VOL.

123, JULY 20, 1983 441

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.*

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE and NATURAL
RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES
and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.
Public Land Act; Leases; Until public lands are released as alienable or disposable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries may lease or otherwise dispose of said lands.—It is
elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau
of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23
SCRA 1184).

_______________

*
FIRST DIVISION.

442

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

Same; Same: Fisheries Act; Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands while same classified as forest or timberland.—The Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the
public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released
for fishery or other purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Applications to lease mangrove or swampland for fishpond purposes are
premature if filed before their release to the Bureau of Fisheries.—All the applications being
premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The
priority given in paragraph “d” of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time
to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one
year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this
case. The validity of paragraph “d” is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly
not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the
area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-
year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that
the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent
Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the
same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of
the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They
pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Administrative Law; Interpretation of Executive Branch that
rejected premature applications for fishpond leases shall be considered filed at the same time
when public land is released for fishpond purposes entitled to controlling weight.—The Office of
the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a
rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not
to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. We find such an
interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of
Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that

443

VOL. 123, JULY 20, 1983 443

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a
statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we
held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department
head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present
case.

Same; Contempt; Petitioner failed to show that entry by respondents on lands in question
disturbed the proper administration of justice.—The petitioner has failed to show that the acts
committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice
and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of
petitioner’s rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and
respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts.
The motion also raises factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations
more proper for a trial court.

Same; Same; Same.—The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take
cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-third’s share of the
disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which
upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally
taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure
question of law was involved in the appeal.

There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the
Solicitor-General’s brief. We do the same:

444

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

“The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66
hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante,
province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for
fishpond purposes, several persons filed their-applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize
the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her
application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28,
1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as
communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.

“On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees,
Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same
bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1958. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid
parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was
only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid
parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an
order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting
the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources where their-appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos.
901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).

“In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the
division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of
the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed
a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of
the Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration
filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second
and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958
and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal).”

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VOL. 123, JULY 20, 1983 445

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.

The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void
and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that
plaintiff had not established such “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment” on the part of
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the
Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special
civil action.

The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED SUCH ‘CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT’ ON
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING
REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-

APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE
‘PRIORITY RULE’ ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14,
FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND
APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF
FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE

446

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT

AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY
AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE
APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH
TO THESE APPLICANTS.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development
into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is
the only issue in this case.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

“SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application.—In determining the priority of application or right to a
permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

“ ‘(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and
unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

xxx xxx xxx

“ ’(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of
Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of
Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR
APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of
Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired
since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application
which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other
fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.’ ”

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following
dates:

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VOL. 123, JULY 20, 1983 447

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

1. 1. Teofila L. de Ligasan—January 14, 1946

2. 2. Custodio Doromal—October 28, 1947
3. 3. Serafin B. Yngson—March 19, 1952
4. 4. Anita V. Gonzales—March 19, 1953
5. 5. Jose M. Lopez—April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on
January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There
was no land available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five
applicants filed their applications.

After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due
course to Yngzon’s application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The
reason given was Yngzon’s priority of application.

We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no
grave abuse of discretion.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor
the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes
of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or

mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest
land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential
right over another. The priority given in paragraph “d” of Section 14 is only for those
applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of

448

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some
kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could
validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of
paragraph “d” is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the
provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond
purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year period, do not
object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has
apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s
order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time
on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66
hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray
that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.

The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to
redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was
released and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category.
We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of
the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given
controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of
a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected.
The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio
Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner
charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without
petitioner’s consent, laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the
areas

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VOL. 123, JULY 20, 1983 449

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
they were claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates
and destroyed petitioner’s hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses
and to occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied
petitioner’s charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for
fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were
authorized to place placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a
copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP)
showing that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in
compliance with government regulations, they placed markers and signs in their respective
boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently
destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for,
which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further prohibited
Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also
prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for
areas pending the issuance of their permits.

The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct
disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes
contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner’s rights, he should resort to
PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did,
a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual
considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.

We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the
court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140, 142)

The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and
punish. If any of his property or

450

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

other rights over his one-third’s share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the
correct action before the proper lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is
also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.

 Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., on leave.

Judgment affirmed. Motion for contempt dented.

Notes.—A Spanish document entitled “Estadistica” is not considered a “title.” (Mun. of

Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734.)

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in all fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries there is the condition that such permit does not authorize the permittee to interfere with
any prior claim by settlement or occupancy within the areas granted to him until the consent of
the occupant or settler is first had and obtained or until such claim shall have been legally
extinguished. (Republic vs. De los Angeles, 44 SCRA 255.)

Existence of impediment in the grant of a fishpond permit must be reckoned at the time of the
grant thereof, not at the time the application was filed. (Nera vs. Titong, Jr., 56 SCRA 40.)

Disposals made by the Director of Lands within a public forest does not make the grantee the
owner of the lands and the title or patent issued by the Director of Lands who has no authority to
issue is void. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 42.)

A mere license submitted by the Director of Forestry to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources does not authorize one to cut forest products. (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104
SCRA 305.)

451