Classical Political Philosophy Plato and Aristotle

Classical Political Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle
Oxford Handbooks Online

Daniel Devereux
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy
Edited by George Klosko
Print Publication Date: May 2011

Subject: Philosophy, History of Western Philosophy (Post-Classical), Social and Political
Philosophy
Online Publication Date: Sep 2011 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238804.003.0007
Abstract and Keywords
Systematic political thought in ancient Greece begins with Plato, and quickly reaches its
zenith in the rich and complex discussions in Aristotle's Politics. The political theories of
both philosophers are closely tied to their ethical theories, and their interest is in
questions concerning constitutions or forms of government. Herodotus sketches a
fascinating debate by proponents of three forms of government: democracy, monarchy,
and oligarchy. In Euripides' Suppliant Maidens, there is a debate between Theseus,
champion of Athenian democracy, and a messenger from Creon, ruler of Thebes. Among
Plato's predecessors there was a tradition of political thought and debate, but he was the
first Greek thinker to undertake a careful, systematic analysis of fundamental questions
in political philosophy. This article discusses Socrates' influence on Plato. It then looks at
Plato's masterpiece, the Republic, and considers his model of an ideal constitution. It
concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's complex and sophisticated analysis of political
constitutions.
Keywords: Greece, political philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, constitutions, democracy, Republic, monarchy,
oligarchy
SYSTEMATIC political thought in ancient Greece begins with Plato, and quickly reaches
its zenith in the rich and complex discussions in Aristotle's Politics. The political theories
of both philosophers are closely tied to their ethical theories, and their interest is in
questions concerning constitutions or forms of government: for example, what are the
different kinds of constitutions, and what are the values characteristic of each type?; how
should the different constitutions be ranked?; what is the ideal or best constitution, given
realistic assumptions about human nature? Earlier thinkers had considered these
questions; Herodotus, for example, sketches a fascinating debate by proponents of three
forms of government: democracy, monarchy, and oligarchy (Histories 3.80–2); and in
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Euripides' Suppliant Maidens we find the following debate between Theseus, champion of
Athenian democracy, and a messenger from Creon, ruler of Thebes.
Herald. Who is tyrant of this city state?…To whom should I deliver this message?
Theseus. First, you began your speech falsely, stranger, asking for a tyrant here.
There is no rule of one man here: this is a free city. The people reign here, taking
turns in annual succession. Even the poor man has a fair share, standing his
ground against the rich.
Herald. You give me a great advantage in this game—the city from which I come is
ruled by one man rather than a mob. There is no one who puffs up my city with
speeches and turns it this way and that for his private gain, no one who gives it
immediate gratification and pleasure but harms it in the long run, then hides his
mistakes with fresh slanders, thus slipping away from justice. How can the people
set the city straight when they cannot even straighten out the speechmakers?…a
poor man who works the soil, even if he's no fool, is still too busy to be able to look
after public affairs; and it is distressing to the better sort when a good-for-nothing
gains honor and power from the people through his speechmaking.
(p. 97) Theseus. Listen to me my clever herald…since you have turned this into a
contest. There is no greater evil for a city than a tyrant! There will be no public
laws, but one man will have control by owning the law and this will be unjust.
When the laws are written down, both the rich and the poor have equal recourse
to justice; if the wealthy are reviled they have no better standing than those of
limited means, and a lesser man can overcome a great one if he has justice on his
side. This is freedom—to ask “Who has a good proposal he wishes to introduce for
public discussion?” And the one who responds gains fame while one who wishes
not to is silent: what could be fairer than that in a city? (ll. 398–442; Gagarin and
Woodruff 1995: 64–5)
Theseus praises democracy for its guarantees of freedom and equality before the law. But
the Herald criticizes it for lack of good governance: the common people do not have time
for careful consideration of political matters, and they inevitably come under the sway of
demagogues; those who might provide better leadership—the “better sort”—are shunted
aside. Theseus counters that democracy protects the rights of all citizens through written
laws that guarantee equal treatment of rich and poor alike. As we shall see, these and
other traditional arguments for and against different constitutions were the seedbed from
which Plato and Aristotle developed their political theories.
There are a couple of historical factors that gave rise to such debates. First, in the
centuries preceding Plato and Aristotle, Greek city states experimented with a great
variety of constitutions and ways of organizing their political life. “Monarchy,”
“oligarchy,” “democracy,” “aristocracy,” “tyranny” are all Greek words; and the forms
they name—and combinations thereof—were to be found among the several hundred city
states that made up ancient Greece. Given this variety, and the extensive intercourse
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between cities, it was inevitable that individuals (such as Theseus and the Herald) would
be drawn into debates about the advantages and disadvantages of different systems. The
second factor is colonization: during this period many city states established colonies
along the coast of Asia Minor, as well as in Sicily and southern Italy. Distinguished
individuals or committees were commissioned to draw up constitutions for these new city
states. Individuals were thus invited to consider how best to organize a community, and
what sorts of principles and values should guide such an effort. It was natural, then, for
Greeks to view political constitutions as artifacts to be designed and modified, not as
patterns received from on high nor as ineluctable expressions of a particular culture or
society.
Among Plato's predecessors there was a tradition of political thought and debate, but he
was the first Greek thinker to undertake a careful, systematic analysis of fundamental
questions in political philosophy. His political views were shaped to a large extent by his
conception of the “human good” and his view of the nature of knowledge. He believed
that the purpose of a political community is to attain the best possible life for its
inhabitants, and that the way to achieve this is to ensure that those who rule have an
accurate understanding of human nature and of what makes a human life truly
worthwhile. These starting points of Plato's political thought were the legacy of his
(p. 98) mentor, Socrates. Socrates did not develop a theory of political constitutions or a
model of an ideal state; his goal was to obtain knowledge of the human good—the values
that determine how we ought to live our lives. He believed that such knowledge was
indispensable to wise decision-making in the political sphere. It is thus appropriate that
we begin this chapter with a discussion of Socrates' influence on Plato. We will then turn
to Plato's masterpiece, the Republic, and consider his model of an ideal constitution. The
Republic was written in mid-career, and in his later works Plato revised important
elements of the theory of the Republic. After examining a few of these later
developments, we will conclude with a discussion of Aristotle's complex and sophisticated
analysis of political constitutions.
Socrates
Socrates was not a “theory-builder,” nor did he write any philosophical works, and yet he
was a pivotal figure in the history of ancient philosophy. He stimulated others through his
questions: he was, as he says in the Apology, a “gadfly,” stinging his followers and fellow
citizens with his puzzling paradoxes and goading them to philosophical reflection (30e–
31a). A few examples of his paradoxical claims are: “no harm can come to a good person”;
“it is better to suffer than to do injustice”; “all wrongdoing is involuntary”; and “no one
knowingly chooses to act badly.” Since he left no writings, we know of Socrates'
philosophical activities and ideas only through reports of others—chiefly through Plato's
dialogues, in which he plays a dominant role. It is generally thought that the shorter
Platonic dialogues (such as the Protagoras, Laches, Charmides, Gorgias) were written
early in Plato's career, and were meant to give a fairly accurate portrait of Socrates'
methods of inquiry and his philosophical concerns. Although Socrates claimed not to have
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knowledge of anything of importance, he had very strong convictions about what was
valuable and worth striving for. He sets out these convictions in his Apology, his defense
at his trial against the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth.
Socrates argues that virtue, wisdom, and truth are values of supreme importance; in
comparison with these “goods of the soul,” worldly goods like wealth, power, and fame
are insignificant (29e–30a). The value of virtue and wisdom is at least partly derived from
their effects on the quality of one's life, for Socrates claims that possession of these goods
guarantees a happy, fulfilling life (36d). Socrates' confidence in the supreme value of the
goods of the soul is the basis of his activity as a moral reformer. But he also claims not to
have knowledge of these goods; for example, he denies that he knows the true nature of
virtue. This is why he spends his days seeking such knowledge (38a).
Socrates' zeal to change his fellow citizens' values did not lead him to get involved in
politics because he thought he could achieve more through personal interaction with
individuals. But his value beliefs carried over to the political sphere: he thought the
values that ought to determine how individuals live their lives should also shape the
(p. 99) political life of the community (36cd). He contends that his fellow Athenians attach
too much importance to wealth and power in their deliberations about public policies as
well as in their day-to-day lives. And in the Gorgias he speaks scornfully of the wealth and
power amassed by Athens during its brief empire, referring to its great public works
projects as “trash.”
Disregarding justice and moderation, they [the leaders of the empire] filled the
city with harbors, dockyards, walls, tribute payments, and such trash as that. And
when that fit of sickness comes on, they [the people] will blame their advisers of
the moment and sing the praises of Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the
causes of their ills. (518e–519a)
This passage points to a fundamental Socratic principle: the policies and laws of a state
should be based on an understanding of the nature of virtue and wisdom, and a
recognition of their central importance to the civic life of the community.
The Gorgias also gives some idea of the sort of political reform that Socrates would
recommend. He argues that what is needed is excellent political leadership, and that this
depends on a special kind of knowledge, which he calls “the political art” (politikê
technê). This art has two main parts: the art of legislation; and the art of “corrective
justice,” which are analogous to two arts concerned with the body: physical training and
medicine (464b–466a). Just as medicine and physical training aim at producing and
maintaining the good condition of the body, health, so legislation and corrective justice
aim at producing the good condition of the soul, virtue. Socrates' conception of the
political art is thus based on an analogy between health as the good condition of the body,
on the one hand, and virtue as the good condition of the soul, on the other. And, as it
turns out, Plato's account of justice and virtue in book IV of the Republic is an elaboration
of this analogy.
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The idea of a special kind of political expertise did not originate with Socrates;
Protagoras and other so-called sophists set themselves up as teachers of the “political
art” (politikê technê (Protagoras 319a)). Socrates' innovation was his particular
conception of this expertise. The knowledge that Protagoras claimed to teach was a set of
skills that guaranteed “success” as conventionally understood in the political arena—the
kind of success enjoyed by Pericles and other admired leaders of Athens (Protagoras
318e–320a). For Socrates, on the other hand, the political art is primarily concerned with
the moral improvement of the members of the city state. The goal of the expert statesman
is to instill and maintain virtue (aretê) in the souls of his fellow citizens—“virtue”
understood as a whole made up of such parts as justice, temperance, courage, and
wisdom. The statesman uses the arts of legislation and corrective justice to accomplish
this goal. Corrective justice operates like medicine: through rehabilitative punishment, it
improves the condition of the soul by removing injustice and other vices (Gorgias 476a–
479e). Legislation, on the other hand, is analogous to physical training: it fosters the
development and maintenance of the virtues by instituting a program of education and
training (464c–465c, 519cd).
(p. 100) In the Gorgias, Socrates also makes some of the same criticisms of Athenian
democracy that the Herald makes in the passage from Euripides quoted earlier. He
compares the Athenian assembly to a gathering of children who care only about what
pleases them (521e–522c); and he charges them, as the Herald does, with being too much
under the sway of demagogues—orators who ingratiate themselves with the people in
order to serve their own private interest (502d–503a). This is his reason for calling the
rhetoric taught by Gorgias a form of “flattery.” We should be hesitant, however, to infer a
general condemnation of democracy from Socrates' criticisms of Athenian democracy. He
claims that Pericles and other admired Athenian leaders did not perform the proper
function of a statesman. Rather than working to improve their fellow citizens, the
Athenian leaders corrupted them by “catering to their appetites” (517bc). If they had
done their job properly, these leaders would have had the opposite effect: they would
have made their fellow citizens more just and temperate, less under the sway of their
appetites; and, as a result, the people would have been better judges of what was in their,
and the city's, best interest. A reformed democracy might meet with Socrates' approval.
Although he did not attempt to describe the sort of constitution that would best
accomplish the goal of the city state, he makes it clear that it must be one in which those
who govern have a knowledge of the nature of virtue and how it is produced; and these
leaders must exercise their governing powers for the sake of the well-being of their fellow
citizens, not for their own private interest.
Although Socrates did not develop a theory of constitutions or a model of an ideal state,
he set out several principles that would serve as foundations of subsequent political
thought in the ancient period:
1. The aim of a political community is the happiness of its members; the laws and
institutions of the community should be designed with this overarching aim in view.
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2. Virtue is a necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition of happiness; thus the

