Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA

343, G.R. No. 78742, G.R. No. 79310, G.R. No. 79744, G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure;
Reasons.—That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly,
however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of
said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the
fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657)
provides for retention limits.—The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article
XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits
now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares: Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according
to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.

Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned under Police Power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.—There are traditional distinctions
between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application
of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for
example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use.

Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as
a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power, deprivation,
excess of the maximum area under power of eminent domain.—The cases before us present no
knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise
of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated
is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined; Requisites of a valid
classification.—Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites
have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection.—Equal protection simply means that all
persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a
wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there
is a concurrence of the lawful subject and method.—It is worth remarking at this juncture that a
statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject
and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from
those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid
down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What
remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined.—Eminent domain is an inherent power of the
State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to
sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be
agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price
or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to
assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights
must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification,
as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power of eminent domain.—But
for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no
power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined.—Just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just”
is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking.—As held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation, addressed to the courts of justice
and may not be usurped by any other branch.—To be sure, the determination of just compensation
is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official
of the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President
Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the
assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner,
whichever was lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.—With these assumptions, the
Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all
this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or
oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people
to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our
peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer’s hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall
decree today.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to
be made fully in money; Other modes of payment.—Accepting the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion
of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted
that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landwoner
will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other
things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance
of the payment are “negotiable at any time.” The other modes, which are likewise available to the
landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of
just compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law repeats the requisites of registration but does not provide that
in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the
provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.—The complaint against the effects of non-registration
of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Setion 4 of the
Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration
as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or
refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor
for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained
on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.—The recognized
rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27
as to retention limits; Case at bar.—In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in
G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already
been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be
examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by
LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.

Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 86889
December 4, 1990

Agrarian Law; Constitutional Law; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Statutes; In construing
constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the
intent of the framers of the Constitution.—It is generally held that, in construing constitutional
provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true
that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to
the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was
meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a
long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands,
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid.—It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands, devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities
are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Same; Same; Elements of Judicial Inquiry.—It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.

Daez vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 856, G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000

Agrarian Reform Law; Presidential Decree No. 27; Requisites for coverage under the Operation Land
Transfer.—P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following:
(1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or
lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption.
If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need
not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

Same; Same; Requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention.—On the other
hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1)
the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-
tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24)
hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares
thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of “other agricultural lands.”
Same; Same; Same; Landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential
Decree No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under Republic Act No. 6657.—In the
landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are
entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985
deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT.
However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had
previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the
retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five
(5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.

Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No.
171101 November 22, 2011

Agrarian Reform Law; Expropriation; Just Compensation; Department of Agrarian Reform’s

(DAR’s) land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner; The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.—The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR’s
land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court
to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

Same; Same; Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); The reckoning point is the
issuance of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA) and not the
placing of the agricultural lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage.—Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after
ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly,
the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands
under CARP coverage.

Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 225 SCRA 278, G.R. No. 103302 August 12,
1993

Agrarian Reform Law; Coverage; Commercial, industrial and residential lands not included.—We
now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that
the CARL shall “cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands.” As to what constitutes “agricultural land,” it is referred to as “land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.” The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. “Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are “arable and suitable agricultural
lands” and “do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.” Based on the foregoing, it
is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as “agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today,
the areas in question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail’s
pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to
restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed
for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999

Agrarian Reform; A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land
by a beneficiary under Republic Act 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.—
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’s) to farmer beneficiaries
over portions of petitioner’s land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary,
the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the
former. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned
upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. There was no
receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.

Same; The Department of Agrarian Reform’s opening of trust account deposits in the landowner’s
name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does not constitute payment under the law—trust
account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds.—The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner
is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or “LBP bonds.”
Respondent DAR’s opening of trust account deposits in petitioner’s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP
bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack
of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due
process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic
requirements of administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA’s
to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.

Same; Due Process; For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required—(1)
the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference and (2) the Notice of
Acquisition.—For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR
A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section
16 of the CARL.
Same; Same; Police Power; Power of Eminent Domain; The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain—to the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation
of private property, but where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent
domain; The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the
taking of private property.—The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the
letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps
designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the
CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that
the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.”The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the
taking of private property.

Same; Same; Service of Processes; The procedure in the sending of notices in the implementation of
the CAR Program is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the
owner is a juridical entity.—When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR
A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure
in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent
to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the
requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is
a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders,
officers and employees.

Same; Same; Same; Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as
to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do
with any legal papers served on him, and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action; A hacienda administrator cannot be considered an agent of the corporation where there is
no evidence showing his official duties or indicating whether his duties are so integrated with the
corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him.—Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier
or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an
agent of the corporation? The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make
it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against
it. Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori
supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
served on him, and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. Petitioner’s
evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioner’s
haciendas. The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentel’s duties is so integrated with the
corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and the preliminary conference
conducted, petitioner’s principal place of business was listed in respondent DAR’s records as
“Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila,” and “7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St.,
Makati, Metro Manila.” Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner.
Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.,
Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and actually resided in the haciendas in
Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred kilometers away from Metro Manila.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Even if Executive Order 229 is silent as to the procedure for the
identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner,
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries, it does not mean that these
requirements may be dispensed with in regard to a Voluntary Offer to Sell filed before June 15,
1988.—Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as
set forth in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure
of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the
identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner,
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these
requirements may be dispensed with in regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Land Conversion; Department of Agrarian
Reform’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of certain landholdings does not ipso facto
give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate over the landowner’s application for conversion of
its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural.—Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due
process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power
to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for
conversion is the DAR.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Land Conversion; Words and Phrases; “Land Use” refers to the
manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management, while “Land
Use Conversion” refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.—“Land Use” refers to
the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. “Land Use
Conversion” refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land
into some other use as approved by the DAR. The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than
agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve
factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.—
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power
to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure of DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give the Supreme Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already
issued to the farmer beneficiaries.—We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the
requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify
the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the
chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone,
CLOA’s were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers
have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to
deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer
beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.