School of Psychology

STUDENT SELF ASSESSMENT SHEET

Exam ID 7383264

Assessment Title ‘Critically evaluate the role of neural structures in subserving a specific
@psychological function’.
Module Title Cognitive Neuroscience Module Code PSY3123M

Module Coordinator John Hudson Due Date 25/01/2018

1. POSITIVE ASPECTS :

I believe I have managed to present supporting evidence for either of the arguments using
multiple approaches (behavioural, neuroimaging and neuropsychological).

I have managed to contrast the literature that was proposed at the early stages of the
research and more recently

2. AREAS TO IMPROVE ON:

I believe I could have directed my argument clearer and perhaps included other approaches
that may have helped me to achieve that.

I believe I could have expanded on neuroimaging evidence in a bit more depth and explore
other areas other than FFA

I believe my conclusion wasn’t as strong and informative

3. REQUESTED FEEDBACK:

The structure is always the key issue that I want to improve.

Especially the structure of conclusion, as I always seem to come across the problem of
making it the strong part of my essay.

4. DART - The University Disability Service:

1. Do you have a disability/medical condition? No

2. Are you in receipt of a DART report/learning support plan? No
School of Psychology
ASSESSMENT FEEDBACK SHEET

Section A- To be completed by Student

Exam ID 7383264

Assessment Title ‘Critically evaluate the role of neural structures in sub-serving a specific
@psychological function’. Timestamp
Module Title Cognitive Neuroscience Module Code PSY3123M

Module Coordinator John Hudson Due Date

25/01/2018

Section B- To be completed by Staff

Marked by (block capitals) Assessment Mark

(Please ensure a minimum of three points are made in sections 1, 2 and 3)

1. POSITIVE ASPECTS :

2. AREAS TO IMPROVE ON:

3. HOW TO ACHIEVE THE NEXT GRADE:

4. REFERENCING COMMENTS:

SIGNED ............................................................. DATE .......................................................

‘Critically evaluate the role of neural structures in sub serving a specific psychological

function’.

Faces are one of the most important visual stimuli perceived by human beings and even after more

than 50 years’ individuals are capable of recognizing a particular face with 90% accuracy (Bahrick,

Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975). People tend to possess the ability that allows them to process and

identify, virtually limitless amount of faces (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000). Therefore, faces can

help navigate social interactions in everyday life and provide various socially relevant information

such as individual’s identity, mood, gender and age (Bruce & Young, 1986). However, it is important

to address the question of how the faces are recognized, more specifically to understand whether

cognitive and neural processes that are used in identifying faces are the same or different when

recognizing objects (McKone, Kanwisher & Duchaine, 2006). Two theories have been established in

order to explain how face recognition occurs and demonstrate the differences in cognitive and

neural processes when processing faces and objects.

First, according to domain-specific hypothesis distinct processing used for faces is only applied for

faces and is different to processing of objects (Kanwisher, 2000; McKone & Kanwisher, 2005; Yin,

1969). It is important to note that this hypothesis doesn’t necessarily propose a mechanism that

demonstrates the origin of the special processing. However, it argues for the possibility that an

innate component is found within the special processing which may be needed to acquire

appropriate face experience at a certain period in development, such as critical time period

throughout infancy when developing normal face processing (Morton & Johnson, 1991; Le Grand,

Mondloch, Maurer & Brent, 2001). In addition, it was argued that there is a specific processing style

used in recognition of the faces referred to as holistic, which may only be unique for face recognition

but not for other objects (Farah, Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 1998; Rossion, 2013). Also, it was proposed

that there might be specialized neural mechanisms that are dedicated to face perception

(Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997).

Alternatively, according to expertise hypothesis the face-specific processing may potentially be a

general ability that occurs for faces as a result of extensive experience in identifying individual faces

(Carey, 1992; Diamond & Carey, 1986). Therefore, expertise hypothesis predicts that special
processing for faces may also occur in any other object category through the same mechanisms used

in face-processing, as a result of becoming a perceptual expert in another category (E.g. dogs, birds).

Also, one of the important assumptions of expertise hypothesis is that acquired

expertise/experience leading to special face-like processing can happen at any life period and

therefore is not restricted to experiences gained in childhood or infancy (McKone et al., 2006).

Finally, the following essay will evaluate the evidence within behavioural, neuropsychological and

neuroimaging fields in order to investigate the assumptions made by expertise and domain-specific

hypothesis.

