Oposa vs Factoran

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

Davide, Jr. J.

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Wheteher or not petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008

MERIDA vs. PEOPLE

CARPIO, J.

Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a
lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which
private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6

Tansiongco reported the matter to the punong barangay of Ipil. Petitioner admitted cutting the tree but
claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the
Mayod Property from Tansiongco under a pacto de retro sale.

Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the DENR forester, Thelmo S. Hernandez. Hernandez ordered
petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw
that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. The DENR subsequently conducted an
investigation on the matter.10

The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the
trial court. The trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed
by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705.

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the
government's favor. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by
Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary
investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.

Issues:

(1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest
officer, filed the complaint against petitioner; and
(2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

Ruling:

Yes. OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by
specified individuals,18non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such
cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity20 and not to
cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense
was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to
"reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials,
for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence."22

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot
be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support
the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD
705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24

2.) Yes.

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts:

(1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest
land without any authority;

(2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority;

and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.

Petitioner stands charged of having cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest
products from a private land without the necessary permit. The curt also said that the lumber or
processed log is covered by the forest products term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between
a raw and processed timber.
.

MOMONGAN vs.OMIPON

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 ,March 14, 1995

ROMERO, J.

Facts:

police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he
was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded.

A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists
against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was
not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in
the transport of illegally cut forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended.

Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the
non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as
the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office.

Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the crime of illegal logging and,
being a mere accessory, he might be utilized by the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution witness against
Cabig. More importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the truck owned by Golpe.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in releasing the truck despite a prima facie evidence for
violation of PD 705bas amended.

Ruling:

No.

The court found that the release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable,
hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary sanction.

According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument
or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments
or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to
transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no
justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.

Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No.
59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally
obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. However, as complainant himself likewise
pointed out, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.

Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge should have turned over the
truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte
for appropriate disposition.

There being no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be
visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San Juan,
Southern Leyte.

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS vs. BATARIO

G.R. No. 92285 ,March 28, 1994

BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts;

PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree
planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry
Code1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation
of wood and "wood-derivated" products.

private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four containers of matches from
Indonesia AND Singapore, which the Bureau of Customs released which violates the Revised Forestry
Code’s ban of importing wood and wood-derived products.

PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter
from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing
and releasing the importations.

, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:

(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular
court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation

(b) The release of subject importations had rendered injunction moot and academic;4
(c) The prayer for damages has no basis as the questioned acts of the Commissioner are in accordance
with law and no damages may be awarded based on future acts;5 and remedy.6

PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. However, AJIC filed a motion
for reconsideration whereby the Court reconsidered and dismissed the case on the ground that it had
"no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations.

PTFI prays for the continuation of the hearing and claims that what was brought before the trial court
was a civil case for injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product
importation.

Ruling: Yes.

The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-
derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and
Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases and, in fact, it is the
duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within
the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial
Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may
already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the
court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Peña, the court held that —

. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical
matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become well nigh indispensable . . . .

The ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of
Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts
by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its
prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In
the case at bench, we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction as it is not before us.

PEOPLE vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

MEDIALDEA, J.

Facts:

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines.

Respondents Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are
still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, enter
the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario
Prudente, and illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said
owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of
different species.

The named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form.

the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked.

Issues:

1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and

(2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

Yes.

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or
removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered,
collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or
permit granted by the state.

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should
be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private
woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that
only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all
the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private
woodlands.

The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff having failed to
comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.

while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a private woodland in
accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he still retained his
rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest
products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private
ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that
ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient
that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

2. Yes.

There are two specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant,
any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the
decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the
presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or
a complaint.

In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint
with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the
necessary informations in court.

In the instant case, however, do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705.
The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged
commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the
complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.

Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime
or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons
charged with the commission of the crime.

In short, Section 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only special authority to
reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom vested by the general law.