IN THE COURT OF SH.

SUMIT DASS, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE -

01, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS, NEW DELHI DISTRICT, NEW DELHI

MCA No. 6/2017

1. Mrs. Kanwaljit Walia

W/o Late (Sh) H.S. Walia
R/o D-2/6, Vasant Vihar
New Delhi – 110 057

2. Sh. Ranjit Singh Walia

S/o Late (Sh) H.S. Walia
R/o D-2/6, Vasant Vihar
New Delhi – 110 057
......... Appellants
Versus

Sh. Arup Kumar Bhattacharyya

S/o Late (Sh) Anil Kumar Bhattacharyya
R/o 150, SFS Flats, Opposite JNU
Munirka Vihar, New Delhi 110 067
........ Respondent

Petition presented On : 26.04.2017

Arguments Concluded On : 23.12.2017
Judgment Pronounced On : 23.12.2017

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal u/s 388 of Indian Succession Act 1925 [herein

after referred as Indian Succession Act] whereby the appellants have
challenged the order dated 03.12.2016 passed by Sh. Amitabh Rawat, Ld
ACJ/CCJ/ARC, New Delhi in S.C. No. 2/2016 titled as “Arup Kumar
Bhattacharya vs Public at large”.

2. This appeal is accompanied with an application U/s 5 of

Limitation Act. Notice of the said application was directed upon the opposite

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party / the respondent.

3. Trial Court Record has also been received.

4. Submissions have been heard at length on the application,

maintainability of the appeal and all other connected aspects advanced by
Sh. Saran Suri and Sh. Himanshu Dubey, ld counsel for appellants and Sh.
Yashpal Singh, ld counsel for respondent.

5. For the purpose of maintaining clarity parties shall be denoted

as the appellants and respondent throughout. I clarify that the appellants
herein had moved an application for impleadement before the Ld. Trial Court
which was also dismissed in terms of separate order dated 03.02.2016 –
simultaneously the succession certificate filed by respondent was granted.

6. The succession certificate which was sought by the respondent

was with respect to the movable properties of late Mrs. Neela Bhattacharya –
she having died issueless. She was married to Arup Kumar Bhattacharyya -
the respondent herein. The appellants herein who are also seeking the
succession certificate or wish to participate in the said process are mother
and brother of the deceased.

7. Before dealing further let me first of all deal with the application
u/s 5 of Limitation Act in-asmuch as unless and until the said application is
disposed of the matter cannot be proceeded further or arguments on the
appeal heard.

8. Qua the same, it is stated by Ld counsel appearing on behalf of

appellants that there is a delay of 64 days in preferring the present appeal. It

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is submitted that the delay occasioned on account of the facts and
circumstances as mentioned in the application which are self explanatory. In
the application it is stated that the appellants had filed the application seeking
impleadment before Ld Trial Court. There was no direction / any specific date
given for disposal of the application and they continued to follow up / seek
information about next date of hearing whereby it was informed to them that
the order was not ready.

9. On 13.02.2017 it was informed to them that the certified copy of

the impugned order was prepared on 02.02.2017. The same was obtained.
The appellants were not having the complete record inasmuch as they had
sought impleadment before Ld Trial Court by moving an application u/o 1 rule
10 of CPC, the same was obtained on 01.04.2017 and thereafter the present
appeal was filed and the delay occasioned due to this reason.

10. Ld counsel appearing on behalf of respondent did not file any

reply to the application but vehemently contended that delay has not been
explained and the said delay smacks of negligence.

11. Ld counsel appearing on behalf of appellants further submitted

that appellants intended to seek legal adjudication of their rights before the
Trial Court. They had not been called/ were arrayed as respondents not
withstanding the facts that they fall within the definition of near relatives under
Section 372 (1)(c). They had noticed the citation and thereafter they had
approached the Court by filing an application seeking impleadment which was
dismissed by the ld. Trial Court on erroneous grounds. Moreso, the said
order was followed up by the order whereby the sub-stratum of the relief
sought by the respondent was also allowed [by passing the order dated
03.02.2016], as such the principles of natural justice were not followed and

