People v. Rubio PDF

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 057 2/4/16 2:29 PM
384 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Rubio
ing the time which the commission takes before rendering

an order denying the motion for a rehearing. This rule shall
take effect on January 1, 1933.
Subject to the above observations, the motion to dismiss
the petition for review of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., is denied.
Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers,

Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
I dissent.
Motion denied.
······
[No. 35500. October 27, 1932]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.. JOSE RUBIO, defendant and appellant.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;

ORGANIC ACT, SECTION 3, PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 3, AND CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 95, 96, 97, 98, AND 99 INTERPRETED.·While the
place to be searched and the property to be seized under a search
warrant must be particularly described in the warrant, yet the
description is required to be specific only in so far as the conditions
will ordinarily allow.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.·The eleventh paragraph of section 3 of the Organic Act,
corresponding to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, forbids every search that is unreasonable and is
construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.·There is no formula for the determination of the
reasonableness of a search and seizure, but each case is to be decided
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on its own facts and circumstances.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.·Search warrants may not be used as a means of
gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him
in a criminal or penal proceeding, but they may be resorted to only
when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the
interest which the public or the complainant may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to tfhe possession of it, or when a
valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property
by the accused
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VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 385

People vs. Rubio
unlawful, and provides that it may be taken. (Boyd vs. United States
[1886], 116 U. S., 616; Gouled vs. United States [1920], 255 U. S., 298;
U. S. vs. Lefkowitz [1932], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions.)
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.·Books of account, invoices, and records may be so used
as instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the
government as to give the public an interest in them which would
justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly issued
search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.·Held in this case, as matters of fact, that the search
warrant conformed to constitutional and statutory provisions, and
that it has not been shown that the seizure of the appellant's books,
invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of securing
evidence to be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Manila. Moran, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying appel-
lant's motion to declare null and void a search warrant is-
sued on December 26, 1930, and to have returned to him
the books of account, invoices, and records which were
seized by virtue of the warrant. The case was originally
assigned to a Division of Five and was there decided, but

subsequently, on representations being made that the
interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the
Division ordered its decision set aside and the transfer of
the case to the court in banc.
The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police
power to internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to this
authority, the chief secret service agent and a supervising
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave testimony
283641——25
386

People vs. Ritbio
under oath before Judge Revilla, in which they specified

the premises situated at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, District
of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose Rubio,
manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, which it was
desired to search. The witnesses, among other things,
stated :
"It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered

reliable that in said premises there are fraudulent books, invoices
and records.
"I have watched personally the foregoing house for several times
in company of the complainant and I can assert positively and with
a probable cause that the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and the
occupant of the same keeps in his possession effects and devices to
wit: fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York
Trading Corp."
Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search

warrant was issued in the usual form, reading as follows:
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA
"THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff,
VERSUS
"JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, Paramount

Corporation and New York Trading Corporation, defendant.
"The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal Revenue Agents of
the City of Manila.
"GREETING:
"Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, E. P.
Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance
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VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 387

People vs. Rubio
of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of

Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P. I., that the
defendant Jose Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books,
invoices and records, and that he verily believes upon probable cause
that the said books, invoices and records, at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna in
the City of Manila, P. I., and the said (personal) property is now being
used in the commission of felony.
"You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and
proper assistance and to enter, in the day time or in the night time, into
the said dwelling house and there diligently search for fraudulent books,
invoices and records, and that you seize and bring them before this court,
to be disposed of according to law.
"Given under my hand this 26th day of December, 1930.
(Sgd.) "E. P. Revilla
"Judge, Court of First Instance"
On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to

the place indicated in the warrant, searched the premises,
and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents
belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation of-which
Jose Rubio was the manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a
motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to secure a
pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant, which
motion, after receiving memoranda in support and in
opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.
The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are
relied upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights, being
paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as the Philippine
Autonomy Act. These portions of the Organic Act provide:
"That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches

and seizures shall not be violated'' (sec. 3, par. 11) ; and
"That no person shall * * * be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" (sec. 3, par.
3). The applicable statutory provisions are
388

