For Recit
For Recit
For Recit
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
T
he 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior
citizens is a tax credit, not merely a tax deduction from the gross
income or gross sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit is
used by a private establishment only after the tax has been
computed; a tax deduction, before the tax is computed. RA 7432
unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the provisions
of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such grant are void. Basic
is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law.
The Case
The Facts
On January 16, 1998, respondent filed with petitioner a claim for tax
refund/credit in the amount of P904,769.00 allegedly arising from the
20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens
in compliance with [R.A.] 7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response
from petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the Court of Tax
Appeals [(CTA or Tax Court)] via a Petition for Review.
However, Sec. 229 clearly does not apply in the instant case
because the tax sought to be refunded or credited by
petitioner was not erroneously paid or illegally collected. We
take exception to the CTAs sweeping but unfounded
statement that both tax refund and tax credit are modes of
recovering taxes which are either erroneously or illegally paid
to the government. Tax refunds or credits do not exclusively
pertain to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes as they
may be other circumstances where a refund is warranted. The
tax refund provided under Section 229 deals exclusively with
illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes but there are other
possible situations, such as the refund of excess estimated
corporate quarterly income tax paid, or that of excess input
tax paid by a VAT-registered person, or that of excise tax paid
on goods locally produced or manufactured but actually
exported. The standards and mechanics for the grant of a
refund or credit under these situations are different from that
under Sec. 229. Sec. 4[.a)] of R.A. 7432, is yet another
instance of a tax credit and it does not in any way refer to
illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes, x x x.[7]
The CA affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
ordering petitioner to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of respondent in
the reduced amount of P903,038.39. It reasoned that Republic Act No. (RA)
7432 required neither a tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private
establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit
is not tantamount to an unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just
compensation for the taking of private property for public use.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
Sole Issue:
Claim of 20 Percent Sales Discount
as Tax Credit Despite Net Loss
Although the term is not specifically defined in our Tax Code, [13] tax
credit generally refers to an amount that is subtracted directly from ones total
tax liability.[14] It is an allowance against the tax itself[15] or a deduction from
what is owed[16] by a taxpayer to the government. Examples of tax credits are
withheld taxes, payments of estimated tax, and investment tax credits.[17]
A tax credit differs from a tax deduction. On the one hand, a tax credit reduces
the tax due, including -- whenever applicable -- the income tax that is
determined after applying the corresponding tax rates to taxable
income.[21] A tax deduction, on the other, reduces the income that is subject to
tax[22] in order to arrive at taxable income.[23] To think of the former as the latter
is to avoid, if not entirely confuse, the issue. A tax credit is used only after the
tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before.
Since a tax credit is used to reduce directly the tax that is due, there ought to
be a tax liability before the tax credit can be applied. Without that liability,
any tax credit application will be useless. There will be no reason for
deducting the latter when there is, to begin with, no existing obligation to
the government. However, as will be presented shortly, the existence of a tax
credit or its grant by law is not the same as the availment or use of such credit.
While the grant is mandatory, the availment or use is not.
If a net loss is reported by, and no other taxes are currently due from, a
business establishment, there will obviously be no tax liability against which
any tax creditcan be applied.[24] For the establishment to choose the
immediate availment of a tax credit will be premature and impracticable.
Nevertheless, the irrefutable fact remains that, under RA 7432, Congress has
granted without conditions a tax credit benefit to all covered establishments.
Although this tax credit benefit is available, it need not be used by losing
ventures, since there is no tax liability that calls for its application. Neither
can it be reduced to nil by the quick yet callow stroke of an administrative
pen, simply because no reduction of taxes can instantly be effected. By its
nature, the tax creditmay still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax
liability, without which it does not have any use. In the meantime, it need
not move. But it breathes.
While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of any tax credit, prior tax
payments are not. On the contrary, for the existence or grant solely of such
credit, neither a tax liability nor a prior tax payment is needed. The Tax Code
is in fact replete with provisions granting or allowing tax credits, even though
no taxes have been previously paid.
For example, in computing the estate tax due, Section 86(E) allows a tax credit -
- subject to certain limitations -- for estate taxes paid to a foreign country.
Also found in Section 101(C) is a similar provision for donors taxes -- again
when paid to a foreign country -- in computing for the donors tax due. The tax
credits in both instances allude to the prior payment of taxes, even if not made
to our government.
In Section 111(B), a one and a half percent input tax credit that is merely
presumptive is allowed. For the purchase of primary agricultural products
used as inputs -- either in the processing of sardines, mackerel and milk, or
in the manufacture of refined sugar and cooking oil -- and for the contract
price of public work contracts entered into with the government, again, no
prior tax payments are needed for the use of the tax credit.
