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G.R. No.

208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.

FACTS:

HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to
as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However,
it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced
from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the
Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to


the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the
MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority
list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1;
and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under
Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B,
the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and
release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same
project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM
must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof:
PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft
or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of
realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned
shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the
BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing
agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special
Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL


The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12,
Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

HELD:

Yes,
the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress ‘role must be confined to
mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 PDAF article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

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