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The Dialogical Self in Education: Introduction

ARTICLE in JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTIVIST PSYCHOLOGY · APRIL 2013

Impact Factor: 0.59 · DOI: 10.1080/10720537.2013.759018

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 1

Introduction of a special issue on the dialogical self in education,

accepted for publication by the Journal of Constructivist Psychology,

vol.26, no. 2, 2013, pp. 81-89.

The dialogical self in education: Introduction

Hubert J.M. Hermans

Radboud University, The Netherlands

Abstract. This is a special issue on the dialogical self in education. In

this introduction, I summarize the main tenets and concepts of

Dialogical Self Theory (DST) as a basis of the different articles of this

issue. Then I introduce the different papers in the context of the

Theory. The contributions give special attention to what happens in

the minds of individuals—teachers, students, and training participants

—when they participate in educational settings that affect and address

the intimacies of their personal selves.

 2

This is the third special issue in this journal in which DST is

applied to topics of central concern to constructivist psychology. The

first one (2003, vol. 16, no. 2) focused mainly on psychotherapy, the

second (2008, vol.21, no. 3) detailed the ways in which research is

performed on the basis of the Theory. The present issue shows how

self and society meet each other, cooperate or clash, when people

become involved in educational institutions or settings.

First, I will give a brief overview of the main ideas and concepts

of the Theory. Building on this theoretical framework, I will introduce

the different contributions.

The other as alter-ego

Hannah Arendt (1958) expressed a sharp insight in the human

condition when she noticed that “If people were not different, they

would have nothing to say to each other. And if they were not the

same, they would not understand each other.” (p. 155). Apparently,

we can easily understand each other, when we have experiences

available which are highly similar to those of the other. However,

 3

when we are faced with the other who is different from us, we need a

well-developed dialogical capacity which enables us to move beyond

familiar, and even cherished, perspectives.

Arendt’s insight fits very well with the Aristotelian notion of the

other as alter ego, being the same and different from the self. This

notion is also reflected in Dialogical Self Theory (DST) (Hermans &

Hermans-Konopka, 2010) in which the other is introduced not as an

‘outside reality’ to which the self relates as a separate entity, but as an

intrinsic feature of the self as extended to the social environment.

Self as extended to an independent other

In his highly prolific chapter on the self, William James (1890) was

well aware that the other was part of the extension of the self, an idea

that facilitated the emergence of DST. He made clear that the self is

not located inside the skin or contained in itself, but that self-relevant

parts of the environment belong to it. In defining the Me , or self-as-

known, James (1890 ) proposed that there is a gradual transition

between Me and Mine: “not only his body and his psychic powers, but
 4

his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and

friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and

bank-account” (p. 291).

The idea of the extended self is a great step forward as it went

beyond the Cartesian dualistic conception in which the self (res

cogitans) and the environment (res extensa), including the other

person, were seen as separate entities. In contrast to the extended self,

the Cartesian self came out, in Levin’s (1988) terms, as “a self of

reason completely purged of body and feeling, a self without shadows,

a self totally transparent to itself, totally knowing of itself, totally self-

possessed, totally certain of itself” (p. 15). James’s proposal of the

extended self can be seen as a significant step beyond the Cartesian

dualism between self and other.

Extension toward an independent other: The polyphony of the self

The idea of the extended self could be further pursued by considering

Bakhtin’s (1973) metaphor of the ‘polyphonic novel,’ which he

proposed after reading Dostoyewski’s works. The basic idea of this

 5

novel is that it is composed of a number of independent and mutually

opposing perspectives embodied by characters involved in dialogical

relationships. The characters are considered as "ideologically

authoritative and independent," each with an own view of the world,

rather than being an object of Dostoyevsky's all-encompassing artistic

vision. The characters are not subordinated to the author’s view but

have their own voice and tell their own story. The characters are not

standing below their creator but beside him, disagreeing with the

author, even rebelling against him. This development in the novelistic

literature marks a revolution against the traditional idea of the

‘omniscient narrator’ (Spencer, 1971).

