Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182585

November 27, 2009

JOSEPHINE MARMO,* NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and MARISA DEL
PILAR, Petitioners,
vs.
MOISES O. ANACAY Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 filed by the spouses Josephine Marmo
and Nestor Esguerra and the spouses Danilo del Pilar and Marisa del Pilar (collectively,
the petitioners), to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated December 28, 2007 and
the Resolution3 dated April 11, 2008 of the Former Special Eleventh Division of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673. The assailed CA Decision dismissed the
petitioners petition for certiorari challenging the Orders dated March 14, 2006 4 and May
8, 20065 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite in Civil Case
No. 2919-03, while the assailed CA Resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, as gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized
below:
On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of
Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the petitioners6 and the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2919-03.7 The complaint states,
among others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife,
Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the house built
thereon, located at Blk. 54, Lot 9, Regency Homes, Brgy. Malinta, Dasmarias, Cavite,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-815595 of the Register of Deeds of
Cavite; they authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner
Josephine sold the subject property to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in
monthly installments of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006; petitioner Danilo
defaulted in his installment payments from December 2002 onwards; the respondent
subsequently discovered that TCT No. 815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424
was issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale
dated September 20, 2001; petitioner Josephine subsequently transferred her title to
petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in
petitioner Danilos name. The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the
alternative, he demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance of P347,000.00
with interest from December 2002, and the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees,
and cost of suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondents
children, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs
because they are indispensable parties.8 Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner Josephines
submission in his Answer.9
Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for
the respondents failure to include his children as indispensable parties.10

The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable
parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the
proceedings.11
THE RTC RULING
The RTC found the respondents argument to be well-taken and thus denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss in an Order dated March 14, 2006.12 It also noted that the
petitioners motion was simply filed to delay the proceedings.
After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,13 the petitioners elevated their case
to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.14 They
charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not
dismissing the case after the respondent failed to include indispensable parties.
THE CA RULING
The CA dismissed the petition15 in a Decision promulgated on December 28, 2007. It
found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners motion to dismiss, noting that the respondents children are not
indispensable parties.
The petitioners moved16 but failed17 to secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision;
hence, the present petition.
Following the submission of the respondents Comment18 and the petitioners Reply,19 we
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.20 Both parties complied.21
Meanwhile, on April 24, 2009, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the pendency of the present petition. The RTC denied the motion to
suspend as well as the motion for reconsideration that followed. The petitioners
responded to the denial by filing with us a petition for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from proceeding with the hearing of the case
pending the resolution of the present petition.
THE PETITION and
THE PARTIES SUBMISSIONS
The petitioners submit that the respondents children, who succeeded their deceased
mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full
determination of the case cannot be made without their presence, relying on Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals,22 Orbeta v. Sendiong,23 and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo.24 They
argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondents children are not
indispensable parties because the issue involved in the RTC whether the signatures of
the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001
were falsified - can be resolved without the participation of the respondents children.
THE ISSUE
The core issue is whether the respondents children are indispensable parties in Civil
Case No. 2919-03. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is
whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in ruling that the respondents children are not indispensable parties.
OUR RULING
We see no merit in the petition.

Genera
l Rule: The denial of a motion to dismiss
is an interlocutory order which is
not the proper subject of an
appeal or a petition for
certiorari.

At the outset, we call attention to Section 1 of Rule 4125 of the Revised Rules of Court
governing appeals from the RTC to the CA. This Section provides that an appeal may be
taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. It explicitly states as well
that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening developments between the
commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that
does not end the whole controversy.26 An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an
incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves
something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits. 27
An Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose
of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by the
court. Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order.28
In the present case, since the petitioners did not wait for the final resolution on the
merits of Civil Case No. 2919-03 from which an appeal could be taken, but opted to
immediately assail the RTC Orders dated March 14, 2006 and May 8, 2006 through a
petition for certiorari before the CA, the issue for us to address is whether the RTC, in
issuing its orders, gravely abused its discretion or otherwise acted outside or in excess of
its jurisdiction.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners Motion to
Dismiss; the respondents co-owners are not indispensable parties.
The RTC grounded its Order dated March 14, 2006 denying the petitioners motion to
dismiss on the finding that the respondents children, as co-owners of the subject
property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case.
We agree with the RTC.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court29 defines indispensable parties as partiesin-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who, for
this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence further
holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy in a situation where the
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a
person whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or
equitable determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties. 30
When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."
We have explained in Vencilao v. Camarenta31 and in Sering v. Plazo32 that the term
"action in ejectment" includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio).33 We also noted in Sering that the term "action in ejectment" includes "also,
an accion publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria34(recovery of
ownership)." Most recently in Estreller v. Ysmael,35 we applied Article 487 to an accion

publiciana case; in Plasabas v. Court of Appeals36 we categorically stated that Article 487
applies to reivindicatory actions.
We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit without impleading other
co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. We made this ruling
in Vencilao, where the amended complaint for "forcible entry and detainer" specified that
the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the disputed properties. In Sering,
andResuena v. Court of Appeals,37 the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not
represent themselves as the exclusive owners of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo
and Teresa Santiago,38 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the coowners precisely to recover lots owned in common.39 In Plasabas, the plaintiffs alleged in
their complaint for recovery of title to property (accion reivindicatoria) that they are the
sole owners of the property in litigation, but acknowledged during the trial that the
property is co-owned with other parties, and the plaintiffs have been authorized by the
co-owners to pursue the case on the latters behalf.
These cases should be distinguished from Baloloy v. Hular40 and Adlawan v.
Adlawan41 where the actions for quieting of title and unlawful detainer, respectively, were
brought for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claimed to be the sole owner. We held
that the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleaded the other co-owners who
are indispensable parties. In these cases, the absence of an indispensable party
rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
We read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought by a coowner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for
the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other coowners. However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole
ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners
are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects
the rights and interests of these other co-owners.
In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed
the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the
litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the questioned
property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more importantly, the
respondents claim in his complaint in Civil Case No. 2919-03 is personal to him and his
wife, i.e., that his and his wifes signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioner Josephine were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which
does not require the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be
determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their
signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately
protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since the
complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties
owned in common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the coowners.421avvphi1
In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not
indispensable parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of De
Guzman43 that in cases like this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit
is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all.44 Thus, the respondents children need not
be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2919-03.
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners reliance on our rulings in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals,45 Orbeta v. Sendiong46 and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo,47 for these cases
find no application to the present case. In these cited cases, the suits were either filed
against a co-owner without impleading the other co-owners, or filed by a party claiming
sole ownership of a property that would affect the interests of third parties.

Arcelona involved an action for security of tenure filed by a tenant without impleading all
the co-owners of a fishpond as party-defendants. We held that a tenant, in an action to
establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners as partydefendants since a tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners as party-defendants
cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land. Orbeta, on the
other hand, involved an action for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages
wherein the plaintiffs prayed that they be declared "absolute co-owners" of the disputed
property, but we found that there were third parties whose rights will be affected by the
ruling and who should thus be impleaded as indispensable parties. In Galicia, we noted
that the complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and annulment of title
alleged that the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest was deprived of possession and
ownership by a third party, but the complaint failed to implead all the heirs of that third
party, who were considered indispensable parties.
In light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners prayer for a TRO to
suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the present petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to show
any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007 and Resolution
dated April 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673, both of which we
hereby AFFIRM. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice