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CULTURE
Technology more than ever has become an established part of our everyday lives. Its
sophistication offers us power that can either dazzle or threaten us.
Living in a Technological Culture examines the relations between science, technology
and culture, introducing basic concepts in ethics and in the philosophy of science and
technology. Some of the issues raised include facts, values, efficiency, instrumental
rationality, pure and applied science, culture, politics and moral responsibility. Mary
Tiles and Hans Oberdiek reveal not only the embeddedness of technologies in cultures,
but also the distinctive ways in which modern technology is embedded in the cultures of
Western industrialized countries.
This book, by questioning our existing uses of technology, opens up the wider debate
on the shape of things to come. The authors argue that unless we address the questions
posed by technology, we will continue to use technology to do stupid things in clever
ways.
As an introduction to the philosophy of technology, Living in a Technological Culture
will be valuable to students, but in assuming no prior background in philosophy, it will
engage all mindful users of technology.
Mary Tiles is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii; she is the author of
various books including Bachelard: Science and Objectivity (1984); An Introduction to
Historical Epistemology with Jim Tiles (1993) and Mathematics and the Image of Reason
(1991), which is published by Routledge. Hans Oberdiek is Professor of Philosophy at
Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania.
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENCE
Edited by W.H.Newton-Smith
Balliol College, Oxford
METAPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
William Seager
* COLOUR VISION
Evan Thompson
Preface vii
The book before you exemplifies its central themes. Because we live nearly half way
around the world from each other, the book would not have been written without the aid
of modern technology. And while computers, fax machines, and electronic mail made the
project possible, they imposed their own discipline. This is to say that the book would
have undoubtedly been different (if neither better nor worse) had its authors shared the
kind of daily face-to-face discussions joint authors often enjoy and we would have liked.
The project grew out of a jointly taught course on Philosophy and Technology at
Swarthmore College and subsequent discussions in Oxford, Reading and Swarthmore.
The ease of air travel brought us together to learn from each other yet has also kept us
apart, and so acts as a metaphor for the promise and frustrations of technology. Despite
the miles between us, the book is fully collaborative. While each of us had principal
responsibility for various chapters, each chapter was read and criticized often many times
by the other.
Decisions about the general shape of the book—what to include or exclude—proved
especially difficult. The reason is not far to seek. Until recently, technology was science’s
neglected stepchild. Science was originally done by ‘gentlemen’; technology was not. In
the academy, naturally enough, science was studied by another class of gentlemen:
professors. Philosophers were especially late in coming to technology, long after
historians and sociologists. The neat and deep division between science and technology
was supported by the assumption that technology is nothing but applied science. (It is odd
that no one ever thought that gourmet cooking is nothing but applied chemistry!) Few
now believe that this division or the assumptions on which it is based can withstand
scrutiny, for science depends on advances in technology as much as technology depends
on science. Still, many continue to write and act as if a bright line can be drawn between
science and technology. Not only is the line barely discernible, it is neither hard nor fast.
Technology offers rich terrain for philosophical reflection. As the centrality of
technology to our age becomes increasingly evident and studies of it acquire increasing
intellectual legitimacy, it is as if new continents await philosophical exploration. As with
all explorations, the explorers are likely to find themselves and their disciplinary culture
transformed by the process. Without changing our core theses, we might have written
several, substantially different books. Because our own explorations have been, of
necessity, limited, we have mapped only those features closest to our philosophical
shores that were most salient from our perspective; we simply gesture toward the vast
hinterland, some of which is already being explored by others. So our map—our book—
looks like those old maps of the New World which depict a bit of the Atlantic coastline
but then trail off in the direction from which the rivers seem to flow. Our hope is that
readers will be enticed to make their own journeys.
Many people contributed to the book before you. Each of us individually would like to
acknowledge our specific thanks.
Mary Tiles The jointly taught course which formed the basis of this project took place at
Swarthmore College in Fall 1988 and I am grateful to the Philosophy Department of
Swarthmore College for the visiting professorship that made my participation possible.
Since then I have, thanks to Professor Peter Manicas and the students of the Liberal
Studies Program, been able to create and teach a similar course at the University of
Hawaii at Manoa. Jim Tiles has, as always, been an invaluable source of supportive
criticism of draft material.
