Big Data A Twenty First Century Arms Race
Big Data A Twenty First Century Arms Race
Big Data A Twenty First Century Arms Race
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
ISBN: 978-1-61977-428-5.
This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy
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report’s conclusions.
June 2017
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CONTENTS
Foreword 1
Executive Summary 3
Chapter 1
Big Data: The Conflict Between Protecting Privacy 5
and Securing Nations
Chapter 2
17
Big Data: Exposing the Risks from Within
Chapter 3
29
Big Data: The Latest Tool in Fighting Crime
Chapter 4
41
Big Data: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows
Chapter 5
53
Big Data: Mitigating Financial Crime Risk
Authors 80
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
FOREWORD
T oday’s threat environment is more fast-paced and complex than ever before.
Around the globe,
increasingly sophisticated state and non-state actors are engaged in harming
the political and
economic fabric of the United States and its allies and partners. Adversaries
are stepping up their
use of cyber and other technologies in their attacks. Non-state actors, such as
transnational organized
criminals, exploit regulatory and supervisory gaps in the global financial
architecture to perpetrate money
laundering and fraud despite stepped up international efforts to counter them.
Terrorist groups leverage
cheap, easily assessable technologies to recruit adherents and plan their assaults.
Needless to say, law
enforcement, intelligence, and financial institutions all have their hands full
trying to fend off the growing
threats.
Fortunately, the big data revolution—the explosion of data and the ability to
analyze them—is providing
a new toolkit to help confront such a dynamic and highly unpredictable security
landscape. Increasingly
ubiquitous web-connected sensors and mobile technologies are creating more data,
while advances
in machine learning and computational power are allowing this data to be more
quickly and efficiently
processed. Now, US intelligence and law enforcement agencies as well as global
financial institutions can
connect disparate information from a variety of sources to provide wider awareness
of emerging threats.
And they can do it at lightning speed. Big data is not only opening the door for
entirely new ways of
detecting and mitigating threats, but it is also helping to streamline and
accelerate existing processes.
We have seen this work firsthand at the Institute of International Finance, where
we have worked to help
our firms realize the benefits of the data and analytics revolution for financial
institutions. While finance
has long been a data-intensive industry, the big data revolution is unlocking new
ways to store, access, and
analyze information. Our firms are using machine learning–based algorithms to
detect complex fraud, while
reducing the number of false alerts. Some are using robots to autonomously act on
alerts by gathering 1
information from internal databases and systems, Internet-based sources, and social
media.
To make full use of new technologies, firms and governments will need to further
improve data quality and
security, upgrade legacy information technology infrastructures and information
sharing mechanisms, and
adapt their internal cultures to fast-paced technological change. They also will
need to work together to
address regulatory obstacles.
Timothy D. Adams
President and CEO
Institute of International Finance;
Board Director
Atlantic Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3
performance and national security. The model led
to lower crime rates over twenty-
Big data also has its drawbacks. The flood of one months.2
According to The Predictive Policing
information—some of it useful, some not—can Company
(PredPol), the success of the predictive
overwhelm one’s ability to quickly and efficiently model used by
the Los Angeles Police Department
process data and take appropriate action. If we and Kent
Police has not only led to its permanent
fail to create and utilize methodologies and tools adoption by
both departments but also sparked
for effectively using big data, we may continue to deployment
across the United States in over fifty
drown in it. In the context of national security, lacking police
departments including in Atlanta, Georgia,
adequate big data tools could have profound, even and Modesto,
California.3
deadly, consequences. However, there are steps In the
financial realm, increases in the amount and
that we can take now—steps that are already being type of data
that can be collected, processed, and
taken in many cases—to ensure that we successfully analyzed help
central banks, private banks, and
harness the power of big data. other
financial institutions better ensure compliance,
This publication looks at how big data can maximize conduct due
diligence, and mitigate risk. Whether
the efficiency and effectiveness of government tracking
cybercrime, unravelling a web of terrorist
and business, while minimizing modern risks. Five financing, or
putting an end to money laundering,
authors explore big data across three cross-cutting big data can
offer these institutions new methods
issues: security, finance, and law. for ensuring
economic security.
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
CHAPTER 1
L
Els De Busser
aw enforcement and intelligence agencies need to
comply with
Senior Lecturer,
5
European Criminal Law; specific legal frameworks when gathering and
processing personal
Senior Researcher, data for the purposes of criminal investigations
and national security.
Centre of Expertise Private companies need to comply with specific legal
frameworks when
Cyber Security, The
Hague University of gathering and processing personal data for the purpose
of commercial
Applied Sciences activities.
4 On January 24, 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied the US
Department of Justice’s petition for a rehearing.
5 Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data (the Convention),” January 28, 1981, ETS No. 108,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
rms/0900001680078b37.
6 Daniel Banisar and Simon Davies, “Global trends in privacy protection: an
international survey of privacy, data protection and
surveillance laws and developments,” J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., 18
(1999): 13-14 and William J. Long and M.P. Quek,
“Personal data privacy protection in an age of globalization: the US-EU
safe harbor compromise,” Journal of European Public
Policy, 9 (2002): 330.
7 OECD, “Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data,” 2013, http://www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/privacy.htm.
8 The draft protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (Convention 108) was finalized by the responsible Ad Hoc
Committee on Data Protection on June 15-16,
2016, and is awaiting adoption by the CoE Committee of Ministers following
consultation of the Parliamentary Assembly.
For the full text of the draft protocol, see: CoE, September 2016, “Draft
Modernised Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data,”
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a616c.
9 These legal instruments are considered most relevant because they cover the
two widest categories of data processing:
processing for commercial purposes and processing for law enforcement
purposes. Further legal instruments covering data
protection are Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, “On The Protection Of
Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal
Data By The Community Institutions And Bodies And On The Free Movement Of
Such Data,” Official Journal of the European
Communities, L 8, January 12, 2001; Directive 2002/58/EC, “Concerning The
Processing Of Personal Data And The Protection Of
Privacy In The Electronic Communications Sector,” Official Journal of the
European Communities, L 201 , July 31, 2002, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:201:0037:0047:en:PDF.
10 Directive 95/46/EC, “On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement
of Such Data,” Official Journal of the European Communities, L 281,
November 23, 1995, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF.
11 Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, “On the Protection of Personal Data
Processed in the Framework of Police and
CHAPTER 1 Big Data: The Conflict Between Protecting Privacy and Securing
Nations
Members of the European Parliament vote on the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR)
Directive, which would
oblige airlines to hand EU countries their passengers’ data in order to help
the authorities to fight terrorism
and serious crimes. Photo credit: Reuters/Vincent Kessler.
9
the request would trigger consequences in the One of the
data protection standards applicable
United States, but complying with it may violate EU in the CoE,
and thus in the EU, is the purpose
data protection laws. This section focuses on the limitation
principle and the necessity requirement
instruments used for requesting personal data and that is
inherently connected to it. This means that
some of the conflicts that have arisen. the gathering
of personal data should be done only
for a specific
and legitimate purpose. Processing
Direct Access for a purpose
that is incompatible with the original
Direct access to data is the most intrusive type of purpose is not
allowed unless the following
instrument for one country to obtain data held by conditions are
met: the processing should be
another country, as it touches upon the sovereignty provided for
by law, it should be necessary, and it
of the country granting access. Additionally, the should be
proportionate. The necessity requirement
country granting access wishes to retain some kind includes those
cases in which personal data need
of control over the processing of its data by the to be
processed for the purpose of the suppression
other country. For these reasons, both countries of criminal
offenses. This allows, in particular, the
involved will have to reach a prior agreement on use—by law
enforcement authorities—of data that
the circumstances under which direct access can be were
previously gathered in a commercial setting
allowed. such as data
related to the purchase of an airline
ticket. The
necessity requirement implies, however,
Direct access to PNR data, before those passengers that the data
are necessary in a specific criminal
board a flight from the EU to any US destination, investigation,
and thus mass collection of data is
was the subject of a number of PNR agreements not considered
necessary, even if such data could
between 2004 and 2012. The reason for the request be useful.
for direct access was a pre-screening process that
27 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law no. 107-71, November
19, 2001.
28 See Section 7210, Exchange of Terrorist Information and Increased
Preinspection at Foreign Airports, Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law no. 108-458, December 17, 2004.
29 For an overview, see Els De Busser, EU-US Data Protection Cooperation in
Criminal Matters (Antwerp: Maklu, 2009), 358-384.
30 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the
use and transfer of passenger name records
to the United States Department of Homeland Security (PNR Agreement), Official
Journal, L 215, August 11, 20121, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22012A0811(01).
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
31 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union
on the use and transfer of passenger name records to
the United States Department of Homeland Security (PNR Agreement), Article
15.
