G.R. No.

L-27906 January 8, 1987

CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION, petitioner,
 vs.
 UNIVERSAL RUBBER

PRODUCTS, INC. and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents.

Facts:

 Respondent Universal Rubber Products, Inc. filed an application with the Philippine
Patent office for registration of the trademark "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE AND
DEVICE" used on rubber shoes and rubber slippers.
 Petitioner Converse Rubber Corporation filed its opposition to the application for
registration on grounds that:
a] The trademark sought to be registered is confusingly similar to the word
"CONVERSE" which is part of petitioner's corporate name "CONVERSE RUBBER
CORPORATION" as to likely deceive purchasers of products on which it is to be used to
an extent that said products may be mistaken by the unwary public to be manufactured by
the petitioner; and,
b] The registration of respondent's trademark will cause great and irreparable
injury to the business reputation and goodwill of petitioner in the Philippines and would
cause damage to said petitioner within the, meaning of Section 8, R.A. No. 166, as
amended.
 Thereafter, respondent filed its answer and at the pre-trial, the parties submitted the
following partial stipulation of facts:

1] The petitioner's corporate name is "CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION"

and has been in existence since July 31, 1946; it is duly organized under the laws of
Massachusetts, USA and doing business at 392 Pearl St., Malden, County of Middle sex,
Massachusetts;

2] Petitioner is not licensed to do business in the Philippines and it is not doing

business on its own in the Philippines; and,

3] Petitioner manufacturers rubber shoes and uses thereon the trademarks

"CHUCK TAYLOR "and "ALL STAR AND DEVICE". 1
 Petitioner's lone witness, Mrs. Carmen B. Pacquing, a duly licensed private merchant
with stores at the Sta. Mesa Market and in Davao City, testified that she had been selling
CONVERSE rubber shoes in the local market since 1956 and that sales of petitioner's
rubber shoes in her stores averaged twelve to twenty pairs a month purchased mostly by
basketball players of local private educational institutions like Ateneo, La Salle and San
Beda.
 Mrs. Pacquing, further stated that she knew petitioner's rubber shoes came from the
United States "because it says there in the trademark Converse Chuck Taylor with star
 red or blue and is a round figure and made in U.S.A. " 2 In the invoices issued by her
store, the rubber shoes were described as "Converse Chuck Taylor", 3 "Converse All
Star," 4 "All Star Converse Chuck Taylor," 5 or "Converse Shoes Chuck Taylor." 6 She
also affirmed that she had no business connection with the petitioner.
 Respondent, on the other hand, presented as its lone witness the secretary of said
corporation who testified that respondent has been selling on wholesale basis "Universal
Converse" sandals since 1962 and "Universal Converse" rubber shoes since 1963.
Invoices were submitted as evidence of such sales. The witness also testified that she had
no Idea why respondent chose "Universal Converse" as a trademark and that she was
unaware of the name "Converse" prior to her corporation's sale of "Universal Converse"
rubber shoes and rubber sandals.
 Eventually, the Director of Patents dismissed the opposition of the petitioner and gave
due course to respondent's application

“I cannot find anything that will prevent registration of the word 'UNIVERSAL
CONVERSE' in favor of the respondent. In arriving at this conclusion, I am guided by the
fact that the opposer failed to present proof that the single word "CONVERSE' in its
corporate name has become so Identified with the corporation that whenever used, it
designates to the mind of the public that particular corporation.”

Issue: whether or not the respondent's partial appropriation of petitioner's corporate name is of
such character that it is calculated to deceive or confuse the public to the injury of the petitioner
to which the name be

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Director of Patents is hereby set aside and a new one entered
denying Respondent Universal Rubber Products, Inc.'s application for registration of the
trademark "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE AND DEVICE" on its rubber shoes and slippers.

A trade name is any individual name or surname, firm name, device or word used by
manufacturers, industrialists, merchants and others to Identify their businesses, vocations or
occupations. 8 As the trade name refers to the business and its goodwill ... the trademark refers to
the goods." 9 The ownership of a trademark or tradename is a property right which the owner is
entitled to protect "since there is damage to him from confusion or reputation or goodwill in the
mind of the public as well as from confusion of goods. The modern trend is to give emphasis to
the unfairness of the acts and to classify and treat the issue as fraud.

