Secnav M-5239.1 PDF
Secnav M-5239.1 PDF
Secnav M-5239.1 PDF
Published By
The Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer
SECNAV M-5239.1
November 2005
FOREWORD
This Manual implements the policy set forth in Secretary of the Navy Instruction
(SECNAVINST) 5239.3A, Subject: "Department of the Navy Information Assurance Policy"
and is issued under the authority of SECNAVINST 5430.7N, Subject: "Assignment of
Responsibilities and Authorities in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy." This Manual is
intended to serve as a high-level introduction to information assurance and IA principles. It
discusses common IA controls and associated requirements and reviews the Department of
Defense strategy for implementing those controls. Future manuals in the SECNAV Manual
(SECNAVMAN) 5239 series will address other topics such as IA roles and responsibilities, basic
IA practices and procedures, and IA incident reporting and response, etc.
This Manual is effective immediately; it is mandatory and applicable to all DON activities,
installations, commands, units, and personnel, and DON owned or controlled information
systems. Nothing in this manual shall alter or supersede the existing authorities and policies of
the Director of National Intelligence regarding the protection of Sensitive Compartmented
Information and special access programs for intelligence.
The entire SECNAV IA Manual series may be accessed through the Department of the Navy,
Navy Electronic Directives System website: http://neds.daps.dla.mil/.
D. M. Wennergren
Department of the Navy
Chief Information Officer
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.2. ATTRIBUTES..................................................................................................................... 4
APPENDIX B – DEFINITIONS................................................................................................ 33
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1. CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1. PURPOSE
This Manual:
1.1.1. Introduces the Department of the Navy (DON) Information Assurance Program, its
concepts, and their application within the DON. Other manuals in the series will provide more
detailed guidance on specific IA-related topics.
1.1.2. Describes the DON Information Assurance Program. The purpose of the DON IA
Program is to protect information to support the DON mission as described in the DON
Information Management and Information Technology (IM/IT) Strategic Plan, to “deliver secure,
interoperable, and integrated information management and information technology to the Marine
and Sailor to support the full spectrum of warfighting and warfighting support missions.” The
major elements of the DON IA Program are: to promulgate IA policies and procedures to
manage risk to DON IT assets, promote implementation of IA throughout the life cycle of all
DON IT assets, and to integrate IA controls throughout the daily activities of the DON.
1.1.3. Replaces DON IA Publication 5239-01, dated May 2000, and should be reviewed
in its entirety.
1.2. APPLICABILITY
1.2.1. This manual is mandatory and applies to all DON activities, installations,
commands, units, and personnel, and to information collected or maintained by or on behalf of
the Department of the Navy and Information Systems used or operated by the Department of the
Navy, by a contractor of the Department of the Navy processing DON information, or other
organizations on behalf of the Department of the Navy. Military, civilian, contractor, and
foreign national personnel who have access to DON-owned or controlled information systems
are also subject to the provisions herein. This manual applies only to classified collateral, and/or
sensitive unclassified, or unclassified information systems and networks. This publication does
not apply to Special Compartmented Information, Cryptographic, Cryptologic, Special Access
Program, Single Integrated Operation Plan-Extremely Sensitive Information, or North Atlantic
Treaty Organization information. Those systems are under the purview of their respective
authorities. However, this manual mentions these types of information only to complete
definitions or provide examples.
1.2.2. This manual is consistent with Federal and Department of Defense (DoD) IA
policies. In the case of a conflict, directives and instructions set forth by higher authority take
precedence. Implementing authorities at the Marine Corps and Navy shall identify conflicting
policy and issues of precedence to the Office of the DON Chief Information Officer (DON CIO)
for resolution.
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2.1. PRINCIPLES
2.1.1. The DON CIO is responsible for developing and promulgating IA strategy and
policy, coordinating IA within the Department and with other DoD components, measuring and
evaluating Service and system level IA performance, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy
on the effectiveness of DON IA activities. The DON CIO shall carry out for the Secretary of the
Navy the information assurance responsibilities assigned in The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) to the Head of each Federal Agency. DON CIO reports
directly to the Secretary of the Navy and has the responsibility to ensure compliance with
applicable Information Assurance requirements including the development and maintenance of a
Department-wide IA Program.1 The Navy Deputy Chief Information Officer for Policy and
Integration (DON Deputy CIO (Policy and Integration)) is designated as the Department of the
Navy Senior Information Assurance Officer (DON Senior IA Officer).