Hans Oberdiek I would be especially remiss if I did not acknowledge the enormous
contribution of Carl Barus, late professor of electrical engineering at Swarthmore
College, to my own interest and understanding of the philosophical implications implicit
in technology. Carl’s conviction that science, technology and values intertwine coupled
with his passion for intellectual honesty and social justice helped not only me, but
generations of engineering students at Swarthmore College, to see the importance of
humanizing a technological culture. It was Carl’s tenacity that helped create a course we
twice taught together and served as the forerunner for the course Mary Tiles and I taught.
I have also taken much from Hugh Lacey, whose concern for the way science embodies
values manifests itself throughout. Constance Cain Hungerford deserves thanks of a
different sort for her unfailing support and helpful comments on drafts of various
chapters. Finally, I would like to thank Swarthmore College for funding a sabbatical
leave in which to complete the manuscript.
INTRODUCTION Technological culture and
its problems
That humans have been designated Homo faber (man the maker, tool user) rather than
Homo sapiens (man the wise, thinker) indicates the centrality of technology in the life of
even those primitive communities which we classify on the basis of their stage of
technological development—stone age, bronze age, iron age. But as the Prometheus myth
reminds us, fire and the metal-based technology it confers, although essential to the
development of human civilizations, was surrounded by ambivalent attitudes: it promises
to confer god-like powers of control over nature, but it is not clear that mere mortals are
sufficiently god-like to be able to wield this (stolen) power wisely. It is a power which
can be used to destroy as well as to create: medicines developed to restore health become
poisons when used negligently or maliciously; presses invented to enlighten are used for
propaganda; and computers which extend our knowledge exponentially can invade our
privacy in ways unthinkable only a short time ago. Even the most benevolent technology
carries with it the potential for harm; implicit in every ploughshare there is a sword.
Since World War II the pace of technological development has increased dramatically,
trailing in its wake problems of which our grandparents did not even dream. Waste
disposal has always presented problems for settled human communities, but none
remotely comparable to those presented by nuclear waste disposal, which, if not carried
out properly, could contaminate portions of the earth virtually forever. But what are the
proper methods of disposal? Here a public consensus is strikingly lacking. Genetic
engineering opens up the possibility of manipulating hereditary material in such a way
that species, including our own, can be significantly altered. Do we know enough about
the development of organisms or about ecological balances to pursue this possibility
prudently? Even granting that we have sufficient knowledge, should experiments of this
kind be allowed, and on what species? Should experimentation on human genetic
material be allowed? Computers have altered so extensively the way information is
collected, interpreted and disseminated that it is appropriate to speak of an information
revolution. Much of this development was prompted and funded by military interests.
That generals have the latest computer-generated information seems desirable; that
‘decisions’ to launch nuclear missiles may be made by computers rather than people,
because people cannot respond quickly enough to (possible) enemy attacks, engenders
terror and a feeling of helplessness.
Developments in First World countries generating dilemmas such as these have
accentuated the divide between developed and developing nations. Can this gap be
narrowed by a transfer of technology from developed to developing nations, and if so
should developed nations give aid in this form? Not to do so may retard development to
such an extent that the lives of hundreds of millions of people will remain materially and
spiritually impoverished. Yet technology which may make perfect sense in a developed
nation can be inappropriate when transferred to a developing nation. The use of chemical
Living in a technological culture 2
pesticides can bring benefits, but is also hazardous. Peasant farmers, unused to handling
such substances, may cause serious damage to themselves and the environment. The
emergence of resistant pests means that increased crop yields are frequently sustainable
only by increased dosage or use of new types of pesticide, which have to be purchased
using scarce foreign exchange. In transferring its technology a donor nation inevitably
transfers its own ways of thinking and doing, its own institutions and values. These
interact profoundly but unpredictably with the ways of life of the recipient nation.
The course of technological development in First World countries reflects their
dominant values and institutions, their ways of thinking and doing. The results of science
and technology are familiar enough, and can mesmerize us. But they are the results and
embodiments of human problem solving practices, results which in turn shape the lives of
people employing them. (Pesticides are a response to crop destruction. To be used
effectively and safely, however, farmers must take all sorts of precautions, study crop
development and carefully determine time and rate of applications. To do so with modern
pesticides they must be numerate and literate.) As practices, science and technology
involve presuppositions, the acquisition of skills, norms of behaviour, and value
commitments. Any practice will initially present itself to initiates as ‘objective’ in that it
will exist as an ongoing concern in which they must learn to participate and whose rules
must be learnt much in the way that the language and manners of one’s society are learnt.
