G.R. No. 125299 - People v. Doria y Bolado
G.R. No. 125299 - People v. Doria y Bolado
G.R. No. 125299 - People v. Doria y Bolado
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
PUNO , J : p
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit
as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked
bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw
Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later,
"Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team
were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3
Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not nd the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." 6 "Jun" led
the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and at woman inside. "Jun"
identi ed the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00
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as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's aps was open
and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with
the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves
recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be
dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 1 0
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and
Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testi ed that on December 5,
1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper.
Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys"
in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied
knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of
being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led
him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For ve (5)
minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to
"Totoy's" house. LibLex
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men,
later identi ed as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions
entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria
was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta
Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied
he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them.
When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria,
then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning
towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had something
inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car.
They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the
wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes
drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to
Violeta, Totoy's wife. 1 1
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on
December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived
with her husband and ve (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins
Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at
5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy,
a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan ve days earlier. She woke her children and bathed
them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her
youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving
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the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the
school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the
way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man
clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The
man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked
her about a box on top of the table. This was the rst time she saw the box. The box was
closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents. cdll
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao con rmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria
was a friend of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he
left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
marked bills were found in her person. 1 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-
appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group"
and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a ne of P500,000.00 each. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
The con scated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to
the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from
the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also
for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the
Supreme Court for mandatory review.
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SO ORDERED." 1 3
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME
FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH
INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING
HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY
WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH
IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF
THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT." 1 5 cdasia
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust
operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and
the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace o cers as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. 1 6 Entrapment has
received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards. 1 7
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Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century
American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover
agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. 1 8 Entrapment
sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and
application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 1 9 It also took off from
a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile
innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. 2 0
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning
because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated
by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. 2 1 The
classic de nition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United
States, 2 2 the rst Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is
the conception and planning of an offense by an o cer, and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion
or fraud of the o cer." 2 3 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery,
or fraud carried out by law enforcement o cers or the agents to induce a defendant to
commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government
o cials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of
the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. 2 4cdtai
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected
to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court
determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of
police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. 4 7
Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task
of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate
inducements. 4 8 On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the
need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if
known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the
conduct of the police and their agents was proper. 4 9 The undisputed fact that the accused
was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a
criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 5 0
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some
states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests. 5 1 In
Cruz v. State, 5 2 the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police
conduct must rst be determined. If this objective test is satis ed, then the analysis turns
to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 5 3 In Baca v. State, 5 4 the
New Mexico Supreme Court modi ed the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a
criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing
lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police
exceeded the standards of proper investigation. 5 5 The hybrid approaches combine and
apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while
apprehending the accused caught in agrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 5 6 we
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acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after nding that the
government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order
to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testi ed that Phelps' apprehension came after he
overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded signi cance to the fact that it was Smith who
went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of
them could smoke this drug. 5 7 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible." 5 8 In People v. Abella, 5 9 we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling
explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police o cer who
pretended to be a merchant. The police o cer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high
one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police o cer and that outside of his testimony,
there was no evidence su cient to convict the accused. 6 0 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se
Tieng, 6 1 we convicted the accused after nding that there was no inducement on the part
of the law enforcement o cer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed
the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending
o cer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by
pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. 6 2
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 6 3 we rst laid
down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16
Corpus Juris, 6 4 we held: prcd
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of
Appeals. In People v. Galicia, 6 6 the appellate court declared that "there is a wide
difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-
principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace o cer for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.
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67In People v. Tan Tiong , 6 8 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is
no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker." 6 9
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was a rmed by this
Court in People v. Tiu Ua. 7 0 Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It
is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. 7 1
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is
similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the
Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and
is considered an absolutory cause. 7 2 To determine whether there is entrapment or
instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending o cers, not
the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test rst applied in
United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. 7 3 Nevertheless,
adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst, 7 4 we applied both tests by examining the conduct
of the police o cers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's
membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also
considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes 7 5 and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's
evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke
marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 7 6
thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal. llcd
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material
in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law
enforcement o cers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment
procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws
are regulatory statutes. 7 7 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.