2.1.2. DON CIO focuses its efforts on the development of IA policy, strategy, tools, and
oversight. The goal of IA is to protect and defend information and information systems.
Information Assurance is an operational requirement throughout DON and is an essential
contributor to the warfighting mission and system interoperability.
2.1.5. Information and information systems shall be properly managed and protected as
required by law, regulation, policy, or treaty. IA is a composite of the principles addressed in this
section.
2.2. ATTRIBUTES
1 SECNAVINST 5430.7N
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controls. Non-repudiation and authentication are often included with the three fundamentals to
emphasize their importance to DoD.
2.3. APPROACHES TO IA
2.3.1. DON IA is achieved through joint efforts within DON and across DoD.
Understanding the common DoD approaches to IA ensures better DON implementation.
2.3.1.1. Joint Vision 2020. This DoD strategy focuses on the continuing
transformation of America’s Armed Forces. The primary purpose of those forces has been and
will be to fight and win the Nation’s wars. The overall goal of the transformation described in
this document is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military
operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict. The
continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change
the conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make
information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the
joint force and the evolution of joint command and control.
2.3.1.2. The Global Information Grid. Joint Vision 2020 envisioned the concept of
a Global Information Grid (GIG) to provide the Net-Centric DoD environment required to
achieve information superiority. The GIG supports all DoD, National Security, and related
Intelligence Community mission and functions in war and in peace. The GIG—a seamless,
common-user, information infrastructure—will be the foundation for information superiority by
providing the enterprise-wide information services for the DoD’s Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems (C4ISR)
and e-Business systems. The GIG includes all owned and leased communications and computing
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systems and services, software, data, security services, and other associated services necessary to
achieve information superiority. The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations
(bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites). Further, the GIG
provides interfaces to coalition, allied, and non-DoD users and systems. GIG IA provides the
capabilities that enable information superiority in every military operation, and is inherent to net-
centric capabilities that support the full range of warfighter, intelligence, and business
operations. DON Information Technology (IT) and IA efforts are oriented towards securely
achieving the vision of the GIG.
2.3.1.2.1. FORCEnet. FORCEnet is the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine
Corps (USMC) initiative to achieve Net-Centric Operations and Joint Transformation by
providing robust information sharing and collaboration capabilities across the Naval / Joint force.
FORCEnet supports joint interoperability requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI) 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. FORCEnet provides
a transitional approach to requirements definition, cross-domain solutions, and command and
control. FORCEnet technical requirements match key Joint, Net-Centric, and GIG technical
guideposts. FORCEnet will enable the delivery of distributed combat systems connected through
the network. It is not a single process, but a collection of processes such as requirements
generation, architecture and design standards, innovation and experimentation, human system
engineering, certification and compliance, and others, all created under a common vision and
with common authority in the USN and USMC, aimed at delivering this capability.
2.3.1.2.2. Navy Marine Corps Intranet. The Navy Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI) is both a strategy and a network. As a strategy, NMCI supports USN and USMC
leverage of a new and technically up-to-date enterprise network and promotes enhanced network
security. As a network, it provides a common, secure, enterprise infrastructure capable of
supporting new enterprise-wide applications. The IA benefits of NMCI include central
management of the network, configuration management, and improved systems availability.
Most legacy networks will migrate to NMCI, the single DON Enterprise network. The
consolidation of legacy networks into NMCI will reduce the number of vulnerabilities to and
increase the IA posture of the DON enterprise.
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2.3.2. As a standard approach to IA, all DON information and information systems shall
be safeguarded through the application of IA controls per DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.2,
Information Assurance (IA) Implementation and SECNAVINST 5239.3A.
2.3.2.2. Federal regulations and guidance organize IA controls into classes and
families. Each family contains controls related by function. Federal regulations require the
application of baseline IA controls organized in this class and family structure. This document is
aligned with that structure.
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DON IA roles and responsibilities are set forth in SECNAVINST 5239.3A and SECNAVINST
5430.7N. Additional key roles are described and assigned in DoD Directive (DoDD) 8500.1,
Information Assurance (IA) and DoDI 8500.2. A high-level summary of key IA roles follows.
An upcoming SECNAV IA Manual will provide a more detailed discussion of DON IA roles and
responsibilities.
