Water Crisis - Provincial Disputes

The Water Apportionment Accord signed between the provinces in 1991 was aimed at putting an end to
inter-provincial squabbling. The agreement was followed by the setting up of the Indus River System
Authority (IRSA) which was tasked to implement the accord. While the agreement provided a basis for
removing the differences, complaints about the violations of the accord continue to appear.

There are reports of ‘discrepancies’ in water discharges and their measurement at key inter-provincial
distribution sites. Sindh has complained about incorrect measurements between the Chashma and Taunsa
barrages and Taunsa and Guddu barrages. Balochistan has charged that Sindh is not allowing it to have its
full share of water in accordance with the agreement. Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab have similar
complaints against KP and have protested over huge water losses between Besham and Tarbela and
inaccurate measurements at the Chashma barrage. The disputes involving all the four provinces can lead to
a serious discord if not resolved at the earliest. What makes the issue serious is that those involved in
disputes are now flouting the authority of IRSA.

Differences among provinces on the interpretation of Water Apportionment Accord of 1991

The main differences relate to the following:

a. Construction of additional storages (Section 6 of the Water Accord-1991:

This is one of the most serious water issues confronting Pakistan today. Section 6 of the 1991 Water Accord
reads: “The need for storages, wherever feasible on the Indus and other rivers was admitted and recognized
by the participants for planned future agricultural development” The federal government and the provincial
government of the Punjab feel very strongly that this section amounts to an agreement to construct
Kalabagh, Bhasha and other dams on the river Indus. Since the feasibility study of Kalabagh dam is already
completed and the detailed engineering design is ready, the federal and Punjab governments would like to
go ahead with the construction of this project forthwith. The federal government feels that the existing
storages are depleting due to silting and a serious irrigation water crisis is looming large. Sindh and NWFP
have serious objections to this project and their assemblies have passed resolutions against the Project. A
number of elements in Sindh apprehend that this project ma become a source of withdrawing excess water
for Punjab. Some people in the NWFP feel that Kalabagh Dam will threaten some of their cities such as
Nowshehra and may damage their agricultural land. The Federation strongly refutes these objections on
technical grounds but the opposition continues.

Terms of Reference of the Study required to establish minimum escapeage to sea downstream Kotri
(Section 7 of the Water Accord-1991)

The section 7 of the 1991 Water Accord reads: “The need for certain minimum escapeage to sea, below
Kotri, to check sea intrusion was recognized. Sindh held the view, that the optimum level was 10 MAF,
which was discussed at length, while other studies indicated lower/higher figures. It was therefore decided
that further studies would be undertaken to establish the minimum escapage needs down stream Kotri.”
Despite the passage of 12 years since the signing of the accord, the study could not be commissioned
because the provinces could not agree on the scope and terms of reference of the study. Unless a study is
undertaken and the minimum flow of water required down stream Kotri is known, Punjab and Sindh may
not agree on the amount of water available for additional storage. Many in Sindh contend that there is not
sufficient water in river Indus for further storage. The federal government cites the historical records of the
past 25 years according to which an average of 35 to 38 MAF water has escaped below Kotri. Even if 10
MAF is allowed to escape below Kotri, there is sufficient water for additional storage, the federal
government contends.

The mode of sharing shortages (Section 14b of the Water Accord-1991)

Section 14(b) of the accord reads, “The record of actual average system uses for the period 1977- 82 would
form the guide line for developing a future regulation pattern. Pakistan has experienced serious shortages
of Indus water during 1994-95, 1997-98 and then during the past four years (1999-2000, 2000- 01, 2001-
02 and 2002-03). During this period, Sindh and Punjab differed seriously and sometime even acrimoniously
on their share of water during the shortages. In the 1991 accord, Punjab had agreed on its share of water
that was 2.7 per cent less than its historical share; Sindh, on the other hand, was given a share of water that
was 1.2 per cent higher than its historical share. Punjab’s contention was that it had agreed to a reduced
share for itself because of a 'package deal' in 1991 under which additional storages were also to be
constructed. Since, according to Punjab, the 1991 accord was not implemented in entirety and storages were
not constructed, Punjab sought its share of water on pre-1991 historical average basis. Sindh contested this
position bitterly and considered 1991 accord sacrosanct. But water continued to be shared on the basis of
the pre-91 basis in the light of a “1994 Inter-provincial ministerial agreement”. Many in Sindh called this
as theft of their water. This serious difference of opinion and the associated bitterness continues.

Reduction in storage due to silting of existing reservoirs

The state of technology at the time of construction of the three main reservoirs, Tarbela, Mangla and
Chashma did not provide for any de-silting of the reservoirs. It was therefore anticipated that these
reservoirs would have a limited life an substitute arrangements would have to be made. By 2002, Tarbela
had lost 3.03 MAF or 26 per cent of its original storage capacity, Mangla 1.18 MAF or 20 per cent of its
original storage capacity, and Chashma 0.37 MAF or 43 per cent of its original storage capacity. In total,
4.58 MAF or 25 % of the total storage capacity of the three reservoirs was lost by 2002. It is anticipated
that by 2013 and 2020, we would have lost 6.27 MAF or 34 % of the total capacity and 7.27 MAF or 40 %
of the total storage capacity respectively. In other words, Pakistan would have lost a storage capacity greater
than the capacity of the proposed Kalabagh reservoir (6.1 MAF) by 2020. This development would have
grave ramifications for the agriculture and overall economy of Pakistan. The federal government is
convinced that construction of new storage is the only effective response to this situation. Some opponents
of the new storages suggest that instead the possibility of de-silting of the reservoirs should be explored.
Most of the experts, however, feel that de-silting and the subsequent disposal of the removed silt is simply
not feasible. The design of the proposed Kalabagh reservoir, however, has a provision of silt flushing.

The Water Apportionment Accord signed between the provinces in 1991 was aimed at putting an end to
inter-provincial squabbling. The agreement was followed by the setting up of the Indus River System
Authority (IRSA) which was tasked to implement the accord. While the agreement provided a basis for
removing the differences, complaints about the violations of the accord continue to appear.

There are reports of ‘discrepancies’ in water discharges and their measurement at key inter-provincial
distribution sites. Sindh has complained about incorrect measurements between the Chashma and Taunsa
barrages and Taunsa and Guddu barrages. Balochistan has charged that Sindh is not allowing it to have its
full share of water in accordance with the agreement. Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab have similar
complaints against KP and have protested over huge water losses between Besham and Tarbela and
inaccurate measurements at the Chashma barrage. The disputes involving all the four provinces can lead to
a serious discord if not resolved at the earliest. What makes the issue serious is that those involved in
disputes are now flouting the authority of IRSA.

The Water Apportionment Accord signed between the provinces in 1991 was aimed at putting an end to
inter-provincial squabbling. The agreement was followed by the setting up of the Indus River System
Authority (IRSA) which was tasked to implement the accord. While the agreement provided a basis for
removing the differences, complaints about the violations of the accord continue to appear.

There are reports of ‘discrepancies’ in water discharges and their measurement at key inter-provincial
distribution sites. Sindh has complained about incorrect measurements between the Chashma and Taunsa
barrages and Taunsa and Guddu barrages. Balochistan has charged that Sindh is not allowing it to have its
full share of water in accordance with the agreement. Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab have similar
complaints against KP and have protested over huge water losses between Besham and Tarbela and
inaccurate measurements at the Chashma barrage. The disputes involving all the four provinces can lead to
a serious discord if not resolved at the earliest. What makes the issue serious is that those involved in
disputes are now flouting the authority of IRSA.