CHI MING TSOI vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision
of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
follows: From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A") After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the
first night of their married life. It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations
were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The plaintiff claims, that the
defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband. On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. But, he said that he does not want his
marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there
is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science. The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because
she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences. The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-
C") The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I-in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making
any findings of fact.
II-in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III-in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV-in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself
that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion;
and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether
or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between
them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim
that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him
does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time
(from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111
Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the
fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the
wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with
his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts
have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the
context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking
meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between
the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats
the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor. The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at
the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to
the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge)
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due
to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, vs.HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides: SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person
charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his
control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of
white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He
argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation
of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary
to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to
enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with
the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused." On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference.
It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to
plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect,
suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial
conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate
an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is
disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia
with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court
in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for
the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A.
No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions,
the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending
before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising
the issues as follows:
I.WHETHER SECTION 23 OF RA NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERSThe People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that
the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3)
the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing
to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it
must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may
permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a

petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental
importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic,"
"monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the
lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally
noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the
protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law
enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and
its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally
eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in
this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else
depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to
resolve a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with
the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity,
courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions
continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power
for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the
exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and
71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that
"x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on
the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable
jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the
power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
x x x x"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
x x x xIn Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which,
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the
1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more
independent judiciary."
 The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether or not
the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of
powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the
word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal
to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of
the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court
and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits
courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's
authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took
effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of
any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser
offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118
mandated: SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was
modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of
the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially
adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to
be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of
not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial): SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections
to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense;
and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the
scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.
It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural
and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People
v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right
of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration
operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival
of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The
time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc
primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by
eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public
prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the
public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State
and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he
greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have
been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its
case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may
have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from
justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult
it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The
possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment,
curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it
may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an
accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the
judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the
remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation
of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising
from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties,
plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration
of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable
penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial
are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may
more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the
State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial;
it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971]) The defendant avoids extended pretrial
incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his
guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and
scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
 In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and
finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Considering the presence of mutuality of
advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him
and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the
offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses
face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Yet a defendant has no
constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty
to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what
the evidence on hand can sustain. [Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and
importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot
accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial
court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused. Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a
grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of
not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.9165 violates the equal protection clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to
equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23
of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We
deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.SO ORDERED.

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE vsRODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations. This resolves the Petition for Review 1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed
the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of
Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of
Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued employment at his
family's printing press business. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn, who
was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986. Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with
their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to
stalk her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house
because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would
have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day. 13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so
they could have sex.14During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her with things. 15 Rodolfo also
suggested that they invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated. 17 Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's
advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel. Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a
priest, as well as any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo. 19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan". Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because
Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. 21 In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head.
Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa
never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself. On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage 23 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo
failed to file a responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and
referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion investigation. Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no
collusion and recommended the trial of the case on the merits.
Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference. The pre-trial conference was declared closed and
terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence.Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a
clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness. 30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria
Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of
psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend. After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez
concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional
impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not
severe enough to constitute psychological incapacity. Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered
mail.35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman
ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor,
wala kayong pakialam sa akin."36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless
driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria
Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity."
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the other
personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. 38 Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder
was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model. 39 Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric
patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's. 40 Dr.
Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia. Dr. Lopez recommended that
Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital obligations. Summons was served
upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading. 43 He likewise did not appear during the pre-trial conference. 44 He was given a
specific date to present evidence but he still failed to appear. 45 he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of
his right to present evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal
offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. 48 The Office of the Solicitor
General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification
and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision 50 granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave
credence to his findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held that the marriage
between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave,
serious and incurable. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.
null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal
partnership (sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall remain
in the custody of the petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability of the respondent to give
support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the marriage
was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision. SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
n August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. 53 The Office of the Solicitor General
explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. 54 It
was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling. 55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby deemed
moot and academic. This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3,
1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case.The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the
Solicitor General,58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr.
Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.The Court of Appeals
granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for
being hearsay, thus, the trial court should not have given it weight. 61 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding
that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. 62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief that he would
change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years before getting married, showed that they were in good terms during
the early part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage. 63 The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration 65 but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 66 dated May 25,
2009. On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion was needed to
prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as long as the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological
incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld. 69 Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's
Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married." 71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, 72 agreed that a physician was not required to declare a person
psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the presence of a
psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's
alleged psychological incapacity.73
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was based on
interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2)
common friends in the report.74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best
friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report. 75 The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's
psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez. 76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations. The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals 77 was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for determining
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 78 Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 80 provided the
guidelines to be followed when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The
following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of
petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he
had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition. The Court of
Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts." 83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not
deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party." 84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to
examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented
establishes the party's psychological condition.
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity,
incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the psychological
impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and
petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering
from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy;
his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible
and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of
disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he investigated
the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent
developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually
developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples who are close to one another; that people
close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of
the respondent. The said disorder started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that
patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek
treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. 1âwphi1 He recommends that the marriage be annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion
on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a
similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his late childhood years and
developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model. The juridical antecedence of respondent's
psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even
before their marriage, and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. 91 She
believed that he would change after they got married; 92 however, this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so
extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that
a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for
treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a
lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at
seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show
that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and
dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by
alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon
escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through
different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation. 94 Although not specifically
named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who
is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as
but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the
family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as
well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After
she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong
in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive
enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the pronouncement we
made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children, property relations,
disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. 1âwphi1 The state's interest should not
amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not only be based on a
medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public
interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines "has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions." 97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of
such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to
protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La
Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.