Usually a practice is simply accepted as it is; its underlying assumptions and values are
absorbed without ever being made explicit, unless or until it faces troubling internal
problems, such as those posed by the rapid development of technology. Internal problems
are characterized by their seeming intractability; one finds oneself baffled, confused, torn
between opposing intuitions.
It is here that philosophical reflection may be able to make a contribution to the
discussion of issues which have drawn the thoughtful attention of reflective scientists,
engineers and policy makers. This contribution cannot take the form of answering or
solving the problems, since that is beyond the scope of any single discipline or any purely
reflective process. Philosophical reflection may, however, hope to render a practice
intelligible to those involved in it by not only revealing the sources and tracing the
development of what seems troubling, but also by seeking to understand how the practice
itself, as something humanly devised, is capable of alteration, amendment or
reinforcement. In short, one may see how to rethink and thereby begin to restructure a
practice so that what troubles, bothers, perplexes and sometimes torments need not arise
in so acute a form. And even if restructuring cannot be done all at once now (as surely it
never can), at least one understands more clearly why things are as they are and what
directions might be explored in making the practice accord better with what our
understanding of it requires.
Yet philosophy has a long tradition of ignoring technology; that is, of treating it as
something not within the range of its reflective gaze. Is this not puzzling? How could
technology and its problems be invisible to philosophical reflection in the industrializing
and industrialized Europe and North America of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?
Why has it been so difficult for the relatively new philosophical subdiscipline labelled
‘philosophy of technology’ to establish itself? To see why this has been so may already
be to make a contribution to understanding something about the interlocking of our
technological practices with our deeply held cultural assumptions.
Introduction 3
research. Hence we find that in current debates the concepts both of science and of
technology are highly contested. We shall return to the concept of science in Chapter 3,
but here let us give a preliminary indication of why the equation of technology with
applied science must both be questioned and taken seriously.
WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY?
Many histories of technology are histories of the stages of development of tools (such as
the plough), of machines (such as the steam engine), of structures (such as bridges) or of
instruments (such as the microscope). Here technology is being equated with material
devices designed and manufactured to make existing human activities easier or to make
possible activities which people have dreamt of engaging in, but to which they are not
biologically adapted (flying, swimming under water, looking at minute objects).
Technological devices are designed to perform some function. They thus embody
practical and also, often, theoretical knowledge together with creative problem solving.
Simple lever and pulley systems make it possible to move and lift heavy weights (the
blocks of stone used in building the pyramids). By working out the theory behind these
(found already in the works of Archimedes) it is possible to design maximally efficient
systems. The creative practical challenge is then to find suitable materials (strong enough
levers and ropes), to get pulleys to run freely, and so on. From this point of view
advanced electronic technology is not different in kind from a stone-hammered flint
arrowhead; modern technological devices may be more complex and be put to more
sophisticated uses, but there is no real basis for regarding the former, but not the latter, as
part of a technological culture. Any tool using culture will be ‘technological’ in the sense
of having its own characteristic technology.
Such historical studies suggest that there is no consistent pattern to the relation
between technological development and scientific progress (for further discussion see, for
example, Volti, 1992, pp. 56–7, Gibbons, 1984, Webster, 1991, Mowery and Rosenberg,
1989). Although some technologies have arisen out of fundamental scientific work,
many, particularly those in earlier historical periods, did not. Even in those cases where
the path from pure theory to practical outcome was most direct, as in the case of the
development of the atomic bomb in the Manhattan Project, much more than pure science
was involved (Gowing and Arnold, 1979). In other cases, such as the steam engine,
widespread adoption of a new technology preceded and seems to have spurred scientific
research in the direction of developing the theory of thermodynamics (Kuhn, 1959,
Musson and Robinson, 1969, Ch.XII). So even in this narrow sense of technology, the
idea that it is just applied science is hard to sustain. It might, however, be possible to
argue that since technological devices embody technical discoveries and increased
technical know-how, it might be possible to develop a methodology for the progressive
acquisition of this kind of technical knowledge. But such a methodology would not be an
adequate base for technology development policy. The mere ability to construct a device
on a one-off basis, its invention, does not ensure the feasibility of its future manufacture
or its widespread adoption. The Alexandrian Greeks discovered steam power in the sense
that they used it in creating moving statues of the gods, self-opening temple doors, etc.,
but they never developed a steam technology. Various people prior to the twentieth
Introduction 5
century built mechanical calculators and reasoning machines, but they were never
anything more than ‘curiosities’.