From a cursory appreciation of the petitioner's corporate name "CONVERSE RUBBER

CORPORATION,' it is evident that the word "CONVERSE" is the dominant word which
Identifies petitioner from other corporations engaged in similar business. Respondent, in the
stipulation of facts, admitted petitioner's existence since 1946 as a duly organized foreign
corporation engaged in the manufacture of rubber shoes. This admission necessarily betrays its
knowledge of the reputation and business of petitioner even before it applied for registration of
the trademark in question. Knowing, therefore, that the word "CONVERSE" belongs to and is
being used by petitioner, and is in fact the dominant word in petitioner's corporate name,
respondent has no right to appropriate the same for use on its products which are similar to
those being produced by petitioner.

The sales of 12 to 20 pairs a month of petitioner's rubber shoes cannot be considered

insignificant, considering that they appear to be of high expensive quality, which not too many
basketball players can afford to buy. Any sale made by a legitimate trader from his store is a
commercial act establishing trademark rights since such sales are made in due course of business
to the general public, not only to limited individuals. It is a matter of public knowledge that all
brands of goods filter into the market, indiscriminately sold by jobbers dealers and merchants not
necessarily with the knowledge or consent of the manufacturer. Such actual sale of goods in the
local market establishes trademark use which serves as the basis for any action aimed at
trademark pre- exemption. It is a corollary logical deduction that while Converse Rubber
Corporation is not licensed to do business in the country and is not actually doing business here,
it does not mean that its goods are not being sold here or that it has not earned a reputation or
goodwill as regards its products. The Director of Patents was, therefore, remiss in ruling that the
proofs of sales presented "was made by a single witness who had never dealt with nor had never
known opposer [petitioner] x x x without Opposer having a direct or indirect hand in the
transaction to be the basis of trademark pre- exemption."

Another factor why respondent's applications should be denied is the confusing similarity
between its trademark "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE AND DEVICE" and petitioner's corporate
name and/or its trademarks "CHUCK TAYLOR" and "ALL STAR DEVICE" which could
confuse the purchasing public to the prejudice of petitioner,

The trademark of respondent "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE and DEVICE" is imprinted in a

circular manner on the side of its rubber shoes. In the same manner, the trademark of petitioner
which reads "CONVERSE CHUCK TAYLOR" is imprinted on a circular base attached to the
side of its rubber shoes. The deteminative factor in ascertaining whether or not marks are
confusingly similar to each other "is not whether the challenged mark would actually cause
confusion or deception of the purchasers but whether the use of such mark would likely cause
confusion or mistake on the part of the buying public. It would be sufficient, for purposes of the
law, that the similarity between the two labels is such that there is a possibility or likelihood of
the purchaser of the older brand mistaking the new brand for it.

By appropriating the word "CONVERSE," respondent's products are likely to be mistaken as

having been produced by petitioner. "The risk of damage is not limited to a possible confusion of
goods but also includes confusion of reputation if the public could reasonably assume that the
goods of the parties originated from the same source.

It is unfortunate that respondent Director of Patents has concluded that since the petitioner
is not licensed to do business in the country and is actually not doing business on its own in
the Philippines, it has no name to protect iN the forum and thus, it is futile for it to
establish that "CONVERSE" as part of its corporate name identifies its rubber shoes. That
a foreign corporation has a right to maintain an action in the forum even if it is not licensed to do
business and is not actually doing business on its own therein has been enunciated many times by
this Court. In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373

... a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is
unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the
Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a
legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants
thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign
corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a
foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation
is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.

KABUSHI KAISHA ISETAN, also known and trading as ISETAN CO., LTD.,
petitioner,
 vs.
 THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS, and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, INC., respondents.