7 8 They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft,
arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 7 9
Laws de ning crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular
individuals, but against public order. 8 0 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a
whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a de nite person. 8 1 These
offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges
to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he
condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws,
rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its
own o cials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are
committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.
82
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance
of o cial duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied
with studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 8 9
It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution
of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. 9 0 Courts should not allow themselves
to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 9 1
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that
the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale
by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 9 2 The manner by which the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police o cer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals
must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of
the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit
the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain
criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the con dential informant who
initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant
was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo
of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testi ed in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical
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manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel.
Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1
Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the con dential informant is not fatal
to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to
hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. 9 3 It is well-settled
that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting o cers, 9 4 or there are
reasons to believe that the arresting o cers had motives to testify falsely against the
appellant, 9 5 or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction, 9 6 the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will
merely be corroborative of the apprehending o cers' eyewitness testimonies. 9 7 There is
no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and
adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. 9 8 LLphil
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other
police o cers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of
the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a
critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was
paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the
marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him
to PO3 Manlangit was actually identi ed by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court.
After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana
recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10)
bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when
brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each
of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police O cer, when you identi ed that box, Tell the court, how were
you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which
contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we con scated
from the suspect, sir .
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that
we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the
witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT
So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS
COURT
Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven
bricks?
PROSECUTOR
Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the scal
as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR
Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor,
despite reconsideration. LLjur
COURT
Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it
has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ
COURT
Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not
"tikoy?"
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A"
which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of ?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias
Jun, sir.
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Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the
investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and
this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT
Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other
letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this
Exhibit "A."
PROSECUTOR
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who
made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears
D-394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I
want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the
enclosure. LexLib
COURT
COURT
Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identi ed, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
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A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
The rst brick identi ed by PO3 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by
suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the
newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and
described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 1 0 0
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team
waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after
he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that
the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual
"kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there
must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher. 1 0 1 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer
received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. 1 0 2
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: prLL
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the
three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting o cer,
however shows otherwise:
"ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that
question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identi ed, the wrapper and the contents was
given to you by whom?
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that
question.
COURT:
Q Whereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give
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us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling
Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling
Neneth and saw her outside the house, she was not committing
any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just
outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1
Manlangit approached her?
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
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Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3
Manlangit was taking place, you were just in the side lines?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth? cdll
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no
testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According
to the records, the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of
Aling Neneth. That's right?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling
Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
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ATTY. VALDEZ:
Objects falling in plain view of an o cer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. 1 2 1 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement o cer in search of the evidence has a prior justi cation for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the o cer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
1 2 2 The law enforcement o cer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. 1 2 3 In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 1 2 4
The object must be open to eye and hand 1 2 5 and its discovery inadvertent. 1 2 6
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
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One ap is inside and the other ap is standing and with the
contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet
frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust
money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the
fact that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because
according to you, you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the
buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
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Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it? cdtai
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor. . .
Q You were only able to verify according to you . . .
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By
reading it. . .
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A
piece of plastic may be big or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
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Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the
information. Let the prosecutor do that for you. cdrep
COURT:
Continue. Next question.
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they
were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testi ed that they had no
information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.
1 3 1 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the
interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath
it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in
plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of
the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. 1 3 2 On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close
scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent
as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of
marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color . 1 3 3 PO3 Manlangit himself
admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items
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other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he
had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents . 1 3 4 It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana . The
marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution. 1 3 5 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should
have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 1 3 6
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 1 3 7 was found in the
house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a nding that she herself is guilty of
the crime charged. 1 3 8 Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin, 1 3 9 viz: cdphil
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement o cers against
those who would in ict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more
so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of
every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution
covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justi ed in
disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself." 1 4 0
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended
by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery,
distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a ne
ranging from ve hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. prLL
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the
submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller
thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court. 1 4 1
The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00
which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy
(970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution,
however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-
appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. 1 4 2
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City
acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
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1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring :
I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno. This Decision rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on
warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modi ed through an obiter
in People v. Ruben Montilla. 1 I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or a
search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help, especially to our law
enforcers who are often faced with actual situations that promptly call for their
application. LibLex
Valid Arrests
Without Warrants
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an
arrest without a warrant is lawful. It states:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace o cer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving nal judgment or temporarily
con ned while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx"
I shall focus my discussion on the rst two rules, which have been most frequently
misapplied and misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and
lawyers as well.
