Bernabe vs alejo

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the
aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of
the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest
of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since
the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal
was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc.
Facts:
1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad,
Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in
Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.

2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction
business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the
execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%.

3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and
transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI.

4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total
contract price, an advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released
upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a
guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for
qualified Filipino contractors.

5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank
issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil
Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to
provide the counter guarantee.
6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under
the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of
the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.

7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint
venture worked for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.

8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond
counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister
Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty
will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since
the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75%
billings in US dollars.

9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank.
The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the
performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.

10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond.
Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money.

11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents.
The joint venture incurred no delay in the execution of the project considering that SOB's violations
of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking.

12. CA: Affirmed.

Issue:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted?

Held:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the
INTRINSIC validity of the contract.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex
contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
(lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis).
The law selected may be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction,
or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to allow the parties to select
the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals,
public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the
transaction.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The
laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi
government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted
may be determined by the laws of Iraq.

BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.

According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if
the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent
upon him.

As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not
imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's
failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur
in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN vs. NELSON D. LAVINAG.R. No. 183026
November 14, 2012

FACTS:

Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice.
Priorto the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino
householdhelpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer
whowould come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. Subsequently, bothNestor
and Laviña were recalled from their posts in Kenya.On November 17, 1997, Laviña
filed before the RTC a complaint for damagesagainst Nestor and his wife,
petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo,Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998,
Laviña amended his complaint to include Pasturan asa defendant.Laviña’s complaint alleged the
following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront againsthis privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of
his diplomatic residence during the two raidsconducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly
instigated by Padalhin and participated by allthe defendants as conspirators; (b) infringement of his
constitutional rights against illegalsearches and seizures when the investigating
team sent by the DFA entered into hisresidence without a warrant, court order or
letter from the DFA Secretary and confiscatedsome of his personal belongings; and (c) bad
faith, malice and deceit exhibited by thedefendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the
conduct of the raids, engaging in asmear campaign against him, and seizing without authority
his personal effects. Laviñasought payment of actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages,
attorney’s fees andcosts of suits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entiled to damages for violation of his right to privacy.
RULING:

Yes. Plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation toArticles 21 and

26 of the New Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:"Article 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of hisduties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.""Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that iscontrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for thedamage.""Article 26. Every person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind ofhis neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not
8constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention andother
relief:(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private
life or family relations off [sic] another;(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place ofbirth,
physical defect, or other personal condition."The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse
of rights under Article 19 ofthe New Civil Code is pertinent:"Test of Abuse of Right.
– Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which,although not unlawful,
are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it isexercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of theactor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot
be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.The principle does not permit acts which, without
utility or legitimate purpose cause damageto another, because they violate the concept of social
solidarity which considers law asrational and just. x x x."The question, therefore, is whether
defendant-appellant intended to prejudice orinjure plaintiff-appellant when he did the acts as
embodied in his affidavit.The Court ruled in the affirmative. Defendant-appellant’s participation
in the invasionof plaintiff-appellant ’ s diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an
employee to takephotographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of
the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover,
we find that defendant-appellant was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did the
questioned acts. As pointedout by the court a quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan
Minister of ForeignAffairs and the Filipino community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal
items in plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence.As already exhaustively discussed by both the
RTC and the CA, Nestor himselfadmitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's
residence without the latter'sknowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith
or malice. However,Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that
Lavina keptivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation.
However,that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptionsconcerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind
the cloak of hissupposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of
damages andattorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper.

MARIO J. MENDEZONA ,et al,petitioners, versus JULIO H. OZAMIZ,et al, respondents

February 6, 2002

Facts:
A suit was instituted on September 25, 1991 by the petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and
Teresita M. Mendezona as initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed on October 7, 1991,
herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona joined as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the
petitioners as plaintiff therein alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M.
Mendezona petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land
each in Lahug, Cebu city with similar areas 3462, 3466 and 3468 square meters covered and
described in TCT Nos 116834, 116835 and 116836. The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of
ownership over their respective properties from a deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by
Carmen Ozamiz and in consideration of P 1,040,000. It appears than on January 15, 1991, the
respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with RTC Oroquieta, City alleging that Carmen
Ozamiz had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends and could no longer
take care of her properties by reason pf weak mind and absentmindedness. As guardians Roberto J.
Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August 6, 1991 with the guardianship court their
Inventories and Accounts including the 10,369 square meters Lahug property. Said Lahug property
covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of
petitioners. In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of ownership of the Lahug property and
alleged that the titles issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the ownership of said
properties was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is
grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen
Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties
having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.
On September 23, 1992, the Trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. On appeal the
Court of Appeal reversed its decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a
simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually paid.

