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478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

*
G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN

CANTON, appellant.

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The Constitution

bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant
issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; Interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures not absolute, exceptions.
—What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any
particular case is a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal
effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. The interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search
of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Same; Same; In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made; the process cannot be reversed.—As pointed out by the
appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport
security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on
SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was
being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances
inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that
SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to
have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search

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incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a

lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.
Same; Same; Appellant’s subsequent arrest without a warrant
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.—The search conducted on
SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages
containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination
yielded positive results for metham­

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 394, DECEMBER 27, 2002 479

People vs. Canton

phetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such

warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport
security personnel and police authorities were duty­bound to
arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest
without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Pasay City, Br. 110.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
          Perlas, De Guzman, Antonio, Venturanza, Quizon­
Venturanza & Herbosa Law Firm for accused­appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged

before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 1(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under an
Information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

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“That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International

Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY
EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride; a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98­0189 and

raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her
arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene
Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.

_______________

1 Original Record (OR), 1.

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480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as

its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc
recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to
let SUSAN take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12
February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),2 being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound
was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking
and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that
time, called her
3
attention, saying “Excuse me ma’am, can I
search you?” Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand
under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several
times and noticed
4
that the package contained what felt like
rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt
similar packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and
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thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but

the latter refused and said: “Money, money only.” Mylene
forthwith reported the matter 5
to SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes, her supervisor on duty.
SPO4 De Jos Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs
Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room
for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking
in the ladies’ room, Mylene touched something in front of
SUSAN’S sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her
skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and
Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and
sealed in gray colored packing6
tape, which SUSAN
voluntarily handed to them. The first was taken from
SUSAN’s abdominal area; the second, from in front 7
of her
genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. Mylene
turned over the packages

_______________

2 OR, p. 16.
3 TSN, 16 October 1998, pp. 6­8.
4 Id., pp. 24­30.
5 Id., pp. 29, 32­34.
6 TSN, p. 16 October 1998, pp. 39­41.
7 Id., pp. 9­12.

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VOL. 394, DECEMBER 27, 2002 481

People vs. Canton

8
to SPO4 De los Reyes. The latter forthwith informed his
superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about
the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray
plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the
same and 9 found that they contained white crystalline
substances which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine
10
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of
the First Regional Aviation Office, testified 11
that no
investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. However,
SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles seized
from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one
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American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one

Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock 12
control
number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. He said
that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but
admitted that13
she did not have a counsel when she signed
the receipt. Yet he told her14
that she had the option to sign
or not to sign the receipt.
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely
reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and
search of SUSAN and 15
the seizure of the prohibited items
found on her person.
After consideration of the 16
evidence presented, the trial
court rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P1 million.

_______________

8 Id., pp. 43­44; 10 March 1999, pp. 7­8, 22.

9 Id., p. 8.
10 TSN, 29 July 1998, pp. 23­53.
11 TSN, 22 February 2000, p. 7.
12 Id., pp. 12; OR, 20.
13 Id., pp. 15­16; 19­20.
14 Id., p. 21.
15 TSN, 26 April 2000, pp. 4­18, 21.
16 Per Judge Porfirio C. Macaraeg. OR, 406­417; Rollo, pp. 18­29.

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482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

SUSAN 17
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial, alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1)
giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a
certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it was not
presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is
therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers,
since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police
officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression

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that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4)
deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence
was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the
search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the
seized items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging
bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN
filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from
resolving
18
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial.
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to
resolve appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial, as well as the Motion
19
to Inhibit the Judge, the trial
court issued an order on 26 November 2001 denying the
motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to
SUSAN’s counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the judge’s
statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN’s
conviction was not based on the medical report which was
not presented in court; (3) there was no violation of
SUSAN’s constitutional rights because she was never
interrogated during her detention without counsel; and (4)
the specimens seized from her were found after a routine
frisk at the airport and were therefore acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN
seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court the
following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search
against her based on the alleged existence of probable
cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto
and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went