inculcation of virtue must be a primary concern of the political community.
3. The inculcation of virtue requires that some individuals have an accurate
understanding of the nature of virtue, and of how it is acquired through education
and corrective justice; in other words, the community should be governed by leaders
who possess the political art.
Socrates deserves credit for giving the impetus to what might be called the “virtue
politics” of ancient political philosophy.1
(p. 101) Plato's Ideal State: The Republic

Socrates viewed himself as a political reformer (Gorgias 521de), but he did not propose
any particular changes in the institutional framework of the city state; he focused on
changing individuals and their values. Plato took the next step. He decided that the only
way to achieve Socrates' political goals was to change the fundamental structure of the
city—to develop and implement a blueprint of an ideally just and good city state. This
blueprint or model is described in Plato's best-known work, the Republic. But the
Republic contains much more than a description of an ideal city state; in fact, this
description plays a subordinate role in an argument for the value of individual justice.
Thus Plato's main concern in the Republic is ethical: through his mouthpiece, Socrates, he
seeks to convince his audience that it always “pays” to be just and to avoid injustice.
In the first book of the Republic, Socrates' claim that justice “pays” is challenged by the
hot-tempered Thrasymachus, a rhetorician and tyrannophile. He accuses Socrates of
naivety and argues that one is better off being unjust if one can get away with it. The
debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus is inconclusive, and, at the beginning of
book II, Thrasymachus' challenge is taken over by the two young brothers Glaucon and
Adeimantus. They contend that, in order to make a convincing case for justice, Socrates
must do three things: (1) give an account of the essential nature of justice and injustice;
(2) show that justice is valuable for its own sake as well as for its consequences; and (3)
show that the life of a just person is happier and more rewarding than the life of any
unjust person. It is in connection with the first task that Socrates introduces a political
dimension to the discussion. It is easier, he suggests, to discover what justice is in a city
than in an individual: since the city is larger, its justice (and injustice) ought to be more
apparent. He therefore proposes that they first determine what justice is in a city and
then look to see what it is in the individual.
In the course of constructing the just city, Socrates distinguishes three main classes of
citizens: the working class (consisting of farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and so on); the
armed forces (the so-called auxiliaries); and the ruling class (the “philosopher-kings”).
Members of the latter two classes are selected at a young age on the basis of their
natural abilities (374e–376c), and receive an education designed to instill the virtues of
courage, moderation, and justice. Those who show unusual aptitude for intellectual
pursuits are then given a “higher” education in mathematics and philosophy, and
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eventually become the rulers of the state. Those who do not receive the higher education
become professional soldiers and educators, and are the helpers or “auxiliaries” of the
rulers. This hierarchical structure of the ideal state is based on the assumption that there
are natural inequalities among individuals in a community, inequalities in their abilities to
achieve moral and intellectual virtues. In regard to these abilities, individuals fall into
three groups: those who can achieve both moral excellence and philosophical wisdom;
those who are able to achieve moral excellence and a lower level of intellectual
excellence—not philosophical wisdom; and those who are naturally (p. 102) cut out for the
life of a craftsman or service-provider, and who are able to achieve a more modest level of
moral and intellectual excellence appropriate to such a life. This assumption of natural
inequalities in regard to social or political roles is a fundamental principle underlying the
design of Socrates' ideal city state, and it is surprising that he does not offer any
supporting argument for it.
Another principle guiding the construction of the ideal city state comes to light in
Socrates' response to an objection from his interlocutor, Adeimantus. After spelling out
the “lower” educational program for the future rulers and auxiliaries, Socrates focuses on
the economic aspects of their life. While the farmers and artisans own their own houses
and enjoy a modest level of material prosperity, the rulers and the military class are not
allowed to have private property or to own gold and silver; their standard of living is
austere and spartan in comparison with that of the workforce. Adeimantus objects that
this is unfair to the rulers and auxiliaries: Socrates is depriving them of a happy life, even
though they make the greatest contribution to the city's welfare. Adeimantus is appealing
to a principle of distributive justice: benefits derived from a cooperative enterprise should
be proportional to one's contribution; since the contribution of the auxiliaries and rulers
is the greatest, they should receive the greatest benefits. In his response (420bc),
Socrates seems to reject Adeimantus' suggestion: while the proper aim in establishing a
city is the happiness of its members, if the city is to be just, its aim cannot be to maximize
the happiness of just one group of citizens—a just city is not one in which a particular
group is “outstandingly happy, but rather one in which “the whole city is as happy as
possible.” Several interesting questions arise at this point. What is the justification for the
claim that a just city is one in which “the city as a whole” is happy? What is it for a group
or a city to be “happy”? What is it for a city “as a whole” to be happy?
The justification for Socrates' claim that a just city is one in which “the city as a whole” is
happy seems to be an implicit appeal to a principle of distributive justice: if it is possible
for all to achieve a certain level of happiness, it would not be fair to make one select
group as happy as possible if that means depriving others of their happiness; fairness
demands that no group within the city should be especially favored over others. Does this
mean that all three groups should have an equal share of happiness, even if the result is
that one or more of the groups will have less than it might otherwise have? Apparently
not, for Socrates indicates later that the rulers, in spite of their Spartan lifestyle, have a
happier life than members of the other two groups (cf. 420b with 518ab, 519c, 520e–
521b). What determines the appropriate distribution to each group is the nature and
“functions” of its members: for the members of each class there is a particular kind of life
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that allows them to flourish and reach their full potential, and in this life they will find
happiness (421c). In the case of the productive class and the auxiliaries, the life assigned
to them turns out to be the happiest they could possibly lead—if the city were designed to
maximize the happiness of the workers or the auxiliaries, it would have exactly the same
constitution (for the happiness of the auxiliaries, see 464d–466c). But Socrates suggests
that, if it were designed to maximize (p. 103) the happiness of the ruling class, it might
have a different structure;2 thus the ruling class, which is the happiest, is the only one
that ends up with less happiness than it might otherwise have had.
According to Socrates' argument, the members of each of the three classes will achieve
happiness by working for the good of the community—that is, by making the contribution
for which they are naturally best suited (421bc). This is what it is for “the city as a whole
to be happy.” It is also clear that Socrates holds that the happiness of the city, or of a
class within the city, depends directly on the happiness of its members. And we should
note that the distribution of happiness accords with Adeimantus' principle of distributive
justice: the degree of happiness of each class is proportional to its contribution to the
security, stability, and well-being of the community.
As noted above, it is the unusual economic aspects of the city that provoke Adeimantus'
objection that the rulers and auxiliaries are not getting their fair share of happiness. The
productive class has a moderate standard of living: they are neither rich nor poor, but
have a relatively comfortable life. (Their standard of living is similar to that of the
inhabitants of Socrates' “first city,” described at 373ac.) The auxiliaries and rulers, on the
other hand, have a more austere life; their basic needs are supplied by the productive
class, but they are forbidden to own private property, and their living conditions are
similar to those of a military encampment (415d–416e). In most city states of the time,
there was a sharp division between rich and poor, and their constitutions were either
oligarchies or democracies depending on which class had the upper hand at the time (cf.
Aristotle, Politics 1296a22–3). In Socrates’ ideal city there is no division between rich and
poor, because rich and poor do not exist. From the perspective of the producers, the
rulers and auxiliaries are deprived of the comforts that make their own lives enjoyable.
One could argue that, given their values and way of life, the producers would have little
reason to envy the lifestyle of their superiors; on the contrary, they would naturally see
their rulers and auxiliaries as enduring hardships in order to provide for the security and
good governance of the state. The stated aim of prohibiting private property and
productive activity in the ruling and auxiliary classes is to guarantee single-minded
devotion to their tasks; but another important result is that the superior classes are
dependent on the productive class for their most basic needs, and this is impressed upon
them in the names used for the producers: they are to be called “payers of their wages”
and “supporters” (463b). The economic structure of Socrates' city is a system of
cooperation designed to strengthen ties of interdependence and eliminate traditional
sources of envy and civil strife.
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The economic arrangements, including the “communism” of the ruling and auxiliary
classes, are written into the laws of the ideal city. Other parts of the legal code have to do
with the selection and education of the guardians and rulers; the criminal justice (p. 104)
system and the special training of judges who will administer it (408c–410a); the conduct
of war with Greeks and non-Greeks (466e–471c); restrictions on music and drama (377a–
403c); and regulations concerning religious practices (427bc). To ensure that rulers
support and adhere to the legal system, Socrates stipulates that they must acquire an
understanding of the rationale behind the laws, the same understanding that guided the
original lawgivers (497cd). The laws articulated in the Republic determine the most basic
aspects of the political and social life of the state. These laws are referred to as
“outlines” (tupoi), and Socrates leaves it to the future rulers to fill in details of the legal
code (425ce). The rulers' understanding of the rationale and “spirit” of the laws will
enable them to work out the details in accordance with the fundamental principles, and