At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting o cer
must have personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense .
Under Section 5 (a), the o cer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate. cdpr
Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the
distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla, 9 when he upheld the
validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the latter was merely alighting from
a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have been perceived as committing a
crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a travelling bag and a carton. He did
not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of
the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no
outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to
commit an offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid
because he was caught in agrante delicto was only an obiter, for what nally nailed him
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down was his implied waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest.
2. "Hot Pursuit" Arrests
Section 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests. 1 0 Here, two
elements must also concur prior to the arrest: (1) an "offense has in fact just been
committed," and (2) the arresting o cer "has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting this type of arrest, "it is
not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed rst. . . The fact
of the commission of the offense must be undisputed." 1 1
Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts
constituting the offense, they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after
its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was committed. AND they must
also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated
the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will
not su ce. The arresting o cers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts
showing that the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime. 1 2 LLjur
In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain
individuals or groups were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information
was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of the lawmen. In People v. Burgos, 1 3 a
certain Masamlok informed police authorities that the appellant was involved in subversive
activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without securing a judicial
warrant, the police proceeded to appellant's house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly
recovered an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials.
The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting
o cers, since the information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed
out that at the time of his arrest, appellant was not in actual possession of any rearm or
subversive document; neither was he committing a subversive act. 1 4 His warrantless
arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113, Section 6
(now 5) of the Rules of Court.
Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justi cation
that the arresting o cer "received an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying
marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl." The Court categorically
stated that such "[r]aw intelligence information is not a su cient ground for a warrantless
arrest." 1 5 And since, at the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious
enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest.
To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses
for which the culprit could be arrested any time in agrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos, 1 6
there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New
People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He
alleged that there was no valid justi cation for his arrest without a warrant, because he
was not then committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had just
committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital. cdtai
The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently
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charged, was a continuing offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA
member "did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, . . . simply because he was,
at the time of his arrest, con ned in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike other so-called 'common'
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing
organized government is attained." 1 7
In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so
were the searches conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to
the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed rearm),
were considered inadmissible as evidence against the person wrongfully arrested.
Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a judicial warrant
must be preceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly issued
therefor.
To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote
these inspiring words from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos: 1 8
"The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases speci cally provided by law. To do so
would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated
and so deserving of full protection."
Valid Searches
Without Warrants
The general rule is that a judicial warrant must rst be duly obtained before search
and seizure may be conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be
conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant
to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches incidental to
violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and frisk." 1 9 cda
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made
even without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention
of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code speci cally allows police
authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law." 2 3
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a
recognized exception to the rule against a warrantless search. 2 4 The consent to the
search, however, must be express, knowing and voluntary. A search based merely on
implied acquiescence is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under
intimidating and coercive circumstances. 2 5
Footnotes
1. Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659.
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2. Rollo, pp. 6-7.
3. Exhibits "A-1" to "A-4," "B-1" to "B-3."
4. Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2."
5. TSN of February 6, 1996, p. 10.
6. TSN of February 6, 1996, pp. 11-12.
10. Exhibits "Q," and "R;" TSN of March 5, 1996, pp. 2-11.
11. TSN of May 8, 1996, pp. 2-8.
12. TSN of April 10, 1996, pp. 4-17.
13. Decision of the trial court, pp. 13-14, Rollo, pp. 30-31.
14. Brief for Accused-Appellant Florencio Doria, pp. 8, 14, Rollo, pp. 52, 58.
15. Brief for Accused-Appellant Violeta Gaddao, p. 39, Rollo, p. 126.
16. People v. Basilgo, 235 SCRA 191 [1994]; People v. Yap, 229 SCRA 787 [1994]; People v.
Macasa, 229 SCRA 422 [1994].
