Philosophy of Human Rights

Philosophy of human rights - Wikipedia 1
Philosophy of human rights

The philosophy of human rights attempts to examine the underlying basis of the concept
of human rights and critically looks at its content and justification. Several theoretical
approaches have been advanced to explain how and why the concept of human rights
developed.
One of the oldest Western philosophies on human rights is that they are a product of a natural
law, stemming from different philosophical or religious grounds. Other theories hold that
human rights codify moral behavior which is a human social product developed by a process of
biological and social evolution (associated with Hume). Human rights are also described as a
sociological pattern of rule setting (as in the sociological theory of law and the work of Weber).
These approaches include the notion that individuals in a society accept rules from legitimate
authority in exchange for security and economic advantage (as in Rawls) – a social contract.
The two theories that dominate contemporary human rights discussion are the interest theory
and the will theory. Interest theory argues that the principal function of human rights is to
protect and promote certain essential human interests, while will theory attempts to establish
the validity of human rights based on the unique human capacity for freedom.[1]
Contents
Natural rights
Social contract
Reciprocity
Soviet concept of human rights
Other theories of human rights
Critiques of human rights
Edmund Burke on natural rights
Jeremy Bentham on natural rights
Marxist critique of human rights
Alasdair MacIntyre on human rights
Theory of value and property
References
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_human_rights
Natural rights
Natural law theories base human rights on a "natural" moral, religious or even biological order
that is independent of transitory human laws or traditions.
Socrates and his philosophic heirs, Plato and Aristotle, posited the existence of natural justice
or natural right (δίκαιον φυσικόν dikaion physikon; Latin ius naturale). Of these, Aristotle is
often said to be the father of natural law,[2] although evidence for this is due largely to the
interpretations of his work by Thomas Aquinas.[3]
The development of this tradition of natural justice into one of natural law is usually attributed
to the Stoics.[4]
Some of the early Church Fathers sought to incorporate the until then pagan concept of natural
law into Christianity. Natural law theories have featured greatly in the philosophies of Thomas
Aquinas, Francisco Suárez, Richard Hooker, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von
Pufendorf, and John Locke.
In the 16th century, asked by the Spanish monarchs to investigate the legitimacy of claims to
land dominion by the indios of Latin America, Francisco de Vitoria expounded a theory of
natural rights, especially in his famous Relectio de Indis.[5]
In the 17th century Thomas Hobbes founded a contractualist theory of legal positivism
beginning from the principle that man in the state of nature, which is to say without a
"commonwealth" (a state) is in a state of constant war one with the other and thus in fear of his
life and possessions (there being no property nor right without a sovereign to define it).
Hobbes asserted natural law as how a rational human, seeking to survive and prosper, would
act; the first principle of natural law being to seek peace, in which is self-preservation. Natural
law (which Hobbes accepted was a misnomer, there being no law without a commonwealth)
was discovered by considering humankind's natural interests, whereas previous philosophers
had said that natural rights were discovered by considering the natural law. In Hobbes'
opinion, the only way natural law could prevail was for human beings to agree to create a
commonwealth by submitting to the command of a sovereign, whether an individual or an
assembly of individuals. In this lay the foundations of the theory of a social contract between
the governed and the governor.
Hugo Grotius based his philosophy of international law on natural law. He wrote that "even the
will of an omnipotent being cannot change or abrogate" natural law, which "would maintain its
objective validity even if we should assume the impossible, that there is no God or that he does
not care for human affairs." (De iure belli ac pacis, Prolegomeni XI). This is the famous
argument etiamsi daremus (non esse Deum), that made natural law no longer dependent on
theology.
John Locke incorporated natural law into many of his theories and philosophy, especially in
Two Treatises of Government. Locke turned Hobbes' prescription around, saying that if the
ruler went against natural law and failed to protect "life, liberty, and property," people could
justifiably overthrow the existing state and create a new one.
The Belgian philosopher of law Frank Van Dun is one among those who are elaborating a
secular conception[6] of natural law in the liberal tradition. There are also emerging and
secular forms of natural law theory that define human rights as derivative of the notion of
universal human dignity.[7]
"Dignity" is a key term for the discussion of human rights. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights does not justify its claims on any philosophical basis, but rather it simply
appeals to human dignity.[8]
Karl Rahner discusses human dignity as it relates to freedom. Specifically, his ideas of freedom
relate to human rights as an appeal to the freedom to communicate with the divine. As
embodied individuals who can have this freedom and dignity threatened by external forces, the
protection of this dignity takes on an appeal to protect human rights.[9]
The term "human rights" has replaced the term "natural rights" in popularity, because the
rights are less and less frequently seen as requiring natural law for their existence.[10] For
some, the debate on human rights remains thus a debate around the correct interpretation of
natural law, and human rights themselves a positive, but reductionist, expression thereof.[11]
Social contract
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes suggested the existence of a hypothetical social
contract where a group of free individuals agree for the sake of preservation to form
institutions to govern them. They give up their natural complete liberty in exchange for
protection from the Sovereign. This led to John Locke's theory that a failure of the government
to secure rights is a failure which justifies the removal of the government, and was mirrored in
later postulation by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his "Du Contrat Social" (The Social Contract).
International equity expert Paul Finn has echoed this view:
the most fundamental fiduciary relationship in our society is