will also ensure that they will not make any significant changes in the legal system: the
rulers of Socrates' ideal state are not “above the law” (445e; cf. 421a).
But, even if the rulers have a proper understanding of the rationale underlying the legal
system, what is to prevent them from taking advantage of their position and illegally
acquiring the luxuries and trappings that traditionally signify status and power—thus
unleashing the vicious cycle of conflict between rich and poor? Socrates' response is that
the rulers' education shapes their values in such a way that the usual temptations to
abuse power have no appeal. In their education in “music and gymnastic” they are
imbued with the Socratic doctrine that “wealth, power, and reputation” are of little
significance in comparison with the “goods of the soul”—wisdom and virtue. But, more
importantly, in their “higher” education in mathematics and philosophy they gain access
to a transcendent world of purely intelligible objects—Platonic Forms—which makes them
regard as petty the usual attractions of political power. Through their education in Forms,
the philosopher-kings become passionate devotees of a life of study and meditation
directed toward a realm of pure being. Socrates attempts to convey the transformative
power of this experience through his famous Allegory of the Cave in book VII (514a–
517c). Our life in this world is likened to the life of prisoners in a cave in which all that
can be seen are dim shadows of reality. The education of the philosopher-rulers frees
them from their bonds and guides them out of the cave into the sunlit world of reality.
Once their intellectual “eyes” are accustomed to the bright light, they not only have a
clear vision of the things imaged in the cave—they find the contemplation of these objects
supremely satisfying and fulfilling (518ab, 519c, 580d–583a). When it is their turn to use
their education for the benefit of the city—that is, to go back down into the cave and take
up the task of ruling, they reluctantly agree to do so: they regard their sojourn in the cave
as a burdensome distraction from the life and activity that they love above all else. They
have no interest in the influence, prestige, and wealth that are the driving ambitions of
most seekers of political power.
Socrates claims that philosophers will make better rulers not only because they will not
be tempted to use their power for personal gain, but also because their knowledge of the
essences of Goodness, Justice, and the other Forms will enable them to make better
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judgments regarding political matters in the cave. But there is room for skepticism about
these claims, and since the time of Aristotle philosophers have pointed to glaring, and not
so glaring, weaknesses in Socrates' theory. But, before considering its (p. 105) defects, let
us point out some of the virtues of the ideal city of the Republic. First, there is the
demand—astonishing for the time—that women be given equal treatment—that is, that
they be given the same opportunities for education and careers as men. Socrates argues
that, when it comes to ruling, or even military service, there is the same distribution of
natural talents and capacities in females as in males. Thus, in the ideal state there will be
men and women in each of the three classes, all pursuing their own special profession
and achieving their appropriate level of happiness.
Since the institution of slavery was a common feature of Greek city states, the absence of
slaves in Socrates' ideal state is also a striking break with tradition. In Aristotle's account
of the origin of a city state, he includes slaves as natural and necessary parts of the
community. By contrast, Socrates' account of the origin of the ideal state makes no
mention of slaves; nor does he make any reference to the introduction of slavery in later
stages of the development of the ideal state. The idea that some human beings are suited
by nature to be the property of others seems to play no role in the political theory of the
Republic.3
On the negative side, critics have pointed to the appalling lack of freedom and autonomy
in Socrates' ideal state. There are strong reasons for doubting that a small ruling elite
with no checks on its power will remain committed to an unselfish pursuit of the common
good. But, even if the philosopher-kings were to measure up to Socrates' high standards
and faithfully abide by the laws, it seems fair to say that the rest of the inhabitants are in
the same position as slaves living under wise and benevolent—but extremely protective—
masters. Unlike slaves, they cannot be bought or sold, and they can own their own land
and dwellings; but, like slaves, they have little control over their lives. Even the music
they can perform or listen to, and the books they can read, are severely restricted:
Homer's great epic poems, the Iliad and Odyssey, and all of Greek tragedy are on the
index of forbidden books. Socrates might counter that true freedom consists in the rule of
reason over the passions and appetites: to be free, our reason must be liberated from its
“enslavement” to the passions and appetites (589d–591a); only then can we see and
pursue our true good (cf. Meno 86d: “since you do not try to rule yourself so that you
might be free”). And, since the rule of philosopher-kings is the rule of reason, this
“rational freedom” is achieved for all members of the ideal city (590ce). But, for those
who have imbibed individualist, liberal ideals with mother's milk, the price of this
“rational freedom” is too high: the subjects of Socrates' philosopher-kings have no more
autonomy than slaves; they have no freedom to choose the goals they will pursue or to
determine what sort of life they will lead. Lacking these essential goods, it is difficult to
see how their lives could qualify as truly happy.
What about the risks involved in giving rulers unchecked, absolute power? Socrates
seems quite confident that his ideal rulers, since they are intellectuals and philosophers,
(p. 106) will have no interest in the sorts of advantages and perquisites that generally
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accompany political power; and therefore they will not be tempted to abuse their power
for personal gain. But, even if it is true that those devoted to the life of the intellect would
be reluctant to take on the burden of governing a state, their attitude might change once
they have tasted power and seen its attractions up close. Plato seems to recognize this
danger in a striking passage in the Laws, a work of his old age. He argues that there must
always be legal checks on the power of rulers, for, even if the ruler possessed the virtues
and the “political art,” his “mortal nature” would inevitably lead him to greed (pleonexia)
and self-interested action (874e–875d). In his later years, Plato clearly thought it was
much too risky to give unchecked power even to those who were experts in the “political
art.”
We should also consider an argument from Aristotle's Politics for allowing people from the
lower classes to participate in decision-making. He contends that, even though “the
many” individually may be inferior to a select few in regard to intelligence and virtue,
when they meet and deliberate together in public assembly they often make better
decisions than the elite—especially in matters in which their own interests are directly
concerned (1281b39–1282b1). He also points out that, if “the many” are excluded from all
political decision-making, they will be resentful and restive, thus undermining the
stability of the constitution (1281b28–30; cf. Laws 757de). Given Socrates' stress on the
importance of unity and stability, it would seem reasonable to give members of the two
lower classes some share in political power. Although Plato was open to such arguments
in his later works, in the Republic he is deeply hostile to democratic ideals and
institutions. He attacks democracy in two places in the Republic: in the “ship of state”
parable in book VI, and in the account of defective, unjust constitutions in book VIII. As
several recent scholars have pointed out, the critique of democracy in book VIII is not so
much an attempt to describe how democratic constitutions actually work, but rather a
caricature—a picture of what a democratic city would be like if its fundamental ideals
were carried to their logical extremes (see Annas 1981: 299–302 and Scott 2000). The
ship of state passage gives a more realistic picture of democracy, and also a clearer idea
of why Plato is against giving the lower classes a share in political decision-making. Let
us briefly consider the “lessons” of the parable.
The ship of state passage not only gives a description of how democracies of the time
functioned, but also seems to have particular relevance to Athenian democracy. As we
noted earlier, in the Gorgias Socrates sees Athens as a society corrupted by demagogues
who used their rhetorical skills to ingratiate themselves with the people for the sake of
private gain. In the ship of state parable, Socrates returns to the dynamic relationship
between the people and its leaders in democratically governed city states (487e–489d).
He asks us to imagine the people (the demos) as a shipmaster who is larger and stronger
than his shipmates, but who does not see or hear well and whose knowledge of
seamanship is similarly defective. The sailors, who represent the orators and politicians,
do their utmost to persuade the master to turn over the helm to them so that they can
consume the ship's stores. The sailors praise those who are most able to take command
through persuasion or force as masters of the art of seamanship: they are (p. 107)
unaware, says Socrates, that a true master of seamanship must attend to “the time of
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year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to the art” (488d);
the true master of seamanship corresponds, of course, to the philosopher-king, the expert
in statecraft. The orators say only what the people want to hear, and they inevitably
corrupt them by catering to their desires for praise, power, and wealth (492c–493a; cf.
Gorgias 481de, 512e–513a). Neither the people nor the orators/politicians have what is
needed to navigate the ship of state—the political art. The ship of state will be well
governed only when experts in this art take command—that is, when philosophers
become rulers. Just as navigational decisions should not be put to a vote but should be
left to the expert navigator, so also political decisions should be the exclusive prerogative
of the experts.
The ship of state passage indicates Plato's beliefs: (1) that there is a political art that
gives one expertise in political decision-making, expertise comparable to that possessed
by other practitioners of arts; and (2) that only a few people in a given community have
the capacity to acquire the political art (493e–494a; cf. Statesman 300e). The first belief
supports the claim that only those who have acquired the political art should have
decision-making authority in the ideal state, and the second supports the view that only a
few will be able to acquire this art—“the many” should have no share in decision-making,
at least in the ideal state. However, as we have already noted, Plato's confidence that
experts in statecraft can be trusted with unchecked power waned in his later years. He
came to believe that, while education is of vital importance for good government, one
must recognize that human beings are not gods and even the best should not be trusted
with absolute power.
Later Developments in the Statesman and Laws