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the appellant even were denied the fair opportunity to address their case. He
further submits that the non-adjudication of the rights or their claims before
the ld. Trial Court is an important factor which has to be considered while
appreciating the reasons for delay. He further submits that notwithstanding
the nature of the defence or claim, the same may be maintainable or
ultimately given or not, what has been done by the ld. Trial Court is to
outrightly shunt the same – on the very same day i.e. 03.12.2016 their
application was dismissed seeking impleadment u/o 1 rule 10 of CPC and
succession certificate was granted. He further submitted that it is not that the
appellants were negligent in prosecuting their remedy but there was no clarity
as to the date of passing of orders by Ld. Trial Court, they kept on following
and later on when they came to know about the order, necessary preparation
were to be done / documents had to be obtained before filing of the appeal
due to which the delay occasioned and the same is bonafide.

12. Reverting to the said submissions, ld. Counsel appearing on

behalf of respondents argued that the delay is apparent, there is a delay
which is more than twice the statutory period for filing of the appeal. The
appellants knew the outcome before the Ld. Trial Court and still had not taken
any steps for filing of the appeal and at this juncture the appeal cannot be
countenanced – the grounds of delay are unbelievable and clumsily
explained. It is not supported by any document.

13. On the point of delay insofar as the judgment which has been
cited by ld counsel deals / pertains to their peculiar facts and circumstances.
In the case of Balwant Singh vs. Jagdish Singh, Civil Appeal No. 1166 of
2006 decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 08.07.2010 there was a delay
spanning years where no effective steps were taken for impleadment or to set
aside abatement.
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14. On this aspect, either side had relied upon the following
judgments (relied by the appellants) -
(1) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. V/s Mst.
Katiji & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1987, Supreme Court of India;
(2) Manju Barjatya v/s Uma Singh & Ors, RFA (OS) 05/16,
High Court of Delhi.
(relied upon by the respondents)
1. Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v/s Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,
Civil Appeal No. 276 of 1958, Supreme Court of India.
2. Balwant Singh v/s Jagdish Singh & Ors, Civil Appeal No.
1166 of 2006, Supreme Court of India.

15. On the point of delay, in so far as the judgments which has been
cited by respondent's side, in the case of Balwant Singh v/s Jagdish Singh
(supra), there was a delay of 778 days in filing the applications for seeking
impleadment by the legal representative. In the said context, question of
construing “sufficient cause“ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was
discussed. However, in my opinion, the principles which were laid down in
the said judgment as to the condonation of delay, favours the appellant,
though, in the end on the basis of the facts as emerged in the said case, the
delay was not condoned. First of all it is stated/ reiterated that there ought to
be liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' in as much as the
same is intended to advance substantial justice. Further sufficient cause
should be such to persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to
treat the delay as an excusable one. Furthermore, the party should show that
besides acting bonafide, it has taken all steps within its power and control and
had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay.

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16. Thus, it is not the case herein that the appellants were not
vigilant enough or were grossly negligent after the matter was disposed of –
their application for impleadment having been dismissed. The appellants
have sufficiently explained the facts – they have given the background and in
the light of the aforesaid principles, the delay is unduly large neither is of such
a nature or magnitude which cannot be condoned. It is also a trite law that
merely on the altar of delay a valid cause or right should not be throttled. It is
rather the other way round that if right or grievance is decided on merits, the
same would sub-serve the ends of justice.

17. In this regard, on the quantum of delay, ld. Counsel for appellant
have relied upon judgment Manju Barjatya vs. Uma Singh (since
deceased) Through LRs & Anr RFA (OS) no. 5/2016 dated 25.11.2016
wherein there was a delay of 3628 days which was condoned, thus, the
length or duration of delay is material but the cause which also includes or
takes color or cue from the main controversy has to be seen.

18. That being the situation, taking into facts and circumstances the
application u/s 5 of Limitation Act is allowed subject to cost of Rs.2,500/-
payable by appellant to respondents.