32 Charles Doyle, Administrative subpoenas in criminal investigations.
33 See, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which
followed the signing by President George W. Bush of
Executive Order 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions
With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism,” 50 USC § 1702, September 23, 2001.
34 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub.L. 106–102, November 12, 1999.
35 Belgian Data Protection Commission, Opinion no. 37/2006, Opinion on
the transfer of personal data by the CSLR SWIFT by
virtue of UST (OFAC) subpoenas, September 27, 2006.
36 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America
on the processing and transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program, Official Journal of the European Union, L 195, July 27, 2010,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2010%3A195%3ATOC.
37 Applicable US legislation is 18 USC Chapter 109 and Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
38 Required disclosure of customer communications or records, 18 US Code
(USC) § 2703, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
text/18/2703.
CHAPTER 1 Big Data: The Conflict Between Protecting Privacy and Securing
Nations
39 Recent cases, “In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled &
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466
(US District Court New York, 2014),” Harvard Law Review, 128 (2015): 1019.
40 In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (United States
District Court, SDNY, 2014), 25.4.2014, 12, https://casetext.com/case/in-re-
of-184.
41 Ibid.
42 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, No. 14-2985, In the Matter of a
Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation.
43 See also Orin Kerr, “The surprising implications of the Microsoft/Ireland
warrant case,” Washington Post, November 29, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/29/the-
surprising-implications-of-the-microsoftireland-
warrant-case/?utm_term=.b12c9264b191.
44 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, No. 14-2985, In the Matter of a
Warrant to Search.
45 See Jennifer Daskal, “A proposed fix to the Microsoft Ireland Case,” Just
Security, January 27, 2017, Microsoft v US, 2nd US Circuit
Court of Appeals, No. 14-2985; Jennifer Daskal, “Congress needs to fix our
outdated email privacy law,” Slate, January 26, 2017,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
future_tense/2017/01/the_confusing_court_case_over_microsoft_data_on_servers_
in_ireland.html; and Centre for Democracy and Technology, “Latest Microsoft-
Ireland case ruling affirms U.S. warrants do not
reach data stored outside the U.S.,” January 26, 2017,
https://cdt.org/press/latest-microsoft-ireland-case-ruling-affirms-u-s-
warrants-do-not-reach-data-stored-outside-the-u-s/.
46 Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention, ETS No. 185, November 23, 2001,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf.
47 50 USC §436, Requests by Authorized Investigative Agencies, and 438,
Definitions.
48 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act and
the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
14
A robotic tape library used for mass storage of digital data is pictured at
the Konrad-Zuse Centre for applied
mathematics and computer science (ZIB), in Berlin. Photo credit:
Reuters/Thomas Peter.
15
Microsoft case.66
Recommendations
A second indication offered by the expert group is
As described
above, national rather than regional
to make a distinct choice for the law offering the
laws are the
primary binding legal instruments for
best protection of personal data. As much as this
data
protection and criminal or national security
could be a morally valuable criterion, the question
investigations.
is: how does one define “best protection”? When
considering systems like those of the United States Traditionally,
ad hoc agreements have been used in
and the EU, where protections take different forms, an attempt to
bridge conflicts of laws, but they have
the criterion of best protection could be defined triggered
difficult and protracted negotiations,
only by means of general requirements including leaving the
parties and affected citizens in legal
the presence of supervisory authorities, judicial uncertainty
for quite some time. Likewise, the
complaint mechanisms, transparency, etc. Using existing
mutual legal assistance mechanisms are
general requirements for deciding on the most unpopular
since they do not bring quick results in
protective system defies the purpose, because a context
where fast responses are essential. There
both countries will fulfill the requirements—e.g., the are possible
alternatives, however, which include
presence of supervisory authorities—but with their the following:
own version of them.
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
CHAPTER 2
A
Erica J. Briscoe
critical element in any institution is the
existence of a trusting
Chief Scientist ATAS
17
Laboratory, Georgia Tech environment, which allows people to interact
with one another
Research Institute without fear of adverse effects either on
their professional or
personal lives. Preservation of trust, however, is
challenging. The rising
number of threats to cybersecurity, fueled by an
increasing reliance on
data-driven devices, is coupled with a growing unease
about the power
that overseers tasked with ensuring that security (both
corporate and
government) possess as a result of their access. When
taken in context with
several high-profile cases of espionage, intellectual
property (IP) theft, and
workplace violence, both the private and public sectors
are faced with a
common challenge: How can institutions leverage
technology to decrease
their risks, especially those that involve malicious
human behavior (such
as insider threats)? This question cannot be answered
without a careful
consideration of how technology solutions affect those
involved. How can
these institutions minimize their vulnerability to
threats, while maintaining
an ethical, legal, and privacy-respecting environment?
While there are no
easy answers to these questions, recent research and
security programs
have shed some light on how a balance may be achieved,
through a
combination of technology and policy-driven solutions.
Regardless of
the responses devised to suffice today, given our
increasingly automated
world, institutions and the public will likely need to
revisit this question
continuously, ideally informed by both shared
experiences and evolving
research into human behavior.
19
Table 2.1: Identified Insider Threat Types and Their Associated Behavior
and Related Indicators.
Threat Behavior Associated Activities
Behavioral Indicators
Unauthorized copying/
information
downloading
Unauthorized copying/
Theft of financial information
downloading
Fraud Modification of sensitive
financial hardship
Unauthorized access
Communications exhibiting
Destruction or modification of
unprofessional behavior or
Sabotage sensitive information or software
grievances
that will have detrimental
results
anger/resentment
Unauthorized copying/
Transmission of sensitive
downloading
IP Theft information
Unauthorized access
based automotive company that was a
Xiang Dong Yu IP Theft
attempts, sharing
direct competitor of Ford. Before resigning,
passwords
Yu copied 4,000 system design documents
onto an external hard drive, which he later
Unauthorized copying/
copied onto his new employer’s computer.a
downloading
In 1996, after being told he was fired,
Lloyd planted a software “time bomb”
in a server at Omega Engineering’s
Unauthorized copying/
Bridgeport, NJ, manufacturing plant. “The
downloading
Tim Lloyd
Sabotage
software destroyed the programs that ran
Stress indicators, e.g.,
the company’s manufacturing machines,
from financial hardship
costing Omega more than $10 million in
losses.”b
Unauthorized access
Discovered in 2007, Sullivan stole 2.3
million bank and credit card records from
Communications
his employer, Certegy, a check processing
exhibiting unprofessional
William Sullivan Fraud
company, including names, addresses,
behavior or grievances
phone numbers, birth dates, and bank
account information to sell.c
Stress indicators, such as
from anger/resentment
Snowden worked as a US National Security
21
Agency contractor who, in 2013, leaked
a trove of documents about top-secret
surveillance programs. He has been
Edward
Unauthorized copying,
charged “in the United States with theft
Espionage
Snowden of government property, unauthorized
downloading
communication of national defense
information, and willful communication of
classified [communications] intelligence.”d
a. US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Michigan, “Chinese national
sentenced for stealing ford trade secrets,” April 12, 2011,
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/detroit/press-releases/2011/de041211.htm.
b. Sharon Gaudin, “Computer sabotage verdict set aside,” Computer World, July
12, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2596062/networking/computer-sabotage-verdict-set-aside.html.
c. Reuters, “Guilty plea in fidelity Nat’l data theft case,” November 29, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/certegy-theft-
idUSN2933291420071129.
d. Peter Finn and Sari Horwitz, “U.S. charges Snowden with espionage,”
Washington Post, June 21, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-
espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-
92547bf094cc_story.html.
83 Carly L. Huth, David W. Chadwick, William R. Claycomb, and Ilsun You, “Guest
editorial: A brief overview of data leakage and
insider threats,” Information Systems Frontiers 15, 2013.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
•
“False sense of entitlement” or a “lack of ac-
“The motivations behind
knowledgement” causing a “desire for revenge”
insider threat behavior •
“Personal and social frustrations, anger,
differ according to the
alienation, dislike of authority and an inclination
for
revenge”
specific individuals and their •
Computer-focused, aggressive loners, intrin-
particular circumstances.”
sically rewarded by exploring networks, code
90 Marisa Randazzo, Michelle Keeney, Eileen Kowalski, Dawn Cappelli, and Andrew
Moore, Insider threat study: Illicit cyber activity
in the banking and finance sector, No. CMU/SEI-2004-TR-021, Carnegie-Mellon
University, Software Engineering Institute, 2005.
91 Splunk, “Machine Learning Reveals Insider Threats,” last accessed March 20,
2017, https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/
premium-solutions/user-behavior-analytics/insider-threats.html.
92 David B. Skillicorn, “Computational approaches to suspicion in adversarial
settings,” Information Systems Frontiers 13, 2011.
93 Rudolph L. Mappus and Erica Briscoe, “Layered behavioral trace modeling for
threat detection,” International Conference on
Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2013.