manifestly that which exists between the community (the people)
and the state, its agencies and officials.
— Paul Finn[12]
The relationship between government and the governed in countries which follow the English
law tradition is a fiduciary one. In equity law, a politician's fiduciary obligations are not only
the duties of good faith and loyalty, but also include duties of skill and competence in
managing a country and its people. Originating from within the Courts of Equity, the fiduciary
concept exists to prevent those holding positions of power from abusing their authority. The
fiduciary relationship between government and the governed arises from the governments
ability to control people with the exercise of its power. In effect, if a government has the power
to abolish any rights, it is equally burdened with the fiduciary duty to protect such an interest
because it would benefit from the exercise of its own discretion to extinguish rights which it
alone had the power to dispose of.[12]
Reciprocity
The Golden Rule, or the ethic of reciprocity states that one must do unto others as one would
be treated themselves; the principle being that reciprocal recognition and respect of rights
ensures that one's own rights will be protected. This principle can be found in all the world's
major religions in only slightly differing forms, and was enshrined in the "Declaration Toward
a Global Ethic" by the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993.
Soviet concept of human rights

Soviet concept of human rights was different from conceptions prevalent in the West.
According to Western legal theory, "it is the individual who is the beneficiary of human rights
which are to be asserted against the government", whereas Soviet law declared that state is the
source of human rights.[13][14] Therefore, Soviet legal system regarded law as an arm of politics
and courts as agencies of the government.[15] Extensive extra-judiciary powers were given to
the Soviet secret police agencies. The regime abolished Western rule of law, civil liberties,
protection of law and guarantees of property.[16][17] According to Vladimir Lenin, the purpose
of socialist courts was "not to eliminate terror ... but to substantiate it and legitimize in
principle".[15]
Crime was determined not as the infraction of law, but as any action which could threaten the
Soviet state and society. For example, a desire to make a profit could be interpreted as a
counter-revolutionary activity punishable by death.[15] The liquidation and deportation of
millions peasants in 1928–31 was carried out within the terms of Soviet Civil Code.[15] Some
Soviet legal scholars even asserted that "criminal repression" may be applied in the absence of
guilt.".[15] Martin Latsis, chief of the Ukrainian Cheka explained: "Do not look in the file of
incriminating evidence to see whether or not the accused rose up against the Soviets with arms
or words. Ask him instead to which class he belongs, what is his background, his education, his
profession. These are the questions that will determine the fate of the accused. That is the
meaning and essence of the Red Terror."[18]
The purpose of public trials was "not to demonstrate the existence or absence of a crime – that
was predetermined by the appropriate party authorities – but to provide yet another forum for
political agitation and propaganda for the instruction of the citizenry (see Moscow Trials for
example). Defense lawyers, who had to be party members, were required to take their client's
guilt for granted..."[15]
Other theories of human rights