19. Now coming to the appeal – as to whether this appeal lies

before the present Court, ld. Counsel has relied upon the judgment 'Shanti
Devi vs. State FAO no. 418/2013 decided on 12.08.2014', wherein, it clearly
mentioned that the appeal against orders passed by Ld. Addl. Senior Civil
Judge in a petition under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, same
would lie before the District Judge. The pertinent observations are as under:

In view of the above legal position, which

emerges from a conjoint reading of

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 Section 388 of the Act and Rule 2 of
Chapter 6 Part B of the Delhi High Court
Rules, application under Part X of the Act
is to be dealt with by subordinate judges
and appeal from their orders granting,
refusing or revoking succession
certificates will lie before the District
Judge. Accordingly, present appeal is not
maintainable in this Court and would lie
before the District Judge.

20. That being the situation this issue or question whether this
appeal lies before this Court as well as the nature of the appeal before FAO is
also decided in favour of the appellants.

21. Apart whereof, another judgment has been relied upon

G.S.Nayyar v/s Kaushalya Devi, as to whether proceedings under Indian
Succession Act are in the nature of suit. The question for consideration as to
whether it should be treated as First Appeal from order was dealt with and it
was observed that it had to be a FAO and not a Regular Civil Appeal. In this
regard, para no. 9, 10 and 16 is relevant and same reads as under:
“ 9. The question for consideration,
therefore, is whether the impugned order
of the District Judge can be treated as a
decree. The definition of the word
“decree” contained in clause (2) of section
2 of the Code is that it means the formal
expression of an adjudication which so far
as regards the Court expressing it,
conclusively determines the rights of the
parties with regard to all or any of the
matters in controversy in the suit and may
be either preliminary or final. By an
extended definition, orders under Section
47 and section 144 of the Code and an
order rejecting a plaint have been
included in the definition of decree.
However, orders of dismissal for default
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 and adjudication from which an appeal
lies as an appeal from an order have been
expressly excluded from the purview of
decree. It is clear from the definition that
the decree finally determines the rights of
the parties in a suit and formal expression
of such adjudication is called a decree.
The decrees are, therefore, passed,
whether preliminary or final, only in suits.
There is no definition of the word suit
given in the Code, but section 26 and
Order 4 Rule 1 of the Code give a clue
that suits are instituted by presentation of
a plaint to the Court. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Hansraj
v/s Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric
Tramway Company Limited observed that
a suit was ordinarily instituted by the
presentation of a plaint. The proceedings
initiated under the Indian Succession Act
for grant of letters of administration are
clearly not suits. Section 295 of the
Succession Act only provides that
contentious proceedings shall, as nearly
as may be, take the form of a regular suit.
The statutory provision is a recognition of
the fact that the proceedings are in reality
not a suit but they have been directed to
merely assume the form of a regular suit
and that too as yearly as may be. A
learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Rajasthan in Mr. Bhonri v/s Suwalal, AIR
1956 Rajasthan 119, observed that the
proceedings under the Indian Succession
Act, even if they became contentious,
were not in the form of a regular suit and
unless there was a suit as provided by the
Code of Civil Procedure, there could not
be any decree.

10. The order of the District Judge

under appeal has, therefore, not been

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 passed in a suit and so it can ordinarily
not be called a decree. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in
Meenakshi Naidoo v/s Subramaniya
Sastri, after quoting the definition of the
decree as contained in Act 10 of 1877 as
modified by Act 12 of 1879 has observed
in regard to proceedings taken under
Section 10 of the pagoda Act that a
decree means a formal expression of an
adjudication upon any right, claim or
defence set up in a civil Court, where such
adjudication decides the suit or the appeal
and since there was no civil suit
respecting the appointment, it would not
be possible to bring the order passed by
the District Judge pursuant to section 10
of the aforesaid Act within the definition of
decree as contained in the Code.

16. The appeal is maintainable in this

Court but it is to be registered as F.A.O
with necessary consequences.”

22. Another aspect which was pointed out or which requires to be

dealt is that the appellants had preferred an application u/o 1 rule 10 of CPC
which was dismissed and the appellants are aggrieved in pith and substance
of the said order, thus, the question of filing of the appeal also needs to be
analysed.

23. On this particular aspect, ld Counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants submitted that the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case
reveals that not only their opportunity to participate in the matter was curtailed
/ thwarted, on the very same day, succession certificate was granted. Thus,
by necessary implications, both the said orders have to be read as one.
Hence, challenge can be made even to the grant of succession certificate
order which by their exclusion had became a 'no contest' matter or a sort of
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one side order.