94 Scott Shane and David E. Sanger, “N.S.A. suspect is a hoarder. But a leaker?
Investigators aren’t sure,” New York Times, October
6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/us/politics/nsa-suspect-is-a-
hoarder-but-a-leaker-investigators-arent-sure.html.
95 Roger Parloff, “Spy tech that reads your mind.”
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
26
102 Lee Hutchinson, “Four hundred miles with Tesla’s autopilot forced me
to trust the machine,” May 22, 2016, http://arstechnica.
com/cars/2016/05/four-hundred-miles-with-teslas-autopilot-forced-me-to-
trust-the-machine/.
103 John Lee and Katrina A. See, “Trust in automation: Designing for
appropriate reliance,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society 46, 2004.
104 Davide Castelvecchi, “Can we open the blackbox of AI?,” Nature 538,
2016.
CHAPTER 2 Big Data: Exposing the Risks from Within
105 Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton, “Deep learning,” Nature 521,
2015.
106 Jayavardhana Gubbi, Rajkumar Buyya, Slaven Marusic, and Marimuthu
Palaniswami. “Internet of Things (IoT): A vision,
architectural elements, and future directions,” Future Generation Computer
Systems 29, 2013.
107 Euijin Choo, Jianchun Jiang, and Ting Yu, “COMPARS: toward an empirical
approach for comparing the resilience of reputation
systems,” Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application
security and privacy, March 3–5, 2014.
108 Timothy Morey, Theodore Theo Forbath, and Allison Schoop, “Customer data:
Designing for transparency and trust,” Harvard
Business Review 93, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-
for-transparency-and-trust.
109 Ibid.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
28
CHAPTER 3 Big Data: The Latest Tool in Fighting Crime
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
CHAPTER 3
A
Benjamin C. Dean
confluence of trends around digital
technologies, data collection,
President, Iconoclast Tech
29
and data analysis over the past two decades
has brought new
opportunities and challenges to public and
private organizations
alike. Digital technologies and data analysis can and
are increasingly used
to identify “bad actors” so as to detect and deter or
prevent fraud, money
laundering, bribery, terrorism, regulatory non-
compliance, and other
criminal activities. A variety of techniques are now
used including profiling,
metadata collection, network analysis, data fusion,
and predictive analytics.
While powerful when used properly, data and data
analysis are still subject
to statistical and economic limitations.
Organizations require people with
new skills and a realistic understanding of what
these technologies can
and cannot do to be able to effectively deploy these
technologies and
analytical techniques.
Definitions
“Bad actors” are defined as those individuals or
entities whose activities
are in contravention of the laws or policies of the
United States and
other authorities. Examples of such actors include
transnational criminal
organizations and human traffickers; those conducting
financial crimes
such as counterfeiting, money laundering, and fraud;
terrorists and terrorist
organizations; and malicious actors in cyberspace,
which encompasses
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
30
An illegal diamond dealer from Zimbabwe displays diamonds for sale in Manica,
near the border with
Zimbabwe. Photo credit: Reuters/Goran Tomasevic.
Micro-expressions
(brief
involuntary facial
expressions)
Source: DoD, Identity Activities.
121 Shane Harris, The Watchers: The Rise of America’s Surveillance State
(New York: Penguin Books, 2010).
122 Federation of American Scientists, Congressional Record: September 24,
2003 (House) H8500-H8550, 2003, https://fas.org/sgp/
congress/2003/tia.html.
123 Mark Williams Pontin, The Total Information Awareness Project Lives
On, MIT Technology Review, 2006, https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/405707/the-total-information-awareness-project-
lives-on/.
124 Shane Harris, “TIA Lives On,” National Journal, February 23, 2006,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110528231531/http://
shaneharris.com/magazinestories/tia-lives-on/.
125 Ibid.
126 Jonathan Rae, “Will It Ever Be Possible to Profile the Terrorist?”
Journal of Terrorism Research 3, no. 2 (2012): DOI: http://doi.
org/10.15664/jtr.380.
127 William Press, “Strong Profiling Is Not Mathematically Optimal for
Discovering Rare Malfeasors,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 6 (2008):
1716-1719.
128 Aline Robert, “Big Data Revolutionises Europe’s Fight against
Terrorism,” Euroactiv.fr, June 23, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/
section/digital/news/big-data-revolutionises-europes-fight-against-
terrorism/.
129 Jenn Riley, Understanding Metadata: What Is Metadata, and What Is It
For?, National Information Standards Organization, 2004,
http://www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf.
CHAPTER 3 Big Data: The Latest Tool in Fighting Crime
130 Information primarily taken from Alan Rusbridger, “Panama: The Hidden
Trillions,” New York Review of Books, Issue 27, October 2016.
131 Glyn Moody, “Panama Papers: Denmark to Pay $1.3M Plus for Leaked Data to
Probe Tax Evasion,” Ars Technica, September 9,
2016, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/09/panama-papers-denmark-
payout-data-tax-evasion-probe/.
132 Greg Satell, How the NSA Uses Social Network Analysis to Map Terrorist
Networks, DigitalTonto, June 12, 2013, http://www.
digitaltonto.com/2013/how-the-nsa-uses-social-network-analysis-to-map-
terrorist-networks/.
133 Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification,
Social Networks 1 (1978/79): 215-239.
134 Malcolm K. Sparrow, “Application of Network Analysis to Criminal
Intelligence,” Social Networks 13, no. 3 (September 1991): 251-274.
135 Valdis Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, no. 3
(2001): 43-52.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
152 Vitalik Buterin, “On Public and Private Blockchains,” Ethereum Blog,
August 7, 2015, https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/.
153 Grace Caffyn, “Everledger Brings Blockchain Tech to Fight against
Diamond Theft,” CoinDesk, August 1, 2015, http://www.
coindesk.com/everledger-blockchain-tech-fight-diamond-theft/.
154 “On Blockchain, Diamonds Are Forever,” Rakuten Today, October 4, 2016,
https://rakuten.today/blog/everledger-blockchain-
diamonds-forever.html.
155 Steve Wilson, “Blockchain Plain and Simple,” Constellation Research,
January 30, 2017, https://www.constellationr.com/blog-
news/blockchain-plain-and-simple.
156 Grace Caffyn, “Everledger Brings Blockchain Tech to Fight against
Diamond Theft.”
CHAPTER 3 Big Data: The Latest Tool in Fighting Crime
Recommendations
A number
of lessons on how to successfully deploy
Box 3.6. Gouré, Kellan, and RAND’s Vietnam digital
technologies and data analytics emerge from
Motivation and Morale Project165 the
various cases covered in this chapter. These
lessons
form the basis for the recommendations
38 During the Vietnam War, to understand below.
whether the US-led carpet bombing campaign
was reducing the morale of the Vietcong •
Invest in people with the skills and knowledge:
fighters and North Vietnamese citizens, the A
broad skill set is required to correctly secure,
RAND Corporation extensively interviewed
scan, index, search, store, order, distribute, and
North Vietnamese prisoners and defectors. edit
data as well as visualize/communicate
Starting in 1964, the original leader of the
findings from data analysis. Very rarely does
RAND project, Leon Gouré, interpreted from any
one person possess all of these skills, so
the sixty-one thousand pages of extensive data
multidisciplinary teams must be formed to
collection and analysis (the big data of its day)
successfully use digital technologies and data
that the bombing campaign was successful
analysis. Organizations should take this into
(i.e., the Vietcong’s morale was falling). One of
account when considering the adoption and
his colleagues, Konrad Kellan, later reviewed
subsequent use of these technologies.
the interviews in 1965. Kellan postulated a
different interpretation, concluding that the •
Ask whether data analysis is appropriate
opposite (and ultimately correct) outcome was for
answering the desired question: Digital
occurring, namely, that the bombing campaign
technologies and data analysis are relatively
only reinforced the morale of the Vietcong and
better suited to solving some problems, such
citizens of North Vietnam.166 as
optimization, than others, particularly
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
CHAPTER 4
T
Tatiana Tropina
he relatively new phenomenon of big data has
rapidly become both
Senior Researcher, Max
41
Planck Institute for a promise and a challenge. Big data solutions
are praised by some
Foreign and International as technologies that will change the world,
criticized by others as
Criminal Law threats to privacy, acclaimed to be a silver bullet to
myriad issues, called
a “buzzword tsunami,” and used as a source of
inspiration for utopian and
dystopian scenarios; big data has quickly become
central to many policy
debates. Governments, law enforcement agencies, and
the private sector
are currently trying to grasp the benefits of the huge
amounts of data
generated and processed daily and exploring how big
data can help them
perform better in different areas—from healthcare to
preventive policing
and from targeted advertising to research and
innovation, to name but a
few. Meanwhile, criminals strive to use big data to
their advantage as well.