In the metaphor of the polyphonic novel there are two elements

which go beyond James’s conception of the extended self: the

independence of the characters and the fact that they have a voice. In

James’s view, the other figures are something which can be

‘appropriated’ or ‘owned’, and in this way are subordinated to a

possessing I. It is perhaps revealing that in James’s view of the

extended self, ‘my child’, ‘my friend’ or ‘my wife’ are mentioned in

the same breath with ‘my yacht’ and ‘my bank-account’. Whereas in
 6

James’ view of the self, the other is owned as ‘mine’, the polyphonic

metaphor recognizes the other as an independent entity. Moreover, the

other is given a voice, so they have the opportunity to speak from their

own independent point of view and become able to tell about their

experiences in their own language. The idea of a self as dialogically

extended to an independent other is particularly promising because it

has the potential of extending the self to a broader societal and

historical context.

The other-in-the-self: Between centralization and decentralization

In a discussion of the concept of identity, Hall (1992) contrasted a

modern or ‘Enlightenment subject’ and a postmodern subject or

decentered subject. In his view the Enlightenment subject was a fully

centered, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason,

consciousness and action, with a ‘center’ as an inner core. The

decentered subject, on the other hand, was described as being

composed of different parts that are highly contingent on the changes

in the environment. The self consists of contradictory identities which

 7

pull us into different directions, so that our identifications are

continually shifting. With a famous dictum of William B Yeats,

“Things fall apart, the center cannot hold.” If we would feel that we

have a unified identity from birth to death, Hall concludes, it is only

because we are in need of a ‘comforting story’ about ourselves.

On the interface of the modern (enlightened) and the post-

modern self, DST proposes a partly decentralized conception of the

self conceiving it as multi-voiced and dialogical. More specifically,

the dialogical self is described in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of I -

positions or voices in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this

mind is with the minds of other people. In this conception the

different, independent positions are related by a continuous I and

brought into communication with each other via dialogical activities

(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010).

The concept of I-position

The central notion of DST, I-position, acknowledges the multiplicity

of the self, while preserving, at the same time, its coherence and unity.
 8

Subjected to changes in time and space, the self is intrinsically

involved in a process of positioning and repositioning. As such it is

distributed by a wide variety of existing, new, and possible positions

(decentering movements). At the same time, the I appropriates or

owns some of them and rejects or disowns others. In this way, the self

is involved in a process of organizing them as parts of a structure

(centering movements). The ‘appropriated’ (James, 1890) or

‘interiorized’ (Vygotzky, 1962) parts are experienced as “mine” and

as belonging to the extended domain of the self. This organization and

stabilization guarantees a certain degree of coherence and continuity

in the self. By placing I-positions in a dialogical framework and

processing them in ‘dialogical spaces,’ both within and between

selves, they are ‘lifted up’ to the level of mutual enrichment and

alterity. When the positions are allowed to express themselves from

their own specific point of view, they are respected as dialogical

partners in the ‘democracy’ of the self.

Internal and external positions in the self

 9

I-positions are not only ‘internal’ (e.g., I as a man, white, husband,

ambitious) but also ‘external,’ belonging to the extended domain of

the self (e.g., my wife, my children, my colleagues, my country, my

opponent). The other is not just an object but can be considered, in

terms of Bakhtin (1973), as ‘another I’. (For the extension of the self

and the other-in-the-self, see also Aron et al., 2005 ; James, 1890; and

Rosenberg, 1979.)

Internal and external positions do not function in isolation from

each other. They are often combined in flexible ways and reflect how

the self relates to the environment (e.g., I as a mother of two children,

I as friend of an African refugee, I as opposed to demagogic political

leaders).

Dialogues may take place between different positions in the self.