24. In this regard, he had relied upon B. Anjanaiah vs. Nagappa

Civil Rev. Petn. No. 191 of 1962 reported in AIR 1967 AP 61 alternate
citation MANU/AP/0102/1967 decided on 02.08.1965 :

(4) The first point that falls for

consideration is whether the plaintiff has a
right of action for the recovery of the suit
amount. As stated earlier, the plaintiff has
filed the suit on the basis of a succession
certificate issued to him. Under Section
381 of the Indian Succession Act, such
certificate would be conclusive as against
the persons owing such debts or liable on
such securities. But the grant of certificate
can be revoked as provided under Section
383 of the said Act on the grounds stated
therein. Under Section 384 of the said Act,
a right of appeal is also provided. It
follows, therefore, that the Act is a self-
contained Act and makes ample provision
for the aggrieved persons, who were
either parties to it or were not parties.
Admittedly, the defendant was not a party
to the O. P. proceedings; but it cannot be
denied that he had notice of the
proceedings. On his own admission in the
written statement, he filed I. A. No. 672/59
to implead him as a respondent; but that
application was dismissed. He also filed
another application in the same O. P. to
implead Mallamma, which was also
dismissed. But he did not get those orders
revised and it is also his admitted case
that he did not apply for revocation of the
certificate under Section 383 of the Act.
25. Ld. Counsel urged that the said ratio assist his case in
as much as once he falls within the domain of 'near relatives', he by

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 virtue of Section 372 of the Act is rather enjoined to avail his
remedy under the Indian Succession Act itself. He further relied
upon judgment titled as Smt Savitri Devi vs. Smt Manorama Bai
and ors M.A. No. 685/96 decided on 28.04.1997, wherein the
following observations were made :

It was contended on behalf of the

respondent No. 1 that the finding
recorded in a summary proceeding
cannot be set aside in appeal. Section
384 of the Indian Succession Act provides
that the order of the Succession Court
granting or refusing certificate is
appealable. The High Court may by its
order declare the person to whom the
certificate should be granted. Therefore,
the finding can be reviewed in appeal. In
this case it has been found that the
finding regardng the divorce of the first
wife is perverse and therefore, it is liable
to be corrected in appeal. It is further
argued on behalf of the respondent No. I
that the finding of the succession Court
would not operate as res judicata in any
other proceeding and therefore, the
appellant instead of filing this appeal
should have challenged this issue in a
separate suit. It is true that a separate suit
is maintainable for challenging the
succession certificate. Section 387 of the
Indian Succession Act enables the
unsuccessful party to file such a silk. But
the choice is with the party. He may elect
to challenge it in appeal or in a separate
suit.

26. He further submits that the said judgment also assist him as his
remedy is either to file an appeal or even a separate suit and he has opted to
file an appeal instead of a regular suit which otherwise was available to him.

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As such he can challenge the grant of Succession Certificate.

27. That being the situation in view of the said judgment B.

Anjanaiah vs. Nagappa (supra) and Savitri Devi v/s Manorama Bai
(supra) particularly the fact that the Succession Act is a self contained code
and it makes ample provisions to the aggrieved persons who are either the
parties to it or were not parties coupled with the fact that the right to file a suit
still remains, in my opinion the present appeal is maintainable as the right to
elect the remedy/ file the suit or appeal as the case vests with the appellant
and it cannot be even said that the respondent in any manner has been
prejudiced.

28. Thus, this technical objection that both the orders dated
03.12.2016 are different or in a manner does not vests the appellants with the
right to file appeal, is untenable. It needs no gainsaying that both the orders
were delivered on the very same day. As such, in my opinion, they form a
composite order and the appellants had no option but to contest the same/
assail the same as they are aggrieved by rejection of their application for
impleadment as well as grant of succession certificate.

29. Coming to the merits of the appeal, ld Counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellants has tried to make out a case on following aspects :

(i) He submits that the requirement of pleadings particularly for the

compliance of Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act it was incumbent
upon the respondent to join the appellants as parties name them and serve
with the notice, however, the respondent deliberately did not implead them. It
hence amounts to concealment of facts. Furthermore, the terminology used
in Section 372 i.e., near relatives does not mean or imply only the class I and

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class II legal heirs as the case may be. Same is because of the fact that the
purpose is to ensure that the legal heirs should come up and the process of
the same mandates that the near relatives should be informed. He further
submits that it was in the knowledge of respondent that his brother and
mother were surviving and were also claiming the amounts qua which the
succession certificate was being sought.