Plato's Statesman and Laws were written a number of years after the Republic. It is thus
not surprising that these dialogues take up new questions and sometimes diverge from
views in the earlier work. One major change, as we have noted, is Plato's attitude toward
ideal rulers: he expresses doubts about whether expert knowledge of statesmanship is
attainable, and, if attainable, whether its possession guarantees that one will use it for
the common good (see Statesman 301de, 302e; Laws 874e–875d, 713c–714b).
Corresponding to this difference is a greater interest in non-ideal constitutions and
realistic possibilities for political reform. One “new” question that receives a good deal of
attention in both the Statesman and Laws is the problematic nature of law and the proper
role of a system of laws in the governance of a state. In order to give some idea of how
Plato's political thought evolved in his later works, we will touch briefly on these two
topics.
In the Statesman and Laws, Plato continues to hold that an ideal ruler is one who
possesses the “political art.” But there are differences in his understanding of what this
(p. 108) art involves, and these differences relate to new insights into the problematic
nature of law. In the Republic, the rulers of the ideal state must have an extensive
training in mathematics and philosophy with the goal of acquiring knowledge of Forms,
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especially the “Form of the Good.” They also need experience in the practical sphere, but
this is mentioned only in passing (484d, 539e). In the Statesman and Laws, on the other
hand, it is unclear whether the political art requires the sort of mathematical and
philosophical knowledge considered to be essential in the Republic. What is stressed in
these later works is a kind of knowledge that seems to be gained through experience—
what Aristotle calls “knowledge of particulars” as distinguished from “knowledge of
universals” (Nic. Eth. VI. 1141b14–23, 1142a11–16). Plato uses the example of medicine in
the Statesman to bring out this point (294a–296a). Suppose that a physician gives a
patient a set of rules to follow as part of his treatment. In light of changing
circumstances, the physician may realize that some of the rules should be modified. The
physician's expertise is shown in her recognition of occasions when what is prescribed by
a rule does not fit the particular case; no collection of precepts set down in a book will be
adequate for making the right sorts of judgments in particular cases—the book learning
must be supplemented by years of experience. Plato suggests that laws in the political
sphere are defective in the same way (294ac; cf. Laws 875d). As Aristotle would say,
universal rules governing conduct inevitably have important exceptions, and one needs
practical wisdom to recognize what is appropriate in the situation (Nic. Eth. II. 1103b34–
1104a10). For Plato, it is the political art that enables one not only to legislate but to
recognize exceptional cases where the law fails to achieve its end—the general good of
the citizenry; in such cases the expert statesman will act against the letter, though not the
spirit, of the law. For this reason, Plato argues in the Statesman that in the ideal situation
ultimate political authority should belong to the expert statesman, not to the laws.
Some of Plato's comments suggest that an ideal statesman should rule autocratically,
“without laws” (293cd, 293e–294a); however, in the passage referred to above (294ac) he
says that “legislation belongs to” the political art; and in another place he says that the
ideal statesman rules “in accordance with laws” (301ab; see also 297d, 300de, 305e).
There seem to be two ways in which the ideal ruler of the Statesman is not bound by laws:
(1) he is justified in not adhering to a standing law—even a law he has laid down—if his
knowledge of the political art dictates a different course (300cd); and (2) he is justified in
changing a law if that is called for by new and unforeseen circumstances (295c–296a).
But he will govern “in accordance with the laws” in the sense that his decisions and
commands will generally follow the letter of the law; and, in the exceptional cases in
which they do not, they will be in accord with the “spirit” of the law.
Plato seems to hold that in non-ideal, “second-best” states laws should be immutable and
strictly adhered to by both citizens and rulers (297de, 300e–301a). But the argument he
gives in support of strict adherence implies that it is sometimes permissible to change the
laws (300b). He points out that these laws inevitably involve errors, since they are not the
product of the political art. But to violate them would be to commit a much greater error,
because the laws have evolved over time through trial and error, and they were (p. 109)
improved through experience and the careful deliberation of many people. Plato
recognizes that legal codes often include procedures for changing laws (296a), and he
seems to approve of changing (imperfect) laws in a careful and deliberate manner, relying
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on the advice and counsel of those with experience. Once these laws have been passed,
they—and not the rulers—must be the ultimate authority in the state.
The Statesman is more pessimistic than the Republic about the possibility of achieving
knowledge of the political art (301de, 302e), and it treats the concept of the ideal ruler,
and the laws he produces, as models to be “imitated” by inferior constitutions. Plato
distinguishes six types of inferior constitutions (in contrast with the four of the Republic),
and classifies them according to two criteria: the number of rulers, and whether or not
they govern according to law. Kingship (lawful) and tyranny (unlawful) are the two types
of rule by one, aristocracy (lawful) and oligarchy (unlawful) the two types of rule by few,
and there are two forms of democracy corresponding to lawful and unlawful rule by “the
many.” The lawful constitutions are “good imitations” of the ideal, the unlawful are bad
imitations (300e–302e; “lawful” here seems to mean adhering to laws conducive to the
general good: 297d). Of the good imitations, kingship is best, because power is more
concentrated and the ruler is better able to achieve his goals. When power is dispersed,
the ruling authority becomes less effective; thus aristocracy comes next after kingship,
and lawful democracy is the least of the good imitations. For the same reason, tyranny is
the worst of the bad imitations, and unlawful democracy the least bad (302e–303b).
There are several interesting differences between the classifications of “inferior”