In contrast to other visual stimuli, human faces are recognized as inseparable wholes (e.g. Gestalts),

rather than as combinations of individual parts of the face (Farah et al., 1998; Rossion, 2013). This

type of processing is called holistic and strong evidence is found in studies that show inability of

individuals to particularly attend to one part of the face without being affected by other parts

(Richler & Gauthier, 2014). For example, evidence comes from the studies with inversion effect

which proposes that individuals have lower recognition rates for faces that are inverted (e.g.

orientated upside-down) compared to other inverted non-face stimuli (Yin, 1969). In a “part-whole”

effect individuals are better at identifying specific face parts of a previously shown face when this

parts are presented within the whole face rather than in isolation (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Finally, in

a composite-effect individuals tend to perform worse in identifying one half of the particular face

(e.g. Barack Obama) if it is aligned with an incompatible other half of the face (e.g. Will Smith) than if

two incompatible halves are misaligned (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987).

One of the reasons as to why faces are processed holistically is explained by domain-specific

hypothesis which states that this type of processing is distinct to the face domain and cannot be

generalized to other type of stimuli (Kanwisher, 2000; McKone et al., 2007). For instance, Robbins &

McKone (2007) carried out series of experiments in which they examined the impact of configurable

(holistic) manipulations for faces and dogs in both dog experts and young novices. One of the aims of

their research was to challenge the results and ideas raised by Diamond and Carey (1986) who

demonstrated support for the expertise hypothesis. More specifically, they found that inversion

affected dog experts, reducing their recognition accuracy by 20% of both dogs and faces, suggesting

face-specific processing found in objects of expertise. However, Robbins & McKone (2007) found

alternative inversion effects in dog experts, demonstrating a reduction in recognition accuracy for
dogs by only 7%, whereas for faces the accuracy dropped by 21%. In the other experiment, the

composite-effect was introduced in order to demonstrate whether comparison of aligned and

misaligned conditions showed any evidence in regards to configural processing in dog experts when

looking at upright dogs. However, no composite effects were found when dog experts were

presented with stimuli of upright dogs, whereas highly significant composite effects were found in

the same participants when they were presented with upright faces. Therefore, results have

demonstrated no evidence of face-specific processing for objects of expertise in dog experts when

asked to complete various behavioural tasks. Robbins & McKone (2007) argued that the failure to

replicate results of Diamond and Carey’s (1986) experiment was because some of the dog experts

were familiar with the dog photos used as stimuli before the actual experiment took place.

Therefore, it can be argued that in Diamond and Carey’s (1986) experiment prior information may

have artificially increased participants’ memory for upright images.

On the other hand, more recently researchers found some support evidence for expertise

hypothesis arguing that holistic processing can be generalized to non-face stimuli using the same

mechanisms and all that is needed is a “history of attention to parts” (Chua, Richler & Gauthier,

2015, p. 728). In other words, face-like holistic processing occurs when both relevant and irrelevant

parts of the behavioural task (e.g., composite-effect task) have a history of being attended to and

that this parts are perceptually combined, letting attentional effect (holistic) to apply to the whole

object (Chua et al., 2015). There is evidence that is in line with this prediction which demonstrates

that holistic processing for non-face stimuli can arise as a result of extensive training in individual-

level differentiation (Wong, Palmeri & Gauthier, 2009). Wong et al., (2009) have trained their

participants with artificial objects (e.g. Ziggerins) using either individuation or categorization training

and compared the effects of those training techniques on holistic processing in those objects. It was

found that categorization training group only showed improvement in basic-level categorization and

demonstrated no changes in holistic processing for objects. Whereas the individuation training

group showed improvement in subordinate level categorization, but more importantly they

demonstrated an increased face-like holistic processing for non-face objects. However, the study did

not provide any reasoning in regards to particular aspects of training that were vital in acquisition of

face-like expertise. To address this issue future research can potentially conduct a systematic
examination of the effects of different training components in isolation and in combination (Wong et

al., 2009).

Next, over the last twenty years’ or so, researchers widely investigated the neural substrates that

are involved in adult face processing using positron emission tomography (PET) and functional

magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Sergent, Ohta & MacDonald, 1992; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Grill-

Spector, Knouf & Kanwisher; 2004; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). For instance,

Sergent et al., (1992) have used the positron emission tomography (PET) to examine brain areas

involved in object and face recognition. It was found that compared to nonsense gratings and curved

shapes, both faces and objects activated various areas in the occipital-temporal cortex. Furthermore,

the fusiform gyrus in the right hemisphere was activated by the face identity condition, whereas in

the object recognition condition only the left hemisphere was activated. However, relatively low

spatial and temporal resolution of PET scans makes it hard to measure cerebral activity, which

subsequently prevents any definite conclusions being made about the localization of regions in a

cerebral cortex (Sergent, Ohta, Macdonald & Zuck, 1994).