A first broadening of the term ‘technology’ would be to include ‘techniques’. Any tool
or machine has itself to be manufactured and then put to use. Early steam engines, such
as Stevenson’s Rocket, were individually built by craftsmen. In the absence of
established standard techniques, engineers developed their own, modifying and learning
from the experience of others. The history of the develop-ment of engineering production
techniques, including things like welding, improvements in the quality of steel, accurate
machining of parts (such as pistons), is an integral part of the history of the development
of the steam engine. More efficient and more widely used engines presuppose the
development of techniques for building them successfully in large numbers.
The steam engine also provides a striking example of the way in which tracing the
development of steam technology, as a culturally significant phenomenon, requires that
one look beyond the basic devices to the techniques for using them. The very earliest
steam engines were stationary beam engines used for pumping water out of mines. These
were enormous machines. The use of steam to power a locomotive required the
production of very much smaller, lighter engines. This development again occurred
within the mining context, where horse-drawn carts running on metal or wooden rails
were already used for transporting ore, coal and slag. For steam engines to gain a use
outside the mining context ways of using them for transport had to be developed
(railways, steamships); a whole new set of techniques and practices had to arise bringing
profound social, economic and industrial changes with them. Steam engines could come
to be widely used only once they could be manufactured in sufficiently large numbers
and at a price which would make investment in them attractive. This in turn required the
development of standardized production techniques. In this respect steam differed
significantly from water or wind as a power source. Windmills and waterwheels and their
accompanying gearing, belts and drives could usually be locally manufactured by skilled
carpenters and blacksmiths who also had the necessary practical, mechanical knowledge.
The tolerance on the uniformity and accuracy of parts was large. Steam is a much more
demanding power source. The results of a boiler explosion are dramatic and catastrophic,
pistons must be able to move freely in the cylinders without allowing significant amounts
of steam to escape, replacement parts must be available. Here the technology starts to
impose standards of accuracy, quality and standardization in engineering production.
Thus the development and use of steam technology both presupposed other economic and
industrial developments and in its turn imposed forms of organization and made demands
upon industrial and social organization.
Under ‘techniques’ one thus has to include the whole complex of ways of doing and
making in which a technological device has a place. A plough plays a role in an
agricultural system. Different kinds of plough may be best suited to the demands of
different kinds of system, which in turn depend on soil conditions, terrain, crops grown
and size of farms and fields. Equally the introduction of a new kind of plough makes new
kinds of agricultural practices possible. Grain farming on the scale practised on the plains
of the American mid-west is practicable only with the introduction of large tractors
pulling multi-furrow ploughs, yet such machinery would be of no use to a hill farmer in
North Wales. Because the modern plough disturbs the earth much more than older ways
of planting, soil erosion and soil depletion become greater problems. Again, in a country
Living in a technological culture 6
with no roads, a motor car is useless for transportation. Where it had not been the custom
to transport goods using wheeled vehicles, such as carts and carriages, the motor car
would not have been developed as a way of facilitating an already existing activity. It
might be introduced to such a country, from outside, making possible a form of transport
which had not been used before, but only if accompanied by a massive road building
programme. Its introduction would then necessarily entail changes in the way of life of
the country concerned.
Thus an understanding and appreciation of technological devices, as devices designed
to perform a function, requires a knowledge of the background practices and techniques
in which it has or had a role. It cannot be derived simply from looking to see how science
was applied to solve a practical problem. It is quite clear that technology choices are
never made by determining, in a narrowly technical sense of ‘best’, which device best
performs the task in question. The ‘best’ chosen is relative to all sorts of constraints other
than those of performing a certain technical task as well as possible. This is another way
of saying that the problems technology is introduced to solve are never purely technical
problems. Technologies, to be widely adopted, have to be mass manufactured, marketed,
purchased and used successfully. The extra constraints thus derive from the contexts in
which the device is to be manufactured, purchased and used. Many of these have to do
with material infrastructure and existing practices, which of course vary from one country
to another and have both technical and social aspects. This means that technological
change, in the sense of change in widely adopted technology, whether military or civilian,
cannot be understood by looking simply at technical problem solving and its methods,
those practical-cognitive contexts of engineering research and development which are
most closely analogous to theoretical science. Instead it requires understanding of the
complex economic, political, socio-cultural and infrastructural contexts of technological
decision making (see for example Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989, Ch. 11).
