SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009.]

SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO , petitioners, vs . THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL , respondents.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. cAIDEa

The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:

On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) led a
complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-33. Said action
originated from Erlinda Nicol's civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander
filed against her by petitioners.
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay
damages. The dispositive portion reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and against
defendant ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos as moral damages, ve thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, another ve thousand (P5,000.00) pesos
as exemplary damages and the cost of suit. 2

Said decision was af rmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court.
It became final and executory on 5 March 1992.
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of which
provides:
Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the
defendant Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in
the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency,
representing the moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses and
exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside from your lawful
fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ into court within sixty (60)
days from date, with your proceedings endorsed hereon.
But if suf cient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this
execution and lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and
buildings of said defendant you make the said sum of money in the manner
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 required by the Rules of Court, and make return of your proceedings with this writ
within sixty (60) days from date. 3

Finding Erlinda Nicol's personal properties insuf cient to satisfy the judgment,
the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to
the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-125322.
On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff's sale was issued.
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an af davit of
third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting
petitioners to put up a sheriff's indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with
petitioners as the highest bidder. cDCEHa

On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.

Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband
of Erlinda Nicol, led a complaint for annulment of certi cate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as
plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of
the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued
at P500,000.00 was only sold at a "very low price" of P51,685.00, whereas the
judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned to
Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
In response, petitioners led a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De
Leon v. Salvador , 4 petitioners claimed that respondent should have led the case with
Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution,
writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff's sale.
In an Order 5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent's complaint
and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any aw in the implementation of the
writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought before the court
issuing the writ of execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies open to the
plaintiff, if he feels that the property being levied on belongs to him and not to the
judgment debtor. The rst remedy is to le a third-party claim. If he fails to do
this, a right is reserved to him to vindicate his claim over the property by any
proper action. But certainly, this is not the proper action reserved to the plaintiff to
vindicate his claim over the property in question to be ventilated before this court.
As earlier stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC Bacoor
as it was that court which issued the writ of execution. 6

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21
has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. The dispositive portion reads:
SHEIDC

WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 for
further proceedings.

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 SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence,

the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact
which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an
independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 8
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
was questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of the judgment debtor
may le an independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution.
The alleged error therefore is an error of judgment which is a proper subject of an
appeal.
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the case
should still be dismissed on substantive grounds.
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its judgment to
the exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, in
line with De Leon v. Salvador . Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband of
the judgment debtor, is not the "third party" contemplated in Section 17 (now Section
16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence a separate action need not be led.
Furthermore, petitioners assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to the bene t
of the conjugal partnership and cited authorities to the effect that the husband is liable
for the tort committed by his wife.
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and jurisprudence.
9

Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper

interpretation of Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads: CDAHaE

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. —

If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor
or his agent, and such person makes an af davit of his title thereto or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same
upon the of cer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee,
the of cer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee,
on demand of the of cer, les a bond approved by the court to indemnify the
third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In
case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of
the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is led
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.

The of cer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is led. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the
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 judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate
action against a third-party claimant who led a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or
any of cer duly representing it, the ling of such bond shall not be required, and
in case the sheriff or levying of cer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he
shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of
such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)

Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a

stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or of cer effecting the writ by
serving on him an af davit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a
third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of
which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff,
as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a
separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of ling a claim in the court
that issued the writ. 1 0 AHDcCT

A third-party claim must be filed a person n other than the judgment debtor or his
agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals , 1 1 which was later
adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals , 1 2 this Court held that the husband of
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and
adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the bene t of the
conjugal partnership. 1 3 On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals 1 4 and Sy v.
Discaya, 1 5 the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein
the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justi ed in bringing an independent
action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of
the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability
is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of
the Family Code 1 6 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insuf ciency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse,
the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of
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 the debtor-spouse. acSECT

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil

obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or bene t is shown to have accrued
to the conjugal partnership. 1 7
In Guadalupe v. Tronco , 1 8 this Court held that the car which was claimed by the
third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a
judgment for support" led by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper
since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal
property but on his separate property.
Hence, the ling of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is
thus vested on Branch 21 . Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, * Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro ** and Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Acting Chairperson as replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official

leave per Special Order No. 618.
** Additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 619.

1. Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, concurred in by Associate Justices Hector

L. Hofileña and Artemio S. Tuquero.
2. Records, p. 10. IATHaS

3. Id. at 11.
4. No. L-30871, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 567.

5. Issued by Judge Roy S. Del Rosario.

6. Records, p. 67.

7. Rollo, p. 26.
8. Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165486, 31 May 2006, 490 SCRA 61, 70.

9. Rollo, p. 59.
10. China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, 24 March 2003, 399
SCRA 430, 431.
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 11. G.R. No. 51283, 7 June 1989, 174 SCRA 59.

12. G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 356.

13. Supra note 11 at 68.
14. G.R. No. 7675, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 60.

15. G.R. No. 86301, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 378.
16. Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
AcDaEH

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the
time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
17. Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 107.
18. A.M. No. P-142, 28 February 1978, 81 SCRA 605.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the of cial copy. The phrase " led a person"
should read as "filed by a person".

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