People vs. Rubio
sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure reading as follows:
"Sec. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the

name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a
justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
"Sec. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following grounds:
"1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
"2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the
means of committing a felony.
"Sec. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
"Sec. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant,
examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing.
"Sec. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the following form:"
The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the

order of the trial court, -the statement of the case, and the
law as herein set forth, are the following:
"1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant was
illegal and void for failure to observe the constitutional and statutory
provisions providing for its
issue.
"2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were
illegal and void appellant's books and papers might be retained because
they were proper subjects for seizure under a search warrant.
"3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of
appellant's books and papers was made solely for the
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VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 389

People vs. Rubio
purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution

and was, therefore, unlawful."
The point made in the first error was not originally

pressed upon the trial court, and is plainly without merit.
The requirements of the law were substantially, and even
literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's contention
that the search warrant was issued without the
complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is
untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also
contended that the application and the warrant did not
particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified
statements of the two internal revenue agents and the
warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all
describe the property sought to be seized as "fraudulent
books, invoices and records". While it is true that the
property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific
only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It
has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has not
shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their
powers under the warrant by seizing property other than
that described in the warrant in question. The list of books,
invoices, and records seized by said officers is the best
evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the command of
their warrant by seizing those things, and only those,
described in the search warrant.
Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books,
invoices, and records seized are property which one may
lawfully possess; they^ were searched and seized solely for

the purpose of using them as evidence to prove an offense
supposed to have been committed by appellant against the
internal revenue customs laws, which search and seizure
for the purpose intended is prohibited by law." Reliance
390

People vs. Rubio
is placed on the Philippine cases of Regidor vs. Araullo

([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real ([1920],
42 Phil., 886) ; and United States vs. De los Reyes and
Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first
two cited cases reveals that the seizures made under the
warrants issued therein were irregular and manifestly in
violation of law. in the first case, for instance, the court
observed:
"A casual examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit

and the list of books, papers, and documents actually seized by the
said officers, as represented by their signed statement, above
quoted, will show that the officers, in executing the said search
warrant, did not limit themselves, in seizing property, to that which
w:as described in the affidavit or search warrant." (Regidor vs.
Araullo, supra.)
In the second case, the court said:
"The important question that remains to be decided is whether,

under a search warrant for opium, the officers of the law were
authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property
having a remote or no connection with opium." (Uy Kheytin vs.
Villa-Real, supra.)
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the

seizures made were in excess of the authority given to the
seizing officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been
shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the
command of their warrant by seizing no other property
than that described therein.
In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United
States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding
was that no public officer has the right to enter the

premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure
against the will of the occupant and without the proper
search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the point
under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a search
warrant
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People vs. Rubio
was issued. From the above, it will be seen that the three
Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest upon
different facts from those in the case at bar.
After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court of April 11,
1932, delivered in the case of United States of America vs.
Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris, was received, and
it is now urged that this opinion is controlling. Of course, if
the opinion, on examination, be found to support the views
of the appellant, it would become our duty, even as against
any pride which one might have in maintaining a position
previously taken, to change front to conform to the
pronouncements of the higher court. Turning to the opinion
just mentioned, we find it said: "All the searches and
seizures were made without a search warrant"·in
contrast, the searches and seizures in the case at bar were
made with a search warrant. Further, it was said: "The
only question presented is whether the searches of the
desks, cabinet and baskets and the seizures of the things
taken from them were reasonable as an incident of the
arrests"—an entirely different state of facts from those
before us. Again, it was said: "The Fourth Amendment
forbids every search that is unreasonable and is construed
liberally to safeguard the right of privacy"·an admonition
which should be respected in this jurisdiction where
constitutional rights are as sacred as in the United States
proper. Finally, a contrast was suggested between the
search of one's house or place of business made
contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a
valid warrant of arrest and a search warrant, and it was
said:
"Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as

evidence of crime of which respondents were accused or suspected. They
could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search
warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such things
and
392

