1. Differentiate constitution from statute.

A constitution is a set of fundamental principles or established precedents according to

which a state or other organization is governed.[1] These rules together make up,
i.e. constitute, what the entity is. When these principles are written down into a single
document or set of legal documents, those documents may be said to embody
a written constitution; if they are written down in a single comprehensive document, it is
said to embody a codified constitution
A statute is a formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a city, state,
or country.[1] Typically, statutes command or prohibit something, or
declare policy.[1] Statutes are rules made by legislative bodies; they are distinguished
from case law or precedent, which is decided by courts, and regulations issued
by government agencies.[1]

2. Three classifications of constitution. Define each classification.

Classification
Type Form Example
Codified in single act (document) Most of the world constitutions.
Uncodified fully written (in few documents) San Marino, Israel, Saudi Arabia
Uncodified partially unwritten (see constitutional convention) Canada, NZ, UK

 Codified constitutions are often the product of some dramatic political change,
such as a revolution
 States that have codified constitutions normally give the constitution supremacy
over ordinary statute law.
 Codified constitutions normally consist of a ceremonial preamble, which sets forth
the goals of the state and the motivation for the constitution, and several articles
containing the substantive provisions
 Uncodified constitutions are the product of an "evolution" of laws and conventions
over centuries
 uncodified constitutions include written sources: e.g. constitutional statutes
enacted by the Parliament and also unwritten sources: constitutional conventions,
observation of precedents, royal prerogatives, custom and tradition, such as
holding general elections on Thursdays; together these constitute the British
constitutional law.

3. Three essential parts of a written constitution.

 Provisions on government -The part that deal with the: framework of government
powers that defines the electorate.
 Provision on Liberty The part that sets forth the fundamental rights of the people
imposition on certain limitations on the powers of this rights.
 Provisions on Sovereignty -That part pointing out the mode or procedure for
amending or revising the constitutions.

4. Three Qualities of a good written constitution.

 Brief: since its outlines the objectives of the state not on a limited scope but in a
measurable extent. It is a written instrument that should not contain many details
in form.
 Broad: in its extent with the purpose of outlining the framework of the
organization of the state. A declaration of domains and functions of the
government, and the interrelationships between those in power and the
governed, necessitates an extensive or broad document.
 Definite: The possible inclusion of vague or unclear words or phrases having two
or more possible meanings may cause conflict of interpretation.

5. How may the 1987 Constitution be amended?

The process of amending the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines is popularly known
to many Filipinos as Charter Change. Any proposed amendment or revision must be
ratified by the majority of Filipinos in a plebiscite.
 Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
"Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
"The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
An enabling law for this Article XVII, Section 2 Philippine Constitutional provision, called
the Initiative and Referendum Act, was authored in 1987 by senators Raul
Roco (AksyonDemokratiko) and Neptali Gonzales (Liberal Party) and was passed by the Eighth
Congress of the Philippines in 1989. The law provides for the implementation of the exercise
of the people's right to initiate a petition to amend the Constitution, with the Election
Registrar of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) tasked under the law with the
verification of the petition signatures' being by at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters in the state.

6. How may the 1987 constitution be revised?

Stated otherwise, the problem is: how do you interpret the procedure of
amendment or revision of the Constitution provided in its Article XVII section 1 which was
designed for a unicameral legislature yet we have a bicameral legislature? In the search
for the proper approach, I submit, with due respect, the following thoughts:
1. We should consider the history of Article XVII section 1, and give life to the intent of
the people that ratified the Constitution.
2. The clear intent is to have a bicameral and not a unicameral legislature.
3. Following that intent, Article XVII section 1 should not be interpreted in any manner
that will negate or derogate the bicameral nature of our legislature which is the
constitutional structure approved by the people.
I further submit that we can take an approach without doing violence to the literal words
of Article XVII, section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. In light of our time constraint, allow me
to give an abbreviated discourse.
Let us again examine the exact wording of the pertinent part of Article XVII section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to or revision of this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress upon a vote of three fourths of all its members: or x xx
As worded, section 1 does not specifically command that the two houses of Congress,
the Senate and the House, must meet in joint session. Neither does it provide how the
three-fourths shall be computed, i.e., whether the three-fourth vote shall be determined
based on the votes in each house, meeting separately or three fourths of the votes cast in
both houses, meeting together. These omissions have given rise to the view that
Congress need not convene as a joint assembly when exercising its power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Also, it has given birth to the concomitant thought that
the three-fourth vote can be computed on the basis of the total votes cast in both houses
and not the votes in each house.
It is respectfully submitted that both propositions will attract a strong constitutional
challenge. It is too simplistic to argue that they are not literally prohibited by Article XVII,
section
1. The unequivocal history of section 1 rejects them. To recall, it was never the intention
of the Constitutional Commissioners to amend or revise the Constitution where a
bicameral legislature has been installed using a procedure of amending or revising a
Constitution where a unicameral legislature has been established.