constitutions in the Statesman and Republic, the most striking being the different
treatments of democracy. The Republic recognizes only an “unlawful” form of democracy
(557e–558a), and it is ranked just above tyranny as the second worst constitution. In the
Statesman, the unlawful form of democracy ranks third from the bottom, ahead of
oligarchy and tyranny; and the lawful form is just below kingship and aristocracy, as the
third best of the good imitations. Plato has clearly revised his earlier, extremely negative,
assessment of democracy. Perhaps the main factor in this revised assessment is Plato's
appreciation of the benefits of “lawfulness” in less than perfect constitutions and his
recognition of a “lawful” form of democracy: a constitution in which the laws are aimed at
the general good, and in which there are built-in safeguards to ensure that laws are
obeyed and respected (298a–300c).
Given that “less than perfect” constitutions are the best one can realistically hope for, and
that laws are of vital importance for these constitutions, it is surprising that there is no
discussion of good and bad legislation in the Statesman. Perhaps when Plato wrote the
Statesman, he had already decided (or had started) to write the Laws, a dialogue that
focuses on the “second-best” constitution and gives a lengthy and detailed account of its
system of laws.
In view of the Statesman's ranking of constitutions, one might have expected the second-
best constitution of the Laws to be a kingship. But in fact it is described as a mixture of
monarchy and democracy (693de, 756e). The Laws, in contrast with the Republic and
Statesman, ranks a mixed constitution above any of the unmixed forms, (p. 110) and
develops for the first time a theory of mixed constitutions (here again anticipating
Aristotle).
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Athenians of the time would have recognized the constitution of the Laws as a revised
form of their own constitution. There are the familiar ecclesia (public assembly) and boulê
(council), and the office of stratêgos (general) with wide-ranging executive powers; many
minor offices, methods of election and appointment, divisions of the population, and so on
are modeled on Athenian precedents. In contrast with the ideal state of the Republic,
most of the political institutions of the Laws would not have struck Plato's contemporaries
as “revolutionary”: the communism of the two upper classes of the Republic is gone; the
gulf between ruling elite and the rest of the citizen body, as represented by the allegory
of the cave, does not exist in the Laws; the Republic's harsh restrictions on poetry and
literature are relaxed. On the other hand, the equal treatment of women is carried over
from the Republic, and, although private property is the rule, there are strict limits on the
amount of property one may possess.
Given that all citizens in the “second-best” state of the Laws have the right (and
obligation) to participate in the political life of the community, it might seem that Plato in
his old age became an enlightened democrat. But, whereas in the Republic he used the
term “citizen” (politês) loosely to designate members of all three classes, in the Laws he
understands a “citizen” (as does Aristotle) as one who has the right to participate in
political decision-making; and the class of citizens in the Laws corresponds (more or less)
to the military and ruling classes of the Republic. The rest of the inhabitants—those who
fill the role of the productive class in the Republic—are resident aliens and slaves with no
political rights (919d–920a, 846d, 849bd). The Laws in effect combines the military and
ruling classes of the Republic, thus expanding the group of political decision-makers; on
the other hand, it introduces slavery and a large population of temporary “guest-workers”
who cannot own land and are not considered members of the community.
Although Plato characterizes the constitution of the Laws as a mixture of monarchy and
democracy, it might be more accurate to describe it as a mixture of oligarchy and
democracy. There are four economic classes mandated by law, and the wealthiest class is
four or five times better off than the lowest class. In the complex rules governing
elections and appointments to high offices, there is a subtle bias in favor of the upper
classes (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1266a6–22). Public education is mandated for all citizens,
but, since the better off have more resources and leisure, their children will be able to go
further in their studies. Plato's intention was that the educational system would stress the
importance of the virtues for the well-being of both individual and state. The strict limits
on the accumulation of wealth and the educational system would thus serve as checks on
the development of “oligarchic” values; in terms of its dominant values, the constitution
of the Laws could be characterized as a mixture of aristocracy and democracy.
Two further innovations of the constitution of the Laws deserve our attention before we
turn to Aristotle's Politics. We noticed earlier that the Laws warns against the corrupting
influence of unchecked power (874e–875d, 713c–714b). The constitution of (p. 111) the
Laws sets out an elaborate system of checks and balances designed to ensure that all
officials adhere strictly to the laws (767e, 928b, 946d–947e; see Morrow 1960: 549–52).
There is a special board charged with conducting reviews of officials' performance at the
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end of their terms (usually one or two years); if there is evidence of malfeasance, they
have the power to indict. Through another mechanism, the examiners themselves
undergo scrutiny at the end of their terms. Moreover, power is divided among several
executive offices so as to balance each against the others, with the aim of preventing any
one office from gaining excessive power. A second innovation has to do with the revision
of the legal code. We noticed that in the Statesman Plato values stability in the laws but at
the same time recognizes the need for revision in light of new circumstances. In the Laws
he establishes a specific institution for revising laws when necessary or desirable. The
“Nocturnal Council,” a sort of think-tank made up of elder statesman and young interns,
is charged with conducting research in moral, legal, and political theory, with special
attention to the laws of the state (951de, 961a–969d). The council may send emissaries to
other city states to investigate their laws, and may recommend changes in laws where
that would be beneficial to the state. The Nocturnal Council is the closest thing in the
Laws to the philosopher-rulers in the Republic, but—characteristic of the difference
between the Republic and the Laws—it has no power to legislate or command; its function
is strictly advisory.
Aristotle's Politics
Aristotle's Politics is devoted chiefly to the study of different constitutions or forms of
government. He agrees with Plato that the goal of a political community is the general
happiness of its members, and that a decisive factor in achieving this goal is the design of
the constitution. On the other hand, his approach to political reform is much more
practical and realistic than Plato's. He distinguishes four questions to be answered by the
well-trained student of politics (1288b10–35):
1. What is the ideally best constitution, that is, what would be the best constitution if
one could determine conditions and circumstances—for example, location, size of
population, general characteristics of inhabitants?
2. What is the best constitution for most existing city states—that is, assuming
typical conditions and circumstances, which form of constitution would be best
suited to attain the general happiness and not too difficult to implement?
3. What sort of constitution would be best for a particular city state, given its current
constitution, its history and traditions, and the characteristics of its population?
4. What is the best way to preserve a given city state's constitution, even if very
imperfect?
Of these questions, only the first was addressed by Plato in the Republic and Laws.
Aristotle's three additional questions indicate a serious interest in improving the (p. 112)
politics of actual city states of his time. The Politics is a handbook for future statesmen,
but also for political consultants—experts who might travel to particular cities to study
their institutions and recommend improvements.
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Before turning to these questions about constitutions, Aristotle considers several prior
questions. (1) What is a city state—how does it differ from other simpler types of
communities? (2) What qualifies one as a citizen of a city state? (3) What is a constitution,
and what are the most illuminating criteria for distinguishing and ranking different
constitutions?
(1) In the opening chapters of the Politics, Aristotle argues that villages are naturally
formed when several households join together, and city states arise from the joining-
together of villages. City states are thus larger and more complex than villages or
households (1252b15–30; cf. 1291a10–33). In each case, the “joining-together” is
motivated by basic needs: provision of food, shelter, defense against aggressors.
However, in the case of the city state, Aristotle says that it “comes into being for the
sake of living, but continues in existence for the sake of living well” (1252b29–30). In
other words, city states were originally formed to provide basic necessities, but, once
established, they reveal their true value by allowing for the development of our
higher capacities—capacities that add immeasurably to the quality of human life. We
see here an important difference between Aristotle and the Social Contract theorists
of the seventeenth century: it is a mistake, he would claim, to think that one can
determine the general purpose of civil society by considering the reasons that first
led individuals to form such societies; and similarly to suppose that we gain the
clearest view of our political or social nature by examining human beings in a pre-
political “state of nature.” Aristotle maintains that human beings are adapted by
nature for life in complex, organized societies like city states.
(2) The opening chapters of book III are devoted to clarifying three basic concepts:
“city state” (polis), “citizen” (politês), and “constitution” (politeia). The Greek terms
are obviously closely related, and the concepts, as defined by Aristotle, are also
interconnected. For instance, a “city state” is defined as a “community of citizens
large enough for a self-sufficient life” (1275b20–21); a “constitution” is defined as the
“organization of the offices of a city state,” especially the most important (1278b8–
10); and a “citizen” is defined in terms of the offices of a city state—“one who is
eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial offices” (1275b17–21). Aristotle's
definition of a “citizen” thus presupposes a complex society with a constitution
defining institutional arrangements for deliberation and judicial decision-making—
that is, a “city state.” Since the three concepts are definitionally intertwined, the
concepts of “citizen” and “constitution” make their appearance only with the
development of a city state.
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Aristotle's definition of a “citizen” in terms of eligibility to hold offices is not meant to capture
the ordinary usage of the term. In ordinary usage, “citizen” might loosely refer to a member of a
political community. In the Republic, for instance, members of all (p. 113) three classes of the
ideal state (rulers, auxiliaries, and producers) are called “citizens,” even though the two lower
classes are not “eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial” offices. In Aristotle's strict
sense, only the rulers in the Republic qualify as citizens; similarly, in an aristocracy or oligarchy
only a small number of individuals would qualify as citizens.
(3) One criterion by which constitutions are differentiated is the number of those
holding political power (1279a25–b10; cf. Plato, Statesman 300e–302e). If power is
restricted to a few, then the constitution is an aristocracy or oligarchy; if decision-
making is open to “the many,” then it is a democracy; and if there is just one person
holding power, it is a monarchy or tyranny. A second criterion is the aim of the ruling
powers—whether the aim is the common good of the community or the private good
of those in power; in other words, the aim differentiates between exploitative and
non-exploitative constitutions. Rule by one is either kingship (non-exploitative) or
tyranny (exploitative); rule by a few is either aristocracy (non-exploitative) or
oligarchy (exploitative). In the case of rule by “the many” who are relatively poor in
comparison with “the few,” it is democracy if exploitative, and is called a
“polity” (politeia) if non-exploitative. (This constitution might also be called a
“republic,” if by this we mean a constitution in which the people are sovereign and
laws are framed with a view to the common good.)
Five of the six constitutions thus distinguished are discussed in the remainder of book III
(kingship) and in book IV (polity, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny); aristocracy is
treated only incidentally in III. 15–18; as we shall see, its full treatment is in book VII.
Before beginning his formal discussion of kingship, Aristotle considers proponents'
arguments for and against all of the different constitutions—arguments based on appeals
to justice and quality of rule (III. 9–13). His verdict is that there are objections to all of
them, and he argues, in the case of democracy, that, while it would not be just to give
“the many” complete control, it would also be unjust to exclude them from all political
offices (1281a14–34). As for the quality of rule, he argues of “the many” that, even if
individually they are inferior to the “few best” in character and intelligence, when they
gather together and deliberate, their collective judgment is better—at least if they are not
thoroughly corrupt (1281a40–b21; cf. Waldron 1995). On the other hand, since “the many”
are individually inferior, it would be better to restrict eligibility for the highest offices.
Aristotle's arguments in these chapters seem to endorse Solon's compromise between
democracy and oligarchy: have “the many” elect the highest officials and conduct
“audits” of their performance, but impose a property qualification for eligibility for those
positions (1281b31–38, 1282a23–41, 1273b35–1274a3).
The idea that one can compare the collective capacity for wise judgment of “the many”
with that of the “few best” has an important, but not often noticed, role in Aristotle's
discussion of kingship (and aristocracy) in Chapters 14–18 of book III. The main question
considered in these chapters is whether kingship is the most “beneficial” constitution for
city states, or whether it is beneficial for some but not for others. (p. 114) Aristotle's
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summary answer is that, if there is one individual in a community whose virtue/wisdom is