People vs. Rubio
disclosing exactly where they were. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S.,
298, 310.)
* * * * * * *
"Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made

solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt of the alleged conspiracy
or some other crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders for
liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and other articles found
and taken were in themselves unoffending. The decisions of this
court distinguish searches of one's house, office, papers or effects
merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from searches such as
those made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take
property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover
property concealed to avoid payment of duties for which it is liable,
and from searches such as those made for the seizure of counterfeit
coins, burglars' tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in
order to prevent the commission of crime."
We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on

previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Gouled vs. United States ([1&20], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-
Bart Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930], 282 U. S.,
344). In the first case, it was said:
"* * * search warrants * * * may not be used as a means of

gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but * * * they may be resorted to only
when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the
interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to
be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise

of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused
unlawful and provides that it may be taken. (Boyd Case, 116 U. S., 623,
624; 29 L. ed., 748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)
"There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other
forms of property, to render them immune from
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People vs. Rubio
search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of
the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be
adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. * * * we cannot
doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for
perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an inter-
est in them Which would justify the search for and seizure of them,
under a properly issued search warrant, for the purpose of preventing
further frauds.
* * * * * * *
"As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the indictment.
It is not difficult, as we have said, to imagine how an executed written
contract might be an important agency or instrumentality in the bribing
of a public servant and in perpetrating frauds upon the Government so
that it would have a legitimate and important interest in seizing such a
paper in order to prevent further frauds, * * *."
As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a

general exploratory search of premises, the seizure of
papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence in
a criminal proceeding cannot be sustained where made at a
time when no crime was being committed and under a false
claim of possession of a search warrant, by one making an
arrest of persons on the premises under color of an invalid
warrant, who required one of them, by pretention of right
and threat or force, to open a desk and safe. It was further
ruled that, there is no formula for the determination of the
reasonableness of a search and seizure, but each case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
This brings us in logical order to the third error and the
point often made that the seizure of appellant's books,
invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of
using them as evidence against him in a criminal

prosecution. The question, in its final analysis, is, were
appellant's books, invoices, and records seized solely for use
as
394

People vs. Rubio
evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or

suspected?·or were the books, invoices, and records seized
in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud? In the
first place, it is to be observed that the public has an
interest in the proper regulation of appellant's books. (Act
No. 3292, section 4.) In the second place, the books
belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was
simply the manager. And in the third place, the search
warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause·to
adopt the language alike of section 96 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the search warrant·that
"fraudulent books, invoices, and records" were "now being
used in the commission of a felony".
Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the
books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the
purpose of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no
support for this contention in the record. In the trial court,
the assistant city fiscal said: "As we have stated above, the
search and seizure in this case were made under the provi-
sions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a
search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the
violation of said laws committed by the defendant." On
appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its position
that the seizure was made with the object of preventing the
use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the
commission of further offenses or fraud against the
Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to be found in
the record to prove that the Government has used the
books of account, documents, and papers as evidence
against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the
intention of so doing. All we "know is, that an information
was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of

the Customs Law, and that he compromised another case
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the
sum of P100,000. On this showing, we perforce cannot
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People vs. Rubio
deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers

were wanted solely for use as evidence of a crime.
A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the
arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads us to
the same conclusion as before, namely, that no consti-
tutional right of the appellant was violated; that the letter
of the law was followed, and that the order of the trial
judge was correct in all particulars. Wherefore, the judg-
ment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Avancena, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Im-

perial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

Convinced that the decision in this case sets at naught
important constitutional principles, I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the warrant here in question is
null and void, because it was issued not only without
authority of law but in contravention of express
constitutional and statutory provisions. Section 3,
paragraph 11 of the Organic Act, provides "That the right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated"; and section 97 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, in turn, provides that "A search
warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and ,upon
application supported by oath particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
These provisions of law are almost an exact reproduction of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and they were undoubtedly intended to afford the same
protection to the people of these Islands as the Fourth
Amendment affords to the people of the United States. We
are thus fully justified in relying on American authorities

and cases for the purpose of ascertaining the real intent,
object and scope of such provisions.
In the leading case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S.,
616, 625; 29 L. ed., 746, 749), the Supreme Court of the
396