In addition to the above-cited provisions in the Tax Code, there are also tax
treaties and special laws that grant or allow tax credits, even though no prior
tax payments have been made.
Under the treaties in which the tax credit method is used as a relief to avoid
double taxation, income that is taxed in the state of source is also taxable in
the state of residence, but the tax paid in the former is merely allowed as a credit
against the tax levied in the latter.[29] Apparently, payment is made to the state
of source, not the state of residence. No tax, therefore, has been previously paid to
the latter.
Under special laws that particularly affect businesses, there can also be tax
credit incentives. To illustrate, the incentives provided for in Article 48 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1789, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 391, include tax credits equivalent to either five percent of the net value
earned, or five or ten percent of the net local content of exports.[30] In order
to avail of such credits under the said law and still achieve its objectives, no
prior tax payments are necessary.
From all the foregoing instances, it is evident that prior tax payments are not
indispensable to the availment of a tax credit. Thus, the CA correctly held that
the availment under RA 7432 did not require prior tax payments by private
establishments concerned.[31] However, we do not agree with its
finding[32] that the carry-over of tax credits under the said special law to
succeeding taxable periods, and even their application against internal
revenue taxes, did not necessitate the existence of a tax liability.
Business Discounts
Deducted from Gross Sales
Based on this discussion, we find that the nature of a sales discount is peculiar.
Applying generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the country,
this type of discount is reflected in the income statement[50] as a line item
deducted -- along with returns, allowances, rebates and other similar
expenses -- from gross sales to arrive at net sales.[51] This type of presentation is
resorted to, because the accounts receivable and sales figures that arise from sales
discounts, -- as well as from quantity, volume or bulk discounts -- are recorded in
the manual and computerized books of accounts and reflected in the financial
statements at the gross amounts of the invoices.[52] This manner of recording
credit sales -- known as the gross method -- is most widely used, because it is
simple, more convenient to apply than the net method, and produces no
material errors over time.[53]
However, under the net method used in recording trade, chain or functional
discounts, only the net amounts of the invoices -- after the discounts have
been deducted -- are recorded in the books of accounts[54] and reflected in the
financial statements. A separate line item cannot be shown,[55] because the
transactions themselves involving both accounts receivable and sales have
already been entered into, net of the said discounts.
The term sales discounts is not expressly defined in the Tax Code, but one
provision adverts to amounts whose sum -- along with sales
returns, allowances and cost of goods sold[56] -- is deducted from gross sales to come
up with the gross income, profit or margin[57] derived from business.[58] In
another provision therein, sales discounts that are granted and indicated in the
invoices at the time of sale -- and that do not depend upon the happening of
any future event -- may be excluded from the gross sales within the same
quarter they were given.[59] While determinative only of the VAT, the latter
provision also appears as a suitable reference point for income tax purposes
already embraced in the former. After all, these two provisions affirm
that sales discounts are amounts that are always deductible from gross sales.
What RA 7432 grants the senior citizen is a mere discount privilege, not
a sales discount or any of the above discounts in particular. Prompt payment is
not the reason for (although a necessary consequence of) such grant. To be
sure, the privilege enjoyed by the senior citizen must be equivalent to the tax
credit benefit enjoyed by the private establishment granting the discount. Yet,
under the revenue regulations promulgated by our tax authorities, this
benefit has been erroneously likened and confined to a sales discount.
To a senior citizen, the monetary effect of the privilege may be the same as
that resulting from a sales discount. However, to a private establishment, the
effect is different from a simple reduction in price that results from such
discount. In other words, the tax credit benefit is not the same as a sales
discount. To repeat from our earlier discourse, this benefit cannot and should
not be treated as a tax deduction.
To stress, the effect of a sales discount on the income statement and income tax
return of an establishment covered by RA 7432 is different from that resulting
from the availment or use of its tax credit benefit. While the former is a
deduction before, the latter is a deduction after, the income tax is computed. As
mentioned earlier, a discount is not necessarily a sales discount, and a tax
credit for a simple discount privilege should not be automatically treated like
a sales discount. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law
does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as
the 20 percent discount deductible from gross income for income tax purposes,
or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. In effect,
the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This contrived
definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted
from gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and
cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax.
When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit,
it means that the amount -- when claimed -- shall be treated as a reduction
from any tax liability, plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax
credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the
benefit to a sales discount -- which is not even identical to the discount
privilege that is granted by law -- does not define it at all and serves no useful
purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.
It is a cardinal rule that courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is
to enforce it x x x.[63] In the scheme of judicial tax administration, the need
for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax laws is
crucial.[64] Our tax authorities fill in the details that Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide.[65] The regulations these
authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will
be followed by the courts.[66] Courts, however, will not uphold these
authorities interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or improper.
