Philosophical Review 92.2 (1983) : 169-195. SM//brackets For Gendered Language

FW
The metaethic is Constitutivism - Constitutivism must be the starting point for ethics—
anything else can be questioned to infinite regress so only grounding normativity in
the constitutive aims of agents can create binding obligations. It also means any
external standards collapse because they eventually have to be grounded in a
constititutive claim, so the AC collapses to the NC.
Existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth since to value

anything requires a basis from which we value—thus we must treat others as ends in
themselves
Korsgaard 83, Christine M (Prof of Phil @ Harvard University). "Two distinctions in goodness." The
Philosophical Review 92.2 (1983): 169-195. SM//brackets for gendered language
The argument shows how Kant’s idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important
assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action. he or she supposes
the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be
objectively good ends, f or then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427—428 and
Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384—385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be
something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant
considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, “for if
the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth” (0 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations
themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as
means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” which he defines
as “the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational
being as an end in itself is a “subjective principle of human action.” By this I understand him to mean that we must regard
ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we
must regard our ends as good. But since “every other rational being thinks of [their] his existence by the
same rational ground which holds also for myself” (G 47/429). we must regard others as capable of conferring value
by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that
person’s ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the
humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically
valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is
our duty to promote the happi- ness of others—the ends that they choose—and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
This outweighs—all other obligations are contingent and collapse

Engstrom 8, Stephen (PhD, Prof of Phil @ University of Pittsburgh). "Universal Legislation As the Form
of Practical Knowledge."Academia.edu. N.p., 2008. Web. 11 Aug. 2017.
<https://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge>.
SM
In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical
reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the exercise of practical reason proceeds
from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should proceed in
this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support, we should
first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamental, exercise of the will, and to do this we
will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 It would be
inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as
the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent
conditions of action, whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most
fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the power of
practical reason.
Next, the constituitive feature of agency is practical reason—all enterprises are

structured by it:
a] Its inescapable—if you want to escape freedom is an act of freedom
B] Arguing against reason uses reason which concedes the authority of reason
Our shared ability to practically reason requires our maxims be universalizable:

Anything else would lack normative force to cause anyone to take action since there
could always be an exception to take that action.
Next, violating freedom is non-universalizable because you simultaneously will the

extension and limitation of your own freedom. Thus the standard is respecting
freedom. Prefer the standard: all frameworks presuppose liberty. People can only be
held responsible for unethical actions if they chose to do them, but choice itself
requires that people can pick which actions to take without threat of force. For
example, if someone holds a gun to my head and makes me steal someone’s apple, I
am not truly culpable because I wasn’t free.
Impact calc: Intended harms outweigh foreseen impacts: Foreseen harms aren’t part
of the will because they’re harms that are caused regardless what an agent wills. You
could take the same action and it could have the same foreseen harms even if the
intention was different, so foreseen harms are arbitrary. It’s key to motivation
because if we were responsible for all harms then we’d never be able to pursue any
ends as foreseen harms are over demanding.
Contention
1] All agents have a right to privacy.
Anderson-Gold 10, S. (2010). Privacy, Respect and the Virtues of Reticence in Kant.
Kantian Review, 15(02), 28–42. doi:10.1017/s1369415400002429 /
Therefore there
is a negative duty of respect for humanity to refrain from such actions as unnecessarily exposing and
ridiculing the faults
of others, by softening or keeping our judgements to ourselves. Nor should we be excessively
interested in what does not concern public justice, that is, the private morality of others. Kant claims that ‘spying on the
morals of others is by itself already an offensive inquisitiveness . . . which is a everyone can rightly resist as a
violation of respect due to him’ (MM 6: 466). In particular Kant is concerned to remind us that not everything that is unconventional is
immoral and that blind imitation of ‘mores’ can be contrary to the duty that we have to improve ourselves. He says: ‘to take scandal at what is
merely unconventional but otherwise in itself good is a delusion . . . an error dangerous and destructive to virtue’ (MM 6: 464). This is because
duties of self-perfection and enlightenment require us to develop and maintain a critical use of our own reason in community with others, not a
timid deference to popular opinion. Resistance to ‘spying’ on one’s morals is ‘rightful’, and part of what it means to have a
right to privacy. Acknowledging ‘zones’ of personal privacy, wherein we do not pry and seek to know the details of a person’s affairs,
is a sign of respect. A certain social distance is due persons. Thus, a certain level of ‘good manners’ can be said to be ‘owed’ to others
and to be part of our own moral development. This remains true even at the level of our response to the faults of others. Kant claims that the
signs of respect that we afford others when they display certain moral failings can make them desire to be worthy. He cautions us even in
confronting error in the ‘logical use’ of reason not to be harsh, not to accuse others publicly of absurdity or poor judgement. Rather Kant
recommends a patient explanation of the ‘possibility’ of error so as to preserve the individual’s selfrespect. Far from being a
rigid ‘individualist’ in his understanding of moral virtue, Kant demonstrates considerable insight into how certain types of ‘social virtues’
operate to support and promote virtue in others. Social virtues such as affability and hospitality may be but ‘tokens’ or indirect signs of
underlying mental attitudes but they are not deceptions because, Kant assumes, mature individuals understand how such behaviours operate
to produce good social relationships. Such social virtues bind us to others and create duties of reciprocity such as
gratitude for favours rendered and thus these ‘virtues’ recreate themselves in others. Here Kant recognizes and affirms the ‘causal’
cultural relations that exist in the development of empirical character4 and our duties in relation to creating and maintaining those social
empirical connections.
2] The AC would coerce candidates two disclose info against their will which is a
violation of their freedom to pursue their own actions.
3] Theirs no a priori distinction between agents because they all share the constitutive
aim of action, thus that negates because universalizability requires that all obligations
apply to everyone equally to generate reciprocal obligations.
Publicity principle doesn’t turn the nc:
A] the publicity principle is a test of a maxim’s morality, i.e. whether it could be willed
by the policymaker but doesn’t mandate that policies are passed that make stuff
public
B] the publicity principle applies to actions taken by policymakers but candidates for
public office aren’t policymakers yet
C] the publicity principle is an imperfect duty because it results in beneficial
consequences but a violation of freedom is a perfect duty because it results in a
contradiction in conception
D] Even if it’s true openness is good coercion to achieve that end is a violation

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FW

Existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth since to value

This outweighs—all other obligations are contingent and collapse

Next, the constituitive feature of agency is practical reason—all enterprises are

Our shared ability to practically reason requires our maxims be universalizable:

Next, violating freedom is non-universalizable because you simultaneously will the

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