The philosopher John Finnis argues that human rights are justifiable on the grounds of their
instrumental value in creating the necessary conditions for human well-being.[19][20] Interest
theories highlight the duty to respect the rights of other individuals on grounds of self-interest:
Human rights law, applied to a State's own citizens serves the

interest of states, by, for example, minimizing the risk of violent
resistance and protest and by keeping the level of dissatisfaction
with the government manageable
— Niraj Nathwani in Rethinking refugee law[21]
The biological theory considers the comparative reproductive advantage of human social
behavior based on empathy and altruism in the context of natural selection.[22][23][24]
Human security is an emerging school of thought which challenges the traditional, state-based
conception of security and argues that a people-focused approach to security is more
appropriate in the modern interdependent world and would be more effective in advancing the
security of individuals and societies across the globe.
Ipso facto legal rights theory
According to the recommendation of human rights scholar Barrister Dr Mohammed Yeasin

Khan LLB Honours, LLM, PhD, PGDL, Barrister-at-Law (Lincoln’s Inn), UK: ‘Right’ being
synonymous of ‘legal’ and antonymous of both ‘wrong’ and ‘illegal’, every ‘right’ of any human
person is ipso facto a ‘legal right’ which deserves protection of law and legal remedy
irrespective of having been written into the law, constitution or otherwise in any country.[25]
Man for man theory of world peace
According to Barrister Dr Mohammed Yeasin Khan: The only way ‘(a) to make the world
terrorism and war free and also free from hunger, poverty, discrimination and exploitation; (b)
to establish rule of law and economic, political and social justice; and (c) to confirm freedom of
man, peace and development worldwide’ is protection and promotion human rights as ‘Ipso
Facto Legal Rights’ and the unity of the world community in one and single theory of ‘man for
man’ correlative, interdependent and ‘one to one-cum-one for other’ approach, namely, the
‘Man for Man Theory’ approach of world peace.[26]
Critiques of human rights

The idea of human rights is not without its critics. Jeremy Bentham, Edmund Burke, Friedrich
Nietzsche and Karl Marx are examples of historical philosophers who criticised the notion of
natural rights. Alasdair MacIntyre is a leading contemporary critic of human rights. His
criticisms are discussed below.
Edmund Burke on natural rights

Edmund Burke was an 18th-century philosopher, political theorist and statesman largely
associated with the school of conservatism.[27] His views on natural rights are best articulated
in Reflections on the Revolution in France, which directly attacked the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and its authors.[28]
A great deal of Burke’s uneasiness of the Declaration lies in the drafter’s abandonment of the
existing establishment.[29] For Burke, constitutional legitimacy was derived not from the
Rousseauian doctrine of general will,[30] but from a form of inherited wisdom.[31] He thought
that it was arrogant and limiting for the drafters of the Declaration to cast aside traditional
notions that had stood the test of time.[32][33] Although it may seem to the drafters that they
had abandoned the shackles of tradition, for Burke, they had limited their findings to the
narrow minded conception of one person or group.[34] This is the grounding from which
Burke’s attack of the Declaration is based.
Burke did not deny the existence of natural rights; rather he thought that the a priori reasoning
adopted by the drafters produced notions that were too abstract to have application within the
framework of society.[35] In stating that “the pretended right of these theorists are all extremes;
and in a proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false”,[32]
Burke identified that abstract rights are meaningless without a societal framework:
What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract right to food or

medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring and
administering them.
— Edmund Burke[32]
In contrast to Locke, Burke did not believe the purpose of government was to protect pre-
existing natural rights;[36] he believed “the primitive rights of man undergo such a variety of
refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the
simplicity of their original direction.”[32] For Burke it was the government, as a result of long
social evolution, that transformed the meaningless natural rights into the practical advantaged
afforded to citizens.[37]
It was not the rights themselves, as much as the level of abstraction and the placing of them
above government which Burke found dangerous.[38] He stated “those who pull down
important ancient establishments, who wantonly destroy modes of administration, and public
institutions… are the most mischievous, and therefore the wickedest of men”.[32] For Burke
politics had no simple answers, and definitely no overarching, universal maxims such as those
expressed in the Declaration.[39] Rather the rights afforded to individuals were to be assessed
in the context of the social framework.[40] However, he acknowledged that the simplicity of the
Declaration was attractive and feared its ability to undermine social order.[41] Burke believed
that the absolute nature of these principles of abstraction were inherently revolutionary; they
were uncompromising and any derogation from the principles a reason to rise up in arms.[42]
This was a problem because;
All government… is founded on compromise and barter. We

balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some
rights, that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be
happy citizens, than subtle disputants.
— Edmund Burke[32]
The natural rights “Against which there can be no prescription; against these no agreements is
binding”[32] gave the revolutionaries the tools to destroy the very society that Burke believed
afforded them with rights. In this way Burke thought the rights contained in the Declaration
would lead to “the antagonist world of madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing
sorrow.”[32]
Jeremy Bentham on natural rights

The 18th-century Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham criticised the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen in his text Anarchical Fallacies. He famously asserted that the
concept of natural rights was “nonsense upon stilts”.[43] Bentham criticised the Declaration
both for the language that it adopted and the theories it posited, stating; “Look to the letter,
you find nonsense; look beyond the letter, you find nothing.”[44]
One of the critiques Bentham levelled against the Declaration was its assertions of rights in the
form of absolute and universal norms.[45] He identified that absolute rights possessed by
everyone equally are meaningless and undesirable. They lack meaning because if everyone has,
for example, unbounded liberty, there is nothing precluding them from using that liberty to
impinge on the liberty of another. In this way “human government and human laws”[46] are
required to give some bounds to rights in order for them to be realised.[47] Even if advocates of
absolute rights recognise this necessity, as the proponents of the Declaration did, Bentham
argues that it is in vain.[47] “It would be self-contradictory, because these rights are, in the
same breath which their existence is declared, declared to be impresciptable; and
impriscriptable… means nothing unless it excludes the interference of the laws.”[48]
In addition to this contradiction, Bentham warned of the dangers of couching rights in absolute
terms. A government that is able to protect every person’s right absolutely and equally is a
utopian aspiration, but the Declaration couches it as the conditions for its legitimacy.[49]
“Against every government which fails in any degree of fulfilling these expectations, then, it is
the professed object of this manifesto to excite insurrection.”[50] Bentham does not deny that
there are some laws that are morally wrong; his uneasiness is in easily justifying a
revolutionary call to arms – with the violence, chaos and destruction associated with it – based
on a repugnant law.[51]
Of the theoretical faults, Bentham thought that natural rights were a construction adopted to
pursue the selfish aims of the drafters, of which no logical basis could be found.[52] He
acknowledged that it may be desirable to have rights, but “a reason for wishing that a certain
right were established, is not that right; want is not supply; hunger is not bread.”[53] To
establish rights existed by virtue of laws enacted by a sovereign was logically sound, but to
assert rights established by nature was not.[52] “A natural right is a son that never had a
father.”[54]
Not only did Bentham think that there was no logical basis for the theory of natural rights, but
he believed that their individualistic approach was harmful to society.[55]
The great enemies of public peace are the selfish and the
dissocial passions – necessary as they are – the one to the very
existence of each individual, the other to his security…What has
been the object, the perpetual and palpable object, of this
declaration to pretended rights? To add such force as possible to
these passions, but already too strong, - to burst the cords that
hold them in, - to say to the selfish passions, there – everywhere
– is your prey! - to the angry passions, there –everywhere- is

your enemy. Such is the morality of this celebrated manifesto.
— Jeremy Bentham[56]
Bentham thought that society was dependent upon people's ability to pursue the greater good,
not just the short-term satisfaction of their own desires. The advancement of natural rights,
which he saw as celebrating selfishness, was to provide the means to break down the social
community that makes human life bearable.[57]
Marxist critique of human rights