greater than the combined virtue and wisdom of the rest of the population, then it would
be most beneficial for this community to be ruled by that individual (1288a15–37). If, on
the other hand, there is no individual in the community whose talents and abilities are
greater than those of the rest when they meet together and deliberate, then kingship
would not be most beneficial for this community.
In the earlier discussion of the “wisdom of the multitude,” Aristotle argued that, unless
the people are corrupt and degraded (cf. 1292a4–30), their decisions on many issues will
be better on the whole than those of a single outstanding individual or a small elite. This
seems to imply that it is only when there is a deficiency in the people that kingship is to
be preferred; if the people are up to the task of political deliberation and judgment, a
different constitution—one that has democratic elements—will be preferable to kingship
(or aristocracy). There is perhaps one other set of conditions in which kingship would be
most beneficial. Aristotle mentions in several places that in their infancy city states were
ruled by kings, and this was understandable, since it is more likely in a small community
that one individual will stand out above the rest. As communities grew and became true
cities, there were more individuals with intelligence and good judgment who were
unwilling to put up with the rule of one (1286b8–13, 1297b16–28, 1313a3–10). Thus the
size of the population is a factor in determining whether kingship is an appropriate
constitution: Aristotle apparently thinks that it is more likely that rule by one will be
appropriate and beneficial in a relatively small, simple community than in a large one.
Aristotle's treatment seems to marginalize kingship. In the Republic, Plato refers to his
ideal constitution as a kingship or aristocracy (445d), and in the Statesman, he argues
that kingship is the best of the six constitutions he distinguishes (302e–303a). But for
Aristotle, kingship is “beneficial” only in certain conditions: either in larger cities in
which the people are not capable of effective deliberation, or in small, simple
communities in which one individual stands head and shoulders above all the rest. In city
states in which the people are up to the task of deliberation, a constitution that includes
democratic elements is clearly preferable. And, according to Aristotle's arguments for the
“wisdom of the people,” the quality of government will be superior in such a mixed
constitution. As we shall see in a moment, a “polity” or “republic” is a mixed constitution
with strong democratic elements; the arguments we have considered so far seem to point
to this constitution as superior to kingship—as we shall see, polity and aristocracy are the
real contenders for the title “best constitution.”
Aristotle characterizes polity as “the best constitution for most city states” (1295a 25–34).
While kingship is best for some city states, polity is “best for most,” because it is a
constitution suitable for the relatively large, developed city states that existed in
Aristotle's time (1296a7–13). As we noted earlier, polity is a mixed constitution combining
democratic and oligarchic elements (1293b32–34). It thus makes sense to discuss the
different types of democratic and oligarchic constitutions (in IV. 4–6) before turning to
polity (in IV. 8–12). One might wonder how a mixture of two defective constitutions could
result in a “correct” constitution that aims at the common (p. 115) good. We should note
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that oligarchy and democracy are defined as rule by the rich and poor respectively
(1279b39–1280a6). Aristotle describes polity as a “mean” between oligarchy and
democracy in that it involves a compromise between the interests of the rich and poor;
and by not favoring one group over the other, it manages to achieve the common good—at
least in economic terms.
An example of how polity combines elements of oligarchy and democracy is by “taking