The absence of the phrases “joint assembly” and “voting separately” in section 1 of Article
XVII does not justify any suggestion that Congress need not meet jointly.
Nor does it justify the idea that Congress need not vote separately. To repeat, when the
Constitutional Commissioners, thru its Committee on Amendments crafted section 1, they
had the impression that a unicameral legislature would be adopted in the final draft of the
1987 Constitution. Unfortunately, it was not adopted and instead a bicameral legislature
was established. Due to inadvertence, the unthinkable happened --- the Committee
neglected to revise section 1 to make it conform to the traditional way of amending or
revising a Constitution where the legislature is bicameral.
Given this historical reality, Article XVII, section 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner that
will erode the bicameral nature of the legislature that was chosen by our people when
they ratified our 1987 Constitution. A contrary interpretation will have undesirable
consequences. We need to have a more profound understanding of the necessity of a
“joint assembly” in a bicameral legislature. The power to propose amendments or to
revise the Constitution is known as the constituent power of Congress. In a bicameral
legislature, it belongs to both of its houses. It cannot be exercised unilaterally by one
house alone. The constituent power is granted to both houses as institutions. Its exercise,
however, is done thru the individual lawmakers. Its exercise from beginning to end, must
be characterized by the equal, uncoerced participation by both houses in their institutional
capacities. It’s a latent power vested in both Houses and to trigger its use, either House,
as institutions, must invite each other to gather together in joint assembly to propose
amendments or revision of the Constitution. The invitation must be acted upon favorably
or unfavorably by either House as an institution, at the very least, by a majority of its
members. In deciding to act favorably or unfavorably on the invitation, the two Houses
exercise their constituent power which is exclusively lodged on them by the Constitution.

The exclusiveness of this power underlines its importance. Whether or not it should be
exercised, how it will be exercised, the manner and procedure of its exercise are to be
determined by each House alone. We should also not lose sight of the purpose of its
exercise. To my mind, its purpose is both to complement and to countercheck the
exercise of half the power that belongs to the other branch. For all these reasons, we
should refrain from interpreting Article XVII, section 1 in a way that will diminish the
importance of convening both houses in a bicameral legislature as a joint assembly when
they exercise their constituent power.
But there is more. It is also evident that the ambiance in a joint session, where the
Senators and Congressmen stand in the same footing with each other as they discuss
the proposal to amend the Constitution is different as when they debate with each other
in separate sessions. In a joint session, there can be no doubt that the quality of the
debate is enhanced and enriched by the exchanges of ideas coming from Senators who
represent the general interest of the people at large and from Congressmen who
represent the particular interest of their specific districts. The uninhibited collision of these
contending ideas brings out the best from the people’s representatives in the Senate and
in the House when they are jointly assembled. The people deserve nothing less than their
cerebral best when the representatives from the two houses of Congress are proposing
to amend the fundamental law of the land.

A bigger anomaly will result if we are seduced by the thought that the three-fourths vote
should be computed on the basis of the total votes cast in both the Senate and the House
and notthree-fourths of the votes cast in each House voting separately. Even with a
blindfold, one can see that the proposal will render the Senate vote irrelevant considering
the disparity of the number of Senators and the Congressmen in the latter’s favor.

