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    Inhibition of Judges

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    Sanchez Roman Victor
    The petition was denied as the petitioner did not present clear evidence of bias to overcome the presumption that the judge will act impartially according to law.

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    Inhibition of Judges

    Uploaded by

    Sanchez Roman Victor
    141 views3 pages
    The petition was denied as the petitioner did not present clear evidence of bias to overcome the presumption that the judge will act impartially according to law.

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    Jurisprudence on Inhibition of Judges

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    The petition was denied as the petitioner did not present clear evidence of bias to overcome the presumption that the judge will act impartially according to law.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    141 views3 pages

    Inhibition of Judges

    Uploaded by

    Sanchez Roman Victor
    The petition was denied as the petitioner did not present clear evidence of bias to overcome the presumption that the judge will act impartially according to law.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 3

    INHIBITION OF JUDGES

    G.R. Nos. 173057-74 September 20, 2010

    BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,


    vs.
    HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4TH
    DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
    PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

    We deny the petition.

    The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section


    1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

    Section 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit


    in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
    heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
    within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
    the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
    which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
    or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
    decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
    in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

    A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself


    from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
    above.

    The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.


    Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed
    that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.
    The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
    sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other
    just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide. 10

    In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained


    that petitioner failed to impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part,
    to wit:
    What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law
    is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph
    of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or
    conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant
    Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice
    Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or
    appreciated. In fact, it is oddly striking that the accused does not even
    make a claim or imputation of bias or partiality on the part of Justice
    Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make such allegation all
    because there is none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from
    the tenor and language of a judge is considered by the Supreme Court as
    insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more insufficient it becomes
    if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with.11

    We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed
    Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine
    Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,12 that the mere imputation
    of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when
    the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented
    to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to
    palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This
    Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
    arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of
    being biased or partial.1avvphi1

    An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture


    and is not one of the "just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second
    paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge
    may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the
    judge’s partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear
    and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
    undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and
    evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be
    considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere
    suspicion is not enough.13

    Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph
    of Section 1, Rule 137, but a closer examination of the motions for
    inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second
    paragraph by underscoring the phrase, "for just or valid reasons other
    than those mentioned above." This was an express indication of the rule
    that he was invoking. Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph 7
    of both motions that "in accused’s mind, such circumstances militates
    against the Hon. Justice Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid ground
    for his inhibition under the 2nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far
    as the cases against accused are concerned." Hence, there is no question
    that petitioner relied on the second paragraph of the Rulewhich
    contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for inhibition.

    And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first
    paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 in his motions to inhibit, we should
    stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a
    judge from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on
    inhibition, "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
    his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
    otherwise...." The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only
    when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as heir,
    legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show
    that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily
    interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition
    of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.

    WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated May 4, 2006


    of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case
    Nos. 28022-23 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

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