Issue:

Whether the court erred in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a
simulated contract.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the contact was not simulated. Contrary to the erroneous conclusions
of the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere non production of
checks. It was not the burden of the petitioner to prove so. It is significant that the deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As
such, it is in favor of presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution. Moreover, A person is not incapacitated to contact merely
because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmity
impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly
protecting her property rights is considered incapacitated.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in
Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise
solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years
and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute
a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-
compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively
liable.

RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165321, [ August 3, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

A marriage will be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code if it is characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Furthermore, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint and
duly proven. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
FACTS:

Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita are husband and wife with three children. After 20 years
of marriage, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the
time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Therefore, he asked the court to declare
his marriage to Teresita null and void. He alleges that Teresita is a squanderer because she did not
know how to manage the funds of the family and is always incurring debts. Aside from this, Teresita
likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plastic-ware and cosmetics
company. She left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also missed
paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family. He also
alleges that Teresita is an adultress because she presents herself as a single woman and sees other
men while Ricardo is away for work as an overseas contract worker. He also suspected that she was
pregnant with another man’s child and proved himself correct when Teresita incurred a miscarriage.
He claims that he could not have fathered the child because his three instances of sexual contact
with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”.

To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the testimony and evidence prepared by Dr. Cecilia R.
Albaran. The doctor stated that the demise of the marriage of the spouses was due to the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder of Teresita. Her behavioral patterns indicate this kind of disorder which is
considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor
based her diagnosis from the testimony given by Ricardo and Richardson, the eldest child of the
couple. This is because Dr. Albaran was not able to conduct a personal psychiatric evaluation over
Teresita.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and
general conclusion on these parties’ personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup.
The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove
the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the
alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity
was grave and incurable.

The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of the evidence and testimony presented in court.
However, the Solicitor General appealed the case and the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on
the ground that the RTC did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed point out the root illness or defect that
caused Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already
existed at the time of celebration of marriage.
 The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not appear to
have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and
rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’ s allegations on Teresita’s overspending and infidelity
do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal
separation or a criminal charge for adultery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

HELD:

No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision made by the trial court because the decision of the
latter failed to comply with the standards and guidelines provided for by jurisprudence.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,et al.,11we held that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage.

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the

Santos case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the
time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given
by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and
applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of
the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result
in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have
been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article
36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was
any marriage in the first place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as
a wife. First of all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of Ricardo,
the petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the condition of
Teresita to properly conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Conclusions and generalizations about Teresita ’ s psychological condition, based solely on
information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof
of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the marriage
was celebrated. The only other party outside of the spouses who gave statements for purposes of
Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son who would not have
been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his
parents until long after his birth.

Finally, the contention of Ricardo that the root cause of the psychological incapacity need not be
alleged in the petition is without merit. While in other cases, the court has allowed the petition to do
away with the root cause, it is because the root cause has been described based on the physical
manifestations which are indicative of the psychological incapacity. The statement of the root cause
does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Hence, the statement of
the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be proven either by an
express statement or through the description of its physical manifestations.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.
They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived
together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that
her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for
the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground
of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel
duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate
the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action,
no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned
union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all surnamed
ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 124118
March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942 or prior
thereto, they got separated and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968.
On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. On
October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing all of his properties, and
assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriage
as devisees and legatees.

On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in
Lucio’s will as its executrix, filed a petition for probateof the will on February 18, 1981 before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of the will.

On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the
RTC, petitioners instituted and action for annulment of Lucio Adriano’s will. In the complaint,
plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on
November 22, 1068, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties
which became the subject of inventory and administration.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage.

RULING:

Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated
to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio’s marriage with
Gliceriasubsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and respondent court in
this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed
property, private respondent have also presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that
the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of conjugal fund of his first marriage.
Although in this case of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity would
dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioner in the instant case have
not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the property in
question.

TAN vs. ANDRADE

GR NO. 171904 and 172017

FACTS:

Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of land of which she mortgaged
to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was about to expire,
Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter,
Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests over the properties. The Deed
of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Bobby extended
and Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of
June 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum of P310, 000. When Proceso failed to purchase
them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a complaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damage against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged that
the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage which was
entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject
properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal in nature,
and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose their respective shares.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband
and co-owned by her and her children.