In On the Jewish Question, Karl Marx criticized Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen as bourgeois ideology:
Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de
l'homme as distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights
of a member of civil society – i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man
separated from other men and from the community. ... according to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791:
"Liberty consists in being able to do everything which does not harm
others."
Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else.
The limits within which anyone can act without harming someone else
are defined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is determined
by a boundary post.
and that:
Security is the supreme social concept of bourgeois society, the concept

of the police, the whole society exists only to ensure each of its members
the preservation of his person, his rights and his property.
Thus for Marx, liberal rights and ideas of justice are premised on the idea that each of us needs
protection from other human beings. Therefore, liberal rights are rights of separation, designed
to protect us from such perceived threats. Freedom on such a view, is freedom from
interference. What this view denies is the possibility — according to Marx, the fact — that real
freedom is to be found positively in our relations with other people. It is to be found in human
community, not in isolation. So insisting on a regime of rights encourages us to view each other
in ways which undermine the possibility of the real freedom we may find in human
emancipation.
Marxist critical theorist Slavoj Žižek argued that: "liberal attitudes towards the other are
characterized both by respect for otherness, openness to it, and an obsessive fear of
harassment. In short, the other is welcomed insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as it
is not really the other. Tolerance thus coincides with its opposite. My duty to be tolerant
towards the other effectively means that I should not get too close to him or her, not intrude
into his space—in short, that I should respect his intolerance towards my over-proximity. This
is increasingly emerging as the central human right of advanced capitalist society: the right not
to be 'harassed', that is, to be kept at a safe distance from others." and "universal human rights
are effectively the right of white, male property-owners to exchange freely on the market,
exploit workers and women, and exert political domination."[58]
British sociologist Robert Fine claims that the key to Marx’s argument was to rebut the
radicalism Bauer espoused: a radicalism that not only denied the rights of Jews but at once
trashed the rights of man and citizen as such. What Marx stood for in the Jewish Question as in
his earlier writings more generally was a philosophy of right. Fine believes what Marx stood
against was a spiritless radicalism that revealed its inhumanity not only through its hostility to
Jews but also through its hostility to the idea of right." Moreover, Fine argued that Marx
argued that the society that gives rise to the idea of rights is the same as that which gives rise to
the commodity form. They are two sides of the same medal. It is a society based on production
by independent producers whose contact with each other is mediated through the exchange of
products on the market. These producers are formally free to produce what and how much they
wish. They are formally equal in that no producer can force others to produce against their will
or expropriate their products against their will. They are self-interested in that they are all
entitled to pursue their own private interests regardless of what others think or do. Their
contact with other producers takes the form of free and equal exchanges in which individuals
exchange their property in return for the property of another and this exchange of unneeded
things in return for useful things appears to be done for the mutual benefit of each party.
Fine also claims that for Marx, exchange relations appear to be formed among free and equal
property owners who enter a voluntary contract in pursuit of their own self-interest. Fine cites
what he believes to be Marx's point about how in exchange lies the clue to all modern
conceptions of freedom and equal right:
Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he

does not appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather recognise one
another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates
their commodities. Accordingly, the juridical moment of the Person enters
here… all inherent contradictions of bourgeois society appear
extinguished ... and bourgeois democracy even more than the bourgeois
economists takes refuge in this aspect.: (Marx, Grundrisse:243, 251)
Furthermore, the parties to the exchange must place themselves in relation to one another as
persons whose will resides in those objects and must behave in such a way that each does not
appropriate the commodity of the other and alienate his own, except through an act to which
both parties consent. Marx characterised this sphere of commodity exchange as ‘a very Eden of
the innate rights of man’ – the realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham:
‘Freedom because both buyer and seller of a commodity ... are

determined only by their own free will....Equality because each enters
into relations with the other as with a simple owner of commodities and
they exchange equivalent with equivalent. Property because each
disposes only what is his own. And Bentham because each looks only to
his own advantage. The only force bringing them together is the
selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each.: (Marx, Capital 1:
280)
Thus according to Robert Fine, Marx's basic criticism was that within political society people
were seen as co-operative, while in their economic roles they were competitive, individualistic
and egoistic. In short, the theory of rights expressed the division and alienation of human
beings. [59]
Alasdair MacIntyre on human rights