2.4.1. DON CIO. The DON CIO is responsible for developing and promulgating IA
strategy and policy, coordinating IA within the Department and with DoD components,
measuring and evaluating Service and system level IA performance, and reporting to the
Secretary of the Navy on the effectiveness of DON IA activities. The Navy Deputy Chief
Information Officer for Policy and Integration (DON Deputy CIO (Policy and Integration)) is
designated as the Department of the Navy Senior Information Assurance Officer (DON Senior
IA Officer). The DON Senior IA Officer has the responsibilities and performs the functions of
the “senior agency information security officer” referenced in FISMA.
2.4.2. DON Deputy CIOs. The DON Deputy CIO (Navy) and DON Deputy CIO (Marine
Corps) shall, subject to the authority of the DON CIO, implement and enforce policies,
standards, and procedures to ensure that DON complies with applicable statutes, regulations, and
directives.
2.4.3. Chief of Naval Operations. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is responsible
for developing and implementing IA-related programs and controls, ensuring that IA is
incorporated throughout the system development lifecycle, assigning designated approval
authorities (DAAs), providing enterprise-wide vulnerability mitigation solutions, and providing
an incident reporting and response capability.
2.4.4. Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commandant is responsible for developing
and implementing IA-related programs and controls, ensuring that IA is incorporated throughout
the system development lifecycle, assigning DAAs, providing enterprise-wide vulnerability
mitigation solutions, and providing an incident reporting and response capability.
2.4.5. Designated Approving Authority. The DAA is the official with the authority to
formally assume responsibility for operating a system at an acceptable level of risk. DAAs
accredit IT system security postures throughout the system development lifecycle and in
accordance with risk-management principles.
2.4.6. Certification Authority. The Certification Authority (CA) is the official responsible
for performing the comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical security features
and safeguards of an IT system, application, or network. This evaluation is made in support of
the accreditation process, to establish the extent that a particular design and implementation
meets information assurance requirements. The CA is responsible for making a technical
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judgment of the system's compliance with stated requirements, identifying and assessing the
risks associated with operating the system, coordinating the certification activities, and issuing a
certification statement for the system. The CA is responsible for managing the certification
process.
2.4.7. Program Manager. The Program Manager (PM) is the person who owns the
business process and controls the funding for the system. The PM is the individual with overall
responsibility for the system/application.
2.4.8. Command Information Officers. All Navy Echelon II Commands and all Marine
Corps Major Subordinate Commands shall have a command Information Officer (IO) billet.
Navy Echelon II command IOs report to the DON Deputy CIO (Navy) for tactical matters and to
their commanding officer for administrative matters. Marine command IOs report to both the
DON Deputy CIO (Marine Corp) and their Major Subordinate Commander.4
2.4.9. IA Manager. The Information Assurance Manager (IAM) is responsible for the
information assurance program within a command, site, system, or enclave. The IAM is
responsible to the local IA command authority and DAA for ensuring the security of an IT
system, and that it is approved, operated, and maintained throughout its life cycle in accordance
with IT system security certification and accreditation documentation. Additionally, this
individual is responsible for creating the site accreditation package. The IAM functions as the
command's focal point for IA matters on behalf of, and principal advisor to, the DAA.
2.4.10. IA Officers. IA Officers (IAOs) are responsible to an IAM for ensuring the
appropriate operational IA posture is maintained for a command, organization, site, system, or
enclave. IAOs assist in creating accreditation packages. They implement and enforce system-
level IA controls in accordance with program and policy guidance.
2.4.12. Privileged Users. Individuals who have access to system control, monitoring, or
administration functions (e.g., system administrator, IAO, system programmers, etc.) are
Privileged Users. Privileged Users are responsible for providing IA safeguards and assurances to
the data they control as well as their personal authentication mechanisms.
4DON memorandum to CNO and CMC, “Designation of the Department of the Navy Deputy Chief
Information Officer (NAVY) and the Department of the Navy Deputy Chief Information Officer
(MARINE CORPS),” 22 Aug 2005.
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3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.2.1. Department of the Navy IA policies are generated and promulgated by the DON
CIO (and the DON Senior IA Officer as a focal point within DON CIO) and provide DON-
specific interpretations of laws, regulations, and executive policy. They also address
requirements set forth by DoD and component organizations. They are general statements of
organizational intent and provide specific IA roles and responsibilities for members of the DON.