168 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the High
Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 2015,
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.
pdf; see also “Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs),”
World Bank, 2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity/brief/illicit-financial-
flows-iffs.
169 Europol, Threat Assessment: Internet Facilitated Organized Crime, The
Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, File No.:
2530–264, The Hague, January 7, 2011,
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/iocta.pdf; see also
Candid
Wueest, “Underground Black Market: Thriving Trade in Stolen Data,
Malware, and Attack Services,” Symantec Official Blog,
November 20, 2015, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/underground-
black-market-thriving-trade-stolen-data-malware-
and-attack-services
170 For example, according to SecureWorks, in 2015-2016 the price for
stolen credit card credentials varied from $4–$80 per item,
the price for stolen online payment account credentials varied from $20
to $149 per item depending on the account balance, and
the full packages of identity information were traded for $15–$65. See
Dell, SecureWorks, Underground Hacker Markets, Annual
Report – April 2016,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/secureworks_hacker_annualreport.pd
f.
171 Hanno Fallmann, Gilbert Wondracek, and Christian Platzer, “Covertly
Probing Underground Economy Marketplaces,” Vienna
University of Technology Secure Systems Lab, 2010,
http://www.iseclab.org/papers/dimva2010_underground.pdf; Europol, The
Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA), 2014,
https://www.eurssopol.europa.eu/content/internet-organized-crime-
threat-assesment-iocta.
CHAPTER 4 Big Data: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows
172 Yuval Ben-Itzhak, “The Cybercrime 2.0 Evolution,” ISSA Journal, June 2008,
http://professor.unisinos.br/llemes/Aula01/
CybercrimeEvolution; Tatiana Tropina, “Organized Crime in Cyberspace” in
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Regine Schönenberg
(eds.), Transnational Organized Crime: Analyses of a Global Challenge to
Democracy, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2013, 47-60.
173 Europol, iOCTA.
174 Joanna Paraszczuk, “IS Militants Use Popular Russian Web Payment System to
Raise Cash,” Radio Free Europe, May, 17, 2015,
http://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-funding-russian-web-payments-
qiwi/27021379.html.
175 FinCEN, Statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, United States Department of
the Treasury, November 19, 2013,
https://www.fincen.gov/news/testimony/statement-jennifer-shasky-calvery-director-
financial-
crimes-enforcement-network.
176 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach:
Virtual Currencies, 2015, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf.
177 FATF, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, 2015, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-
Financing-Risks.pdf, 36.
178 Sam Rubenfeld, “Foreign Terror-Fighters Fundraise on Social Media,
Crowdfunding Sites,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2015,
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/10/21/foreign-terror-fighters-
fundraise-on-social-media-crowdfunding-sites/;
FATF, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, 31-32.
179 Such concerns were especially raised after it became known that Syed Rizwan
Farook, one of the two shooters responsible for
the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, on December 2, 2015, was
able to get a loan of $28,500 through an online peer-
to-peer lending website (see, e.g., Darrell Delamaide “Loan to Terror Couple
Challenges Regulators,” USA Today, December 15,
2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/12/15/shooting-terrorism-
online-loans-san-bernardino/77358520/).
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
180 Yaya Fanusie, “The New Frontier in Terror Fundraising: Bitcoin,” The
Cipher Brief, August 24, 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.
com/column/private-sector/new-frontier-terror-fundraising-bitcoin-1089.
181 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, OECD/G20
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD
Publishing, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-challenges-digital-economy-
discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf.
182 Internal Revenue Service, IRS Intensifies Work on Identity Theft and
Refund Fraud; Criminal Investigation Enforcement Actions
Underway across the Nation, 2014, https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-
intensifies-work-on-identity-theft-and-refund-fraud-
criminal-investigation-enforcement-actions-underway-across-the-nation.
183 Key definitions: Placement—depositing money into the financial system,
layering—distancing money from its source through a
series of transactions, and integration—the commingling of money with
funds in legal sectors.
184 Wojciech Filipkowski, “Cyber Laundering: An Analysis of Typology and
Techniques,” International Journal of Criminal Justice
Sciences (IJCJS) 3, no. 1 (2008): 15-27.
185 National Drug Intelligence Center, Money Laundering in Digital
Currencies, US Department of Justice, 2008, http://www.justice.
gov/archive/ndic/pubs28/28675/28675p.pdf.
186 Tatiana Tropina, “Fighting Money Laundering in the Age of Online
Banking, Virtual Currencies and Internet Gambling,” ERA
Forum 15, no. 1 (June 2014): 69-84.
187 Council of Europe, Criminal Money Flows on the Internet: Methods,
Trends, and Multi-stakeholder Counteraction, Moneyval Research
Report, March 2012,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Activities/MONEYVAL(2013)6_Reptyp_flo
ws_en.pdf, 36.
188 FATF, Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of
Commercial Websites and Internet Payment Systems, 2008,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/.
CHAPTER 4 Big Data: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows
45
A woman looks at a map showing where eight members belonging to a New York-based
cell of a global cyber
criminal organization withdrew money from ATM machines. The US government charged
eight individuals with
using data obtained by hacking into two credit card processors in a worldwide
scheme that netted some $45
million within hours, a crime prosecutors described as one of the biggest bank
heists in history.
Photo credit: Reuters/Lucas Jackson.
189 Council of Europe, Criminal Money Flows on the Internet; see also Christine
Victoria Thomason, “How Has the Establishment
of the Internet Changed the Ways in Which Offenders Launder Their Dirty
Money?” Internet Journal of Criminology, July
2009,
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Thomason_Internet_Money_Laundering_July
_09.pdf and Stephen J.
Weaver, “Modern Day Money Laundering: Does the Solution Exist in an Expansive
System of Monitoring and Record Keeping
Regulations?” Annual Review of Banking & Financial Law 24, 2005: 443-465.
190 John Villasenor, Christopher Bronk, and Cody Monk, Shadowy Figures: Tracking
Illicit Financial Transactions in the Murky
World of Digital Currencies, Peer-to-Peer Networks, and Mobile Device
Payments, The Brookings Institution and the James
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, August 29, 2011,
http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/d9048418/ITP-pub-
FinancialTransactions-082911.pdf. See also LIRNEasia & UP–NCPAG, Mobile
Banking, Mobile Money and Telecommunication
Regulations, 2008, http://lirneasia.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Mobile-
2.0_Final_Hor_EA.pdf.
191 Jean-Loup Richet, Laundering Money Online: A Review of Cybercriminals
Methods: Tools and Resources for Anti-corruption
Knowledge, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, June 1, 2013,
arxiv.org/pdf/1310.2368; see also Giulio Piller and Elvis
Zaccariotto, “Cyber-Laundering: The Union between New Electronic Payment
Systems and Criminal Organizations,” Transition
Studies Review 16, no. 1 (2009): 62-76, and Tropina, “Fighting Money
Laundering in the Age of Online Banking.”
192 Danton Bryans, “Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective
Solution,” Indiana Law Journal 89, August 29, 2013,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2317990, 1; Europol, iOCTA, and TRACFIN, Regulating
Virtual Currencies, 2014, http://www.economie.
gouv.fr/files/regulatingvirtualcurrencies.pdf.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
193 Filipkowski, “Cyber Laundering.” See also Council of Europe, The Use
of Online Gambling for Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism Purposes, 2013,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/activities/MONEYVAL(2013)9_
Onlinegambling.pdf and Ingo Fiedler, Online Gambling as a Game Changer to
Money Laundering? Institute of Commercial Law,
University of Hamburg, April 30, 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261266.
194 TRACFIN, Regulating Virtual Currencies; see also Europol, iOCTA.
195 Raymond D. Moss, “Civil Rights Enforcement in the Era of Big Data:
Algorithmic Discrimination and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act,” March 9, 2016, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 48.1, 2016:
1.
196 Marc Goodman, Future Crimes (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, 2015), 137.
197 Colin Tankard, “Big Data Security,” Network Security 2012, no. 7 (July
2012): 5–6.
198 Jose Gutierrez, Thomas Anzelde, and Galliane Gobenceaux, Risk and
Reward: The Effect of Big Data on Financial Services,
Leading Trends in Information Technology, Stanford University, Summer
2014, https://web.stanford.edu/class/msande238/
projects/2014/BigDataFinance.pdf, 18; Lidong Wang and Cheryl Ann
Alexander, “Big Data in Distributed Analytics, Cybersecurity,
Cyber Warfare, and Digital Forensics,” Digital Technologies 1, no. 1
(2015): 22-27, doi: 10.12691/dt-1-1-5, and Tankard, “Big Data
Security,” 5-6.
199 Brian Krebs, Experian Sold Consumer Data to ID Theft Service, Krebs on
Security, October 20, 2013, https://krebsonsecurity.
com/2013/10/experian-sold-consumer-data-to-id-theft-service/.