People vs. Rubio
United States, through Justice Bradley, dwelt at length

on the historical reasons for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment and made, among others, the following
pertinent observations: "In order to ascertain the nature of
the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution under the terms 'unreasonable searches and
seizures/ it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or
then recent history of the controversies on the subject, both
in this country and in England. The practice had obtained
in the Colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue
officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search
suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis
pronounced 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the
most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book"; since they placed 'the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.' This was in February, 1761, in
Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was
perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother
country. 'Then and there,' said John Adams, 'then and
there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.'" And speaking of the importance
and scope of the protection intended to be given by the
Fourth Amendment, the same court, in Weeks vs. United
States (232 U. S., 383, 392; 58 L. ed., 652, 655), said: "This
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or
not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is
obligatory upon all entrusted under our federal system
with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those
who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain

conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
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People vs. Rubio
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution

and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal
for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."
The historical background of the provision in our
Organic Act which recognizes "the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures" clearly
reveals that it was intended to protect the people against
abuses arising from the issuance of general warrants, thus
reaffirming the principle "tha,t a man's house was his
castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to
search and seize his goods and papers." As stated by Cooley
in his Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, p. 611: "The
maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,' is made a part
of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been
looked upon as of high value to the citizen." To safeguard
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, we
find not only in the Federal Constitution but in every State
constitution a provision to the effect that no search warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause and upon
application supported by oath particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of
the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints
as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law." (Weeks vs. United States, supra.)
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, Go-Bart Importing Company vs. United

States (75 L. ed., [Adv. Ops.], 191), it was said: "The first
clause of the Fourth Amendment declares: 'The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated.' It is general and forbids every search that
is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to
be offenders as
398

People vs. Rubio
well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the

premises where the search was made and the papers taken.
(Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 307; 65 L. ed.,
647, 651; 41 S. Ct., 261.) The second clause declares, 'and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.' This prevents the issue of warrants on
loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the
purpose to protect against all general searches. Since
before the creation of our government, such searches have
been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of
liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or statutes
of every state in the Union. (Agnello vs. United States, 269
U. S., 20, 33; 70 L. ed., 145, 149; 51 A. L. R., 409; 46 S. Ct.,
4.) The need of protection against them is attested alike by
history and present conditions. The amendment is to be
liberally construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its
effective enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the
rights for the protection of which it was adopted. (Boyd vs.
United States, 116 U. S., 616, 623; 29 L. ed., 746, 748; 6 S.
Ct., 524; Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S'., 389-392; 58 L.
ed., 654, 655; L. R. A., 1915B, 834; 34 S". Ct., 341; Ann.
Cas. 1915C, 1177, supra.)99
Turning now to the case before us, is the search warrant
sufficient to satisfy the law? It seems clear to me that a
perusal of the warrant itself, of the application upon which
the same was issued, and of the sworn testimony given in
support of the application, requires a finding that the war-

rant failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by
law as to (1) the existence of probable cause, and (2) the
description of the property or things to be seized.
It is a well established doctrine that if a warrant is
sought for the seizure or searfch of person or property, the
application must be based on a sworn statement of facts,
not surmises or beliefs. "No search warrant shall be issued
unless the judge has first been furnished with
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People vs. Rubio
facts under oath·not suspicions, beliefs, or surmises·but

