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CASE DIGEST: Belgica v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 5. Release of Funds.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
209251, 2013) the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing
agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special
I. SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE Provision No. 3.
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall
be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS- II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO
PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, A. Congressional Pork Barrel
standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act. WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written 1.) separation of powers
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority (a) to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the
3. Legislators Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows: areas of fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting, violating the separation of powers
principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure the law. Informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under
Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the 2.) non-delegability of legislative power
purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester Congress.
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of 3.) checks and balances
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence,
project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original outside of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-
must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within
PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide
realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr. the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be. indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject
to the Presidents power of item veto. YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
4.) accountability authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested (b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of President of the Philippines under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the Presidential Social Fund
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
advantage of their own office. indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used to finance the priority infrastructure
However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF per development projects. This gives him carte blancheauthority to use the same fund for any
se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. The law does not supply a definition of
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis. priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of
department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the priority infrastructure development projects must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar
Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment. to Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.

5.) political dynasties

NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase as may be defined by law. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on
this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely speculative since it has not
been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) local autonomy

YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of making equal the unequal. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely
on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators
and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and resolutions of LDCs should
not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body.

B. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel


WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power:
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of
PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, BRION,
SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and
BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., PERALTA,

Petitioners, BERSAMIN,

- versus DEL CASTILLO,

THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND ABAD,


MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the VILLARAMA, JR.,
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
in representation of the Members PEREZ,

of the Congress, MENDOZA,

Respondents SERENO,

REYES,

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Baguio City Promulgated:

EN BANC

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012

AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its DECISION


Chairman
Present: MENDOZA, J.:
and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members,
ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES,
GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONA, C.J.,
CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers
CARPIO, Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of
DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, [1] also sought the issuance
LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, VELASCO, JR.,
ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the
MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary
SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of
allocations to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to
stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate and the receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed a intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the
Reply thereto.[2] On April 26, 2005, both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition: cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayers money. [7] Further,
the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated function devoid of constitutional sanction, [8] and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
hereunder 8,327,000,000.00 nothing less than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making
Xxxxx of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not include
Special Provision
the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive
priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted
programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the Department.[9] By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to
implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned:PROVIDED, FURTHER, That propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the
the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed
necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
Respondents Position
Petitioners Position

For their part, the respondents[10] contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, [11] they argue that the former should not
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not
be equated with pork barrel, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring to government projects
empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
affording political opportunism.[12] In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then
funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main
that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures
features of the pork barrel system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing
alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration
of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004). [3] In its memorandum, LAMP insists
especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork
that [t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a
barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the supposed
deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork
iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source of
barrel system.[4] In other words, [t]he omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as allocations to
dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These
individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus signifying an omission intentionally made by
facts have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without
Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply. [5] Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that the pork barrel
qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the claim that Members of
has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004. [6]
Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF allocations and releases
and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved budget for a
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the
[13]
particular project. Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not
DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual
be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to
Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which
present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly
projects are to be actually funded by PDAF.
or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are appropriations for substantially similar, if not the it.[17]
[14]
same, beneficial purposes, the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,[15] where CDF was described
as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute,
specified in the law. InPhilconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice ofdirect allocation and release of funds to the
propose and identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the
was also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the President and their laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of
congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of
constituents and the priority to be given each project. unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn,
cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.
The Issues
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of
The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the
legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial reviewan actual case or implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For
controversy. LAMP, this is the right torecover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of
Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal
The Courts Ruling expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of
government before the court intervenes.The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be
To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal. before the Court.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject as a result of its enforcement. [18] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be constitutional questions.[19] In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public
[16]
the very lis mota of the case. right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person, and could be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer. [20] Thus,
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. [21] Of greater import than the damage caused by
the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of enforcement of an invalid statute. [22]
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works [23] is authority in support of the
petitioner: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of the executive which approved it. [27] This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.] clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. [28]
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the
Now, on the substantive issue. unconstitutionality of the PDAFs enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA
allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latters encroachment on executive power in
The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack
Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of
another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even
unconstitutional.[24] The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. [25] common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners
request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like
With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question: In this, the Courts hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court
allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to
list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie. [29] Again, newspaper or electronic
Constitution or the laws? reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, not because of any
issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established
The Court rules in the negative. in accordance with the rules of evidence. [30]

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. InFarias v. The Executive Secretary, committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold
[26]
the Court held that: that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment
and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004. The process was explained in this wise,
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than in Guingona v. Carague:[31]
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption
should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is 1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive
on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of
Constitution. budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available
revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous
Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to
in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the
Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC). strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and
foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said
Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the process remain intact.
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated
xxx
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a
activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds
releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual
performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and
and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
budgets were approved.
adopted.[34]
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons.
of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. [32] While the budgetary process commences from WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by
crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom
and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to
objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget
execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of
the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. The DBM lays down the guidelines for
the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against
Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
the priorities set by the Executive. [33] This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute infidelity on the part of petitioner.
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
axercise in futility.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and
administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed. enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of
the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a
basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
David vs Arroyo
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
(Note: Many issues are discernible in this case. I only focused on the overbreadth
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the doctrine.)
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
David vs Arroyo
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, On the
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed against that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.[106] Here, the incontrovertible fact
the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent. remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its overbreadth. They claim that Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be

its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored;[107] The reason for

the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the citizens. this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the
principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations
not before the Court.[108] A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
Issue: 1.Whether PP 107 is void because of its overbreadth
2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
Held: No. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
on their faces statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
Amendment cases. overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute on its face, not merely as applied
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms for so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US Supreme Court held that we have it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is
not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First the concern with the chilling; deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
Amendment (freedom of speech). courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws very existence may
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally expression. An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered those third parties.
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. InBroadrick v. Oklahoma,[105] it was held: In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners,
face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,[109] it
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the was held that:
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,ordinarily results in a
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.
A facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness is likewise unwarranted.

Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which holds that a
law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.[110] It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their faces statutes in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even
attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish
that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
2. The Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest
of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating
BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as
the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication
and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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