 Petitioner Kabushi Kaisha Isetan is a foreign corporation organized and

existing under the laws of Japan. It is the owner of the trademark "Isetan"
and the "Young Leaves Design".
 On October 3, 1983, the petitioner applied for the registration of "Isetan"
and "Young Leaves Design" with the Philippine Patent Office
 Private respondent, Isetann Department Store, on the other hand, is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines
 May 20, 1980, the private respondent registered "Isetann Department
Store, Inc." and Isetann and Flower Design in the Philippine Patent Office
No. 4701 and 4714
 On November 28, 1980, the petitioner filed with the Phil. Patent Office two
(2) petitions for the cancellation of Certificates of Supplemental
Registration Nos. SR-4714 and SR-4701 stating among others that:
“. . . except for the additional letter "N" in the word "Isetan", the mark
registered by the registrant is exactly the same as the trademark ISETAN
owned by the petitioner and that the young leaves registered by the
registrant is exactly the same as the young leaves design owned by the
petitioner.”
 he petitioner also invoked the Convention of Paris of March 20, 1883 for
 the Protection of Industrial Property of which the Philippines and Japan are
both members. The petitioner stressed that the Philippines' adherence to
the Paris Convention committed to the government to the protection of
trademarks belonging not only to Filipino citizens but also to those
belonging to nationals of other member countries who may seek protection
in the Philippines.
 the petitioner also filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a petition to cancel the mark "ISETAN" as part of the registered
corporate name of Isetann Department Store, Inc. which petition was
docketed as SEC Case No. 2051 (Rollo, p. 524) On May 17, 1985, this
petition was denied in a decision rendered by SEC's Hearing Officer, Atty.
Joaquin C. Garaygay.
 The Commission reversed the decision of the Hearing Officer on February
25, 1986. It directed the private respondent to amend its Articles of
Incorporation within 30 days from finality of the decision
 However, respondent Isetann Department Store filed a motion for
reconsideration. (Rollo, pp. 325-353). And on September 10, 1987, the
Commission reversed its earlier decision dated February 25, 1986 thereby
affirming the decision rendered by the Hearing Officer on May 17, 1985.
The Commission stated that since the petitioner's trademark and
tradename have never been used in commerce on the petitioner's
products marketed in the Philippines, the trademark or tradename
have not acquired a reputation and goodwill deserving of protection
from usurpation by local competitors. (Rollo, p. 392).
 On January 24, 1986, the Director of Patents after notice and hearing
rendered a joint decision in Inter Partes Cases Nos. 1460 and 1461, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Office is

constrained to hold that the herein Petitioner has not successfully
made out a case of cancellation. Accordingly, Inter Partes Cases
Nos. 1460 and 1461 are, as they are hereby, DISMISSED. Hence,
Respondent's Certificate of Supplemental Registration No. 4714
issued on May 20, 1980 covering the tradename "ISETANN DEPT.
STORE, INC. & FLOWER DESIGN" are, as they are hereby,
ordered to remain in full force and effect for the duration of their term
unless sooner or later terminated by law.

Issue: WON the patent office and CA were right.

Ruling:

Regarding the petitioner's claims of substantial justice which led us to give due
course, we decline to disturb the rulings of the Patent Office and the Court of
Appeals.

Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive right thereto. Such right
grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One way make
advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these
alone would not give exclusive right of use.For trademark is a creation of use.
The underlying reason for all these is that purchasers have come to understand
the mark as indicating the origin of the wares. Flowing from this is the trader's
right to protection in the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has
accumulated from use of the trademark. ...

In fact, a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark

unless it uses it in commerce.