facts which, when the law is properly applied to them, tend
to establish the necessary legal conclusion, or facts which,
when the law is properly applied to them, tend to establish
probable cause for believing that the legal conclusion is
right. The inviolability of the accused's home is to be
determined by the facts, not by rumor, suspicion, or guess-
work. If the facts afford the legal basis for the search
warrant, the accused must take the consequences. But
equally there must be consequences for the accuser to face.
If the sworn accusation is based on fiction, the accuser
must take the chance of punishment for perjury. Hence the
necessity of a sworn statement of facts, because one cannot
be convicted of perjury for having a belief, though the belief
be utterly unfounded in fact and law." (Veeder vs. United
States, 252 Fed., 414, 418.)
In United States vs. Borkowski (268 Fed., 408), the court
held that the finding of probable cause should be based, not
on the opinion or belief of a witness or witnesses, but on
facts set forth in the affidavit from which the existence of
probable cause may be fairly inferred. Otherwise the
conclusion would be that of the witness, and not of the
judicial officer in whom alone the Constitution has vested
the extraordinary power to issue search warrants, and who
is thus legally charged with the duty of preventing
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The reason for the doctrine is tersely stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Go-Bart Importing

Co. vs. United States, supra, thus: "This prevents the issue
of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It
emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general
searches. Since before the creation of our government, such
searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental
principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitu-
tions or statutes of every state in the Union."
Let us now see the sworn statements supporting the
application for the search warrant in this case. Do they
400

People vs. Rubio
state facts·rather than suspicions, beliefs, and surmises?

In the first statement we find the following questions and
answers:
"Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?·A. Juan

Evaristo, chief secret service agent. Augusto Piccio, -upervising agent,
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
"Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant?·A. Yes.
"Q. Do you know who occupies said premises?·A. I do not know.
According to the best of information the house is occupied by Mr. Jose
Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation and its subsidiary
companies.
"Q. What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant?·A.
It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in
said premises there are fraudulent books, invoices and records."
In the second statement we also find the following questions and
answers:
"Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?·A. Juan
Evaristo and Augusto Piccio, internal revenue officers, Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
"Q. Are you the witness for this search warrant?·A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know the house situated at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna,
District of Binondo, City of Manila?·A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know who occupies said house?·A. Yes. According to the
best of my information the house is occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio.
"Q. What do you know about that house?·A. I have watched
personally the foregoing house for several times in company of the
complainant and I can assert positively and with a probable cause" that
the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being
conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his
possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent books of the Simplex
Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies
401
VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 401

People vs. Rubio
Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Trading Corporation."
The same persons, Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio,

signed both statements.
It will be observed, in the first place, that the witnesses
could not even state positively who occupied the premises
or house to be searched. All that they affirmed was
"According to the best of information the house is occupied
by Mr. Jose Rubio." In the second place, the only reasons
given for the application for the search warrant, are as
follows: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I
considered reliable that in said premises there are fraud-
ulent books, invoices and records" and "I have watched
personally the foregoing house for several times in
company of the complainant and I can assert positively and
with a probable cause that the prohibited fraudulent books,
invoices and records, exist and being conducted in the said
house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his
possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent books of
the Simplex Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies
Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Trading
Corporation."
As I shall try to explain more fully later, the alleged
existence of "prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records" and the alleged possession by the appellant of
"fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation and
New York Trading Corporation" furnished no definite bases
of fact which could justify the issue of a warrant upon
probable cause; and, as declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States, the requirement as to the existence of
probable cause for the issue of a search warrant "prevents
the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of

fact".
The other essential requisite for the issuance of a search
warrant, which is also lacking in the present case, is that
relating to the description of the thing or things to be
seized. The law provides in unmistakable language that
288641——26
402

People vs. Rubio
the application for a search warrant must particularly

describe the thing to be seized. The reason for this
requirement is explained by Cooley in his work already
cited as follows: "Search-warrants are always obnoxious to
very serious objections; and very great particularity is
justly required in these cases before the privacy of a man's
premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister of the
law. And therefore a designation of goods to be searched for
as 'goods, wares, and merchandises,' without more
particular description, has been regarded as insufficient,
even in the case of goods supposed to be smuggled, where
there is usually greater difficulty in giving description, and
where, consequently, more latitude should be permitted
than in the ease of property stolen." (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, pp. 621, 622.)
Neither the phrase "fraudulent books of the Simplex
Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies Paramount
Trading Corporation and New York Trading Corporation".
found in the sworn statement, nor the phrase "fraudulent
books, invoices and records", found in the search warrant,
supplies the particularity of description required by law.
Such phrases do not even express a conclusion of fact by
which a warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure, but they do express a conclusion of law
as to the full import of which even lawyers may differ. In
the last analysis, therefore the warrant in this case
authorized nothing less than a general exploratory search,
which is precisely what the law condemns as "obnoxious to
fundamental principles of liberty". In Marron vs. United
States (275 U. S., 192, 196; 72 L. ed., 231, 237), the court
said: "The requirement that warrants shall particularly
describe the things to be seized makes general searches
under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to
be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer exe-
cuting the warrant."
403
VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 403