200 Trend Micro, Addressing Big Data Security Challenges: The Right Tools
for Smart Protection, 2012, http://www.trendmicro.de/
media/wp/addressing-big-data-security-challenges-whitepaper-en.pdf, 4.
201 Europol, Exploring Tomorrow’s Organized Crime, 2015.
202 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4 Big Data: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows
49
records were scraped and compiled to identify authority
(Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs,
critical nodes and patterns, which were further or HMRC)
employs the big data tool Connect
verified by journalists.226 The analysis resulted in a to detect
tax evasion and tax fraud. Connect
documentary, which was broadcast in Denmark, makes it
possible to bring together and
and sparked the launch of a further investigation by analyze
billions of pieces of HMRC internal
the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.227 data. It
performs searches of information,
which would
otherwise be difficult to find, to
In the United States, FinCEN uses advanced elicit
patterns and connections that uncover
analytics tools to detect terrorist financing. The crime. HMRC
reported that between April
data gathered by FinCEN—via special rules that 2013 and
April 2014 it was able to recover £2.6
help identify transactions by particular terrorist billion by
using this technology, with an initial
organizations—generate matches in advanced investment
of £45 million (including five years
data analytics systems for review and exploration. of running
costs).231
222 PwC, Goods Gone Bad: Addressing Money-Laundering Risk in the Trade Finance
System, January 2015, http://www.pwc.com/us/
en/risk-assurance-services/publications/assets/pwc-trade-finance-aml.pdf.
223 Ibid., 13.
224 Global Financial Integrity, “GFI Launches Database—GFTrade—to Help Developing
Countries Generate Millions in Additional
Public Revenue,” November 9, 2016, http://www.gfintegrity.org/press-
release/gfi-launches-database-gftrade-to-help-developing-
countries-generate-millions-in-additional-public-revenue/.
225 Statewatch, Note on Big Data, Crime, and Security: Civil Liberties, Data
Protection, and Privacy Concerns, April 3, 2014, http://
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-242-big-data.pdf, 2.
226 EurActive, Big Data Revolutionizes Europe’s Fight against Terrorism, 2016,
https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/
big-data-revolutionises-europes-fight-against-terrorism/; see also Global
Editors Network, “The VAT Hustlers,” 2016, http://
community.globaleditorsnetwork.org/content/vat-hustlers-0.
227 The Local DK, “Terror Suspects Tied to VAT Scam in Denmark,” January 25,
2016, http://www.thelocal.dk/20160125/terror-
suspects-tied-to-financial-fraud-in-denmark.
228 FinCEN, Statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery.
229 C. Todd Gibson, Michael McGrath, and Ken Juster, FinCEN Proposal to Impose
AML Obligations on US Funding Portals, K&L
Gates, 2016, https://www.fintechlawblog.com/2016/05/fincen-proposal-to-
impose-aml-obligations-on-u-s-funding-portals.
230 Charles S. Clark, “IRS and SEC Detect Fraud Patterns in Heaps of Data,”
Government Executive, October 16, 2012, http://www.
govexec.com/technology/2012/10/irs-and-sec-detect-fraud-patterns-heaps-
data/58816/.
231 United Kingdom Houses of Parliament, “Big Data, Crime, and Security,”
Postnote, July 2014, 3.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
50
Big data analytics can help law enforcement agencies with criminal
investigations, allowing them to deal with
large amounts of data to identify connections between seemingly unrelated
pieces of information.
Photo credit: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst.
232 Justin Heinze, “Fighting Crime with Data: How Law Enforcement Is
Leveraging Big Data Analytics to Keep Us Safe,” Better
Buys, 2014, https://www.betterbuys.com/bi/fighting-crime-with-data/; “How
Big Data Analytics Can Be the Difference for
Law Enforcement,” SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-
fraud/big-data-analytics-for-law-enforcement.html;
Abdullahi Muhammed, “A Look into Big Data Applications for Law
Enforcement,” Smart Data Collective, 2016, http://www.
smartdatacollective.com/oxygenmat/382813/look-big-data-applications-law-
enforcement.
CHAPTER 4 Big Data: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows
233 Trendmicro, Addressing Big Data Security Challenges: The Right Tools for
Smart Protection, White Paper, 2012, http://www.
trendmicro.de/media/wp/addressing-big-data-security-challenges-whitepaper-
en.pdf; Surfwatch, Big Data, Big Mess, 2.
234 Articol Bănărescu, “Detecting and Preventing Fraud with Data Analytics,”
Emerging Markets, Queries in Finance and Business,
Procedia Economics and Finance 32, 2015: 1832–1833.
235 Conrad Constantine, “Big Data: An Information Security Context,” Network
Security, January 2014, 19. See also Surfwatch, Big
Data, Big Mess, 3.
236 Forest, Foo, Rose, and Berenzon, Big Data, 20.
237 Europol, Exploring Tomorrow’s Organized Crime, 43.
238 Forest, Foo, Rose, and Berenzon, Big Data, 21.
239 “Ten Arrested in Netherlands over Bitcoin Money-Laundering Allegation,”
Guardian, January 20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2016/jan/20/bitcoin-netherlands-arrests-cars-cash-ecstasy;
Daniel Dob, “Dutch Police Arrests 10 Men for
Bitcoin Money Laundering,” The Merkle, January 20, 2016,
http://themerkle.com/dutch-police-arrests-10-men-for-bitcoin-money-
laundering/; and Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “10
Arrested in Netherlands in Bitcoin Operation,” January
22, 2016, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/4841-10-arrested-in-netherlands-in-
bitcoin-operation.
240 Wang and Alexander, “Big Data in Distributed Analytics”; Neil Richards and
Jonathan King, “Three Paradoxes of Big Data,” 66
Stanford Law Review Online 41, September 3, 2013; Forest, Foo, Rose, and
Berenzon, Big Data; and Statewatch, “Note on Big Data.”
241 Houses of Parliament, Big Data, Crime and Security, 1.
242 Forest, Foo, Rose, and Berenzon, Big Data, 21.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
BIG DATA
A Twenty-First
Century Arms Race
CHAPTER 5
T
Miren B. Aparicio
he goal of financial crime legislation is to
enhance transparency in
Counsel and Senior
53
Consultant, The World financial transactions and restrict or prevent
criminals from using
Bank Global Practice banks and other non-financial sector entities to
launder money.
Financial integrity regulations help prevent money
laundering, terrorist
financing, bribery, and corruption,243 and big data is
used in conjunction
with regulatory obligations to help fight financial crime.
57
A woman holds bank notes at Banco Delta Asia in Macau, China. Photo credit:
Reuters/Paul Yeung.
266 US Department of Justice, The USA Patriot Act, Section 319(b) and
implementing regulations, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_
infobase/pages_manual/OLM_027.htm.
267 The final rule (§ 1010.230) released by the Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on May
6, 2016, to obtain and record beneficial ownership information will increase
the customer due diligence obligations of covered
financial institutions, which will have two years to implement the new
requirements on beneficial ownership, as part of their
obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act in Title 31.
268 The beneficial ownership definition includes any individual who owns directly
or indirectly 25 percent or more of the equity
interests of the corporate customer. See Department of the Treasury, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, Customer Due
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 31 CFR Parts 1010, 1020,
1023, et al., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-
05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf.
269 Ibid. Covered financial institutions include federal regulated banks and
credit unions, mutual funds, brokers and dealers in
securities, futures comissions merchants and introducing brokers in
commodities.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
fatfrecommendations/documents/riskbasedapproachguidanceforlegalprofessionals.html
273 Rachel Louise Ensign and Serena Ng, “Money Laundering Loophole: Law
Firms,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2016, A1 and A6.
274 US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Announces Key Regulations and
Legislation to Counter Money Laundering and Corruption,
Combat Tax Evasion,” Press Release, May 5, 2016,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0451.aspx.
275 US Department of Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order, February 21,
2017, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/
Real%20Estate%20GTO%20February%202017%20-%20Generic.pdf.
276 US Department of the Treasury, “FinCEN Renews Real Estate ‘Geographic
Targeting Orders’ to Identify High-End Cash Buyers in
Six Major Metropolitan Areas,” Press Release, February 23, 2017,
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-renews-real-
estate-geographic-targeting-orders-identify-high-end-cash.
277 Louise Story, “US to Expand Tracking of Home Purchases by Shell
Companies,” New York Times, July 27, 2016, http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/us-expands-program-to-track-secret-buyers-of-
luxury-real-estate.html?_r=0.
