For Legal Technique & Logic

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]

FIDEL M. BAÑARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAÑARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL
BESARINO, petitioners,

vs.

ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.[1]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino
were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa[2] filed by the private respondents. The cases were
assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.

After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss the
aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the
parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal.[4] Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount
involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [5] and Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.[7]

The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995[8] denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to
the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the
cases.[9]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised
Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss.[10]

On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against
petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[11]

More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a Motion to
Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to
the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.[12] Attached to the motion was a Certification dated
February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal[13] stating that the
parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private respondents against
petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a Comment
and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13,
1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-
filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.[14]

On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order[15] granting private respondents Motion to Revive.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
municipal trial court.[17]

Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition assailing the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the said
Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and
executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order.[18] In
response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment,[19] arguing that the motion to revive the said cases
was in accordance with law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[20]

After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions,[21] the Regional Trial
Court rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as
follows:

Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents comment thereto, the Court
regrets that it cannot agree with the petitioner (sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal
cases were dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the
private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal
of said cases was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has
not attained finality at all.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned
Decision for lack of merit.[24]

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following questions of law:

1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;

2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived
by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and

3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was
dismissed without prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of
dismissal has become final and executory.[25]

Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary
fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the courts order, the order of
dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or
information.[26] Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the court
which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of
the parties with respect to said case.[27]

On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of
decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for
non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive
regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.[28]

Petitioner’s contentions are meritorious.

A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined by the court.[29] As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.[30]

This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order [31] if no motion
for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order
was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without
 prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order
but a final disposition of the complaint.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order
disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.[33]

After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke.[34] A final judgment or order cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous
conclusion by the court which rendered the same.[35]

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the
courts power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new
complaint.

This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[36] where we ruled thus:

The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set
aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court’s docket.
Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be
reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the
filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding
filing fees prescribed by law.

xxx

[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen
(15) days therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remains within the control
of the Court, the plaintiff may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action
before that period lapses. But after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-
day reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or
"revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another
complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of
finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses
jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof
inconsistent with such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)

Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as
well. In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of
a new information for the offense."[39]

Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and
ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the
criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a
motion to revive.

Equally erroneous is private respondents’ contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the
Revised Rules of Court[40] do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival
of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said provision states:

Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.[42]

There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents view. Section 18 merely states
that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for
non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed
case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no
declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within
which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies
suppletorily to cases covered by the former:

Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of
Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as
they are not inconsistent therewith.[43]

A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure
and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10,[44] and Rule 36, Section 2[45] of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments
also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or
made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.[46] Hence,
the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence [47]applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.

The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said
doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date
set by law.[48]

It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure
especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases
expeditiously.[49] To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion
even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from settling justiciable
controversies with finality,[50] thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court
that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of
1991[51] may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law[52] is
not jurisdictional in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss.[54] The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the
causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as
soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their
arraignment.

However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the
ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground was
raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had
long become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled [55] by the Municipal Trial
Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.[56]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby
SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-
0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.

SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.