The Trademark Law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of the
mark prior to its registration. - There is no dispute that respondent corporation
was the first registrant, yet it failed to fully substantiate its claim that it used in
trade or business in the Philippines the subject mark; it did not present proof to
invest it with exclusive, continuous adoption of the trademark which should
consist among others, of considerable sales since its first use. The invoices
(Exhibits 7, 7-a, and 8-b) submitted by respondent which were dated way back in
1957 show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be used as "samples"
and "of no commercial value". The evidence for respondent must be clear,
definite and free from incosistencies. (Sy Ching v. Gaw Lui. 44 SCRA 148-149)
"Samples" are not for sale and therefore, the fact of exporting them to the
Philippines cannot be considered to be equivalent to the "use" contemplated by
the law. Respondent did not expect income from such "samples". "There were no
receipts to establish sale, and no proof were presented to show that they were
subsequently sold in the Philippines." (Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 118 SCRA 526 [1982]; Emphasis Supplied)

The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in
the Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename or trademark in the
Philippines. It has absolutely no business goodwill in the Philippines. It is
unknown to Filipinos except the very few who may have noticed it while
travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine
government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks.

Any goodwill, reputation, or knowledge regarding the name Isetann is purely the
work of the private respondent. Evidence was introduced on the extensive
promotional activities of the private respondent.

The mere origination or adoption of a particular tradename without actual use

thereof in the market is insufficient to give any exclusive right to its use (Johnson
Mfg. Co. v. Leader Filling Stations Corp. 196 N.E. 852, 291 Mass. 394), even
though such adoption is publicly declared, such as by use of the name in
advertisements, circulars, price lists, and on signs and stationery. (Consumers
Petrolum Co. v. Consumers Co. of ILL. 169 F 2d 153)

PHILIPS EXPORT B.V., PHILIPS ELECTRICAL LAMPS, INC. and PHILIPS

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

petitioners,
 vs.
 COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE

COMMISSION and STANDARD PHILIPS CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

 Petitioner Philips Export B.V. (PEBV), a foreign corporation organized

under the laws of the Netherlands, although not engaged in business here,
is the registered owner of the trademarks PHILIPS and PHILIPS SHIELD
EMBLEM under Certificates of Registration Nos. R-1641 and R-1674,
 Petitioners Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc. (Philips Electrical, for brevity) and
Philips Industrial Developments, Inc. (Philips Industrial, for short),
authorized users of the trademarks PHILIPS and PHILIPS SHIELD
EMBLEM, were incorporated on 29 August 1956 and 25 May 1956,
respectively
 Respondent Standard Philips Corporation (Standard Philips), on the other
hand, was issued a Certificate of Registration by respondent Commission
on 19 May 1982.
 Petitioners filed a letter complaint with the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) asking for the cancellation of the word "PHILIPS" from
Private Respondent's corporate name in view of the prior registration with
the Bureau of Patents of the trademark "PHILIPS" and the logo "PHILIPS
SHIELD EMBLEM" in the name of Petitioner, PEBV, and the previous
registration of Petitioners Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial with the
SEC.
 As a result of Private Respondent's refusal to amend its Articles of
Incorporation, Petitioners filed with the SEC, on 6 February 1985, a
Petition (SEC Case No. 2743) praying for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, alleging, among others, that Private Respondent's
use of the word PHILIPS amounts to an infringement and clear violation of
Petitioners' exclusive right to use the same considering that both parties
engage in the same business.
 Respondent countered that Petitioner PEBV has no legal capacity to sue;
that its use of its corporate name is not at all similar to Petitioners'
 trademark PHILIPS when considered in its entirety; and that its products
consisting of chain rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw are grossly
different from Petitioners' electrical products.
 In so ruling, the latter declared that inasmuch as the SEC found no
sufficient ground for the granting of injunctive relief on the basis of the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented, it cannot order the
removal or cancellation of the word "PHILIPS" from Private Respondent's
corporate name on the basis of the same evidence adopted in toto during
trial on the merits. Besides, Section 18 of the Corporation Code (infra) is
applicable only when the corporate names in question are identical.
 the SEC en banc affirmed the dismissal declaring that the corporate
names of Petitioners and Private Respondent hardly breed confusion
inasmuch as each contains at least two different words and, therefore,
rules out any possibility of confusing one for the other.
 On 30 January 1990, Petitioners sought an extension of time to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, which Petition was later
referred to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 12 February 1990.
In deciding to dismiss the petition on 31 July 1990, the Court of
Appeals 1 swept aside Petitioners' claim that following the ruling in
Converse Rubber Corporation v. Universal Converse Rubber Products, Inc., et
al, (G. R. No. L-27906, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 154), the word PHILIPS
cannot be used as part of Private Respondent's corporate name as the same
constitutes a dominant part of Petitioners' corporate names. In so holding, the
Appellate Court observed that the Converse case is not four-square with the
present case inasmuch as the contending parties in Converse are engaged in a
similar business, that is, the manufacture of rubber shoes. Upholding the SEC,
the Appellate Court concluded that "private respondents' products
consisting of chain rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw are unrelated
and non-competing with petitioners' products i.e. electrical lamps such that
consumers would not in any probability mistake one as the source or
origin of the product of the other."