3.2.3. Procedures shall define deployment of the system, system configuration, day-to-
day operations for both the system administrator and user, as well as how to respond to real or
perceived attempts to violate system security.
3.2.4. All DON information systems and networks shall include written standard
operating procedures, which are routinely updated and tailored to reflect changes in the
operational environment.
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3.3.1.5. System acquisition may not proceed prior to registration with the DON
system inventory.
3.3.2.2. Each system shall include risk assessment and risk management programs
throughout the system’s life cycle.
3.3.2.3. To the extent possible, legacy systems shall employ system security
standards that support relevant security policies and procedures within a secure enclave.
Modifications to legacy systems shall prioritize incorporation of common security procedures
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and products to improve their overall security postures. Legacy systems with weak security
implementations shall be placed outside the secure enclave or in a separate demilitarized zone
(DMZ) if they pose significant security risks to other information resources protected within the
enclave. Ultimately, most legacy networks will migrate to the single DON Enterprise network,
NMCI.
3.3.3. Acquisitions
3.4.1. Certification and Accreditation. The C&A process leads to an informed system
accreditation decision based on risk-management principles. Accreditation may be granted by
DAAs only after systems are identified and categorized, IA controls are assigned and
implemented, and control implementations are validated.
3.4.1.1. All DON information systems (as defined in DoDD 8500.1) shall be
certified and accredited for operation.
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3.4.1.3. DON C&A shall be conducted in accordance with DoDI 5200.40, DoD
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process and DoD 8510.1-M,
Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process
Application Manual. These documents present the standard DoD approach for: identifying,
implementing, and validating IA Controls; authorizing the operation of DoD information
systems; and managing IA posture across DoD information systems. The process ensures
compliance with various Federal reporting requirements and flexibility in a changing technical
and threat environment.
3.4.2. Identify and Categorize Systems. The provision of IA is dependent on the accurate
and timely identification and categorization of systems; understanding which assets require
protection and the level of protection appropriate for each asset is necessary for the development
of a comprehensive and effective IA program. All DON information systems shall be identified
and reported to the DON system inventory. Categorization addresses a system’s classification
level and mission assurance category as described in DoDI 8500.2.
3.4.2.1. Services shall annually certify that all mission critical, mission essential,
and mission support systems are included in the DoD’s system inventory or that systems are
separately included in the Intelligence Community’s system inventory. Descriptions of “mission
critical” and “mission essential” are described in DoDI 5000.2, Enclosure 4. A definition of
“Mission Support is located in Appendix B.
3.4.2.2. Each inventory entry shall be updated at least quarterly8 and shall include
several mandatory elements, including: date of most recent security control testing, listing of
system interconnections, and system mission assurance categories and classification levels.
Detailed information about mission assurance categories may be found in DoDI 8500.2. Detailed
information about classification levels may be found in SECNAVINST 5510.36, Department of
the Navy Information Security Program Regulation.
3.4.3. Assign, Implement, and Validate IA Controls. Every DON information system
shall include risk assessment and risk management programs. When assigning IA controls from
DoDI 8500.2, consider the mission assurance category and classification level of a system. Also
consider the specific risks to a system and address general and localized threats and
vulnerabilities (risk assessment). Implementation of IA controls varies with operating
environment and shall be documented as a portion of the C&A package (risk management).
Validation techniques will vary between controls; DoD C&A policy provides specific guidance
on selecting and implementing IA control validation techniques (risk management).
3.4.4. Plan of Action and Milestones. The Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) is a
Federally-mandated9 management tool for tracking IA weaknesses and weakness mitigation
8 Mandate established under FISMA. Deadlines are December 1, March 1, June 1, and September 1.
9 Mandate established under FISMA.
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3.4.7. Maintain Approval to Operate and Conduct Reviews. Computers and the
environments they operate in are dynamic. System technology and users, data and information in
the systems, risks associated with the system and, therefore, security requirements are ever-
changing. Design, execute, and maintain a Lifecycle Implementation Plan that specifies the C&A
schedule for all systems. Reevaluate system security postures at least annually or when there are
significant modifications that change the security posture or accreditation status..
