Quimsing Vs Tajanglangit

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Quimsing vs Tajanglangit

G.R. No. L-19981 February 29 1964

FACTS:

May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s appointments were confirmed- May 17, 1962- at
the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all the confirmed
appointments was approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for its next
meeting- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police
of Iloilo. Hence this petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the
position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and duly
qualified and the functions of which he was actually discharging.

ISSUE

WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of
his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon.

RULING:

The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void,
because said position was not vacant. The Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments
provide:“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table,
and this shall be final disposition on such a motion." “SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of
an appointment shall not be sent to the President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period
for its reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is pending."

The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s appointment, it was merely under reconsideration.
It has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s appointment was delivered to Malacañang.
This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for
reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the
confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that
the appointment was confirmed.

Guvera vs Inocentes
16 Scra 379 1996 [Ad Interim Appointments]

FACTS:

On November 25, 1965, Onofre Guevara took his oath as an Undersecretary of Labor after his
appointment was extended ad interim on November 22, 1965. The appointment was questioned by
Rauol Inocentes on the ground that Guevara’s appointment ceases to be valid after each term of
Congress. At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate adjourned its session. The House of
Representatives continued its session and adjourned upon learning the Senate’s adjournment. In the
case of Guevara’s appointment, Congress, through the Commission on appointments has not acted on it
while the special session is being conducted.

ISSUE:

Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid.

RULING:

Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointment shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress"

The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until disapproval of the
Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress, whether special or regular session. In
this case, the second mode of termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at about
midnight of January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of petitioner Guevara ineffective. The
contention that the Commission on Appointments should be first organized before the second mode can
be made effective is untenable because they are two different and separate modes of termination.

Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-known maxim in statutory
construction applies. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

De Rama vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner: Conrado L. de RamaRespondent: Court of Appeals (Ninth Division, the Civil Servi
ce Commission)

Ponente: Ynares-SantiagoFACTS:

Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, wrote a letter to the Civil Servic
e Commission (dated July13, 1995) seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees.

Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of sai
d employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done
in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the1987 Constitution.

Three of the said employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed
with the CSC a claim forpayment of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments
were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim,Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Que
zon, petitoner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries andbenefits pursuant to Offic
e Order No. 95-01.
Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-
Judicial Division of the CSCissued an Order finding that since the claimants-
employees had assumed their respective positions and performed theirduties pursuant to th
eir appointments, they are entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to theirp
ositions. The CSC Legal and Quasi-
Judicial Division ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salariesand benefi
ts by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor.

CSC denied petitoner’s request for the recall of appointments of the fourteen employees, for
lack of merit, and declaredthat the appointments of the said employees were issued in acco
rdance with pertinent laws, and cannot be withdrawn orrevoked by the appointing authority
until disproved by the CSC. Furthermore, CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation thatthese we
re midnight appointments. Constitutional provision prohibits only those appointments made
by an outgoingPresident and cannot apply to local elective officials.

CSC upheld the validity of the appointments, and petitioner’s failure to present evidence wo
uld warrant the revocationor recall of the said appointments.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC’s Resolution, averring that the CSC was
without jurisdiction: (1) torefuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold the
validity of said appointments, even assuming therewas failure to present eveidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution covers local elective officials.

DECISION:

No. Records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointment
s of the fourteen (14)private respondents before the CSC, the only justification he gave was
that these were “midnight appointments” thatare forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of
the Constitution. The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibitionapplies only to pr
esidential appointments. In truth, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
makingappointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

DISSENTING OPINION: Mendoza

What the majority overlooks is that Article VII, Section 15 is simply an application of a broa
der principle that after theappointing authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a pru
dent caretaker of the office, and therefore, he shouldnot fill positions in the government unl
ess required by the imperatives of public service.

TORRES V THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONSG.R. No. 122338December 29, 1995FACT


S:In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned by the president with the condition th
at if heshall violate any penal law again, his sentence will be carried out. Petitioner accepted the con
ditionalpardon and was released from prison. However, by 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parolerec
ommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres becauseTo
rres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition. His pardon w
ascancelled. He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court. He contended that his pardon should
nothave been cancelled since the judgment on the new estafa cases were still on appeal. Through his
wifeand children, he petitioned to be released from prison alleging that he was denied due process,
and thathis constitutional rights to be presumed innocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon
hisrecommitment to prison.Issue: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before thepetitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the te
rms of his conditional pardonand accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.Ruling: W
here a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the Presidentwho opts t
o proceed against him under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait fora judi
cial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefore by final judgment,
in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison.It did not matter that Torres
was allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed againsthim subsequent to his c
onditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13)years in apparent violati
on of his right to a speedy trial.Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty ha
s been judicially adjudged as illegal orunlawful. The incarceration of Torres is legal since he would h
ave served his final sentence for his firstconviction until November 2, 2000, had he not violated th
e conditions of the pardon and had thus had itrevoked.Lastly, only the President has the prerogativ
e to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment.Courts haveno authority to interfere with the gran
t by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt
of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President todetermine whether or not there has been a
breach of the terms of a conditional pardon

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