Alasdair MacIntyre is a Scottish philosopher who has published a number of works in a variety
of philosophical fields, including political philosophy, ethics and metaphysics.[60] MacIntyre
criticises the concept of human rights in After Virtue and he famously asserts that “there are no
such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.”[61]
MacIntyre argues that every attempt at justifying the existence of human rights has failed. The
assertions by 18th century philosophers that natural rights are self-evident truths, he argues,
are necessarily false as there are no such things as self-evident truths. He says that the plea
20th century philosophers made to intuition show a flaw in philosophical reasoning. MacIntyre
then outlines that, although Dworkin is not wrong in asserting that the inability to demonstrate
a statement does not necessitate its falsity, the same argument can be applied in relation to
witches and unicorns.[61]
MacIntyre made this critique of human rights in the context of a wider argument about the
failure of the Enlightenment to produce a coherent moral system.[62] Philosophers of the
enlightenment sought to cast aside the discredited notions of hierarchy and theology as
justifications for morality. Instead, MacIntyre argues, the enlightenment placed the individual
as the sovereign authority to dictate what is right and wrong. However allegiances to historical
notions of morality remained and philosophers sought to find a secular and rational
justification for existing beliefs.[63] The problem, MacIntyre maintains, is that theological
morality was developed to overcome defects in human nature; to posit an example of the ideal.
Without this notion of ‘perfect humanity’ the only remaining foundation to build a moral
theory on was the foundation of imperfect human nature.[64] For MacIntyre, the result was a
collection of moral stances, each claiming to have a rational justification and each disputing the
findings of the rival notions.[62]
MacIntyre believes that a number of the moral debates that occur in society can be explained as
a result of this failure of the “Enlightenment Project”.[65] Human rights are an example of a
moral belief, founded in previous theological beliefs, which make the false claim of being
grounded in rationality.[66] To illustrate how the principles lead to conflict, he gives the
example of abortion; in this case the right of the mother to exercise control over her body is
contrasted with the deprivation of a potential child to the right to life. Although both the right
to liberty and the right to life are, on their own, considered morally acceptable claims, conflict
arises when we posit them against each other.[67]
Theory of value and property

Henry of Ghent articulated the theory that every person has a property interest in their own
body.[68] John Locke uses the word property in both broad and narrow senses. In a broad
sense, it covers a wide range of human interests and aspirations; more narrowly, it refers to
material goods. He argues that property is a natural right and it is derived from labour.[69] In
addition, property precedes government and government cannot "dispose of the estates of the
subjects arbitrarily." To deny valid property rights according to Locke is to deny human rights.
The British philosopher had significant impacts upon the development of the Government of
the UK and was central to the fundamental founding philosophy of the United States. Karl
Marx later critiqued Locke's theory of property in his Theories of Surplus Value, seeing the
beginnings of a theory of surplus value in Locke's works. In Locke's Second Treatise he argued
that the right to own private property was unlimited as long as nobody took more than they
could use without allowing any of their property to go to waste and that there were enough
common resources of comparable quality available for others to create their own property.
Locke did believe that some would be more "industrious and rational" than others and would
amass more property, but believed this would not cause shortages. Though this system could
work before the introduction of money, Marx argued in Theories of Surplus Value that Locke's
system would break down and claimed money was a contradiction of the law of nature on
which private property was founded.[70]
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What are some of the major theories discussed around the philosophy of human rights?

What are some of the major theories discussed around the philosophy of human rights?

How does natural law theory view the basis of human rights?

How does natural law theory view the basis of human rights?

Philosophy of human rights - Wikipedia 1

International equity expert Paul Finn has echoed this view:

the most fundamental fiduciary relationship in our society is

Soviet concept of human rights

Other theories of human rights

Human rights law, applied to a State's own citizens serves the

Ipso facto legal rights theory

According to the recommendation of human rights scholar Barrister Dr Mohammed Yeasin

Man for man theory of world peace

Critiques of human rights

Edmund Burke on natural rights

What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract right to food or

All government… is founded on compromise and barter. We

Jeremy Bentham on natural rights

– is your prey! - to the angry passions, there –everywhere- is

Marxist critique of human rights

Security is the supreme social concept of bourgeois society, the concept

Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he

‘Freedom because both buyer and seller of a commodity ... are

Alasdair MacIntyre on human rights

Theory of value and property

21. Nathwani (2003) p.25

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