On the other hand, fMRI scans were found to produce higher resolution images which opened a new

method for researchers to examine the neural substrates involved in face processing. Kanwisher et

al., (1997) have demonstrated an additional evidence in regards to activation of the fusiform gyrus in

relation to face recognition. It was found that in 12 out of 15 participants the area of fusiform gyrus

was active significantly more when they were presented with faces rather than other objects. This

specific area of fusiform gyrus was named by the researchers as the fusiform face area (FFA). In

addition, activation of FFA was found to be almost identical in the conditions where participants

were presented with human, cartoon, and cat faces (Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, &

Kanwisher, 2000)

Alternatively, according to the expertise hypothesis, the FFA may not only demonstrate strong

activation for faces, but also for objects of a particular category (birds, cars) that an individual gained

substantial expertise for (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skuldlarski & Gore, 1999; Gauthier, Skuldarski,

Gore & Anderson, 2000). For instance, Gauthier et al., (2000) used fMRI technique to examine

activation of the FFA in participants who were either bird or car experts presented with tasks about

faces, familiar object, cars and birds. It was found that when bird experts looked at pictures of birds

and car experts looked at pictures of cars, the right FFA have demonstrated significant signal
increases. Moreover, it was found that signal increases in the FFA were correlated with the level of

expertise suggesting that intensity of FFA activation is related to the level of expertise and not the

visual properties of objects.

On the other hand, it was suggested that the activation of the FFA in regards to objects of expertise

may be explained in a different way other than brain engaging in the same type of computations

needed for face-processing (Robbins & McKone, 2007). For instance, it was argued that increased

activation in FFA can be due to experts devoting more attention towards the objects of expertise for

which they have more attentional engagement (McKone et al., 2006). That is, car experts are likely

to be more engaged in processing car stimuli rather than other objects which subsequently increases

the activation of the neural responses to objects of expertise. Also, it is important to consider the

problem of poor spatial resolution in fMRI as it may be combining other small adjacent areas that

have different functions (McKone et al., 2006). For instance, fMRI scans with higher resolution found

distinct areas dedicated for faces and for bodies (Schawrzlose, Baker & Kanwisher, 2005). Finally, the

further issue which may complicate the interpretation of the results in regards to expertise effects

found in the FFA is the similarity in the visual features of faces and other stimuli. That is, cars, birds

or even butterflies were found to resemble face-like features (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006).

In order to overcome the issues of visual similarity it is important to consider stimuli that do not

have face-like features (Bilalic, 2016). For instance, it was suggested that radiological stimuli like x-

rays of a human torso are unlikely to have the same face-like features. For instance, Harley et al.,

(2009) used fMRI to measure neural activity in the FFA of expert and novice radiologists, as they

completed the task of identifying abnormalities in chest x-rays. It was found that performance on

the behavioural task in experts had a reliable correlation with the neural activation in the FFA.

Whereas in novices FFA activation was not related to how well they performed in identification of

abnormalities in x-rays. Therefore, the results have supported the idea that FFA is activated by

stimuli that an individual has expertise for, and not only by faces. However, it was argued that in

accordance with other fMRI studies (poor resolution) it remains unclear whether expertise effects

found in FFA are not just the spread of activity from other nearby regions that have different

functional specialization (Schwarzlose et al., 2005). Alternatively, a more sensitive method that

would help in achieving higher resolution is multivariate pattern recognition analysis (MVPA) as

opposed to classical univariate fMRI analysis (Bilalic, 2016). That is, the advantage of MVPA analysis
is that it measures the activity of brain multiple voxel patterns (representation of brain cells in fMRI)

in response to experimental variables (conditions), whereas the univariate analysis only measures

the activity of individual brain voxels (Lewis-Peacock & Norman, 2013).

For instance, one of the studies examined the expertise effects in the FFA of radiologists and medical

students using the radiological images (Bilalic, Gorttenthaler, Nagele & Linding, 2014). Bilalic et al.,

(2014) employed MVPA method and argued that it will allow to measure full activation of patterns in

FFA which is more likely to identify expertise differences as opposed univariate fMRI analysis. It was

predicted that if FFA area was indeed expertise modulated and processes stimuli holistically, MVPA

will demonstrate that radiologists are better in distinguishing X-ray stimuli compared to other stimuli

(e.g. rooms and tools) as opposed to medical students who had limited radiological experience. It

was found that FFA in radiologists was significantly more active when they distinguished X-rays from

other stimuli than FFA in medical students.

