BELTRAN VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

June 20, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

Issue:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Ruling:

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for concubinage.
 TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

November 29, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 
September 14, 1988.  They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet
each other regularly.  Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989,
petitioner stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when
she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with
bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. This
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. 
He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of
their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by
living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of
their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent.  With respect to petitioner,
private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage
contract with Santella that he was still single.

Issue:

WON the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it.

Ruling:

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question
which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board.  As discussed above, the concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.  We have previously ruled that there is
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.
 JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

(93 Philippine Reports 257)

Facts:

Three proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the summary
settlement of the estates of Joaquin Navarro Senior, his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro Junior and Pilar Navarro, all deceased; by the petitioner, Ramon Joaquin – an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and by
Antonio Navarro – respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro Sr. by first marriage. All of them, having
been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to
the Court of Appeals, whose decision modifying that of the Court of First Instance, in turn was
elevated to the Supreme Court for Review. The main question presented in the first two courts
were related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children,
all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February
1945. The trial court found the deaths of these persons to have occurred in this order: 1st, The
Navarro Girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd, Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,; 3rd, Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
court, with the exception to that of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., ruling that the son
outlived his mother. The following findings were taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez,
who miraculously survived:

On February 6, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila, spouses Joaquin Navarro Sr.
(70) and Angela Joaquin (67), together with their three daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion and
Natividad (23-25), and their son Joaquin Navarro Jr. (30) with his wife Adela Conde, sought
refuge on the ground floor of the German Club building. During their stay, the building was
packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the said club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those
who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the
entrance. Joaquin Navarro Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to find safer ground,
however Angela Joaquin refused to join them. So, J. Navarro Sr., his son along with his wife
Adela, and a former neighbor Francisco Lopez fled the burning structure. However, as the group
got out, J. Navarro Jr. was shot in the head and died instantly, while the others lay flat on the
ground in front of the club premises in order to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German
Club, already on fire, collapsed trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela
Joaquin. The three (Navarro Sr., Conde and Lopez) managed to reach an air shelter nearby and
stayed there for three days. February 10, 1945, they were forced to leave the shelter because the
shelling tore it open. They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy, only to be met by Japanese
patrols who fired at the refugees, killing Navarro Sr. and his daughter-in-law Adela.

Issue:

Problem of survivorship - Whether the mother, Angela Joaquin, died before her son, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. or vice versa.
Decision:

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents’ estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of “reserve troncal” which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro’s death preceded that of her son. Without
costs.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.

Rationale:

Rule 123, Section 69, Revised Rules of Court: When two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (a) shown who died first and there are no (b)
particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes.

Art. 33, Civil Code 1889: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or
more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either
must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the
same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

Both 1 & 2 will substitute if there are no facts. But since there are facts in this case [inferred
from Francisco Lopez’ testimony], they will not be applicable. Where there are facts known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, presumption does not step in. Facts are
credible because witness was found disinterested, trustworthy and entitled to credence by courts.

The presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory –
that the mother outlived her son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Supported by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference is ought to prevail.
 SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPNES

(537 SCRA 373-39)

Facts:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and gender in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The docketed petition (SP Case No. 02-105207) impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent. The petitioner alleged that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
“Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth. His gender was registered as
“male”. Petitioner further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. Silverio consulted several doctors in the United States, and underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001, he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand, and was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines. He was issued a medical
certificate by the said expert attesting that the petitioner had undergone the procedure. From
then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”, and his gender from
“male” to “female”. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds that the
petition was filed not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex as a
result of the recent surgery.

However, on August 13, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, contending that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. The petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition was made.

Issue:

Whether a change of name and gender on his civil registry can alter one’s legal capacity or status
on the grounds of sex reassignment.

Rationale:

NO. “The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will […] The comprehensive term
status… includes such matters at the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimization, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.” Petitioner believes that
having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought. However, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for a change of
name is controlled by statutes (Article 376 of the Civil Code; amended by RA 9048).
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing his name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status (Article 413 of the Civil Code: “All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws”.). But there is no such special law
in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to the petitioner’s
cause. Under the Civil Register Law (Section 5, Act 3753), a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of an infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno
(C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 ALCANTARA V ALCANTARA

(531 SCRA 446)

Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went to the Manila City Hall in 1982 to look for someone who
could "fix" the marriage for them, as they had not then secured a marriage license. A “fixer”
conducted the ceremony right then and there and also contracted a priest who solemnized the
marriage in 1983. Marriage License was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite to
which neither of them resides. The parties were given a marriage contract bearing a marriage
license number that, obviously because of a typographical error, did not accurately coincide with
the original marriage license number.
 
Issue:

Whether or not the irregularities in the issuance of the marriage license are sufficient to render
the marriage void.
 
Held:

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took
place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage,
thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority
of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in
the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound
to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by
the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of
law.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.

Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts
look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
 
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit.The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.Costs against
petitioner.
 
SO ORDERED.