3.5.1. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security
of Federal Automated Information Resources requires “written management authorization, based
upon the acceptance of risk to the system, prior to connecting with other systems.” DON
information systems satisfy this requirement through compliance with the connection approval
procedures established in CJCSI 6211.02B, Defense Information System Network: Policy,
Responsibilities and Processes.
3.5.2. Written agreements between Government networks that are under the purviews of
different DAAs detailing proof of accreditation, acceptance of risk, and related responsibilities
shall be in place prior to interconnection between networks. Assessing benefits and risks of
internetworking, as compared with the costs to mitigate and control risks, is required as part of
the overall vulnerability analysis. Decisions to maintain connections to other networks should be
made with awareness of the lack of control over the security safeguards in use by other network
infrastructures.
3.5.3. Dynamic interaction among accredited software systems that have been designed to
interact is not considered a security relevant event. This includes authorized messaging with non-
DoD information systems, e.g., electronic commerce/electronic data interchange transactions
with an information system belonging to another department or agency.
3.5.4. DON connections to the Defense Information Infrastructure, including the Non-
Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secret Internet Protocol Router
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3.5.4.1. DON systems that connect directly to non-DoD infrastructures such as the
Internet shall apply appropriate security technologies, to specifically include a firewall, to protect
information technology resources from unauthorized external activities. Do not design or connect
without the approval of the appropriate DAA. Such systems shall conform to requirements set
forth in DoDI 8551.1, Ports, Protocols, and Services Management.
3.5.5. Cross Domain Solutions. A Cross Domain Solution provides the ability to
manually and/or automatically access and or transfer information between two or more differing
security domains. Interconnections between DoD information systems of different security
domains or with other U.S. Government systems of different security domains shall be employed
only to meet compelling operational requirements, not operational convenience. Service-level
validation as well as Service and formal Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) DAA
authorization are required prior to making connections. Details of the Navy Cross Domain
Solution process and sample documents including request forms and checklist can be obtained
from https://infosec.navy.mil/, and Marines are directed to use this site also.
3.6.1. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) is a part of
the E-Government Act of 2002 (PL 107-347). FISMA places requirements on government
agencies and their components, with the goal of improving the security of federal information
and information systems.
3.6.2. FISMA requires the Head of each Federal Agency to provide information security
protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm that may result from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of its information
and information systems. The protection should apply not only within the agency, but also within
contractor or other organizations working on behalf of the agency.
3.6.3. FISMA requires each federal agency to report to Congress annually, addressing the
adequacy and effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices. In
addition to the annual report, FISMA requires each agency to conduct an annual independent
evaluation of the IA program and practices to determine their effectiveness. The annual DON
FISMA Report is submitted to the DoD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks
and Information Integration), which sends a composite FISMA report to OMB and Congress.
3.6.4. The annual FISMA report changes each year. Generally, it summarizes the data in
the DON IT Registry, including C&A status of systems and networks, dates of annual reviews,
and dates of annual testing of security controls and contingency plans. It also includes personnel
training statistics. These statistics play an important part of Congress’ annual “grading” Federal
agency security programs.
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.1.1. DON IA operational controls focus on activities that are implemented and executed
by people as opposed to systems. These controls are put in place to improve the security of a
particular system or group of systems. They often require technical or specialized expertise and
rely upon management activities as well as technical controls.
4.2.1. Introduction
4.2.1.1. Personnel security controls evaluate the military, civilian, and contractor
personnel who develop, use, operate, administer, maintain, defend, and retire DoD or DON
Information Systems. These controls support assurance that the right people have access to the
right information and information systems.
4.2.1.2. DON shall have a workforce that is sufficiently educated and trained to
assure the security of government networks and information. DoDD 8570.1, Information
Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management, establishes IA training,
certification, and workforce management policy for DoD.
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necessity for access to, or knowledge or possession of, specific official DoD information
required to carry out official duties.10
4.2.3.1. “Foreign nationals” refers to all individuals who are not citizens or
nationals of the U.S. This may include some U.S. military personnel, DoD civilian employees,
and contractors.
4.2.3.3. Where foreign national access is required, each system shall have
policies and procedures to ensure that access is authorized only to information approved for
release to that foreign national’s government, and for controlled unclassified information
authorized for release in accordance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the
Export Administration Regulations.
4.2.3.7. DAAs and IAMs shall be U.S. citizens. DAAs shall be civilian or
military employees of the U. S. Government, while IAMs shall be civilian, military, or contract
employees of the U. S. Government.