Between internal ones, dialogues may sound like this: “I asked him for

a favor but repeating it two or three times, I felt like a beggar;

therefore, I stopped talking about it.” Here we see a conflict between

‘I as an advice seeker’ and ‘I as a beggar’, with the former

appropriated and the latter rejected.

 10

A dialogical relationship can also emerge between internal and

external positions in the self. For example, ‘In my imagination, I’m

often talking to him as a good friend with whom I can share my

disappointments. Although he is physically absent, he gives me a good

advice and I feel his support. I often take his advice into consideration

as a valuable suggestion.’ In this case ‘I as disappointed’ (internal

position) is in touch with him as a ‘good friend’ (external position),

which then leads to an answer in the extended self.

Also between two external positions of the self a dialogue can

emerge. For example, ‘Two colleagues in my department got involved

in a serious conflict. However, they were able to solve it by discussing

with each other what they saw as the origin of the clash. I learned a lot

from that’. In that case, the two colleagues can be seen as external

positions in the self involved in a dialogical process.

In DST the other functions in two qualities. As far as others have

their own independent life apart from myself (the ‘actual’ others), they

are able to agree or disagree with me and have the potential to develop

a point of view that I may, or may be not, able to change. However, as

‘external positions’ in the self, they are placed in a field of tension

 11

between the voices of the actual others as independent realities and the

voices of the others as constructed or reconstructed on the basis of my

imagination of the other and, moreover, under the influence of the

needs of the internal positions in the self. In other words, the other has

an existence as an outside reality but is also as part of my extended

self in which I make something of him. In this field of tension, internal

and external dialogues meet with the potential to correct, influence,

and develop each other.

Self as a society of mind

The notion of dialogue forms a basic link between self and society,

because it plays, as a significant potential, a constitutive role in both

of them. They allow people, as members of a society, to learn from

each other in productive exchanges and permit the individual to learn

from him- or herself. In this way, the dialogical self functions as a

‘part-whole:’ as a ‘society of mind’ with tensions, conflicts, and

oppositions as intrinsic features of a (healthy functioning) self and, at

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the same time, as participating in society at large, with similar

tensions, conflicts, and oppositions.i

The self-society bridge acknowledges the extension of the self to

the local and global environment. The voices of other individuals, the

collective voices of groups, and even the power games of societal

institutions, enter the self-space of the individual and challenge the

self to give an answer. Along these lines, a self emerges in which

different voices agree or disagree with each other, lead to unification

or opposition, and are involved in relations of power and counter-

power. Along these lines, real, remembered, or imagined voices of

friends, allies, strangers, or enemies figure as transient or more

stabilized positions in and around the self that is able to open or close

itself to the globalizing environment (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka,

2010).

Personal and social positions: Linking self and society

As Callero (2003) has convincingly argued, many of the concepts in

mainstream (social) psychology (e.g., self-consistency, self-

 13

enhancement, self-verification, self-monitoring, self-efficacy, self-

regulation, self-presentation, self-knowledge, self-control, self-

handicapping, and self-deception) are typically thought of as

containers of individual minds, with the social environment and

society as external, determining factors. Such concepts typically lack

the multiplicity, multi-voiced capability, struggle and power-games

that are essential for society, including the self as a society of mind. In

fact, they are typical of the modern model of the self that, under the

influence of Enlighenment, tends to consider the self as an entity or

essence in itself and as something which can be defined in isolation of

society.

In the context of the discussion about the self-society

connection, the distinction between two kinds of internal positions in

the self, personal and social, becomes particularly salient. Whereas

social positions reflect the way the self is subjected to social

expectations and role-prescriptions (e.g., ‘I as a professional’, ‘I as a

father’, ‘I as a leader’), personal positions leave room for the many

ways in which the individual responds to such expectations from his

own point of view and for the various ways in which the individual
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fashions, stylizes, and personalizes them (‘I as ‘a dominant leader’, ‘I

as a sociable leader’). Combinations of social and personal positions,

not only personalize social role behavior, but may also be a source of

tension and conflict both in self and society (e.g. a pastor who publicly

declares himself a homosexual priest or a psychotherapist having a

sexual relationship with his patient).

Certainly, it is possible that social and personal positions are

combined productively. For example, motivation for a particular task

or job, increases when the person is not only conforming to social role

expectations, but does his work on the basis of personal desire,

passion, conviction, or call. Particularly, in an era when professional

work is increasingly fused with private and personal life

circumstances, the coalition of social and personal positions becomes

particularly salient to both persons and organizations.

Some basic concepts of Dialogical Self Theory

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In this section I summarize two of the main concepts that are central

to DST and are used by several contributions in this issue: ‘third

position,’ ‘meta-position’, and ‘promoter position’.ii

Third position

Two positions involved in a conflict can, under specific conditions, be

reconciled in a third position in which the conflict between the

original positions is lessened and mitigated. Rather than being a

compromise between positions, where differences are settled by

mutual concessions, a third position profits from the energies

originating from the two positions and combines them in the service

of its strengthening and further development. For example, A.U.

Branco, A.L. Branco, and Madureira (2008) described the case of a

catholic woman in Brazil who defined herself as lesbian. Her internal

conflict followed from the opposition between the ‘I as catholic’

versus the ‘I as lesbian.’ The authors described how the client

developed a third position as a missionary: Inspired by her values as a

Christian, she decided to help forsaken and lost people, including

 16

many gays and lesbians, which were in similar circumstances as she

herself had been. The missionary position provided her a way to

reconcile her lesbian nature with traditional Christian values and

beliefs and to move into the direction of a higher level of integration

of the self.

Meta-position

A meta-position enables the self to move specific and specialized

positions and to take a ‘helicopter-view.’ In order to clarify the nature

of this position, I give the example of a tennis player. During the

game, the best he can do is to be fully in the flow of the action. Any

form of self-criticism or self-doubt would hinder the effectiveness of

the performance. As long as he is fully engaged, he is just in the

position of the player and ‘in the act.’ However, after the game, there

is time for critical self-reflection which may lead him to decide to

improve his skills. On this (first) level of self-reflection, he thinks of

himself in the position of tennis-player only. However, he may move

to a second and higher level of self-reflection, where he thinks of his

 17

position as tennis-player in the context of a broader variety of

positions. He may start to reflect on his situation from a larger array of

perspectives. Does he want to make a career? How will it be when his

physical condition declines? At this level he examines his position as

a tennis player by considering it in the context of other significant

positions, for example, as father, husband or student gifted in

mathematics. Along these lines, he may arrive at a well-balanced

decision about where to go in his future.

Sometimes described as an ‘observing ego’ or ‘meta-cognition,’

a meta-position permits a certain distance from one or more other

internal and external positions, although it can be attracted, both

cognitively and emotionally, toward some positions more than others

(e.g., self-reflection can be critical, amused, or depressive). It provides

an overarching view which allows one to consider different positions

simultaneously including their relevant linkages.

Rather than being a form of socially isolated introspection, a

meta-position is, or at least can be, of a dialogical nature. Depending

on the nature of the contact with others, a person can take different

meta-positions. Having a long conversation with a good friend under

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the enjoyment of a glass of wine leads to a meta-position which is, qua

affective quality and even content, different from talking for one hour

in the treatment room of a psychotherapist. Even when being alone,

the same person can be involved in very different relationships with

himself at different moments (e.g., open, sad, superficial or deep).

Meta-positions allow the person to delay immediate gratification

and to postpone impulsive reactions. They permit and facilitate the

organization of the self beyond the spur of the moment and allow a

more encompassing view on self and world. They take a broader array

of specific I-positions into account and have an important executive

function in the process of decision making. As mediated by higher

cortical brain activity, they are able to influence the lower emotional

circuits of the brain so that long-term planning becomes possible.