People vs. Rubio
The constitutional rights of the appellant were also

violated when the books and papers in his possession were
searched for and seized to be used as evidence against him.
The record shows that the books and papers so seized were
made the basis for the institution of a criminal action
against the appellant. This is expressly admitted in the
order appealed from. The order, in fact, says:
"Aplicando los principios arriba mencionados al caso pre-
sente, resulta, segun el parrafo 7 de la mocion del acusado,
que los documentos y papeles secuestrados en poder de este
fueron entregados por los agentes de rentas internas al
Fiscal de la Ciudad, por lo que este instituye la querella
registrada como causa criminal No. 41563. En esa querella
se alega que el acusado Jose Rubio, valiendose de los
mencionados documentos y papeles, quiso defraudar al Go-
bierno de las Islas Filipinas. De suerte que estos
documentos y papeles fueron usados como instrumentos o
agendas (instruments or agencies) para la perpetracion de
fraudes contra el Gobierno.' En tal caso, el publico tiene en
esos documentos y papeles un interes que justifica el
secuestro de los mismos, al objeto de evitar fraudes
ulteriores.
"Se dira que la querella fiscal no es prueba de que los

documentos y papeles secuestrados en poder del acusado se han
usado realmente para los fines que en la querella se describen. Pero
el Juzgado cree que la querella constituye prueba de 'causa
probable' de que esos documentos y papeles se han usado para tales
fines."
Curiously enough, the order under review sought to jus-

tify the search and seizure by the very fact that the books
and papers seized, were used as evidence against the
appellant. This clearly brings the case within the principle
laid down in Boyd vs. United States, supra, followed in a
long line of cases, both State and Federal, and recently
reaffirmed in United States vs. Lefkowitz (76 L. ed. [Adv.
404

People vs. Rubio
Ops.], 563). The principle adverted to is that which declares

as illegal searches and seizures whether made with or
without a search warrant, when the purpose of making
search was solely to secure evidence to be used, in a crimi-
nal or penal proceeding, against the person in whose house
or office the articles searched for and seized were found. It
is true that in the Lefkowitz case the court found that "all
the searches and seizures were made without a search
warrant", but it is also true that the court positively
declared that even if they were made with a search
warrant they would have been equally held illegal. The
searches and seizures were held illegal not because they
were made without a search warrant, but because of the
purpose for which they were made. So the court said:
"Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for
use as evidence of crime of which respondents were accused
or suspected. They could not lawfully be searched for and
taken even under a search warrant issued upon ample
evidence and precisely describing such things and
disclosing exactly where they were. (Gouled vs. United
States, 255 U. S., 298, 310; 65 L. ed., 647, 653; 41 S. Ct.,
261.)" The court further observed:
"Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to
find evidence of respondents' guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other
crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in violation
of the Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in
themselves unoffending. The decisions of this court distinguish searches
of one's house, office, papers or effects merely to get evidence to convict
him of crime from searches such as those made to find stolen goods for
return to the owner, to take property that has been forfeited to the
Government, to discover property concealed to avoid payment of duties
for which it is liable, and from searches such as those made for the
seizure of counterfeit coins burglar's tools, gambling paraphernalia and
illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission of crime. (Boyd vs.
405
VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 405