CHAPTER 5 Big Data: Mitigating Financial Crime Risk
from the FATF (grey) list of countries with strategic The 2015 FATF
report on Emerging Terrorist
deficiencies in February 2016.278 However, the leak Financing
Risks points to crowdfunding as an
of the law firm Mossack Fonseca shortly after alternative
way to transfer funds abroad for terrorism
(in April 2016) revealed the continued lack of finance
purposes, citing the FIU of Canada, which has
transparency and extended use of shell companies reported
several instances “where individuals under
to launder money and evade trade sanctions.279 It investigation
for terrorism-related offences, have
also suggested that FATF international surveillance used
crowdfunding websites prior to leaving and/or
of AML country frameworks should be strengthened attempting to
leave Canada.”282 Several cases link P2P
through independent reviews. lending or
crowdfunding platforms with terrorism
financing.
Online lending platforms should screen
A recent US State Department report points to the lenders and
investors against designated terrorist
country’s serious AML deficiencies: and
sanctioned entity lists, take steps to detect
Numerous factors hinder the fight against fake
investors, and report suspicious transactions.
money laundering, including the existence The
questionable due diligence practices of some
of bearer share corporations, a lack of crowdfunding
platforms internationally, combined
collaboration among government agencies, with
regulatory fragmentation, make crowdfunding
lack of experience with money laundering vulnerable to
exploitation by criminals.
investigations and prosecutions, inconsistent In the San
Bernardino, California, terrorist attack,
enforcement of laws and regulations, and a in which a
married couple killed fourteen people
weak judicial system susceptible to corruption and wounded
others, one of the shooters obtained
and favoritism. Money is laundered via bulk a loan from a
peer-to-peer lending site to finance
cash and trade by exploiting vulnerabilities at the
attack.283 The problem in this case was not the
the airport, using commercial cover and free source of
funding (which was legitimate), but the
trade zones (FTZs), and exploiting the lack of clients’
identification and end use of Syed Raheel
regulatory monitoring in many sectors of the Farook’s
loan, which was not to consolidate loans,
economy. The protection of client secrecy is as he had
alleged, but to purchase guns and
often stronger than authorities’ ability to pierce munition. P2P
lending risk lies in the anonymity of
the corporate veil to pursue an investigation.280 these loans,
compared with traditional bank loans
to a person
who has an account with the bank and 59
Fintech: Crowdfunding, Online Lending whose
financial activities can be monitored.
Platforms, P2P Lending
Online lending platforms, peer-to-peer (P2P) Another
potential threat is to cybersecurity
lending, and equity crowdfunding—the raising of and identity
theft. In October 2015, US
capital by selling unregistered securities to investors
telecommunications giant T-Mobile reported a data
or lenders over the Internet—are rapidly growing breach that
affected fifteen million customers. The
industries in the United States, United Kingdom (UK), stolen data
could be used to create fake lender or
and China, according to Morgan Stanley.281 However, investor
profiles to launder money. As an example,
Standard and Poor’s has raised concerns about the fake
investors (with stolen T-Mobile identities) could
online lending platforms’ capacity to comply with crowdfund a
sham company that purports to do
key financial regulatory principles and the quality of charitable
work abroad. The investors could transfer
the data that the platforms keep and on which they funds to the
company by purchasing (worthless)
base their loan underwriting decisions. equity, and
the company could transfer the money
abroad under
the guise of its business.
278 The Inter-American Development Bank drafted the new AML legislation, and
provided technical assistance to Panama to be
removed from the FATF grey list “Panamá prepara nueva ley contra el blanqueo
de capitals,” La Estrella De Panamá, August 12,
2014, http://laestrella.com.pa/economia/panama-prepara-nueva-contra-blanqueo-
capitales/23795230.
279 “The Lesson of the Panama Papers,” The Economist, April 9, 2016,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21696532-more-
should-be-done-make-offshore-tax-havens-less-murky-lesson-panama-papers.
280 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol.
II, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/
vol2/index.htm.
281 By 2020, Morgan Stanley forecasts online lenders will reach $47 billion, or
16 percent of total US small and medium enterprise
(SME) approvals, Smittipon Srethapramote et al., Global Marketplace Lending:
Disruptive Innovation in Financials, Morgan Stanley,
May 19, 2015, http://bebeez.it/wp-
content/blogs.dir/5825/files/2015/06/GlobalMarketplaceLending.pdf.
282 FATF, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, “Case Study 19: Crowdfunding,”
October 2015, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf, 31-32.
283 Darrell Delamaide, “Loan to Terror Couple Challenges Regulators,” USA Today,
December 15, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/2015/12/15/shooting-terrorism-online-loans-san-
bernardino/77358520/; “FBI Will Investigate San Bernardino
Shootings as Terrorist Act,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 4,
2015, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi-will-
investigate-san-bernardino-shootings-as-terrorist-act.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
292 See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and World Bank, General
Principles for International Remittance Services,
January 2007, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d76.pdf. “The World Bank Migration
Development Brief,” Issue No. 21, October
2013, 29; See also, “Let Them Remit,” The Economist, July 20, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21581995-western-worries-about-money-laundering-are-threatening-
economic-lifeline.
293 FATF, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, 2001, reviewed 2008,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/FATF%20Standards%20%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN
%20rc.pdf; see also World Bank,
Guidance Report for the Implementation of the CPSS-World Bank General
Principles for National Remittance Services, Financial
Infrastructure Series, 2007,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/paymentsystemsremittances/publication/guidance-
report-for-
the-implementation-of-the-cpss-wb-general-principles-for-international-
remittances, 24-26.
294 European Parliament, “The Impact of Remittances in Developing Countries”,
p.30 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/remittances_study_/remittances_study_en.pdf
295 Aruna Viswanatha and Brett Wolf, “HSBC to Pay $1.2 Billion US Fine in Money
Laundering Case,” Reuters, December 11, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211.
296 Raúl Herández-Coss, The US–Mexico Remittance Corridor: Lessons on Shifting
from Informal to Formal Transfer System, World
Bank Working Paper No. 47, February 2005,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871/US-
Mexico_Remittance_Corridor_WP.pdf.
297 International Monetary Fund, Mexico: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money
Laundering and Combating Terrorism, Country
Report, 2009, 130, paragraph 146.
298 Amit, “11 Money Transfer Companies Using Blockchain Technology,” Let’s Talk
Payments, October 23, 2015, https://
letstalkpayments.com/11-money-transfer-companies-using-blockchain-technology-
2/.
299 Kate, “19 Bitcoin Remittance Startups That Won’t Let the Cryptocurrency Die,”
Let’s Talk Payments, February 5, 2016, https://
letstalkpayments.com/19-bitcoin-remittance-startups-that-wont-let-the-
cryptocurrency-die/.
300 Chamber of Digital Commerce, Georgetown University, “Blockchain and Financial
Inclusion White Paper”, March 2017, p. 18-19,
http://finpolicy.georgetown.edu/newsroom/news/center-releases-white-paper-
blockchain-and-financial-inclusion
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
62
A chain of block erupters used for Bitcoin mining is pictured at the Plug and
Play Tech Center in Sunnyvale,
California October 28, 2013. A form of electronic money independent of
traditional banking, Bitcoins started
circulating in 2009 and have since become the most prominent of several
fledgling digital currencies.
Photo credit: Reuters/Stephen Lam.
attracted the attention of regulators. Due to the are not
necessarily associated with a real-world
anonymity afforded by these currencies, criminals identity.
It therefore offers a level of anonymity
are increasingly using virtual currency exchanges beyond
traditional credit and debit cards or online
and e-wallets to launder money. For instance, payment
systems, such as PayPal. The transactions
a high percentage of illicit financial flows from in
blockchain can be tracked, but mixers can be
developing countries are now being transferred used to
hide the transactions history of any client
through trade-based money-laundering methods so it
becomes easier to launder money without
to avoid detection. Using virtual currencies in such being
detected.302 Also, the transaction records
international transactions makes them almost may
reside with multiple entities located in different
untraceable.301
jurisdictions, which makes it difficult for law
63
engage in exchanging virtual currency for “real custodian
wallet providers and impose strict limits on
currency.” However, this gets more complicated prepaid
cards.312 Under the European Commission’s
when private users (who are not regulated) offer proposal to
expand the scope of the revised fourth
on classified websites to sell or buy bitcoins at a AMLD (or
5AMLD), VCE platforms and WPs would
premium or a discount, making the transaction become
“obliged entities” and have to implement
anonymous. A Louisiana chiropractor exchanged similar
preventive measures and report suspicious
more than $3 million in money orders through his transactions.
The new directive would also reduce
moneylaunderingterroristfinancingvulnerabilitiesofcommercialwebsitesandinternetpaym
entsystems.html.
307 Dong He et al., Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations,
International Monetary Fund, January 2016, SDN/16/03, 36.
308 Lester Coleman, “Arrests and Prosecutions Reveal Big Vagaries in Bitcoin
Selling Regulations,” Cryptocoin News, May 23, 2016,
https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/arrests-and-prosecutions-reveal-big-vagaries-
in-bitcoin-selling-regulations/.