legislation from both constitutions”: choosing officials by lot is characteristic of
democracy, while choice by election is characteristic of oligarchy; in a polity one might
therefore establish a law that officials are elected, as in an oligarchy, but without any
property qualification, as in democracy (1294b6–13). A sign that a polity is “well mixed” is
our ambivalence about how it should be described: one cannot decide whether it is
democratic rather than oligarchic or oligarchic rather than democratic (1294b14–40). And
Aristotle contends that this kind of mixture is a guarantee of stability, for “none of the
parts of the city state will wish for another constitution” (1297a6–7, 1294b38–40).
Aristotle mentions that most city states of his time were either democracies or
oligarchies, and that a “well-mixed” polity was rare or non-existent (1296a22–3, 1296a36–
8). And yet a polity should not be difficult to establish, since it is “the best constitution for
most city states,” and such a constitution is said to be “easier and more attainable by
all” (1288b38–9). Given that most city states are either democracies or oligarchies, and
that polity is a mixture of these two constitutions, it is clear that most city states can
become polities by making changes in the direction of the other—that is, by making a
democracy more oligarchic and vice versa; and this is why Aristotle says that polity is
“best for most city states.” However, since there are different types of democracies and
oligarchies, and each type can be analyzed into a particular organization of parts, one
needs to know how the different kinds of parts fit together in different combinations
(1290b25–39, 1294a30–5). Equipped with this sort of knowledge, the expert legislator will
be able to design changes that will transform a given democracy or oligarchy into a polity.
Aristotle points out that a legislator can design laws that encourage the growth of a
middle class (1296b35–40, 1308b28–31), and he regards a strong middle class as an
essential element of a polity (1295a25–b28); just as the economic status of those who hold
power is a defining criterion of democracy and oligarchy, so also in the case of polity—
this is a constitution in which the middle class holds the balance of power (1295b34–9).
Aristotle claims that people of the middle class are not typically arrogant and high-
handed, as the rich tend to be, nor are they as envious and prone to petty crime as the
poor. They are, therefore, the best equipped both to rule and to be ruled, which is the
mark of a good citizen (1295b1–28, 1277b7–16). These armchair “sociological” claims may
strike us as dubious and dogmatic; on the other hand, it is commonly believed that a
society with a strong middle class functions better and has greater stability than one
divided between rich and poor—and Aristotle clearly shares this belief (1296b34–1297a7).
The growth of a middle class provides greater opportunities for leisure and education,
and thus the enhancement of the general level of (p. 116) political deliberation and the
“wisdom of the people.” It seems clear that Aristotle's lectures on ethics and politics were
Page 20 of 26

designed with this end in view (see Nic. Eth. 1102a5–13, 1109b30–35, 1152b1–8, and
especially 1180b23–1181b24).
After giving his account of the constitution that is “best for most” city states, Aristotle
discusses, in books V and VI, which constitutions are best in particular circumstances and
how different constitutions are preserved and destroyed. Finally, in books VII and VIII, he
gives his account of the ideal constitution, discussing such topics as: size of population;
geographical location; ownership of land; character of people; class divisions; and
education. Given the detail and complexity of his discussions in the preceding books,
Aristotle's account of the constitutional arrangements and institutions of the ideal state is
surprisingly sketchy; since the discussion breaks off without reaching a conclusion in
book VIII, it seems likely that a more detailed description of executive and judicial offices,
methods of selection, and so on was planned but not completed, or has not survived.
Another surprising aspect of the description of the ideal constitution in books VII–VIII is
the fact that Aristotle does not relate it to his earlier classification and discussion of
constitutions in books III–IV—he does not, for example, tell us whether it is a kingship, an
aristocracy, or a polity. In book IV, on the other hand, he says that “it is correct to call the
constitution described in the earlier discussions an aristocracy,” and goes on to say that
this is the ideally best constitution (1293b1–7, b18–21); this is puzzling since, prior to
book IV, we find no thematic discussion of aristocracy. However, there is evidence that
books VII–VIII were intended to follow book III: the last lines of book III announce that
the next topic to be discussed is “the best constitution” (1288a2–4). If books VII–VIII
originally came before book IV, then Aristotle's comment that “it is correct to call the
constitution described in the earlier discussions an aristocracy” would refer to the
account of the ideal constitution in books VII–VIII.4 Putting these pieces together, it
seems likely that Aristotle would call his ideal constitution an aristocracy; it is clearly not
a kingship, because there is a class of individuals who control the government; and it is
not a polity, because participation in government is restricted to those who have virtue in
the strict sense (1329a2–17, 1293b1–5, 1295a25–31).
Aristotle divides up the population of his ideal state into three groups, which correspond
roughly to the three classes in the Republic: at the bottom are the farmers and artisans;
in the middle are those who make up the armed forces; and at the top are those who
govern the state (1328b2–23). In contrast with the constitution of the Republic, there is no
difference in the natural capacities of soldiers and rulers; they receive the same
education, and are separated only by age—the young serve in the military for a number of
years, and then in middle age they begin their political careers (1329a2–17, 1332b32–
1333a2). Underlying this merging of the Republic's two upper (p. 117) classes is a
different view of the kind of knowledge needed for political rule. Aristotle rejects the
Republic's view that metaphysical knowledge of transcendent Forms is necessary for
good political rule; he develops a conception of a more accessible “practical wisdom” that
encompasses a broad understanding of ethics and politics, combined with deliberative
excellence based on years of experience (Nic. Eth., bk VI). Aristotle apparently thought
Page 21 of 26

that the portion of the population corresponding to the two upper classes of the Republic
would be able to attain practical wisdom, and thus be qualified to rule in the best state.
By combining the Republic's class of rulers and auxiliaries, Aristotle makes his ideal
constitution more inclusive, since political decision-making is not restricted to
philosophers; but it is also, in a way, less inclusive, since women are excluded from the
political life of the community. Moreover, the bulk of the population—the farmers,
artisans, and so on—are excluded from the city state in ways that their counterparts in
the Republic are not. Like the producers in the Republic, they are excluded from the
political life of the community; but they are also, unlike their counterparts, excluded from
owning land: only members of the military/political class are permitted to own land
(1329a17–26). And, while the artisans and farmers are necessary for the existence of the
city state, they are not considered parts of it: they do not have a share in the city state,
and are therefore not considered to be citizens (1329a17–24, a34–39). And, since they are
not parts of the city state, their happiness is not considered as part of the overall
happiness of the state—in fact, Aristotle apparently holds that they are not capable of
leading happy lives, so there is obviously no need to take their happiness into account
(1328a37–40, 1328b33–1329a2, a19–26). In the Republic, by contrast, the well-being and
happiness of the productive class is no less important than that of the other two classes
(419a–421c). A further repugnant aspect of Aristotle's ideal state (absent from the
Republic) is its dependence on a large slave population (1330a25–31); all in all, it is not a
pretty picture.
Aristotle claims that his ideal state is “governed best” because those who govern possess
unqualified virtue (1328b33–1329a2; cf. 1293b1–7). But his earlier argument for the
“wisdom of the many” seems to run counter to this claim: there he contended that the
many may reach better decisions through deliberation than the few who are unqualifiedly
virtuous and wise. Aristotle seems to present us with two conflicting criteria for
determining the quality of government: (1) that government is best when those who
govern are unqualifiedly virtuous, and this will be true of the ideal aristocracy described
in books VII–VIII; and (2) that government is best that reaches the best decisions, and
this will be a constitution in which the many, who are not unqualifiedly virtuous, will
participate in decision-making. The polity or republic satisfies the second criterion,
because all groups within the community, rich, poor, and middle class, have a significant
role in decision-making; it also makes a gesture toward the first criterion by including
restrictions to ensure that the best-qualified individuals occupy the most important
offices. On the other hand, Aristotle might argue that, if those who possess unqualified
virtue make up a sizeable portion of the population (though still a minority), and if they
deliberate as a body, they will combine the assets of virtue and numbers. (p. 118) And, as
we have seen, those who take part in decision-making in his ideal state are more than just
“a few.”
Of the three “correct” constitutions, kingship is “best for some” but not most city states,
polity is “best for most,” and aristocracy is best without qualification. Aristotle considers
polity and aristocracy to be superior to kingship, and aristocracy to be superior to polity.
Page 22 of 26