Promoter position

Whereas meta-position is a spatial concept in DST, the notion of

promoter position refers explicitly to the temporal nature of the

process of positioning and repositioning. The basic consideration is

 19

this: When the self would function as a successive multiplicity of

unrelated I-positions, each with their own specific development over

time, the result would be a confusing cacophony of voices that would

lack any coordination at the higher levels of organization of the self. A

special concept, promoter position, is needed to avoid what James

would describe as a ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ of I-positions.

While meta-positions facilitate the continuity, coherence and

organization in the self from a spatial perspective, promoter positions

do so from a temporal point of view.

Due to their considerable openness towards the future of the self,

promoter positions produce and organize a diverse range of more

specialized but qualitatively different positions in the service of the

development of the self as a whole (see also Valsiner & Cabell, 2012).

Due to their broad bandwidth, they have the potential to synthesize a

variety of new and existing positions in the self and organize them at a

higher level of integration. Promoter positions are innovators of the

self par excellence.

Significant others—real, remembered, anticipated or

imaginary—may function as promoters in the temporal organization

 20

of the self. Typically, mothers, fathers, family members, or teachers,

function as promoters (or as anti-promoters when they are experienced

as impediments to one’s development). However, the range of

possibilities is much broader. Inspiring figures in art, politics, science,

novels, film, or music may have a promoter function as facilitating

existing I-positions and generating new ones.

Not only actual persons, but imagined figures also may function

as promoter positions. Some people return, in a period of stress and

pain, to an image or picture of a deceased family member from which

they receive support and strength (Neimeyer, 2012). Others, with a

religious or spiritual background, consult the image or statue of a

Buddha, Christ, holy person, or a god, which has for them the

meaning of an ‘ultimate promoter position’ (Rowan, 2012).

Also in the internal domain of the self, promoters may emerge as

generated or stimulated by positions in the external domain. Some

people profit from a developmental impetus of I-positions like ‘I as a

person who always goes on and never gives up’ or ‘I as looking at

things in an artistic way,’ ‘or ‘my call in live.’ Such positions have the

potential of helping people to find their way in a great diversity of

 21

situations and open new perspectives for future developments in the

self.

External and internal positions are often closely linked to each

other when, for example, somebody says: ‘I’m a high achiever as a

revenge against my father, who always expressed negative

expectations about me’ or ‘I became a writer in order to compensate

for the injustice done to my loved ones.’ The highly dynamic

interconnections between external and internal positions, may account

for the way the self responds to the variegated social and societal

influences to which the self is subjected. In DST, promoter positions,

like meta-positions, have significant functions in the dialogical

development of the self.

The contributions to this special issue

Joanna Krotofil’s contribution to this special issue is focused on

the Personal Position Repertoire (PPR) method (Hermans, 2001) as

applied in a group people who participate in a marriage preparation

course run by the catholic church for Polish migrants in Great Britain.
 22

The author uses a bi-clustering method, proposed by Kluger, Nir, and

Kluger (2008) to analyze the structure of the columns and the rows

simultaneously. This permits looking at the data from a bird’s eye

perspective and facilitates the process of meta-positioning. Moreover,

Krotofil combines the PPR method with focus group discussion,

which enables to discuss important findings of their PPR investigation

with the other participants. The combination of individual assessment

and group brings internal and external dialogue together.

In their research on professional identity, Leijen and Kullasepp

are interested in the combination of professional and personal

positions of students and beginning teachers. Using pedagogical

dilemmas, they investigate how students respond to ambivalent

situations and how they place themselves in professional positions,

personal positions or combinations (coalitions) of the two. They

describe a variety of developmental trajectories which their subjects

use to arrive at solutions. Moreover, they focus on differences found

between pedagogically experienced and inexperienced students.