309 New York State Department of Financial Services, New York Codes, Rules, and
Regulations, Title 23, Department of Financial
Services, Chapter I. Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Services,
Part 200. Virtual Currencies, http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf.
310 US Department of Treasury, “OCC to Consider Fintech Charter Applications,
Seeks Comment,” Press Release, December 2, 2016,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-
152.html.
311 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Evaluating Charter Applications
From Financial Technology Companies, Comptroller’s
Licensing Manual Draft Supplement, March 2017,
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-
pub-lm-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf.
312 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council Amending Directive (EU)
2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing and
Amending Directive 2009/101/EC, July 5, 2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/document/files/aml-directive_en.pdf; see
also Samantha Sheen, “ACAMS, 4AMLD Part 3: Virtual Currency Exchange
Platforms, E-Wallet Providers and Pre-Paid Cards,”
Advancing Financial Crime Professionals Worldwide, July 20, 2016,
http://www.acams.org/aml-resources/samantha-sheens-blog/
eu-proposals-to-bolster-fight-against-financial-crime/.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
65
included.326 Although there are notable differences
in the positions of the Council and the European Tools to
Mitigate Risks
Parliament, and depending on the final agreement, The elaboration
of customer risk profiles has been
the 5AMLD (or revised fourth AMLD) could widen recently called
the “fifth” pillar330 of an AML program,
transparency obligations by lowering the threshold due to the
substantial changes introduced by the
below 25 percent, so that more beneficial owners new FinCEN
legislation in 2016. The other four pillars
would need to be identified by banks. are policies,
training, compliance, and independent
audit functions.
A strong customer due diligence
The 5AMLD aims to reinforce such transparency program should
include the following information
obligations by also proposing to create public about customers:
the full identification of a customer
access by way of compulsory disclosure of certain and its
beneficial owners (for legal entities),
information on the beneficial ownership of trusts development of a
“client profile” and transaction
and other passive non-financial entities such as activity
profiles (or transaction monitoring) in
foundations. The 5AMLD needs to be adopted by the anticipation of
the projected customer’s activity,
338 FinCEN, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, in the matter of Eurobank, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, US Department of the Treasury,
2010,
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/AssessmentEurobank.pd
f.
339 Ibid., 4; see also Daniel Nathan and Alma Angotti, Securities Regulation &
Law Report, 44 SRLR 1410, 07/23/2012, The Bureau of
National Affairs, http://www.bna.com.
340 See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List, https://www.treasury.gov/
ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf; United Nations, Consolidated United Nations
Sanctions List, https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/
fop?
xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolida
ted.xsl; European External Action
Service, Consolidated List of Persons, Groups and Entities Subject to EU
Financial Sanctions, https://data.europa.eu/euodp/
en/data/dataset/consolidated-list-of-persons-groups-and-entities-subject-to-
eu-financial-sanctions; UK Treasury, Financial
Sanctions: Consolidated List of Targets,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-
of-
targets.
341 FINRA Notice,
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p003704.pdf.
342 Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Statement on AML Screening, Monitoring and
Searching, 2009, http://www.wolfsberg-principles.
com/pdf/standards/Wolfsberg_Monitoring_Screening_Searching_Paper_(2009).pdf,
3.
343 Screening process for PEPs and sanctions requires quality data, including
primary name; alias and alternate names; record
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
69
A taxi passes a company list showing the Mossack Fonseca law firm at the Arango
Orillac Building in Panama
City. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists released a
database with information on more than
200,000 offshore entities that are part of the Panama Papers investigation. Photo
credit: Reuters/Carlos Jasso.
351 Albert Bollard, Elixabete Larrea, Alex Singla, and Rohit Sood, The
Next-Generation Operating Model for the Digital World,
McKinsey & Company, 2017, http://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/the-next-generation-
operating-model-for-the-digital-world.
352 George Anadiotis, “Big Data versus Money Laundering: Machine Learning,
Applications and Regulation in Finance,” ZDNet,
http://www.zdnet.com/article/big-data-versus-money-laundering-machine-
learning-applications-and-regulation-in-finance/.
353 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Management of Risks
Related to Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, 6.
354 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, Special
NASD Notice to Members 02-21.
355 FinCEN, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, in the matter of Eurobank,
San Juan, Puerto Rico.
356 Ibid.
357 Nathan and Angotti, “Broker-Dealer AML Transaction Monitoring: The
Devil’s in the Details.”
358 Ibid.
359 US Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, in the matter of
Wachovia Bank, No. 2010-1,
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/100316095447.pdf, 4.
360 Ibid., 4.
CHAPTER 5 Big Data: Mitigating Financial Crime Risk
Regtech
solutions have promising applications
to streamline
compliance costs and processes.
361 Kevin Petrasic, Benjamin Saul, James Greig, and Matthew Bornfreund,
“Algorithms and Bias: What Lenders Need to Know,” White
& Case, January 20, 2017,
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/algorithms-and-bias-what-lenders-
need-know.
362 See The USA Patriot Act, Section 352.
363 Fintech Circle Innovate CEO Nicole Anderson coined the term “regtech.” See
“The FinTech Influencers: FinTech, RegTech, and
the Disruption of Banking’s Services,” Herrington Starr, May 26, 2015,
http://www.harringtonstarr.com/fintech-influencers-fintech-
regtech-disruption-bankings-services.
364 Institute of International Finance, Regtech in Financial Services: Technology
Solutions for Compliance and Reporting, March 2016,
p. 4, https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-
services-solutions-compliance-and-reporting.
365 European Securities and Markets Authority, European Banking Authority, and
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority, Joint Committee Discussion Paper on the Use of Big Data by
Financial Institutions, JC 2016 86, Joint Committee of
the European Supervisory Authorities, December 2016,
file:///Users/mirenapariciobijuesca/Downloads/jc-2016-86_discussion_
paper_big_data.pdf, 27.
366 Caitlin Long, “Why Financial Regulators Are Warming to Blockchains and
Rightfully So” in Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative
Monetary Future, (April 2016), http://www.alt-m.org/2016/04/26/why-financial-
regulators-are-warming-to-blockchains-and-
rightfully-so/
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
375 World Bank, Digital Identity Toolkit: A Guide for Stakeholders in Africa,
June 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/147961468203357928/pdf/912490WP0Digit00Box385330B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
376 National Institute of Standards and Technology, DRAFT NIST Special
Publication 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines, US
Department of Commerce, 2017, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63-
3.html.
377 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Commissioner J. Christopher
Giancarlo speech before the CATO Institute,
“Cryptocurrency: The Policy Challenges of a Decentralized Revolution,” April
2016, US Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-14; see also
Mary Jo White, “Opening Remarks at the SEC
Fintech Forum” US Securities and Exchange Commission, November 2016,
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-
remarks-fintech-forum.html.
378 Digital Asset Holdings, The Digital Asset Platform, December 2016,
http://hub.digitalasset.com/hubfs/Documents/
Digital%20Asset%20Platform%20-%20Non-technical%20White%20Paper.pdf?
utm_campaign=whitepaper-non-
tech&utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9kX1tI0v3HDSL4FBF2JCelw-
TrrhFvbkqsrl_lqGfRwSbWk00bu1VqUmQqgK_
SSKdlxDAtq05ciM8q-BsommkSxGP3EF-
UgkJAhInC9DE4eQx89hI&_hsmi=38825746&utm_content=38825746&utm_source=hs_
email&hsCtaTracking=fc1f9260-0c14-472a-967e-c9cb3095f953%7Cba8116ac-3c0b-
43f3-a880-d60c4bc1d707, 4.
379 Ibid., 27.
380 See Nick Szabo, “Foreword” in Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business &
Beyond, Chamber of Digital Commerce, December
2016,
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/a87f67248663abe55ad9325d6/files/Smart_Contracts_12_Us
e_Cases_for_Business_Beyond.
pdf?utm_source=Chamber+of+Digital+Commerce&utm_campaign=4123b7a006-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_06&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_e6622a916a-4123b7a006-338085917
381 Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business & Beyond, Chamber of Digital
Commerce, December 2016, https://
gallery.mailchimp.com/a87f67248663abe55ad9325d6/files/Smart_Contracts_12_Use_Cases_
for_Business_Beyond.
pdf?utm_source=Chamber+of+Digital+Commerce&utm_campaign=4123b7a006-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_06&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_e6622a916a-4123b7a006-338085917.
382 See also Ibid., 6-48.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
74
A bitcoin ATM machine enables the user to convert cash to bitcoins via a QR
code transfer to an application on
their mobile device. Photo credit: Reuters/Mike Blake.