However, even when our conception of technology is broadened to include associated
techniques, it does not yield an understanding of technology which would entitle us to
think of the culture of developed countries in the twentieth century as specifically
‘technological’, i.e. in a way which would distinguish them from the cultures of medieval
Europe or Ancient Egypt. Yet we are frequently said to live in a technological age. What
does this mean? What further is embodied in this conception of technology? What does it
mean to live in a ‘technological culture’?
Here the discussion of steam technology can perhaps give us some initial clues. We
have already noted that the production of steam engines begins to impose demands of
standardization, accuracy and quality control in construction and in the supply of
component materials and parts. This in turn entails a degree of industrial systematization
and organization not required by the use of water or wind power. In addition, the use of
steam power involves an ongoing cost after the initial installation; unlike water or wind
steam had to be generated from coal (or wood) which has to be paid for. There is thus a
pressing economic incentive to improve the efficiency of steam engines. It was in this
context that a much more exact study of steam engines, their characteristics and the
determinants of their efficiency was undertaken and the theoretical aspects of engineering
design started to come more into play. The technology became an object of scientific
study and theoretical results were applied in the design of new engines. The knowledge
required by an engineer is now more than practical know-how; it increasingly comes to
Introduction 7
involve a theoretical, scientific component. That is to say, a technology which was not
originally an instance of applied science becomes one to which science is applied. It is in
the nineteenth century that science and technology really start to come together in the
way in which Francis Bacon had dreamt of at the end of the sixteenth. It is here perhaps,
with the emergence of theoretically directed practices, that we might look for an attitude
or approach which could be said to be technological in a sense which does not find
application in earlier cultures. As a provisional conjecture we might say that the move
towards a situation in which technology (including techniques) is applied science is what
has created a ‘technological culture’ and is what perhaps differentiates it from previous
cultures.
In other words, technological culture is a product of, and continues to embody, a
vision of what constitutes human progress, one in which the equation of technology with
applied science plays an important role. (The desire for a science/technology policy
founded on a rational methodology would itself be a manifestation of this vision.) As
Woolgar (1989, p. 312) remarked, discussions of technology are the reverse side of the
coin to debates about human nature. Recognition of this connection between human
ideals and technology, which goes via the conception of progress through technology, can
help us understand why the definitions of science, technology and their interrelation
should be highly sensitive. To contest them is to contest presuppositions deeply
embedded in modern cultural ideals. Moreover, modern philosophy both helped to shape
and has in turn been shaped by those ideals, hence its inability to ‘see’ technology as
anything other than applied science. Consequently there are no neutral positions, for no
definition of such sensitive central terms can be philosophically neutral. For the
increasing number of people who, like ourselves, wish to discuss and understand
technology, to start from a definition of technology would be premature, since our
enquiry is directed towards acquiring a better understanding of its actual significance in
our culture. Such an enquiry may, in itself, be interpreted as a challenge to dominant
philosophical and cultural ideologies, in that it suggests that they be subjected to critical
scrutiny. There is no way to sit on the fence. For even if we do not presuppose a precise
definition of technology, we do need to give a preliminary demarcation of the domain
with which we will be concerned, and this will already require us to make some
commitments. Exactly what these commitments are will become clearer as the
investigation progresses.
We will take it that technologies are ways of doing and making which are both
affected by and affect ways of thinking. Thus when considering any technology one
would minimally expect to consider technological devices (artefacts), techniques for their
production and use, the relative roles played in each of these by technical and manual
skills, practical knowledge (know-how) and theoretical knowledge. In addition, we would
suggest that one cannot grasp the significance of any complex technological device, such
as a hydroelectric generator or a nuclear reactor, without understanding its history,
complex support system, social meaning and political implications. Just as a satisfactory
understanding of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel cannot be confined to a mineral and
chemical analysis of the paint used, even if supplemented by attention to Michelangelo’s
tools and state of mind, so the great bridges of the world cannot be satisfactorily
understood without tracing their connections with the Industrial Revolution, the self-
confident, explorative urge prevalent in the nineteenth century, the expanding needs of a
Living in a technological culture 8
youthful, vigorous capitalism, and the moral and political commitment to universalism
over parochialism.
Thus, clearly we have rejected the simple equation of technology with applied science,
but at the same time we must acknowledge the technological significance of this
conception of technology, since it has been part of the context of technological
development in the twentieth century in particular. Therefore we shall have to take time
(in Chapter 3) to consider in more detail the relations between pure science, applied
science and technology. Before doing so, however, we need to probe more deeply into
our ambivalent attitudes towards technology
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