30. Per contra, ld counsel for respondent on this aspect urged that
there was no requirement of either impleading the LRs as husband was only
entitled to succession certificate. He submits that the said would only expand
the scope of controversy and would lead to multiplicity of litigation as every
person would try to impede grant of succession certificate. He submits that
proper publication was carried out in newspaper and the appellants herein
had also come in pursuance of the notice and it is not that they were not
aware about the proceedings.

31. This aspect, in my opinion does not make any difference as the
appellants had knowledge of publication and they had appeared before the
Court. The petitioner/ the respondents herein had filed the petition naming
the public at large. In clause 6(c) of the petition it is also stated that there is
no other heirs except her husband. Section 372(1)(c) uses the word 'family'
followed up by 'or' then uses the word 'near relatives'. 'Family' has not been
defined under the Indian Succession Act. It is after that there is no 'family',
the question of information to other relatives i.e., 'near relatives' is to be there.
Thus, to my mind, in so far as the requirement of arraying them as parties is
concerned or the same being a basic requirement, failing which the petition
would have been dismissed for non-joinder of the parties, same is not the
case herein. Obviously, as mentioned earlier, in so far as the filing of the
petition is concerned, the appellants had due notice thereof. This point is

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decided accordingly.

32. The second line of argument which was strongly agitated was
that the ratio of Smt. Sharbati Devi & Anr vs. Smt. Usha Devi (1984) 1
SCC 424 is not applicable to the given set of facts and circumstances as the
ld. Trial Court did not even consider the fact/analyse or appreciate that there
is always a difference in so far as nomination in respect of insurance
contracts and nomination with regard to other contracts/statutory
developments. In a same swipe, it has been decided that the petitioners
were not eligible to claim the succession certificate or entitled to the dues. He
submits that in this regard he relies upon the judgment Smt. Usha Majumdar
and Ors v/s Smt. Smriti Basu, AIR 1988 Cal. 115, Smt. Indrani Wahi v/s
Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Ors , (2016) 6 Supreme Court
Cases 440 and Vidhyadhari and ors v/s Sukhrana Bai and Others,
(2008)2 Supreme Court Cases 238.

33. On this particular aspect, ld. Counsel on behalf of respondent

contended that the nomination insofar as salary dues are concerned is
governed by CCS (pension) rules and the rules are sacrosanct and in the
event if the nomination is made by any government servant who has no
family at the time of making of the nomination but subsequently acquires the
same, the earlier nomination shall become invalid. As such he submits that
any nomination if any made by the deceased in favour of his mother stands
cancelled after her marriage/ have a family of her own. He submits that
earlier while the appeal was being argued the appellant had sought refuge or
relied upon the fact that they are entitled on the premise of Section 15(2)(a) of
the Hindu Succession Act wherein such dues/ salary of the deceased should
be treated as legacy of the deceased inherited from her parents. Later on he
submits that such a plea or argument was not raised in as much as the
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appellant knew that the salary and other dues of the deceased Neelu
Bhattacharya were self earned.

34. In so far as the judgment which have been relied upon, the
judgment of Vidyadhari vs. Sukhrana Bai (supra) is important and I am
quoting paragraph no. 13 of the same. The same is reproduced hereunder :

13. This Court in Rameshwari Devi

case has held that even if a government
servant had contracted second marriage
during the subsistence of his first
marriage, children born out of such
second marriage would still be legitimate
though the second marriage itself would
be void. The Court, therefore, went on to
hold that such children would be entitled
to the pension but not the second wife. It
was, therefore, bound to be considered by
the High Court as to whether Vidhyadhari
being the nominee of Sheetaldeen could
legitimately file an application for
Succession Certificate and could be
granted the same. The law is clear on this
issue that a nominee like Vidhyadhari who
was claiming the death benefits arising
out of the employment can always file an
application under Section 372 of the
Indian Succession Act as there is nothing
in that Section to prevent such a nominee
from claiming the certificate on the basis
of nomination. The High Court should
have realised that Vidhyadhari was not
only a nominee but also was the mother of
four children of Sheetaldeen who were the
legal heirs of Sheetaldeen and whose
names were also found in Form A which
was the declaration of Sheetaldeen during
his life-time. In her application Vidhyadhari
candidly pointed out the names of the four