In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax
credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what
RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled up the intent of
Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The
administrative agency issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or
restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional
requirements not contemplated by the legislature.[67]
Availment of Tax
Credit Voluntary
Third, the word may in the text of the statute[71] implies that the
availability of the tax credit benefit is neither unrestricted nor
mandatory.[72] There is no absolute right conferred upon respondent, or any
similar taxpayer, to avail itself of the tax credit remedy whenever it chooses;
neither does it impose a duty on the part of the government to sit back and
allow an important facet of tax collection to be at the sole control and
discretion of the taxpayer.[73] For the tax authorities to compel respondent to
deduct the 20 percent discount from either its gross income or its gross sales[74] is,
therefore, not only to make an imposition without basis in law, but also to
blatantly contravene the law itself.
What Section 4.a of RA 7432 means is that the tax credit benefit is merely
permissive, not imperative. Respondent is given two options -- either to
claim or not to claim the cost of the discounts as a tax credit. In fact, it may
even ignore the credit and simply consider the gesture as an act of
beneficence, an expression of its social conscience.
Granting that there is a tax liability and respondent claims such cost as a tax
credit, then the tax credit can easily be applied. If there is none, the credit
cannot be used and will just have to be carried over and
revalidated[75] accordingly. If, however, the business continues to operate at
a loss and no other taxes are due, thus compelling it to close shop, the credit
can never be applied and will be lost altogether.
In other words, it is the existence or the lack of a tax liability that determines
whether the cost of the discounts can be used as a tax credit. RA 7432 does
not give respondent the unfettered right to avail itself of the credit whenever
it pleases. Neither does it allow our tax administrators to expand or contract
the legislative mandate. The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory
construction is thus applicable x x x. Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.[76]
Fourth, Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 deny the exercise by the State of its
power of eminent domain. Be it stressed that the privilege enjoyed by senior
citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private
establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these
establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property
taken by the State for public use.[77]
The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use
by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare,
and public convenience.[78] The discount privilege to which our senior citizens
are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these
citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and
formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it
not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.
Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain.[80] Tax measures are but enforced
contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions[81] and clearly imposed for
a public purpose.[82] In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most
effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable
distribution of wealth.[83]
Fifth, RA 7432 itself seeks to adopt measures whereby senior citizens are
assisted by the community as a whole and to establish a program beneficial
to them.[86]These objectives are consonant with the constitutional policy of
making health x x x services available to all the people at affordable
cost[87] and of giving priority for the needs of the x x x elderly.[88] Sections 2.i
and 4 of RR 2-94, however, contradict these constitutional policies and
statutory objectives.
Furthermore, Congress has allowed all private establishments a simple tax
credit, not a deduction. In fact, no cash outlay is required from the
government for the availment or use of such credit. The deliberations on
February 5, 1992 of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on Social
Justice, which finalized RA 7432, disclose the true intent of our legislators to
treat the sales discounts as a tax credit, rather than as a deduction from gross
income. We quote from those deliberations as follows:
"THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Unico). By the way, before that ano, about
deductions from taxable income. I think we
incorporated there a provision na - on the
responsibility of the private hospitals and
drugstores, hindi ba?
MS. ADVENTO. Kaya lang po sir, and mga discounts po nila affecting
government and public institutions, so, puwede na
po nating hindi isama yung mga less deductions
ng taxable income.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Puwede na. Yung about the private
hospitals. Yung isiningit natin?
SEN. ANGARA. In the case of private hospitals they got the grant of
15% discount, provided that, the private hospitals
can claim the expense as a tax credit.
SEN. ANGARA. I-tax credit na lang natin para walang cash-out ano?
SEN. ANGARA. Letter A. To capture that thought, we'll say the grant
of 20% discount from all establishments et cetera,
et cetera, provided that said establishments -
provided that private establishments may claim the
cost as a tax credit. Ganon ba 'yon?
SEN. ANGARA. Dahil kung government, they don't need to claim it.
Special Law
Over General Law
Sixth and last, RA 7432 is a special law that should prevail over the Tax Code
-- a general law. x x x [T]he rule is that on a specific matter the special law
shall prevail over the general law, which shall
be resorted to only to supply deficiencies in the former.[90] In addition,
[w]here there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general -- the
terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special -- the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general,[91] one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case.[92] It is a canon of statutory construction that a
later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute,
will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[93]
RA 7432 is an earlier law not expressly repealed by, and therefore remains
an exception to, the Tax Code -- a later law. When the former states that
a tax credit may be claimed, then the requirement of prior tax payments under
certain provisions of the latter, as discussed above, cannot be made to apply.
Neither can the instances of or references to a tax deduction under the Tax
Code[94] be made to restrict RA 7432. No provision of any revenue regulation
can supplant or modify the acts of Congress.
SO ORDERED.