SSS v Davac, G.R. No. L-21642.

July 30, 1966

Arcaba vs. Tabancura, G.R. No. 146683. Nov. 22, 2001

FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two
lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-
law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter
waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his
house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila
and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the
same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On
the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to
Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered
over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a
complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and
heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife
of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

HELD:
Yes. The donation made was void under Article 87 of theFamily Code. he court in this
case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not
valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary
permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand
her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a
public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
 Ching v Goyanko, GR 165879, November 10,2006

FACTS:

Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against Maria Ching, praying for the
nullification of the deed of sale and of transfer certificate and the issuance of a new one.
Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real owners of the property involved. They further
contend that it was after their father‘s death that they found out that a contract of sale
involving the same property has been executed by their father and common-law wife
Ching. However, Ching claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she
who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the complaint against Ching,
declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void,
fictitious and simulated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null
and void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy.

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals
and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had
abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and
from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or
purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

In the case at bar, the subject property having been acquired during the existence of a
valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the court finds no
evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and
his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-appellant
Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife, there
has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor
their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that the property located at Cebu City
belongs to the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the subject property was not conjugal,
still the court cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on records that
they have been living together as common-law husband and wife.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each
other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between
spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal
partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of
undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living
as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. Those provisions are
dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties.

Muller v Muller, G.R. NO. 149615, August 29, 2006

CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the
February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming
with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution
dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany
at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of
land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent
filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of
personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous
title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.
Thus – “However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the
community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is
excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily,
the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties
purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot
be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of
the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave
the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by
the parties of the said real property.”

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision
modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer
of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust
for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the

land as well as the costs for the construction of the house?

HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321
ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller
the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for
the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13,
2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August
12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case
No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner
and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the
partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.

DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.”
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.
In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of
Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It
is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit
the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots
or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of
any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural."
(Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted

his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled
in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the
exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of
its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of
equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
 Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own.

Pacific Ace v Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012