_______________

17 OR, 422­439.
18 Id., pp. 441­444.
19 Id., pp. 466­471.

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People vs. Canton

beyond the limits of the “Terry search” doctrine; (4) in not

ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation
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without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case

the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not
testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on
judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has
not been offered in evidence;
20
and (7) in applying the ruling
in People v. Johnson.
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that
the strip search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was
constitutionally infirmed because it was not “incidental to
an arrest.” The arrest could not be said to have been made
before the search because at the time of the strip search,
the arresting officers could not have known what was
inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which
were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point
then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was
actually committing a crime. The strip search was
therefore nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is
erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains21 that,
following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, such
stop and frisk search should have been limited to the
patting of her outer garments in order to determine
whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a
threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the
moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal
area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained
her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in the
ladies’ room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the
propriety of the admission of the medical report executed
by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was
neither testified on nor offered in evidence.

_______________

20 348 SCRA 526 (2000).

21 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 (1968).

484

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484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

Lastly, SUSAN
22
questions the application of People v.
Johnson because of its sweeping statement allowing
searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports
in view of the gravity of the safety interests involved. She
stresses that the
23
pertinent case should have been Katz v.
United States, which upholds the Fourth Amendment of
the United States of America that “protects people and not
places.”
In its Appellant’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante
delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being
authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within the
exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to
the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be
frisked and brought to the comfort room for further
inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise
maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized
from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by
Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSAN’s
conviction was not solely based on the questioned document
but also on the fact that she was caught flagrante delicto in
possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by
law. Consequently, it supports SUSAN’s conviction but
recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to
P100,000.
We affirm SUSAN’s conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and
subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the
arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional
rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search

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_______________

22 Supra note 20.

23 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).

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People vs. Canton

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
...
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in

any particular case is a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The
rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person’s body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure outlined 24
in the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4)
waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations 25
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental

to a lawful arrest.

We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the
search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental
to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not precede the
search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN
was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the
latter felt a bulge on SUSAN’s abdomen. The strip search
that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what
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were the packages concealed on SUSAN’s body. If ever at

the

_______________

24 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443­444 (1999).

25 Supra, People v. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 249, 263 (2000); People v.
Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 143850­53, 18 December 2001, 372 SCRA 608.

486

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such

restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, arrest is the “taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense.”
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search
in the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no
knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body;
hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be
shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful
arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
26
a search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed.

II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security

procedure is not confined only to search for weapons
under the “Terry search” doctrine.

The Terry search or the “stop and frisk” situation refers to

a case where a police officer approaches a person who is
acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with
a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited
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search of the outer clothing of such person 27

to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:

_______________

26 People v. Chua Ho San, supra note 24, citing Malacat v. Court of

Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 (1997).
27 Terry v. Ohio, supra note 21.

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People vs. Canton

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air

carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand­carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.

This constitutes another exception to the proscription

against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by
SUSAN and shown in Annex “D” of her Brief, the afore­
quoted provision is stated in the “Notice to All Passengers”
located at the final security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search,
unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons.
Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN
consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of
packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to
refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the
packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by
her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement
that the packages contained only money, aroused the
suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something
illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the
action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing
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her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as
suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of
“the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to
further search without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity
28
in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.” Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room was
justified under the circumstances.

III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the

instant case.

The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts

and issues, finds application to the present case. That case
involves accused­appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a
departing pas­

_______________

28 People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, 410 (1991).

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488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

senger bound for the United States via Continental

Airlines CS­912. Olivia Ramirez was then the frisker on
duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers,
employees and crew to check for weapons, bombs,
prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When
Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt something hard on the
latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that
she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the
matter to her superior, who then directed her to take Leila
to the nearest women’s room for inspection. In the comfort
room, Leila was asked “to bring out the thing under her
girdle.” She acceded and brought out three plastic packs
which contained a total of 580.2 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This Court
ruled that the packs of “methamphetamine hydrochloride”
seized during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and
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are therefore admissible in evidence against Leila.

Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise
without warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante
delicto. The Court held in this wise:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting
to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry­on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x­ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and,
if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.

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VOL. 394, DECEMBER 27, 2002 489

People vs. Canton

29
SUSAN’s reliance on Katz v. U.S. is misplaced. The facts
and circumstances of that case are entirely different from
the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted,
over the accused’s objection, to introduce evidence of
accused’s end of telephone conversations, which was
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On

certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States of America reversed the decision, ruling that
antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in
the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the
kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
house or office, is not a subject the Fourth Amendment
protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.
The maxim—stare decisis et non quieta movere—invokes
adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle
things which are established. When the court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all 30
future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
There being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v. U.S.
and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the
ruling in Katz.

IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto,

was lawfully arrested without a warrant.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

provides:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or

a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

_______________

29 Supra note 23.

30 People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 145371, 28 September 2001, 366 SCRA
266.

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490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
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probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of

facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore­

quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted
in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing
white crystalline substances, which upon examination
yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such
warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the
airport security personnel and police authorities were duty­
bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in
her person flagrante delicto.

V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an

accused under custodial investigation was not
violated.

Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section

12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only
when a person is under 31
“custodial investigation” or is “in
custody interrogation.” Custodial investigation refers to
the “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant

_______________

31 Sebastian v. Garchitorena, 343 SCRA 463, 470 [2000]; People v. De la

Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 [1997].

491

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VOL. 394, DECEMBER 27, 2002 491

People vs. Canton

32
way.” This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator 33
is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him. And the right 34
to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation.
The objective is to prohibit “incommunicado” interrogation
of individuals in a police­dominated atmosphere, resulting
in self­incriminating35statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the
defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation
was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her
signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but
before she did so, she was told that she had the option to
sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the
packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove
its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her 36
during
her detention and used in evidence against her. Hence,
her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to
stand on.

VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.

SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay

rule, the admission of the medical report on the physical
and medical examination conducted upon appellant’s
request, which contained the following:

On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and

cooperative. She related that she was an illegitimate daughter,
married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, “I gamble like an
addict. I gambled since I was young and I lost control of myself
when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I
owe other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband.
This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money.” She
denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances.
(Emphasis supplied).

_______________

32 People v. Salonga, 359 SCRA 310, 320­321 [2001].

33 People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216, 230 [1989].
34 Manuel v. P.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 326, 334­335 [1997].

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35 People v. Ayson, supra note 33, at 229.

36 See People v. Johnson, supra note 20.

492

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Canton

This argument is meritorious. The admission of the

questioneddocument was erroneous because it was not
properly identified.Nevertheless, even without the medical
report, appellant’s conviction will stand, as the court’s
finding of guilt was not based on thatdocument.

VII. SUSAN’s conviction and the penalty imposed on her

are correct.

Having found the warrantless search and seizure

conducted in this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to rule
that that the three packages of shabu recovered from
SUSAN are admissible in evidence against her. Supported
by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, provides:

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.—The penalty of

reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.
...
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.—The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14­A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities:
...
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. . . .

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,

the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

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As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within

the limits established by law. For possession of regulated
drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to
P10 million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine
hydrochloride found in the pos­

493

VOL. 394, DECEMBER 27, 2002 493

People vs. Canton

session of SUSAN, the trial court’s imposition of fine in the

amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by
law.

VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be

returned to her.

Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may be

issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.

Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN’s passport, plane tickets,

and girdles exceeded the limits of the afore­quoted 37
provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in
Criminal Case No. 98­0189 finding appellant SUSAN
CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of
Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appellant’s passport, plane tickets, and
girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
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          Vitug, Ynares­Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,

concur.

Judgment affirmed.

_______________

37 People v. Johnson, supra note 20.

494

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Torres vs. Garchitorena

Note.—This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket

prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously
operates only against searches and seizures that are
unreasonable. (People vs. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 [1999])

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