Cases in Political Law

CASES IN POLITICAL LAW
Magallona v Ermita:
The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means
to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it
comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to
delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the
old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing
the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.).
But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2
of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago
as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our
“internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a
regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the
baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones
– in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which
is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a
larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the
demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article
77 of the UNCLOS.
Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon:

G.R. No. 154705 405 SCRA 126 June 26, 2003
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN,
and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND
SERVICES, respondent.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling
that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted
itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah,
entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor
of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement
are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of
Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and
unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by
invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may
be sued herein in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The practical
justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of
foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States,
as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude would
“unduly vex the peace of nations”.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to
change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive
theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the government of a state), but not with regard
to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri
imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute
that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter
into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was
entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental
functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the
case of:
a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of
the mission;
an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending
State;
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof,
but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent
engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is
not the case herein.
Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel
People v Perfecto
South China Sea Case
Lambino v COMELEC
Republic v Sandiganbayan
Ku Layan v Tan
China International Machinery and Equipment Corporation v Sta. Maria
University of the Philippines v Dizon
Republic v Purisima
Amigable v Cuenca
Ministerio v City of Cebu
Merritt v Government of the Philippine Island
Santiago v Republic
Froilan v Pan Oriental Shipping Company
PNB v Pabalan
Air Transportation Office v Ramos
Palafox v Province of Ilocos Norte
Belgica v Ochoa
Bengzon v HRET
Grace Poe Case

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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW

Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon:

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