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1990, and its
Resolution dated 20 November 1990, are SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ENJOINING private respondent from using "PHILIPS" as a feature of its
corporate name, and ORDERING the Securities and Exchange Commission to
amend private respondent's Articles of Incorporation by deleting the word
PHILIPS from the corporate name of private respondent.

As early as Western Equipment and Supply Co. v. Reyes, 51 Phil. 115

(1927), the Court declared that a corporation's right to use its corporate and trade
name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against
the world in the same manner as it may protect its tangible property, real or
personal, against trespass or conversion. It is regarded, to a certain extent, as a
property right and one which cannot be impaired or defeated by subsequent
appropriation by another corporation in the same field (Red Line Transportation
Co. vs. Rural Transit Co., September 8, 1934, 20 Phil 549).

A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the very existence of a

corporation

The general rule as to corporations is that each corporation must have a name
by which it is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts. The name of a corporation
in this respect designates the corporation in the same manner as the name of an
individual designates the person and the right to use its corporate name is as
much a part of the corporate franchise as any other privilege granted

Our own Corporation Code, in its Section 18, expressly provides that:

No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission

if the proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of
any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is
patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law. Where a change in a
corporate name is approved, the commission shall issue an amended certificate
of incorporation under the amended name. (Emphasis supplied)

The statutory prohibition cannot be any clearer. To come within its scope, two
requisites must be proven, namely: (1) that the complainant corporation acquired
a prior right over the use of such corporate name; and
 (2) the proposed name is
either:

(a) identical; or

(b) deceptively or confusingly similar
 to that of any existing corporation or to any

other name already protected by law; or

(c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

In this regard, there is no doubt with respect to Petitioners' prior adoption

of' the name ''PHILIPS" as part of its corporate name. Petitioners Philips
Electrical and Philips Industrial were incorporated on 29 August 1956 and
25 May 1956, respectively, while Respondent Standard Philips was issued a
Certificate of Registration on 12 April 1982, twenty-six (26) years later
(Rollo, p. 16). Petitioner PEBV has also used the trademark "PHILIPS" on
electrical lamps of all types and their accessories since 30 September 1922,
as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 1651.

the corporate names of Petitioners and Private Respondent are not identical, a
reading of Petitioner's corporate names, to wit: PHILIPS EXPORT B.V., PHILIPS
ELECTRICAL LAMPS, INC. and PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
inevitably leads one to conclude that "PHILIPS" is, indeed, the dominant word
in that all the companies affiliated or associated with the principal
corporation, PEBV, are known in the Philippines and abroad as the PHILIPS
Group of Companies.

It is settled, however, that proof of actual confusion need not be shown. It

suffices that confusion is probably or likely to occur

it may be that Private Respondent's products also consist of chain rollers, belts,
bearing and the like, while petitioners deal principally with electrical products. It is
significant to note, however, that even the Director of Patents had denied Private
Respondent's application for registration of the trademarks "Standard Philips &
Device" for chain, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw. That office held that
PEBV, "had shipped to its subsidiaries in the Philippines equipment, machines
and their parts which fall under international class where "chains, rollers, belts,
bearings and cutting saw," the goods in connection with which Respondent is
seeking to register 'STANDARD PHILIPS' . . . also belong"