4.2.3.8. IAOs and personnel with privileged access may be contractors or foreign
nationals, provided requirements of DoDI 8500.2 and SECNAVINST 5510.30A are met. For
foreign nationals, requirements include submission of a complete waiver package per
SECNAVINST 5510.30A.
4.2.4. Privileged Access. A privileged user is an authorized user who has access to
system control, monitoring, or administration functions.11 Privileged access to DON systems
10 DoDD 8500.1
11 DoDI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation, 6 Feb 2003, section E2.1.44
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should only be held by personnel whose current job duties require that level of access.
SECNAVINST 5510.30A specifies requirements for privileged access to DON systems.
4.2.5.2.1. DoDI 8500.2 and SECNAVINST 5510.30A state that DAAs and
IAMs shall be U.S. citizens. DAAs shall be civilian or military employees of the U. S.
Government, while IAMs may be civilian, military, or contractor employees. See DoDI 8500.2
and SECNAVINST 5510.30A for more information.
12 DoDD 8570.1, Information Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management, 15 August 2004
13 DoDI 8500.2, section 5.8.2
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4.3.1. Physical Security is the action taken to protect DON information technology
resources (e.g., installations, infrastructure, personnel, equipment, electronic media, and
documents) from damage, loss, theft, or unauthorized physical access.
4.3.2. Commanders of DON organizations are responsible for ensuring the physical
security posture is accurately assessed and security resources are appropriate to protect DON
information and resources in accordance with SECNAVINST 5510.34 and SECNAVINST
5510.36.
4.4.1. All DON units shall be prepared to recover from disasters and continue operations
in the event of the non-availability of information systems and resources or denial of service
conditions. Contingency plans shall be developed, evaluated, and annually tested to prepare for
emergency response, backup operations, and post-disaster recovery. At a minimum, contingency
planning shall address reconstitution for the loss of processing, storage, or transmitting of
information.
4.4.2. System and network design shall incorporate redundancy and data backup in
accordance with the level of IA controls for the system’s mission assurance category (MAC)
level. For some systems or networks, this will require a remote site capable of providing
network operations using routine system backups stored offsite in preparation for a disaster.
NIST Special Publication 800-34, Contingency Planning for Information Technology Systems,
provides guidance on developing contingency plans, including disaster recovery.
4.4.3. The DON continuity of operations (COOP) program provides the means to
continue DON mission essential operations during national security emergencies and events
requiring all or part of the DON to be relocated or reconstituted. Program details are described in
SECNAVINST 3030.4A, Department of the Navy Continuity of Operations (DON COOP)
Program.
4.5.1. Configuration management identifies, controls, accounts for, and audits all changes
to a site or information system during its design, development, and operational lifecycle. Proper
configuration management is essential to the maintenance of system accreditation status. For
each change or modification to an information system or site configuration, assess the security
impact of the change against the accreditation conditions issued by the DAA.
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4.5.2. Various federal departments and agencies publish baseline security requirements
for commonly deployed IT hardware and software. Key resources include:
NSA Security Configuration Guides address a wide variety of open source
and proprietary software.
http://www.nsa.gov/snac/.
4.6.1. Malicious code refers to any type of computer software, standalone or embedded,
designed to perform some type of unauthorized or undesirable activity. This includes viruses,
worms, spyware, Trojan horses, and other executable files and scripts that intentionally or
unintentionally perform unauthorized activities or act in a malicious manner.14
4.6.2. The most critical countermeasure to malicious code is the installation and
maintenance of anti-virus software. This software is available to all DoD components at no cost
and is downloadable from the DoD IA Portal and the DON IA website.15
4.7.1. Network management tools are used to detect, isolate, and react to intrusions,
disruption of services, or events that threaten the security of DON information technology
resources. Intrusion detection is performed by personnel actively monitoring the outputs of these
tools.
4.7.2. The Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT) and the Marine Corps
Network Operations and Security Center (MCNOSC) monitor networks for these types of
events. More information on DON incident response will be published in a forthcoming manual.
14 Source: http://www.cert.mil/antivirus/malcode.htm
15 Source: http://iase.disa.mil/ or https://infosec.navy.mil/.
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4.8.2. The IA Vulnerability Management (IAVM) process generates alerts that are issued
by DoD to direct enterprise-wide response to specific software vulnerabilities. IAVM actions
shall be addressed and compliance reported within the timeframe allotted by DoD.