In their contribution to this issue, Annemie Winters and

colleagues notice that, as a result of the process of individualization,

 23

young people are faced with the task to develop a personal career

identity. Using some of the core concepts of DST, they analyze

identity in terms of positioning, that is, as a development of I-

positions, meta-positions, and promoter positions. Drawing on

conversations between student, teacher and/or workplace mentor they

detail different strategies teachers and/or mentors are using in the

contact with students: ignoring an I-position, re-positioning by talking

on behalf of the student, broadening an I-position without conclusion,

and dialogue resulting in the formulation of a promoter-position.

In his paper, Fecho makes an argument for literacy practice as a

means for dialogues with others and within the self. He studies

meaning making in terms of Bakthin’s notion of heteroglossia—

literally “different tongues”—with a focus on the tensions that

centripetally pull language toward institutionally sanctioned

stabilization and, at the same time, centrifugally tug it in the opposite

direction toward individual interpretation and eventually towards

verbal anarchy. Using heteroglossia in combination with DST, he

explores the literacy practices of Isaac, a working class adolescent

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and his attempts to bring meaning to

 24

his life struggles. He argues that, particularly for those learners who

are marginalized from the cultural center, reading and writing are

valuable media through which they try to understand the chaos around

them.

In an extensive review article, James Day and Paulo Jesus

compare the various similarities and differences between cognitive-

developmental and socio-cultural models in the psychology of moral

and religious development with special attention to the workings of

the dialogical self. The authors argue that despite apparent differences,

and even oppositions, between the cognitive-developmental paradigm

and the narrative-dialogical paradigm, they show meaningful overlap.

They further argue that, although DST literature objects against

sequential and prescriptive developmental models, its outline of

promoter positions strongly resembles the kinds of developmental

endpoints, suggested by representatives from cognitive-developmental

circles.

References
 25

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Chicago Press.

Aron, A., Mashek, D., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., Wright, S.,

Lewandowski, G., & Aron, E. (2005). Including close others in the

cognitive structure of the self. In M. Baldwin (ed.), Interpersonal

cognition (pp. 206–232). New York : Guilford Press

Bakhtin , M. ( 1973 ). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics (2nd edn.;

trans. R. W. Rotsel ). Ann Arbor, MI : Ardis . (Original work

published 1929 as Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo [Problems

of Dostoevsky’s Art]).

Branco, A. U., Branco, A. L. & Madureira, A. F. (2008). Self-

development and the emergence of new I -positions: Emotions and

self-dynamics. Studia Psychologica , 6, 23–39.

Callero, P. L. (2003). The sociology of the self. Annual Review of

Sociology , 29, 115–33.

Hall, S. (1992). The question of cultural identity. In S. Hall , D. Held,

& T. McGrew (Eds.), Modernity and its futures (pp. 273–316).

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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Hermans, H.J.M. (2001). The construction of a personal position

repertoire: Method and practice. Culture and Psychology , 7, 323-

365 .

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Theory: Positioning and counter-positioning in a globalizing

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Neimeyer, R. (2012). Reconstructing the self in the wake of loss: A

dialogical contribution. In: H.J.M. Hermans & T. Gieser (Eds.),

Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory (pp. 374-389). Cambridge,

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Rosenberg , M. (1979). Conceiving the self . New York: Basic Books.

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Rowan, J. (2012). The use of I-positions in psychotherapy. In: H.J.M.

Hermans & T. Gieser (Eds.), Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory

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Sampson , E. (1985). The decentralization of identity: Toward a

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Psychologist , 11, 1203–1211 .

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Notes

i
Computer scientist Minsky (1985) developed a model in which the mind is considered a
hierarchically organized network of interconnected parts that together function as a "society."
There is, however, a significant difference between Minsky’s conception and DST. While
Minsky uses ‘society’ as a metaphor for the internal functioning of the mind in the context of
artificial intelligence, DST is focused on the self as functioning as part of the society at large,
as exemplified by the processes of globalization and localization. Moreover, DST sees the self
 28

as emerging from historical processes (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, Chapters 1 and
2).
ii
For more details and broader theoretical context, see Hermans & Hermans-Konopka (2010).