17. People v. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 [1995]; People v. Tadepa, 244 SCRA 339 [1995];
People v. Basilgo, supra.
18. 21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 203 [1981 ed.]; see also State v. Campbell, 110 NH
238, 265 A2d 11, 13 [1970] — sale of narcotics; Annotation in 62 ALR 3d 110, Sec. 2[a].
19. 21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 204 [1981 ed.]; see also United States ex rel. Hall v.
Illinois (CA7 Ill) 329 F2d 354, 358-359 cert den 379 US 891, 13 L Ed 2d 94, 85 S Ct 164
[1964] — unlawful sale and possession of narcotic drugs.
20. Id.; see also State v. Campbell, supra, at 13; United States v. Becker (CA2 NY) 62 F2d
1007, 1009 [1933] — sending obscene matter in interstate commerce.
65. Id., at 52-53; also cited in People v. Hilario and Aguila, 93 Phil. 386, 389-390 [1953].
66. 40 O.G. No. 23, p. 4476 [1941].
67. Id., at 4478.
68. 43 O.G. No. 4, p. 1286 [1947].
77. Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent
Provocateurs," The Yale Law Journal, vol. 60: 1091, 1093 [1951].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id., at 1094.
84. People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 563 [1994]; People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759, 764 [1994];
People v. Crisostomo, 222 SCRA 511, 514 [1993]; People v. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151,
159 [1986]; People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50, 58-59 [1986].
85. Id.
86. People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759, 764-765 [1994]; People v. Salcedo, 195 SCRA 345, 352
[1991]; People v. William, 209 SCRA 808, 814 [1992]; People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50, 58-59
[1986].
87. 591 P. 2d 947 [Cal. 1979].
88. Id. at 955. The Supreme Court of California quoted Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs," Yale Law Journal,
vol. 60: 1091, 1111 [1951], also herein cited; See also Paton, Cornell Law Review, supra,
at Note 55. It must be noted, however, that entrapment is not based on constitutional
grounds as search and seizure and forced confessions — United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 430, 36 L Ed 2d 366, 372-373, 93 S Ct 1637 [1973].
89. Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184 [1995]; People v. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27 [1994];
People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759, 771 [1994].
90. Sorrells v. United States, supra, at 457, Roberts, J ., concurring.
91. Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184, 191 [1995]; People v. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27, 35
[1994]; People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759, 771 [1994].
92. People v. Tadepa, 244 SCRA 339, 341-342 [1995]; People v. Crisostomo, 222 SCRA 511,
515 [1993].
93. People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995]; People v. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67 [1995]; People v.
Marcelo, 223 SCRA 24 [1993].
94. People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 [1994].
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95. People v. Sillo, 214 SCRA 74 [1992].
96. People v. Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91 [1990]; People v. Libag, 184 SCRA 707, 717-715
[1990]; People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184, 191-192 [1990].
97. People v. Lucero, 229 SCRA 1, 9-10 [1994]; People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455, 464 [1994];
People v. Solon, 244 SCRA 554, 561 [1995]; People v. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 [1995].
98. People v. Solon, 244 SCRA 554 [1995]; People v. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733 [1995].
99. TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 14-18; Emphasis supplied.
100. TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 16-17.
101. People v. Ponsica, 230 SCRA 87, 95-96 [1994]; People v. Agustin, 215 SCRA 725, 732-
733 [1992].
107. Section 12, Rule 126; Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
108. People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69 [1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-
128 [1991].
109. Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871-874
[1968].
110. People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 153 [1993]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697
[1986].
111. People v. Tabar, supra, at 153-154; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937]; People v.
Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
112. TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 17-18; Direct examination; Emphasis supplied.
113. TSN of March 12, 1996, pp. 16-18, Cross-examination by counsel for Violeta Gaddao;
Emphasis supplied.