4.8.2.1. The IAVM program applies to any asset on any DON owned or
controlled information system network.
4.8.4.1. The five INFOCON levels include: Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and
Delta. These are defined in DoDD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense.
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4.9.2. Validation may occur locally. Requests for on-line surveys, IA assist visits, and
Red Team support may be made to NAVCIRT or MCNOSC via appropriate command.
Assistance is also available to support vulnerability identification and mitigation via appropriate
Service commands.
4.9.2.1. Blue Team Operations. A Blue Team operation uses a team specifically
constructed for the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle charged with assisting in the protection of
the targeted assets and conducting training to local personnel. The Blue Team provides special
technical expertise to system/security administrators and managers to assist command personnel
in defensive actions. Blue Team trusted agents provide assistance in identifying Red Team
attacks and serve as safety observers to ensure that safety is not compromised.
4.10.1. Protect all electronic media (e.g., compact disks, internal and external hard drives,
and portable devices), including backup media, removable media, and media containing sensitive
information from unauthorized access.
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4.10.2. Control access to such materials, and ensure that they are properly labeled, stored,
destroyed, and disposed of in accordance with the rules for the data they contain. This includes
all sensitive unclassified data not approved for public release. This also includes special
handling instructions for U.S. classified and NATO marking and release requirements.
4.10.3. SECNAVINST 5510.36 defines the DON Information Security Program policies,
including media marking requirements.
4.11.1. An event is an observable occurrence, not yet assessed, that may affect the
performance of a system. Examples of events include a user connecting to a file share, a server
receiving a request for a Web page, a user sending electronic mail, or a firewall blocking a
connection attempt.
4.11.2. Incidents are adverse events with a negative consequence. Examples of incidents
include the unauthorized use of another user's account, the unauthorized use of system privileges,
and the execution of malicious code that destroys data, and data manipulation such as web
defacements. There are two types of incidents pertinent to this document.
4.11.3. Sites shall have a structured ability to audit, detect, isolate, react, and promptly
report incidents.
4.11.4. USMC personnel shall report potential IA incidents to the MCNOSC via their
chain of command. USN personnel shall report events and incidents to NAVCIRT via their chain
of command.
4.11.5.3. Note that not all computer incidents will result in a reportable loss or
compromise of classified information. When an incident does occur, be cognizant of DON dual
reporting requirements.
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4.12.1. DON shall establish, resource, and implement IA training and certification
programs for all Naval personnel – military and civilian – in accordance with SECNAVINST
5239.3A. These programs shall train, educate, certify, and professionalize personnel
commensurate with their responsibilities to develop, use, operate, administer, maintain, defend,
and retire DoD information systems.16
4.12.2. Initial IA Awareness training shall be provided to all military, civilian, and
contractor personnel as a condition of access to DON information systems in any system
lifecycle phase.
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5.1. INTRODUCTION
5.1.1. The technical class of IA controls focuses on IA controls established by people but
executed by systems. To be effective, these controls are dependent upon the proper functioning
of the systems. Implementation of technical controls requires significant operational
considerations and should be consistent with the management of IA within the organization.
5.2.1.3. Something you are – A unique attribute of the user, such as a fingerprint
or iris scan.
5.2.2. All DON information systems must require at least one of the three methods above
to identify a user for the purpose of access in addition to need-to-know and security clearance
requirements. DAAs will ensure that the identifying mechanism is appropriate for the system
criticality. For example, access to a MAC I system with classified information should require at
least two of the three identification mechanisms.
5.3.2. DON information systems including networks, e-mail, and web servers shall be
enabled to use DoD PKI certificates to support authentication, access control, digital signature,
and encryption. PKI requirements for DoD and DON information systems and applications can
be found in DoDI 8520.2, Public Key Infrastructure and Public Key Enabling.
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5.4.1. An authenticator is the means used to confirm the identity of a station, originator,
or individual.
5.4.2. The Common Access Card (CAC) is the DoD’s cyber and physical identification
card for all active duty Uniformed Services personnel, members of the Selected Reserve, DoD
civilian employees, and personnel working on site at DoD facilities using DoD networks and e-
mail services. The CAC is organization independent and interoperable across all DoD
Departments and Agencies including the DON.