People vs. Rubio
United States, 116 U. S., 616, et seq.; 29 L. ed., 746; 6 S. Ct., 524; Weeks
vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383, 395; 58 L. ed., 652, 656; L. R. A., 1915B,
834; 34 S. Ct., 341; Ann Cas., 1915C, 1177; Gouled vs. United States,
supra [255. U. S., 306; 65 L. ed., 651; 41 S. Ct., 261]; Carrol vs. United
States, 267 U. S., 132; 69 L. ed., 543; 39 A. L. R., 790; 45 S. Ct. 280,
supra.)
"In Entick vs. Carrington (19 How. St. Tr., 1029), Lord Gamden
declared that one's papers are his dearest property, showed that the law
of England did not authorize a search of private papers to help forward
conviction even in cases of most atrocious crime and said (p. 1073) :
'Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards
criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more
pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is
very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent
as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem,
that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too
the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.'
"The teachings of that great case were cherished by our statesmen
when the Constitution was adopted. In Boyd vs. United States, supra
(116 U. S., 630; 29 L. ed., 751; 6 S. Ct., 524), this court said: The
principles laid down in this opinion (Entick vs. Carrington) affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security. * * * They apply
to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. * * * Any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
goods is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.' And this
court has always construed provisions of the Constitution having regard
to the prin-
406

People vs. Rubio
ciples upon which it was established. The direct operation or literal

meaning of the words used do not measure the purpose or scope of its
provisions. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 406, 407, 421; 4 L.
ed., 579, 601, 602, 605; Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S., 616; 29 L. ed.,
746; 6 S. Ct, 524, supra; Byars vs. United States, 273 U. S., 28; 71 L. ed.,
520; 47 S. Ct., 248, ubi supra.)"
In Federal Trade Commission vs. American Tobacco

Company (264 U. S., 298, 305, 306), the Supreme Court of
the United States, through Justice Holmes, declared that
the mere fact "of being organized as a corporation do not
make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad company
now may be. (Smith vs. Interstate Commerce Commission,
245 U. S., 33, 43.) Anyone who respects the spirit as well as
the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to
believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its sub-
ordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into .the fire
(Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Brimson, 154 U. S.,
447, 479), and to direct fishing expeditions into private
papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of
crime. We do not discuss the question whether it could do
so if it tried, as nothing short of the most explicit language
would induce us to attribute to Congress that intent. The
interruption of business, the possible revelation of trade
secrets, and the expense that compliance with the
Commission's wholesale demand would cause are the least
considerations. It is contrary to the first principles of
justice to allow a search through all the respondents'
records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something
will turn up. The unwillingness of this court to sustain
such a claim is shown in Harriman vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission (211 U. S., 407), and as to
correspondence, even in the case of a common carrier, in
United States vs. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. (236 U.
S., 318, 335). The question is a different one where the
State granting the charter gives its Commission power to
inspect."
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 057 2/4/16 2:29 PM

384 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

ing the time which the commission takes before rendering

Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers,

[No. 35500. October 27, 1932]

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;

on its own facts and circumstances.

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 385

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

assigned to a Division of Five and was there decided, but

386 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

under oath before Judge Revilla, in which they specified

"It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered

Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, Paramount

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 387

of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of

On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to

"That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches

388 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of Criminal

"Sec. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the

The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 389

purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution

The point made in the first error was not originally

lawfully possess; they^ were searched and seized solely for

390 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

is placed on the Philippine cases of Regidor vs. Araullo

"A casual examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit

In the second case, the court said:

"The important question that remains to be decided is whether,

Under these circumstances, it is evident that the

was that no public officer has the right to enter the

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 391

"Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as

392 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

"Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made

We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on

"* * * search warrants * * * may not be used as a means of

be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 393

As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a

using them as evidence against him in a criminal

394 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or

was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 395

deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers

Avancena, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Im​-

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

are thus fully justified in relying on American authorities

396 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

United States, through Justice Bradley, dwelt at length

who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain

VOL. 57, OCTOBER 27, 1932 397

charged at all times with the support of the Constitution

United States, Go-Bart Importing Company vs. United

Avancena, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Im-

support of the application, requires a finding that the war-

Curiously enough, the order under review sought to jus-