Finally, one of the strongest pieces of evidence in regards to specialized processes for faces

recognition was found in cases of neurological patients with acquired prosopagnosia in which

individuals lose their ability of face recognition as a result of brain impairment (Kanwisher & Yovel,

2006). It has been argued that prosopagnosia is only the noticeable feature of a more general

impairment in object recognition called agnosia (Gauthier, Behrmann & Tarr, 1999). However,

studies of double dissociation between face and object recognition have demonstrated that the two

abilities are separated functionally and anatomically suggesting that particular brain damage can

selectively impair either of this abilities (McNeil & Warrington, 1993; Moscovitch, Winocur, &

Behrmann, 1997; Busigny, Joubert, Felician, Ceccaldi, Rossion, 2010). For instance, Moscovitch et al.,

(1997) examined a patient CK with visual object agnosia who was a collector of toy soldiers and had

expertise in differentiating them. As a result of a brain damage, CK has lost his ability to discriminate

between other group of objects (toy soldiers) whereas his face-recognition ability remained intact.

Alternatively, Busigny et al., (2010) investigated a case of acquired prosopagnosia in a patient GG.

They found that GG had preserved ability in recognizing non-face objects and being able to precisely

discriminate or recognize individual exemplars of a particular category of objects (birds, faces,

houses etc.). However, GG’s ability to recognize and discriminate faces was significantly impaired

which was associated with his inability to holistically process individual faces in various behavioural

tasks (whole-part, face inversion and composite tasks). Therefore, cases of CK and GG demonstrated
functional dissociations in their abilities of face and object recognition providing further support for

face-specific view.

Alternatively, researchers have argued that association found between face-specificity and

prosopagnosia may be due to lack of sensitivity in the methods that were employed to examine

object recognition and individuation of faces in laboratory and real-life settings (Bukach et al., 2012)

Gauthier et al., (1999) argued that measure of sensitivity will allow to identify the ability of agnosic

and prosopagnosic individuals in distinguishing between the same and different conditions of an

experiment.

Further, according to the expertise hypothesis it was argued that face recognition is just an example

of additional domain-general processes that potentially acts as a support when experts engage in

within-category differentiation of almost any visually similar object categories (Bukach et al., 2012).

Therefore, according to expertise account patients with acquired prosopagnosia who demonstrate

an impairment in their general expertise processes are likely to show loss in their ability of expert

differentiation in both, faces and other visually similar object categories. For instance, Bukach et al.,

(2012) wanted to test this prediction by training their prosopagnosic patient LR in order to achieve

expertise with a homogenous category of objects such as “Greebles” (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). It is

important to note that “Greebles” have a holistic configuration of parts, which is a feature that

discriminates faces from other object categories (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Thus, it was proposed

that despite LR’s normal object-recognition ability, his inability to process faces holistically using

multiple parts will also be demonstrated during the obtainment of Greeble expertise. Even though

LR eventually achieved the expertise criterion, it took him a lot more training sessions to do so

compared to controls suggesting the use of anomalous strategy. Researcher have also examined LR’s

ability to use multiple critical features of Greebles in the identification task of Greebles before and

after training. However, it was found that even after training LR have relied on the use of single-

feature strategy (shape differences) in order to identify Greebles. Thus, it was concluded that LR’s

use of single feature to differentiate both faces and Greebles is due to impairment of his general

expertise processes.

Finally, this essay has demonstrated a substantial amount of evidence in behavioural,

neuropsychological and neuroimaging fields regarding the debate of domain-specificity and domain-

generality (expertise hypothesis) in face recognition. The research has been very contradicting in
nature where several arguments were presented to support or oppose either side of the debate.

The ability to discriminate and recognize faces relies on mental representations made by individuals

regarding particular aspects of the face, that help them to differentiate one face from another.

Therefore, it is important to understand how such representations are made and the behavioural

evidence has demonstrated that individuals tend to process faces holistically, that is faces in a visual

system of an individual are represented as inseparable wholes (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). However,

recently Chua and colleagues (2015) have argued that holistic processing may not only be

generalized for face processing, but also for non-face stimuli as a result of extensive training in

individual level differentiation (Wong et al., 2009). Early neuroimaging research have provided

strong evidence of the FFA activation in regards to faces (Sergent et al., 1992; Kanwisher et al.,

1997). However more recent researcher has pointed out that strong activation of FFA may be related

to objects of particular category that an individual has substantial expertise for (Bilalic et al., 2016).

Finally, neurological studies of prosopagnosia cases have argued for specialization of processes in

face recognition as a result of impairment in individuals’ ability to recognize faces (Moscovitch et al.,

1997). Whereas, the expertise account has argued that impairment in face recognition may be an

example of general deficit in expertise processes (Bukach et al., 2012). Thus, it is argued that more

recent researcher points towards the idea of expertise account, where “special” processing for faces

can occur equally well for other objects in which individual has achieved expertise.
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