RULING:

No. pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that
“all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to apply, the party
invoking the same must, however, preliminary prove that the property was indeed acquired during
the marriage. As held in Go vs Yamani:
XXX As a condition sine qua non for the operation of Article 160 in favor of the conjugal partnership,
the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquire during the
marriage.

Emilio Tuason vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 116607
April 10, 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuason married petitioner Emilio Tuason due to the series
of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner’s used of prohibited drugs, cohabitating with
three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child support, abused of conjugal
property use and incurring of bank debts without the respondent’s consent, respondent filed a
petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage in 1989 before RTC Makati on the
ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal
properties from further dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was there after scheduled to present his evidence
in May 11, 1990. Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on June 8, however, petitioner
failed to appear. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
marriage and awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.
Thereafter, on September 24, 1990, respondent filed “Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties” which was opposed
by petitioner on October 17. On the same day, petitioner filed a petition from relief of judgment of
the June 19, 1990 decision. The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991 which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on July 1994. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a petitioner for relief from judgment is warranted because the decision of the court
is null and void for the violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
RULING:
Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: a final and executory judgment of the
RTC may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence with
petitioner showing meritorious cause of action. In the case at bar, the decision of nullity had already
become final when petitioner through his counsel failed to appeal during the reglementary period
despite petitioner eventually justifying his absence due to medical reasons. Further, the failure of
the counsel to inform petitioner of adverse judgment to enable him to appeal is an inexcusable
negligence and not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Similarly
inexcusable is the counsel’s failure to notify the court of petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner cannot
claim that he was deprived of due process by the court.
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION,

DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND DR. ALEJANDRO P. ORTIGAS Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
MANUEL AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES ERIC AND JURISITA
FACTS:
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely:
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter
Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to
complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were housed
in the second floor of the clinic.

According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately
10 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon,
the group went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the evening. They again
went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their
breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the
beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka
or gin. He also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage which they mixed
with the soda and that they did not consume the whole bottle.

Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010
when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos
immediately ran to the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same, he saw
thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He also felt
extreme heat, prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to
extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When Ramos'
attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on
the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.

According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom door and the group had started
shouting for help. After a considerable amount of time, he heard somebody outside instructing him
to get back from the window. When he did so, somebody broke the window and started to dismantle
the iron grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke
inhalation and only remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through the window.

Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including the daughters
of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting" to asphyxia.

As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three
deceased students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. (Citations omitted)

Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-appellants continued to question individual

defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa
bang gusto ninyo sa amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the parents of
Jessa, and respondent Spouses Eric and Jurisita Quintos, the parents of Cecille, sought the help of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was an accidental fire

RULING:
St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.

St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H. Quasha Memorial, Inc., being the owner and operator
of the Cabiao Community Clinic is not without liability for the fate of the fire victims. As a learning
institution, which sends out its students to rural areas to comply with its curriculum requirement, St.
Luke's has the duty and responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its students are
safe. It is significant to stress that the Cabiao Community Clinic was established by the Municipality
of Cabiao and the St. Luke's College of Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of its Community
Medicine undertaking to the rural areas in order to train its students in health promotion and disease
prevention as well as to provide medical service to deserving population and to undertake clinical
research on various health practices.

The victims were sent there as part of their community medicine module in the curriculum and their
assignments were determined by the officials of the College of Medicine.

Liyao vs. Liyao

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed
a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize
and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all
successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child
of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were
legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until
the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her
mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in
fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
the deceased.

HELD:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then
settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Facts:

Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage and they had two
children. A rift surfaced and the two eventually separated. They agreed that Carlitos would have the
children in his company on weekends.

Claiming that Suzanne broke the agreement, Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the RTC. Suzanne opposed, alleging that Carlitos often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.

The RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Carlitos take the children
out without the written consent of Suzanne.

Suzanne appealed. In the meantime, she got married to a Dutch national and eventually immigrated
to Holland with her children. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied the Carlitos any
visitorial rights. Carlitos appealed.

Issue:

Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?

Held:

No. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child
or children.

There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural
right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations
include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to Article 220,
of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental
authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection,
advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of
the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to
indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships.
Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of
examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass
illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of
marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.

The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to
the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for
no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in
instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined
the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.

It seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial
court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no
case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother."

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006.

FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and
Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente
lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and
respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was
only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of
the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her
second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New
England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

ISSUE:
Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

HELD:
As to the amount of support pendente lite, the court takes its bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to
the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for
half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given
his various business endeavors. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been
done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, the court deems it proper
to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until
they had finished their respective studies. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil
Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the
resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled
to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal
interest from the dates of actual payment.
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