Ruzol VS Sandiganbayan
Ruzol VS Sandiganbayan
Ruzol VS Sandiganbayan
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R.
Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized
a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and
concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of
salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the
organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta
Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government
organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon
province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of
the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged
forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of
Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art.
177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and
Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and
official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol
and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and
committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest
product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of
official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the
presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the documentary
evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and
the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities
of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved
function to manage and control communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees
levied by the municipality for the use of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest
products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title
One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of
R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is
denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin"
or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a
person wanting to transport the said forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO
or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a
substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the
annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued
by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not
enough to impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have
been committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180
SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221
Transport permits through the Provincial Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio
Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under
the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as
Mayor and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of
DENR.7
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting
Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense
of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the
three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits
with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of
General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of
the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation
revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the
question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
Subsidiary Issue:
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue
transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree
No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation
to Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and
authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including watershed
reservations presently administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation
of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees
for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the
implementation of multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection,
development and preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the
implementation of measures and programs to prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and
grazing lands; in collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification
of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills
and other wood processing plants and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest
products. (Emphasis Ours.)
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
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SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following functions:
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(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and
mineral resources and in the process of exercising such control the Department shall impose
appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources.
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(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s
forest, land and mineral resources;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint
venture or production sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such
other privileges and arrangement concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon
failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes
which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national
interests;
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(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest
products, grading and inspection of lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the
movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the
permittee should secure the necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved
wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges
the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the DENR
to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and
typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only
be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this
mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested
with the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.
1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products"
is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
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(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the
DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry products;
(2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development
projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30),
which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had
been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in
protected areas and critical watersheds;
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that
the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which
are sources of local water supply as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above
mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not
included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport
permits remains with the DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed
shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law
has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the
intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous
with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that
the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other
government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare
clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact
such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the
protection of property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this
duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate
ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly,
provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its
territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their
Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport
were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of
General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the
area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged
forest products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be
done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the
"LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the environment and natural resources within their
territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed
in Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-
DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was
promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative
Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-
DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use
and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and
development of the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the
DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in
forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and
efficient management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs
together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an
integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced
use of natural resources to support local, regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable
management of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance
the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR
shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As
the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management
of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall
devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter
into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community
empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and
other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local communities
for forest management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
(Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation
of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes,
rules or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to
immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not
necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged
forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure
to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied
by the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred
by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources
of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
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Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise
the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public
hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as
Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
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vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer
the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or
charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an
appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless
to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is
generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the
Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact
ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs
and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal
Revenue Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the
issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the
regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are
infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and
control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We
recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of communal forests within its
territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in
accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient
execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage
and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision,
control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has a well-defined and
technical meaning.31Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence and
knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal
forest. The DILG, on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined
the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments
shall be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual
identification and assessment of existing communal forests. The assessment shall determine
the suitability of the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these
communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the
RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and
the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU
Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their purpose shall be maintained as such.
Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal
forest is located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said
communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said resolution, the DENR
Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to
the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU
within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said
communal forest to the city or municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was
transferred shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a
management plan governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination
with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level
of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest
management planning to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure
sustainability.
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly
identify potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning
to be undertaken jointly between the DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land
use plan shall indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests within
the production forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the
passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue
an Administrative Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required
administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU
shall formulate the management plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The
management plan shall include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of
the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares.
(Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following
requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within
the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall
indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the
DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an
administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied
with. Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the Municipality of General
Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the
issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from
the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not
substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the
regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest
products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before
obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as
defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely
represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do
so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis
Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by
knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter
act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits
to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without
being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were
attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution.36As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the
accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that
his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived
of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt
proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion,
so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As
explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the
State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands;
with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded
as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty
often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for
liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove
that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official
functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that
the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged
forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly
belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that,
pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be
gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the
Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject
permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to
the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the
Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a
defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is
ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it
can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of
his conduct and outward acts.45
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject
permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations and
religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject
permits even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was
legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required
by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew
that he had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and
back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established
doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an accused sought another person’s
approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one
seeks the opinion or affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public
consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate
and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of
untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was
not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the
participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier
Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the
Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief
executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly
believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence
and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed,
Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the
prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and
credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of
PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim
of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the
shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has
his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but
also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest
denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now
obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured
natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as
municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-
governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar.
Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit
of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist,"
as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol
possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is
that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within
General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him
criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run
contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection
of the environment and conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that
this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official
functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is
only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac
vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First
Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of
violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes
as charged.
SO ORDERED.