International
cooperation mechanisms among law
International Cooperation
enforcement
authorities and Financial Intelligence
Recent successful international anti-corruption Units and
exchange of information should be
cooperation examples among law enforcement prioritized and
reinforced. Another successful
authorities include Odebrecht, Braskem, and example of
international anti-money laundering
International Soccer. As the US Justice Department cooperation
between the US Treasury and foreign
announced in 2016 referring to sharing information governments was
the US Treasury’s declaration
among law enforcement authorities under the in October 2015
of Banco Continental (Honduras)
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Pilot Program: “an Group as
“specially designated narcotics traffickers,”
international approach is being taken to combat an which allows
the freezing of assets in the United
international problem.”386 States due to
money laundering.389 The Honduran
In the US v. Odebrecht case, the US jurisdiction authorities
cooperated in the investigation and
was attracted via the use of US bank accounts liquidated the
Honduran bank, which had been
by Odebrecht and Braskem in Miami. Odebrecht, involved in
money laundering activities for a decade.
a Brazilian conglomerate, engaged in 2001 in a The Egmont
Group is composed of a number of
scheme paying bribes to officials in several countries FIUs that have
been working together since their
including Brazil, Angola, Argentina, Colombia, the first meeting
in Brussels in 1995, at the Egmont-
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Arenberg
Palace.390 The group provides a forum for
Mozambique, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The FIUs that
allows them to share information through
Justice Department called “an elaborate, secret memoranda of
understanding meant to improve
financial structure” to pay $778 million in bribes anti-money
laundering programs. The exchange
over fifteen years. In exchange, Odebrecht asked of financial
intelligence can generate evidence in
politicians on retainer to pass friendly tax legislation fighting
financial crime and improve FIU expertise.391 75
and contracts with state-owned oil companies such
as Petrobras.387 At the European
level, the European Commission’s
recent proposal
of 5AMLD would enhance the FIUs’
Braskem, a Brazilian petrochemical company, also authority to
access information from any covered
participated in the scheme and received several entity in
Europe across national borders by setting
contracts with Petrobras. Both companies pleaded up automated
centralized mechanisms in the form
guilty for corrupt payments and profits, which of (i) a
central data registry of holders of banking
amounted to approximately $3.8 billion. The final and payment
accounts or (ii) central data retrieval
penalty388 for Odebrecht was determined to be $2.6 systems.392 The
interconnection of central registries
billion in April 2017 (initially estimated at $4.5 billion would also
increase transparency.393 Moreover, the
but negotiated down since Odebrecht admitted it recent proposal
to set up a strong independent
could not pay the fine). Brazil would receive 80 European Public
Prosecutor’s Office with authority
percent of the recovery, with the United States and over all types
of financial crimes affecting the EU
Switzerland receiving 10 percent each. Braskem
77
auditors that it has in place an effective alternative. . Public-private
partnership initiatives (PPPIs) are
. . The IT monitoring system should enable a bank to often led by
international financial institutions in
determine its own criteria for additional monitoring, partnership with
international banks, government
filing a suspicious transaction report (STR) or taking agencies, and the
private sector to boost
other steps in order to minimize the risk.”403 investments in
the energy, water, infrastructure, and
transport
sectors. As the lead adviser, international
The financial sector’s obligation to report
financial
institutions work with governments on
suspicious activities to a Financial Intelligence Unit
legal and
regulatory requirements to build technical
exists in many countries. Technology is helping
capacity.
International financial institutions should
the financial sector analyze, filter, investigate, and
consider
including financial integrity safeguards,
process information on suspicious transactions.
similar to
environmental and social safeguards,
This should be complemented with regular
in their design
of the PPPI strategies. These are
training programs for employees. Most global
key to fostering
transparent bidding processes
banks have incorporated automated tools to help
and good
governance and to avoiding corruption.
them comply with STRs and other regulatory or
Implementing
these safeguards would also have the
disclosure requirements. Whether they purchase
benefit of
raising financial integrity standards for
software from vendors or develop their own
local partners.
monitoring programs, the important thing is to get
the job done in capturing unusual client behavior
patterns. US and EU financial crime enforcement
402 AML/CFT measures have been incorporated into conditionality under fund-
supported programs in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Greece,
Kyrgyzstan, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Uganda. See International Monetary
Fund, Review of the Fund’s Strategy on Anti-Money
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, February 2014,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/022014a.
pdf, 17.
403 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Sound management of risks related to
money laundering and financing of terrorism,”
(Basel, 2016), 6-16.
404 US Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, in re:
“Eurobank, San Juan, Puerto Rico,” (No. 2010-
2),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/AssessmentEurobank.pd
f, 4; See also Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, Special NASD Notice to Members
02-21.
405 Jonathan Pickworth and Jonah Anderson, “New UK AML Action Plan – The
Increased Role of the Private Sector,” White & Case,
April 28, 2016, http://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/new-uk-aml-action-
plan-increased-role-private-sector.
BIG DATA: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMS RACE
Voluntary Standards •
Financial regulators should promote the use of
The Wolfsberg Group is an example of how collective data
analytics and monitoring tools by banks
action from global banks can help promote strong and
their gatekeepers and fintech companies.
international AML standards. Although the group
•
Banks and supervisors should review rules that
has been criticized for being too formalistic and
may
hinder regtech experimentation.
relying too much on information based on standard
questionnaires, it is also recognized that these •
Emerging countries should reinforce financial
questionnaires have simplified the due diligence
supervision and explore technology innovation
process for correspondent banking through data such
as the issuance of digital identities to
repositories. In addition to formal AML policies, the
promote financial inclusion.
group should consider analyzing the efficiency of
the automated controls currently in place to detect •
International financial institutions should
and monitor suspicious transactions and clients.
expand their role in promoting good
AUTHORS
Miren B. Aparicio, Counsel and Senior Consultant, The World Bank Global
Practice
Miren B. Aparicio is a counsel and senior consultant at the World Bank
Global Practice
and a member of the Chamber of Digital Commerce Smart Contracts
Alliance initiative
in Washington DC. Ms. Aparicio has advised financial services firms in
a wide range of
investment banking business sectors. Her practice focuses on Fintech
and Regtech, capital
markets and financial crime, including policy and regulatory advise for
governments.
Ms. Aparicio’s financial services experience in Spain includes working
at Morgan Stanley
(as General Counsel and Head of Compliance), Société Générale Corporate
and Investment
Chapter 5
Banking and BBVA. Ms. Aparicio developed an Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter- 81
Terrorism Financing institutional framework, risk mitigation and
governance for the Inter-
American Development Bank. Her publications include several articles
with Thomson
Reuters regulatory intelligence (Accelus) about the need to balance
Fintech innovation
and regulation. Ms. Aparicio is an LL.M. graduate at Columbia
University of New York;
D.E.A. in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International
Studies in Geneva;
Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS).
Atlantic Council Board of Directors
HONORARY DIRECTORS
Stéphane Abrial *Robert S. Gelbard Richard Morningstar
David C. Acheson
Odeh Aburdene Thomas H. Glocer Georgette Mosbacher
Madeleine K. Albright
*Peter Ackerman Sherri W. Goodman Thomas R. Nides
James A. Baker, III
Timothy D. Adams Mikael Hagström Franco Nuschese
Harold Brown
Bertrand-Marc Allen Ian Hague Joseph S. Nye
Frank C. Carlucci, III
John R. Allen Amir A. Handjani Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Ashton B. Carter
*Michael Andersson John D. Harris, II Sean C. O’Keefe
Robert M. Gates
Michael S. Ansari Frank Haun Ahmet M. Oren
Michael G. Mullen
Richard L. Armitage Michael V. Hayden Sally A. Painter
Leon E. Panetta
David D. Aufhauser Annette Heuser *Ana I. Palacio
William J. Perry
Elizabeth F. Bagley Ed Holland Carlos Pascual
Colin L. Powell
*Rafic A. Bizri *Karl V. Hopkins Alan Pellegrini
Condoleezza Rice
Dennis C. Blair Robert D. Hormats David H. Petraeus
Edward L. Rowny
*Thomas L. Blair Miroslav Hornak Thomas R. Pickering
George P. Shultz
Philip M. Breedlove *Mary L. Howell Daniel B. Poneman
Horst Teltschik
Reuben E. Brigety II Wolfgang F. Ischinger Daniel M. Price
John W. Warner
Myron Brilliant Deborah Lee James Arnold L. Punaro
William H. Webster
*Esther Brimmer Reuben Jeffery, III Robert Rangel
R. Nicholas Burns Joia M. Johnson Thomas J. Ridge
*Executive Committee Members
*James L. Jones, Jr. Charles O. Rossotti
List as of June 19, 2017
*Richard R. Burt
The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that
promotes constructive US leadership and engagement
in
international
affairs based on the central role of
the Atlantic community in meeting today’s global
challenges.
Atlantic Council