Yap SR Vs Siao GR 212493
Yap SR Vs Siao GR 212493
Yap SR Vs Siao GR 212493
GABRIEL YAP, SR. DULY REPRESENTED BY GILBERT YAP AND ALSO IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, GABRIEL YAP, JR., AND HYMAN YAP, Petitioners, v. LETECIA SIAO, LYNEL SIAO,
JANELYN SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO, SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.
CEBU SOUTH MEMORIAL GARDEN, INC., Petitioner, v. LETECIA SIAO, LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN
SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO, SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this court are two consolidated cases involving two petitions for Review on Certiorari. These
petitions assail the Decision1 dated 9 October 2013 and Resolution2 dated 26 March 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02037.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 212493 are deceased Gabriel Yap, Sr., represented by his son and the President
of Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc., Gilbert Yap; Gabriel Yap, Jr., in his capacity as Treasurer; and
Hyman Yap, as one of the directors, while petitioner in G.R. No. 212504 is Cebu South Memorial Garden,
Inc. Respondents in both cases are Letecia Siao and her children, Lynel, Janelyn, Eleonor, Shellett and
Honeylet.
These consolidated cases arose from a Complaint for Specific Performance filed by petitioners Cebu
South Memorial Gardens, Inc. and Gabriel Yap, Sr., both represented by Gilbert Yap against respondents
Honeylet Siao and Letecia Siao on 27 April 1999. Gilbert Yap, in his own behalf, Gabriel Yap, Jr. and
Hyman Yap joined the plaintiffs in their Supplemental Complaint. In their Second Amended Complaint,
the petitioners alleged that Gabriel Yap, Sr. and Letecia Siao entered into a Certificate of Agreement
where the parties agreed on the following terms:
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As a backgrounder, respondent Letecia Siao's husband Sergio Siao was indebted to petitioner Gabriel Yap,
Sr. Petitioners claim that the titles to the subject parcels of land were in the possession of Gabriel Yap, Sr.
as collateral for the loan. In consideration of condoning the loan, Gabriel Yap, Sr. returned the titles to
Letecia Siao on the condition that the parcels of land covered by the titles would be developed into
memorial lots.4
Petitioners claimed that respondents refused to transfer the ownership of the three parcels of land to
Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc., causing them to be exposed to numerous lawsuits from the buyers of
the burial plots.
Respondents argued that Letecia Siao was coerced to sign the Certificate of Agreement, rendering it null
and void.
A panel of commissioners was appointment to determine the financial standing of petitioner corporation
and the actual money received by Letecia Siao.
On 31 January 2000 and during the pendency of the case before the commissioners, respondents filed a
Motion for Payment of Monthly Support5 for Leticia Siao's family and herself. Respondents relied on the
agreement made by the parties during the preliminary conference to abide by the terms of the Certificate
of Agreement. In a Resolution6 dated 5 April 2000, the RTC granted the motion for monthly support and
ordered Gabriel Yap, Sr. to pay immediately Letecia Siao the amount of P1,300,000.00. Resultantly,
petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment7 on 24 May 2002 alleging that respondents had
abandoned their defense of the nullity of the Certificate of Agreement when they agreed to implement its
provisions. Petitioners submitted that the trial court may render a summary judgment or judgment on
the pleadings based on the admitted facts.
On 1 August 2002, Judge Generosa G. Labra of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City
issued an Order denying the motion and holding that there were no existing admissions or admitted facts
by respondents to be considered. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on 11
September 2002. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73850,8 through Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, reversed the trial court's decision and ordered its judge to render
summary judgment in favor of petitioners. The appellate court ruled that by claiming benefits
arising from the Certificate of Agreement, respondents had invoked the validity and effectiveness of the
Agreement.
Respondents sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court. Respondents did not file
an appeal before the Supreme Court within the reglementary period. Thus, the Decision became final and
executory on 7 June 2004 and the same had been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.9
In compliance with the Order that had become final, on 7 February 2006, RTC Branch 13 of Cebu City
Judge Meinrado P. Paredes rendered a Summary Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied. Once again, respondents filed an appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Summary Judgment rendered by
the RTC.
On 9 October 2013, the Court of Appeals set aside the Summary Judgment on a technicality. The
appellate court found that the certification against forum-shopping appended to the
complaint is defective because there was no board resolution and special power of attorney
vesting upon Gilbert Yap the authority to sign the certification on behalf of petitioner
corporation and individual petitioners. The appellate court added that the procedural defects
affected the jurisdiction of the court in that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because
the complaints are considered not filed and are ineffectual. Petitioners filed their separate motions for
reconsideration but they were denied by the appellate court.
The following errors are grounds for the allowance of these petitions:
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4.
5. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the
summary judgment despite the fact the same is
consistent with the Certificate of Agreement.12
Petitioner Yaps, in G.R. No. 212493 maintain that the signature of the President of the corporation is
sufficient to vest authority on him to represent the corporation sans a board resolution. Petitioners stress
that the Special Power of Attorney categorically granted Gilbert Yap the full authority to appear and
represent Gabriel Yap, Sr. With respect to the failure of Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap to sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping, petitioners assert that while the two men share a common interest
with petitioner corporation and Gabriel Yap, Sr., these are not indispensable parties, thus their
signatures are not necessary. Petitioners also submit that the issue of a defective certification of
non-forum shopping was belatedly raised, thus should not have been considered.13
Petitioner in G.R. No. 212504 adds that the appellate court should have considered the subsequent
submission of the board resolution as substantial compliance with the Rules. Petitioner also argues that
the appellate court violated the doctrine of immutability of judgment when it dismissed the complaints
thereby effectively directing the trial court not to render any summary judgment.14
Respondents filed one Comment on both petitions. They argue that petitioners, except for Gabriel Yap, Sr.
are not parties to the Certificate of Agreement, thus the petitions should be dismissed because as against
them no rights were violated. Respondents insist that the Certificate of Agreement is void because it
involved unliquidated community properties. Respondents further claim that petitioners, other than Cebu
South Memorial Garden, did not appeal the Summary Judgment before the Court of Appeals, hence, they
are all bound by the denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment by the RTC. With respect to the alleged
defect in the Certification of Non-forum shopping, respondents echoed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals.15
We will first discuss the procedural aspect of this case where the Court of Appeals wholly based its
decision. The appellate court ruled that the certification against forum-shopping is defective because it
was signed by Gilbert Yap without a valid board resolution. In the leading case of Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation v. Commission on Internal Revenue,16 the Court, in summarizing numerous jurisprudence,
rendered a definitive rule that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of
Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4)
Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale behind the rule is that
these officers are "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition."17
In Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc v. Euro-Med Laboratories, Pharmacy, Inc.,18 the President and Manager of
Cebu Metro was held by the Court as having the authority to sign the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping even without the submission of a written authority from the board. The Court went
on to say:
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Cebu Metro also cited cases wherein the Court allowed officers of a corporation to sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping even without a board resolution, to wit:
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x x x x
Bolstering our conclusion that the certification of non-forum shopping is valid is the subsequent
appending of the board resolution to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Board Resolution reads:
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The Board of Directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden, through a Board Resolution, not only authorized
the President of the corporation to sign the Certificate of Forum-Shopping but it ratified the action taken
by Gilbert Yap in signing the forum-shopping certificate.
In Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila,22 we held that the belated
submission of a Secretary's certification constitutes substantial compliance with the rules, thus:
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In Cosco Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance,24 we cited instances wherein the lack of
authority of the person making the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through
subsequent compliance by the parties therein:
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In Lim v. Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station26 it was ruled that the Assistant Vice-President for BPI
Northern Mindanao, who was then the highest official representing the bank in the Northern Mindanao
area, is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint,
signifying his authority in filing the complaint and to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping.
In Fuji Television Network v. Espiritu,27 we highlighted two rules relative to certification against
forum-shopping:
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x x x x
x x x x
Clearly, a defect in the certification is allowed on the ground of substantial compliance as in this case.
Applying the above-mentioned rule, the signatures of petitioners Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap are not
indispensable for the validity of the certification. These petitioners indeed share a common cause of
action with Gilbert Yap in that they are impleaded as officers and directors of Cebu South Memorial
Garden, the very same corporation represented by Gilbert Yap.
At any rate, any objection as to compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should
have been raised in the proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time. 28
In Young v. John Keng Seng,29 it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in
the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the earliest
opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading.
The Court of Appeals relied on procedural rules rather than on the merits of the case. On this score, we
can remand the case to the Court of Appeals for an opportunity to rule on the substance of the case. The
Court, in the public interest and expeditious administration of justice, has resolved action on the merits,
instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served
by the remand of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.
Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case to the Court of Appeals would serve no purpose save to
further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play. 30
Considering that this case has dragged on for 15 years with no concrete solution in sight, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits.
We reiterate the ruling penned by Justice Labitoria of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
7385031directing the trial court to render a summary judgment. The issues and arguments posed by
respondents have already been passed upon and resolved by the Court of Appeals. By appealing the
summary judgment, respondents are in effect asking the Court of Appeals to revisit the same issues. We
cannot allow this under the principle of the "law of the case."
The "law of the case" doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a
question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court to effect the ruling; the question
settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent
appeal. It means that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.32
The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Without it, there would be
endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the
chance of having propositions rewritten once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the
law of a given case.33
In the Labitoria decision, the Court of Appeals directed the trial court to render a summary judgment on
the ground that there was no longer any legal controversy regarding the Certificate of Agreement when
respondents relied on the same agreement to ask for support. This ruling became the law of the case
between the parties which cannot be disturbed. Respondents cannot raise this same issue in another
petition.
In any case, we affirm the summary judgment rendered by the trial court, as directed by the Court of
Appeals. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by
the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.34
Petitioners' complaint seeks for specific performance from respondents, i.e. to transfer ownership of the
subject properties to petitioner corporation based on the Certificate of Agreement. As their defense,
respondents challenge the validity of the Agreement. However, respondents filed a motion for support
relying on the same Agreement that they are impugning. In view of this admission, respondents are
effectively banking on the validity of the Agreement. Thus, there are no more issues that need to be
threshed out. As aptly explained by the appellate court:
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 9 October 2013 and
Resolution dated 26 March 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 02037 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-23707 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu
City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry