Design, Integration, Certification and Testing of The Orion Crew Module Propulsion System
Design, Integration, Certification and Testing of The Orion Crew Module Propulsion System
Design, Integration, Certification and Testing of The Orion Crew Module Propulsion System
R=20140009924 2018-12-08T09:01:15+00:00Z
50th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference
Heather McKay, Eric Coffman, Sarah May, Rich Freeman, George Cain
Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company;
and
Rex Delventhal
NASA/Glenn Research Center
The Orion Crew Module Propulsion Reaction Control System is currently complete and
ready for flight as part of the Orion program’s first flight test, Exploration Flight Test One
(EFT-1). As part of the first article design, build, test, and integration effort, several key
lessons learned have been noted and are planned for incorporation into the next build of the
system. This paper provides an overview of those lessons learned and a status on the Orion
propulsion system progress to date.
I. Introduction
The Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) is NASA’s next generation spacecraft for human exploration of
deep space. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the design, development, qualification and integration of
the vehicle. The Orion vehicle is comprised of 3 major elements – a Crew Module, a Service Module, and a Launch
Abort System (LAS). A key component of the Orion Crew Module (CM) is the Propulsion Reaction Control System
(RCS), a high-flow hydrazine system used during re-entry to orient the vehicle for landing. The system consists of a
completely redundant helium (GHe) pressurization system and hydrazine fuel system that supplies twelve 160 lbf
monopropellant thrusters. The propulsion system has been designed, integrated, and qualification tested in support
of the Orion program’s first orbital flight test, Exploration Flight Test One, EFT-1, scheduled for 2014. A subset of
the development challenges from this first flight test campaign will be discussed in this paper for consideration when
designing future spacecraft propulsion systems.
The concept of operations (CONOPS) and human rating requirements of the CM propulsion system are unique
when compared with a typical satellite propulsion reaction control system. The system requires a high maximum
fuel flow rate. It must operate at both vacuum and sea level atmospheric pressure conditions. The system must
meet stringent Orion human rating requirements.
C. EM-1 Improvements
There are several lessons learned from the EFT-1 vehicle that are being incorporated into the design of the CM
for the follow-on vehicle, Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1). Mainly, weld head access and alignment problems led to
welding challenges during on-vehicle integration.
During manufacturing of tubing assemblies, the trim to fit operations required added time to the operation and
introduced unique fit up and installation challenges during clean room operations. These operations included tube
trimming, facing, fit up and welding. Trimming operations during fit up were often asymmetric, resulting in tighter
tolerances in some locations than others. As a result clearance issues within the propulsion system and between
other subsystems required resolution as the build progressed.
Many saddle clamps were in locations that were difficult to access including behind tanks and pressure control
assemblies. The saddle clamps were comprised of many individual parts, and required extra diligence to control
many individual parts during installation activities, especially in inaccessible areas. On-vehicle closeout welds were
often in locations that were difficult to align tube ends for welding. This led to additional challenges for non-
destructive evaluation (NDE) and X-ray. The released engineering showed only a general routing of heater and
temp sensor harnessing on EFT-1. Engineering on EM-1 will have better definition of heater and temp sensor
harnessing to better determine tie down locations and avoid clearance issues.
The thruster pod design on EFT-1 consisted of struts attaching the pods to the primary structure. The struts took
up volume shared with tube and harness routing raceways, and required heavier primary and secondary structure.
The RCS thruster pods will be mounted to primary structure gussets on EM-1, increasing routing volume and
reducing mass. The EFT-1 thrusters were designed without a nearby support location for the tubing attached at the
thruster valve inlet and required the addition of brackets on the pods to support tubes. Additionally, in multiple
locations, the on vehicle welding locations for thruster inlets were challenging to access.
B. Test Configuration
The hot fire test article consisted of a mix of flight-like hardware and ground hardware, with 4 flight-like engine
and 8 hydraulic simulators to replicate engine flow rate and pressure drop response. The Hot Fire Test Article
(HFTA) also included two ASME-certified propellant tanks and all fluid and gas handling components, distribution
lines, controls, and instrumentation required to control and monitor the HFTA test activities.
The system was instrumented with a number of strain gages, thermocouples, accelerometers, and pressure
transducers which were used to measure system responses.
The hot fire test series successfully met the test objectives, and the results provided valuable insight into the
EFT-1 system performance. However, there were two issues encountered during test that had to be resolved prior to
requirements verification. During HFTA, the waterhammer pressures in the system exceeded predictions.
Waterhammer occurs when high flowing fuel is rapidly stopped by a closing engine valve, resulting in a spike in
system pressure. By performing additional stress analyses on the fuel manifold tubing and valves, it was determined
that these waterhammer pressures were acceptable in the system. The second anomaly occurred when one of the
engines emitted a cloud of white vapor during test. It was determined that the large cloud was fuel vapor from
hydrazine that was not fully combusted when it flowed through the engine. After extensive investigation, the root
cause of this anomaly was identified as poisoning of the catalyst with other potential contributing factors. The
causes are primarily sea level ground test issues and not a significant risk for the EFT-1 flight.
A sample of the data collected during hot fire test is shown below in Figure 2. Analytical models predicting
waterhammer pressure transients, pressurization performance, and material stresses were correlated with test data
and will be used to make analytic predictions for future missions. The engines demonstrated performance margin
above the maximum flight values, and the overall system robustness was confirmed over a range of stressing
nominal and off-nominal conditions. The Orion HFTA met the objectives of test and provided valuable insight into
the EFT-1 mission performance.
Figure 2: Representative Hot Fire Data Depicting Waterhammer, Engine Valve Current, and Engine
IV. EFT-1 Integration Chamber Pressures Installation
and On-Vehicle