114. Compare with People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97, 103 [1990], where the two accused were
pursued and arrested a few minutes after consummating the sale of marijuana. "Hot
pursuit" has a technical meaning. It is a doctrine in International Law which means the
pursuit in the high seas of a foreign vessel undertaken by the coastal state which has
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that state
(Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, p. 90 [1992]).
115. Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917].
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Police officers had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime after
conducting a surveillance of the accused (People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v.
Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990]), or a prior test-buy operation (People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA
184 [1990]).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. PO3 Manlangit affirmed this fact in his cross-examination by counsel for appellant
Gaddao — TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 42-43.
119. SPO1 Badua's testimony does not clearly establish where he found the marked bills —
whether from appellant Gaddao's person or after a search of her house.
120. Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, p. 195 [1995].
121. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1069 [1968]; see also Bernas,
supra, at 174.
122. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971]; Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 510 [1983]; see also People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 611
[1993] citing both cases.
123. Harris v. United States, supra, at 1069.
124. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 582.
125. Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Cruz, supra, at 151.
126. Roan v. Gonzales, supra, at 697, citing Harris v. United States, supra; Bernas, supra, at
174 citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 [1971].
127. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744, 751 [1981]; also cited in People v.
Musa, supra, at 612 and Note 48; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235,
245, Note 13 [1979].
128. Robbins v. California, supra, at 751; Texas v. Brown, supra, at 514.
129. People v. Musa, supra, at 611.
130. TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 44-47; Emphasis supplied.
131. TSN of February 20, 1996, p. 31.
142. Section 23, R.A. 7659 amending Article 62 of the Dangerous Drugs Act; see also
Section 17 (5), R.A. 7659 amending Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:
1. GR No. 123872, January 30, 1998.
2. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159,174, December 12, 1997.
3. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 14, September 4, 1986; citing Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859 (1948).
4. Malacat v. CA, supra.
5. 210 SCRA 174, June 22, 1992, per Cruz, J.
6. Ibid., p. 180.
7. 163 SCRA 402, July 6, 1988, per Cruz, J.
8. 280 SCRA 72, October 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
9. Supra.
10. Malacat v. CA, supra.
11. People v. Burgos, supra, p. 15, per Gutierrez, J.
12 Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263, October 3, 1991.
13. Supra.
14. Supra, p. 14.
15. Supra, p. 87.
16. 187 SCRA 311, July 9, 1990; 202 SCRA 251, October 3, 1991 (per curiam).
17. The Anti-Subversion Law, which prohibited mere membership in a subversive
organization, has since been repealed.
18. Supra, p. 14, per Gutierrez, J.
19. Malacat v. CA, supra, p. 174; citing Mustang Lumber v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA
430, 450,1996; Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil 439 (1909); Rule 126, § 12, Rules of Court; and
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). See also Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687, 697, November 25, 1986; citing several cases.
20. Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in Nolasco v. Paño, 147 SCRA
509, 515, January 30, 1987.
21. People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 611, January 27, 1993; citing Coolidge v. new
Hampshire, 403 US 443, 29 L ed. 2d 564, 583 (1971); Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 75 L
ed. 2d 502 (1983); Concurring Opinion by Stewart, Brennan and White, JJ , in Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 US 557, 22 L ed. 2d 542 (1969); and Walter v. US , 447 US 649, 65 L ed. 2d
410 (1980).
22. Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 873-874 (1968), per Zaldivar, J .; quoting from 47 Am Jur
513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L ed. 543, 45 S Ct. 280, 39 ALR
790; and People v. Case, 320 Mich 379, 190 NW 389, 27 ALR 686. See also Roldan v.
Arca, 65 SCRA 336.
23. Papa v. Mago, ibid., pp. 871-872, citing pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and Carroll v. United States, 39 ALR 790, 799. See also People v. CFI of Rizal, Br. IX
, 101 SCRA 86, November 17, 1980.
24. People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561, 576, September 5, 1997; People v. Fernandez, 239
SCRA 174, December, 17, 1994; People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557, March 29, 1994; People
v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992.
25. Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424, 436-437, October 7, 1994.
26. Supra.
27. 392 US 1; 88 S Ct. 1868; 20 L ed. 2d 889 (1968).