Again, there is no gainsaying the fact, that in proposing amendments and revising the
Constitution, the Senate must be regarded as a distinct, separate and co-equal institution
of the House, and this institutional role of the Senate cannot be whittled a bit even if there
are less Senators than Congressmen. When the members of both houses vote as co-
equal institutions, no one should be considered as superior or inferior from another,
because of the arithmetic of number alone.

If ordinary laws cannot be enacted without the equal participation of the Senate, the
more reason that a proposal to amend or revise the Constitution cannot be passed
without the equal participation of the Senate. The Constitution never contemplated the
Senate to be a useless appendage in the making of a law, more so in the making of a
Constitution. Nonetheless, it appears that Resolution
No. 1 respects the institutional right of the Senate to vote separately and to compute the
three-fourths vote necessary to propose any amendment to the Constitution on the basis
of the votes cast in each house.
In sum, I respectfully submit that Congress should interpret Article XVII, section 1 in a
manner that will respect the bicameral nature of our Congress. The people voted for a
bicameral legislature where both the Senate and the House are co-equal with one
another, each granted with powers designed both to complement and to check each
 other. We are bound by the people’s will. This delicate structure of our legislature
established by the people themselves is an important component of our constitutional
blueprint and cannot be violated without shaking the foundation of our constitutional
structure. Let us all be guided by following the universal canon of constitutional
construction, viz:
"In construing a constitutional provision, it is the duty of the court to have recourse to the
whole instrument, if necessary, to ascertain the true intent and meaning of any particular
provision. Every statement in a constitution must be interpreted in the light of the entire
document, rather than as a sequestered pronouncement; it must be regarded as
consistent with itself throughout, and because fundamental constitutional principles are of
equal dignity and none must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair the other,
the court should harmonize them if this can be done reasonably and without distorting the
meaning of any provision.
"It is an established canon of constitutional construction that no one provision of the
constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and are to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Frequently, the meaning
of one provision of a constitution standing by itself may be obscure or uncertain, but is
readily apparent when resort is made to other portions of the same instrument. It is often
necessary to interpret the constitutional provision with an eye to their relation to other
provisions."

7. Define the following:

 Amendment-An amendment is a formal or official change made to
a law, contract, constitution, or other legal document. It is based on the verb to amend,
which means to change for better. Amendments can add, remove, or update parts of
these agreements. They are often used when it is better to change the document than to
write a new one.
 Revision-Revision is re-working and re-writing, it is not merely changing a few words,
adding a sentence here or there, or taking out material that was unnecessary. To
revise a paper is to restructure the paper, eliminate unnecessary details or
information, add details, move paragraphs and sentences around, rewrite paragraphs
and sentences, double-check the accuracy of the supporting evidence, reword
awkward areas, edit, and proofread. We experiment with the organization to see what
clearly conveys the content to the reader and to help us focus on the main points.
 Peoples Initiative-People's Initiative (or "PI") is a common appellative in the Philippines
that refers to either a mode for constitutional amendment provided by the 1987
Philippine Constitution or to the act of pushing an initiative (national or local) allowed by
the Philippine Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987.The appellative also refers to the
product of either of those initiatives. The provision in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines allowing for a "people's initiative" as one of the modes for constitutional
amendment has been called the "people's initiative clause.
 " The other modes allowed by the Constitution involve a Constituent Assembly (or "Con-
Ass") or a Constitutional Convention (or "Con-Con"), both of which also allow a total
revision of the charter.The appellation (also known as "PI") also refers to the act—
allowed by the law-given right of the Filipino people—of directly initiating statutes or
calling for referenda on both the national and the local government level.
 Initiative on the constitution
 Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

8. Requirements and Limitations to peoples initiative.

To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the
total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission.

9. Three systems of initiative.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
 2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

10. Contents of the petition on initiatives.

A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
a.) The petition shall state the following:
1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. the proposition;
3. the reason or reasons therefor;
4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
b.) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the
legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated
if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in
the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the
province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
c.) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed
validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
d.) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly
initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said
barangay.