Given Private Respondent's aforesaid underlined primary purpose, nothing

could prevent it from dealing in the same line of business of electrical
devices, products or supplies which fall under its primary purposes.
Besides, there is showing that Private Respondent not only manufactured
and sold ballasts for fluorescent lamps with their corporate name printed
thereon but also advertised the same as, among others, Standard Philips

The fact that there are other companies engaged in other lines of business using
the word "PHILIPS" as part of their corporate names is no defense and does not
warrant the use by Private Respondent of such word which constitutes an
essential feature of Petitioners' corporate name previously adopted and
registered and-having acquired the status of a well-known mark in the Philippines
and internationally as well.
UNIVERSAL MILLS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
 UNIVERSAL TEXTILE
MILLS, INC., respondent.

Facts: Appeal from the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
S.E.C. Case No. 1079, entitled In the Matter of the Universal Textile Mills, Inc. vs.
Universal Mills Corporation, a petition to have appellant change its corporate
name on the ground that such name is "confusingly and deceptively similar" to
that of appellee, which petition the Commission granted.

According to the order, "the Universal Textile Mills, Inc. was organ on December
29, 1953, as a textile manufacturing firm for which it was issued a certificate of
registration on January 8, 1954.

The Universal Mills Corporation, on the other hand, was registered in this
Commission on October 27, 1954, under its original name, Universal Hosiery
Mills Corporation, having as its primary purpose the "manufacture and production
of hosieries and wearing apparel of all kinds."

The immediate cause of this present complaint, however, was the

occurrence of a fire which gutted respondent's spinning mills in Pasig,
Rizal. Petitioner alleged that as a result of this fire and because of the
similarity of respondent's name to that of herein complainant, the news
items appearing in the various metropolitan newspapers carrying reports
on the fire created uncertainty and confusion among its bankers, friends,
stockholders and customers prompting petitioner to make announcements,
clarifying the real Identity of the corporation whose property was burned.
Petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of
this allegation.

respondent's position is that the names of the two corporations are not similar
and even if there be some similarity, it is not confusing or deceptive; that the
only reason that respondent changed its name was because it expanded its
business to include the manufacture of fabrics of all kinds; and that the
word 'textile' in petitioner's name is dominant and prominent enough to
distinguish the two. It further argues that petitioner failed to present
evidence of confusion or deception in the ordinary course of business; that
the only supposed confusion proved by complainant arose out of an
extraordinary occurrence — a disastrous fire.

Upon these premises, the Commission held: From the facts proved and the
jurisprudence on the matter, it appears necessary under the circumstances to
enjoin the respondent Universal Mills Corporation from further using its present
corporate name. Judging from what has already happened, confusion is not only
apparent, but possible. It does not matter that the instance of confusion between
the two corporate names was occasioned only by a fire or an extraordinary
occurrence. It is precisely the duty of this Commission to prevent such confusion
at all times and under all circumstances not only for the purpose of protecting the
corporations involved but more so for the protection of the public.

We believe it is not. Indeed, it cannot be said that the impugned order is arbitrary
and capricious. Clearly, it has rational basis. The corporate names in question
are not Identical, but they are indisputably so similar that even under the test of
"reasonable care and observation as the public generally are capable of using
and may be expected to exercise" invoked by appellant, We are apprehensive
confusion will usually arise, considering that under the second amendment of its
articles of incorporation on August 14, 1964, appellant included among its
primary purposes the "manufacturing, dyeing, finishing and selling of fabrics of all
kinds" in which respondent had been engaged for more than a decade ahead of
petitioner. Factually, the Commission found existence of such confusion, and
there is evidence to support its conclusion. Since respondent is not claiming
damages in this proceeding, it is, of course, immaterial whether or not appellant
has acted in good faith, but We cannot perceive why of all names, it had to
choose a name already being used by another firm engaged in practically the
same business for more than a decade enjoying well earned patronage and
goodwill, when there are so many other appropriate names it could possibly
adopt without arousing any suspicion as to its motive and, more importantly, any
degree of confusion in the mind of the public which could mislead even its own
customers, existing or prospective. Premises considered, there is no warrant for
our interference.