, seal, leakage checking of
9 lic 6 5 2 60
lic table turns Top-up oil & in hydraulic hydraulic flow
system
slowly filter cleaned flow line line
Oil pipe Ensure the
Hydrau- Hydrau- Oil leaks Leakage in
cleaned, proper checked
10 lic lic func- from 6 hydraulic 5 3 90
Damage oil- hydraulic flow
system tion cylinder cylinder
seal replaced line
Pump cleaned,
Oil Damage the Change all
Hydrau- Hydrau- Damage oil
pressure oil seals and damaged /
11 lic lic seal replaced, 6 5 4 120
is not hydraulic cracked hose
system pressure Hydraulic
stable hose & oil seal
hose changed
Damage oil Replacing oil
Clamping
seals & hose, filter, damaged
Hydrau- Hydrau- accessory
Improp- blockage oil-seals and
12 lic lic doesn’t work, 7 6 3 126
er work hydraulic hoses and
system pump Oil pressure
flow line and cleaning the
not stable
filter pump
Cleaning the
Poor Wear /jam of complete
Mechan-
Spindle Improp- precision & bearing, assembly and
13 ical 7 6 2 84
system er work abnormal blockage oil replacing the
system
sound flow line damaged
bearing
Impact / jerk,
Replacing the
Poor tool break,
Mechan- damaged
Head Centre precision and damage
14 ical 8 6 bearing and 3 144
stoke out high RPM bearing & I/O
system reset I/O
of spindle parameter
parameters
disorder
Revolving Replacing the
Mechan- centrebearing damaged
Tail Centre Non linear
15 ical 6 jam/ damage, 5 bearing and 5 150
stoke out finishing
system play in reset the I/O
bearing parameters

78
 Appendix 9
1
Calculate the Degree of Relation by using this equation τ i (k) = 3 ∑3𝑘=1 ∆i (k)

1 1
τ 1 (k) = 3 [𝛾1 (1) + 𝛾1 (2) + 𝛾1 (3)] = 3 [0.33 + 0.44 + 0.57] = 0.4467

1 1
τ 2 (k) = 3 [𝛾2 (1) + 𝛾2 (2) + 𝛾2 (3)] = 3 [0.33 + 0.50 + 0.50] = 0.4433

1 1
τ 3 (k) = 3 [𝛾3 (1) + 𝛾3 (2) + 𝛾3 (3)] = 3 [0.33 + 0.50 + 0.67] =0.5000

1 1
τ 4 (k) = 3 [𝛾4 (1) + 𝛾4 (2) + 𝛾4 (3)] = 3 [0.33 + 0.50 + 0.57] =0.4667

1 1
τ 5 (k) = 3 [𝛾5 (1) + 𝛾5 (2) + 𝛾5 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.50 + 0.67] =0.5233

1 1
τ 6 (k) = 3 [𝛾6 (1) + 𝛾6 (2) + 𝛾6 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.50 + 0.57] =0.4900

1 1
τ 7 (k) = 3 [𝛾7 (1) + 𝛾7 (2) + 𝛾7 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.44 + 1.00] =0.6133

1 1
τ 8 (k) = 3 [𝛾8 (1) + 𝛾8 (2) + 𝛾8 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.50 + 0.80] =0.5667

1 1
τ 9 (k) = 3 [𝛾9 (1) + 𝛾9 (2) + 𝛾9 (3)] = 3 [0.44 + 0.50 + 0.80] =0.5800

1 1
τ 10 (k) = 3 [𝛾10 (1) + 𝛾10 (2) + 𝛾10 (3)] = 3 [0.44 + 0.50 + 0.67] =0.5367

1 1
τ 11 (k) = 3 [𝛾11 (1) + 𝛾11 (2) + 𝛾11 (3)] = 3 [0.44 + 0.50 + 0.57] =0.5033

1 1
τ 12 (k) = 3 [𝛾12 (1) + 𝛾12 (2) + 𝛾012 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.44 + 0.67] =0.5033

1 1
τ 13 (k) = 3 [𝛾13 (1) + 𝛾13 (2) + 𝛾13 (3)] = 3 [0.40 + 0.44 + 0.80] =0.5467

1 1
τ 14 (k) = 3 [𝛾14 (1) + 𝛾14 (2) + 𝛾14 (3)] = 3 [0.36 + 0.44 + 0.67] =0.4900

1 1
τ 15 (k) = [𝛾15 (1) + 𝛾15 (2) + 𝛾15 (3)] = [0.44 + 0.50 + 0.50] =0.4800
3 3

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