But his preference for aristocracy is tempered by his appreciation of the stability and
greater inclusiveness of polity (1296b38–1297a7). In the subsequent history of political
thought, it was the “well-mixed” polity that had the greater impact, not only in antiquity
but also in the development of “republicanism” in the Renaissance.5
References
Primary Sources
Aristotle (1998). Politics, ed. and trans. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Gagarin, Michael, and Woodruff, Paul (1995) eds. Early Greek Political Thought from
Homer to the Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plato (1997). Plato: Complete Works, ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Secondary Sources
Annas, J. (1981). An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barker, E. (1918). The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. London: Methuen.
Bobonich, C. (2008). “Plato's Politics,” in G. Fine (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Plato.
New York: Oxford University Press, 311–35
Brickhouse, T. C., and Smith, N. D. (2000). Plato's Socrates. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Brown, L. (1998). “How Totalitarian is Plato's Republic?” in E. N. Ostenfeld (ed.), Essays

on Plato's Republic. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 13–27.
Calvert, B. (1987). “Slavery in Plato's Republic,” Classical Quarterly, 37: 367–72.
Cooper, J. M. (2005). “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in R. Kraut and S. Skultety
(eds), Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 65–89.
Hansen, M. H. (1991). The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Oxford: B.

Blackwell.
Hansen, M. H. (1993). “The Polis as a Citizen-State,” in M. H. Hansen (ed.), The Ancient

Greek City-State. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 7–29.
Hansen, M. H. (2006). Polis: An Introduction to the Greek City-State. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
Kamtekar, R. (2001). “Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic: Plato's Two
Principles,” History of Political Thought, 22: 189–220.
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Kamtekar, R. (2006). “The Politics of Plato's Socrates,” in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R.

(p. 119)
Kamtekar (eds), A Companion to Socrates. Oxford: Blackwell, 214–27.
Keyt, D. (2006). “Aristotle's Political Philosophy,” in M. L. Gill and P. Pellegrin (eds), A

Companion to Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 393–412.
Keyt, D., and Miller, F. (1995) (eds). A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Klosko, G. (1984). “Provisionality in Plato's Ideal State,” History of Political Thought, 5:

171–93.
Klosko, G. (2006). The Development of Plato's Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
Kraut, R. (1984). Socrates and the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kraut, R. (1997) (ed.). Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Kraut, R. (2002). Aristotle: Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kraut, R., and Skultety, S. (2005) (eds). Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield.
Laks, A. (1990). “Legislation and Demiurgy: On the Relationship between Plato's Republic
and Laws,” Classical Antiquity, 9: 209–29.
Laks, A. (2000). “The Laws,” in C. J. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History
of Greek and Roman Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 258–92.
Miller, F. (1995). Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Morrow, G. (1960). Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Ober, J. (1998). Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.
Ostenfeld, E. N. (1998) (ed.). Essays on Plato's Republic. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Rowe, C. J. (2000). “The Politicus and other Dialogues,” in C. J. Rowe and M. Schofield
(eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 233–57.
Rowe, C. J., and Schofield, M. (2000) (eds). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman
Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Santas, G. (2006). The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Schofield, M. (2006). Plato: Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scott, D. (2000). “Plato's Critique of the Democratic Character,” Phronesis, 45: 19–37.
Skinner, Q. (1978). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.
Taylor, C. C. W. (1997). “Plato's Totalitarianism,” in R. Kraut (ed.), Plato's Republic:

Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 31–48.
Vlastos, G. (1968). “Does Slavery Exist in the Republic?” Classical Philology, 68: 291–5.
Waldron, J. (1995). “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter
11 of Aristotle's Politics,” Political Theory, 23: 563–84. Repr. in R. Kraut and S. Skultety
(eds), Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 145–65.
Notes:
(1) Another important political issue associated with Socrates is the basis of our
obligation to obey the law, which is discussed in the Crito. Surprisingly, this issue is not
taken up in any of Plato's later works or in Aristotle. For recent discussions of “Socratic
politics,” see Kraut (1984), Brickhouse and Smith (2000); Kamtekar (2006); and Klosko
(2006).
(2) A lottery system in which only a few of the philosophers would have to rule would
allow most to avoid ruling, thus maximizing the aggregate happiness of the highest class.
But if justice demands that each member “pay back” for benefits received (520bc), then
all members of the ruling class must serve their tour of duty.
(3) There is a reference to slaves at 433d, and there is a dispute as to whether this
passage is clear evidence that the ideal state of the Republic includes slaves. For
arguments in favor, see Vlastos (1968); for arguments against, see Calvert (1987).
(4) According to this “original” plan, Aristotle first discusses kingship, aristocracy, and
the ideal constitution, and then goes on to discuss the other “inferior” constitutions; and
this is the plan Plato follows in the Republic.
(5) See Skinner (1978: i, 49–65, 159). I am grateful to George Klosko and Kristin Inglis for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
Daniel Devereux
Daniel Devereux is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. He has

published articles on Plato and Aristotle, especially on their ethics and metaphysics.
He is currently writing a book on Socratic and Platonic ethics.
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What are the main forms of government discussed?

What are the main forms of government discussed?

What are some of Plato's major works on political philosophy?

What are some of Plato's major works on political philosophy?

Classical Political Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle

Oxford Handbooks Online

Print Publication Date: May 2011

Abstract and Keywords

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2. Virtue is a necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition of happiness; thus the

(p. 101) Plato's Ideal State: The Republic

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Later Developments in the Statesman and Laws

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There are several interesting differences between the classifications of “inferior”

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summary answer is that, if there is one individual in a community whose virtue/wisdom is

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An example of how polity combines elements of oligarchy and democracy is by “taking

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Aristotle (1998). Politics, ed. and trans. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Annas, J. (1981). An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, L. (1998). “How Totalitarian is Plato's Republic?” in E. N. Ostenfeld (ed.), Essays

Calvert, B. (1987). “Slavery in Plato's Republic,” Classical Quarterly, 37: 367–72.

Hansen, M. H. (1991). The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Oxford: B.

Hansen, M. H. (1993). “The Polis as a Citizen-State,” in M. H. Hansen (ed.), The Ancient

Hansen, M. H. (2006). Polis: An Introduction to the Greek City-State. Oxford: Oxford

Subscriber: New York University; date: 01 March 2019

Kamtekar, R. (2006). “The Politics of Plato's Socrates,” in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R.

Kamtekar (eds), A Companion to Socrates. Oxford: Blackwell, 214–27.

Keyt, D. (2006). “Aristotle's Political Philosophy,” in M. L. Gill and P. Pellegrin (eds), A

Klosko, G. (1984). “Provisionality in Plato's Ideal State,” History of Political Thought, 5:

Klosko, G. (2006). The Development of Plato's Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford

Ober, J. (1998). Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Princeton: Princeton University

Santas, G. (2006). The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Subscriber: New York University; date: 01 March 2019

Skinner, Q. (1978). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge

Taylor, C. C. W. (1997). “Plato's Totalitarianism,” in R. Kraut (ed.), Plato's Republic:

Daniel Devereux is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. He has

Subscriber: New York University; date: 01 March 2019

Subscriber: New York University; date: 01 March 2019

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