5.4.3. The CAC is the primary token for generation, storage, and use of DoD PKI
certificates.
5.4.5. Passwords shall be encrypted both for storage and for transmission. Password
criteria are specified in CJCSM 6510.01.
5.5.1. Access Controls are used to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
data and information systems by limiting access to authorized personnel. Access to all DoD
information systems shall be based on a demonstrated need-to-know and granted in accordance
with SECNAVINST 5510.30A requirements for position designation, personnel security
investigation, and adjudication.
5.6.1. Account management ensures that valid user accounts are associated with active,
authorized personnel. While applicable to all types of accounts, account management for
privileged user accounts is critical. System administrators shall monitor user account inactivity
and establish procedures for investigating, deactivating, and eliminating accounts that do not
show activity over time.
5.7.1. In DON networks, a DMZ, also know as a “screened subnet,” exists logically
between the public domain (Internet) and the DISN. This boundary condition can be physical or
virtual. One option for creating this dedicated network segment is to operate a dedicated network
segment with a firewall installed at both ends, thus better protecting the internal network during
external information exchange and providing external, untrusted sources with restricted access to
releasable information while shielding the internal networks from outside attacks. Both firewalls
will have different rule sets according to the specific access controls for the attached networks
and the interior firewall will be more restrictive than the exterior firewall. A DMZ may also
include an intrusion detection system sensor to alert the appropriate personnel of suspicious
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and/or malicious network traffic. In order to defend the internal network, services that are
accessed from external networks, such as e-mail and web servers, must be placed in a DMZ.
5.7.2. Deploy firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other NIAP or NSA-approved
security solutions to provide exterior protection to networks. Boundary defenses shall be
commensurate with the criticality and sensitivity of the systems in the network and appropriate to
the operating environment.
5.7.3. Intranet and extranet web services shall be protected with appropriate access
controls. Afloat commands shall only use Internet web-hosting services provided by a
centralized network operations center.
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APPENDIX A – REFERENCES
View http://iase.disa.mil/policy.html for a list of all IA-related laws, regulations, and policies.
Laws
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Title III of E-Government Act of 2002
(PL 107-347), 17 Dec 2002
OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources, 28
November 2000.
IA Generally
CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 11 May 2005
CJCSI 6211.02B, Defense Information System Network (DISN): Policy, Responsibilities and
Processes, 31 July 2003
Acquisition
DoDD 8580.1, Information Assurance (IA) in the Acquisition Defense System, 9 July 2004
DoDI 5200.40, DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process
(DITSCAP), 30 December 1997
DoDI 8510.1-M, DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process
(DITSCAP) Application Manual, 31 July 2000
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CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND), 15 June
2004
DoDI 8551.1, Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM), 13 Aug 2004
PKI
DoDI 8520.2, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling, 1 April 2004
Workforce Development
SECNAVINST 5510.30A, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, 19 June 2000
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Other References
CNSS Instruction No. 4009, National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, May 2003.
DON memorandum to CNO and CMC, “Designation of the Department of the Navy Deputy
Chief Information Officer (NAVY) and the Department of the Navy Deputy Chief Information
Officer (MARINE CORPS),” 22 Aug 2005.
Website References
Secretary of the Navy/Assistant for Administration Under Secretary of the Navy Publications
website: https://www.navsopubs.hq.navy.mil.
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APPENDIX B – DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are critical to understanding IA. A comprehensive set of IA definitions
is available from the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction Number 4009,
National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary at http://www.cnss.gov/.
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Legacy System An existing system that is designated for closure when the
capability is absorbed by an interim or core system or if the
capability is no longer required. No modifications or
enhancements are made to legacy systems.17
Mission Assurance Category Applicable to all DoD information systems, the mission
assurance category reflects the importance of information
relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives,
particularly the warfighters' combat mission. Mission
assurance categories are primarily used to determine the
requirements for availability and integrity.
Mission Critical (System) A system the loss of which would cause the stoppage of
warfighter operations or direct mission support of
warfighter operations.
Mission Essential (System) A system that is basic and necessary for the
accomplishment of the organizational mission.
17 http://www.dod.mil/bmmp
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36 Appendix B
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37 Appendix C
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38 Appendix C
Table of Revisions/Changes
STOCK NUMBER
0516LP1049453