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 children as the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen.
No doubt that she herself has claimed to
be a legal heir which status she could not
claim but besides that she had the status
of a nominee of Sheetaldeen. She
continued to stay with Sheetaldeen as his
wife for long time and was a person of
confidence for Sheetaldeen who had
nominated her for his Provident Fund, Life
Cover Scheme, Pension and amount of
Life Insurance and amount of other dues.
Under such circumstances she was
always preferable even to the legally
wedded wife like Sukhrana Bai who had
never stayed with Sheetaldeen as his wife
and who had gone to the extent of
claiming the Succession Certificate to the
exclusion of legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. In
the grant of Succession Certificate the
court has to use its discretion where the
rival claims, as in this case, are made for
the Succession Certificate for the
properties of the deceased. The High
Court should have taken into
consideration these crucial circumstances.
Merely because Sukhrana Bai was the
legally wedded wife that by itself did not
entitle her to a Succession Certificate in
comparison to Vidhyadhari who all
through had stayed as the wife of
Sheetaldeen, had born his four children
and had claimed a Succession Certificate
on behalf children also. In our opinion, the
High Court was not justified in granting the
claim of Sukhrana Bai to the exclusion not
only of the nominee of Sheetaldeen but
also to the exclusion of his legitimate legal
heirs.

35. The lines which I have emphasised by way of underlining

categorically points out that in the grant of succession certificate, the Court
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has to use its discretion, where the rival claims are made out. Furthermore,
the nominee also on the basis of the nomination can file an application under
Section 372 of the Act. I am not delving much on this particular aspect, in as
much as the said aspect were not even considered by the ld. Trial Court – the
opportunity to present the said judgments was not even given by the ld. Trial
Court. The other two judgments particularly of Indrani Bai and Usha
Majumdar (supra) also points out to the fact that there is a difference in the
status nominee in so far as the insurance contracts are concerned/ other
statutes. I am not quoting from the said judgments, as this line of arguments
was never adjudicated upon by the ld. Trial Court. Thus, in my opinion, the
order passed by ld. Trial Court, in a manner is a perverse order or does not
comprehensively adjudicate upon the controversy.

36. Sitting in the Appellate jurisdiction, I could have also decided the
said aspect, but in my opinion it would be more in the fitness of things that the
matter is again remanded back to Trial Court to decide afresh after giving an
opportunity to the appellant to present their case.

37. The last argument was that the succession certificate granted
was of much more amount than even pleaded/ sought for by the appellants.
The amounts with regard to medical bills and expenses were in fact incurred
by the appellants. This fact is refuted by the respondents. Nonetheless, if the
said amount is taken to be the dues qua which succession certificate has
been granted, then otherwise also the appellants requires to be heard in as
much as they have paid/expended money and would be entitled for
reimbursement from the employer of the deceased.

39. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the order passed
by the Ld. Trial Court cannot be said to be legally sustainable order. In these
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circumstances the order(s) dated 03.12.2016 are set aside.

40. The ld Trial Court shall afford an opportunity to the appellants to

participate in the petition. Nothing stated herein shall tantamount to be an
expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The Ld Trial Court shall pass
appropriate orders taking into the pleadings and material brought on record
by either side.

41. In case the amount has already been taken / claimed by the
respondent from the department concerned then Ld Trial Court can take
steps to secure the amount either by way of bank guarantee or by any other
means as it deems fit.

42. Put up before Ld Trial Court on 27.01.2018. Copy of this order

be also sent to Ld Trial Court.

43. Copy of order be given dasti to the parties under their signature.
Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Pronounced in open Court
on 23.12.2017
(Sumit Dass)
Additional District Judge-01
NDD/PHC/New Delhi/ 23.12.2017

MCA no. 6/17

Mrs. Kanwaljeet Walia vs. Mr. Arup Kumar Bhattacharya Page no. 18 of 18