Article XIII

"LABOR"

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments,
and to expansion and growth.

1. SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike.

Held:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one
hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may
be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike
by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by
the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of
a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

"AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM"

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the
State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.

2. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by
the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting
a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands
and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings
are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A.
6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds
and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of
money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:
No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

3. MADDUMBA V. GSIS

Facts:

Respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties, including a house and lot.
The petitioner participated and submitted his bid. It bid was subject to a down payment of 35% of the
amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the
receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his
sealed bid a manager's and cash to complete the proposal bond. Upon the receipt of the notice of
award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These
bonds were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland acquired by the Government from him.
However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to
pay in cash the balance of the required down payment. When the second monthly installment became
due, petitioner sent a letter to the GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay with
his Land Bank bonds. Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 251. The GSIS Board of Trustees denied petitioner's offer and
"resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a
discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity." The petitioner asked the Board to reconsider and
them submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, wherein it was stated that "if the GSIS
accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value.

Issue:

Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 251, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value
in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS.

Held:

Respondent Government Service Insurance System is ordered to accept the bonds issued by the Land
Bank of the Philippines at their par or face value. A government-owned or controlled corporation, like
the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a
matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference.
Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended
Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds shall be
accepted 'in the amount of their face value'; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will
impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death,
retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members,
the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers." Respondent's arguments
disregard the fact that the provisions of Section 85 are primarily designed to cushion the impact of
dispossession. Not only would there be inconvenience resulting from dispossession itself, but also from
the modes of payment in financing the acquisition of farm lots. Acceptance of Land Bank bonds,
instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain degree of sacrifice for the landowner. This, of course,
is in addition to the fact that, in case of expropriation of land covered by land reform, the landowner
will seldom get the compensation he desires. Thus, discounting the Land Banks bonds, and thereby
reducing their effective value, entails and imposes an additional burden on his part. It is, in fact, in
consideration of this sacrifice that we extended the rule on liberality in the interpretation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, then known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in favor not
only of the actual tillers but the landowners as well. As explained in an earlier case, “the value of
these bonds cannot be diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said bonds are fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines.” Respondent cannot rely on the deletion by
Presidential Decree No. 251 of the provision in Section 85 that the bonds shall be accepted in the
amount of their face value, and wrest therefrom an interpretation in support of its thesis.

4. Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
On June 10, 1988, RA 6657(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) was approved by the President of the
Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business avers that it would
be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17 and 32 of said law. Hence,
it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provide,
among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That
the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and it represents no more than 5% of the total
investment of commercial livestock and poultry raises. That the land is incidental but not be included
in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue:
Whether certain provisions of RA 6657 are unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“agriculture” the livestock and poultry industry?

Held:
Yes. Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word
“agriculture”, it showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in
the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reason why they used the term “farmworkers”
rather than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the
livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used
“farmworkers” to have distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate
farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of the due
process of law.

5. DAR v. DECS

Facts:
In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares
located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to
respondent DECS. Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.

On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, and was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years.

On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.

After investigation, said MARO sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent DECS, stating that the subject
lands are now covered by CARP.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject properties are exempted from the coverage of CARL.

HELD:

No. As respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the
nearby locality, the court is inclined with the petitioner’s argument that the lands subject hereof are
not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used
as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be
exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of
CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those “lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, …, shall be
exempt from the coverage of this Act.”
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land
must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools
for educational purposes."
6. Archbishop v. Secretary
RC Archbishop of Caceres vs. DAR, G.R. 139285, Dec. 21, 2007

Facts: Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of
268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the
remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop filed with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines Sur several petitions for
exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.

ISSUE: Can an agricultural land conditionally donated to the archbishop and held in trust and in behalf
of the millions of the Filipino faithful be exempted from CARP?

RULING: Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as the lands
are clearly not exempt under the law. He should not fear that his followers are simply being deprived of
land, as under both PD 27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation, which he may then use for
the benefit of his followers. His situation is no different from other landowners affected by agrarian
reform––they are somewhat deprived of their land, but it is all for a greater good. As religious leader,
Archbishop can take solace in the fact that his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can
utilize them to the fullest.

Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.

7. PP v. Judge Leachon
People of the Philippines v The Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.
GR 108725
September 25, 1998

Facts:

On August 7, 1990, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed 2 separate violation of PD 772
(Anti-Squatting law) against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego before the Regional Trila Court
of Occidental Mindoro presided by the respondent judge. The case proceeded to trial and after the
presentation of evidence; the prosecution rested the cases and sent a written offer of evidences. After
almost a year the judge dismissed the cases motu proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
which was referred to the Court of Appeals for disposition. Court of Appeals reversed the Order of
dismissal and ordered the continuation of the trial. The respondent judge once again dismissed the
case motu proprio once more saying that PD 772 is repealed by Art. XIII Section 9 and 10 of the 1987
Constitution. (Urban and rural dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner) Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but were denied by the judge. Petitioners found their way to the Supreme Court via instant petition.

Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the subject criminal cases for the violation of the Anti-Squatting law and in
declaring the said law as repugnant to the provision of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:

Yes. The respondent judge dismissed the subject cases motu proprio, after the prosecution had rested
the same and without giving the three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. There is also
no showing that the issue of constitutionality of PD 772 was ever posed by the accused, such an issue
cannot be given due course because it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity.

Petition cannot prosper because on October 27, 1997 Republic Act No. 8368 (Penalizing Squatting and
Other Similar Acts) was enacted and repealed PD 772. All cases under the provision of PD 772 shall be
dismissed.

"HEALTH"

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

8. DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON

Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as
provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by
Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the
sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and
Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the
national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who
are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically
penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant
thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for
declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the
public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.

Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar
import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.

Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost”
(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by
doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to
prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand
name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand
name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with “no
substitution,” the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent
would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the
population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority

Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

9. Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to
“dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary
of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type
of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on
the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

10. EPZA VS CHR

Facts:
Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their
human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 the PNP Company tried to level
the area occupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of
development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation
and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the
group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways to desist fromdoing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order
with CHR for lack of authority and said motion wasdismissed.EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari
and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no
clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in
entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease
and desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not
limited to mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue:
WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violatorsof human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.

Held:

The SC held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be
conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even aquasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The
constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and
never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in
the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not
being a court of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court .A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is
granted.

11. Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994

Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case"
on vendors of North EDSA.

Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for
contempt.

Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and
carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights".

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all
parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics),
social rights (right to education, employment and social services.

Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural
birth, right, innate and inalienable.

CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or
administration of
the government.

POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or

administration of the government.

ARTICLE XIV

"EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS"

"EDUCATION"

Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and
shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

12. Meyer v. Nebraska

SCOTUS - 1923

It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.

Facts
 NE statute states that no person may teach any subject to a person in any language other than
English.
 Languages may be taught to children only after they reach the 8th grade. D taught
German to a 10 year old child. D was convicted.

Procedural History

 NE Supreme Court affirmed conviction.

 SCOTUS reversed conviction, found law unconstitutional.

Issues

Is control over the education of their children a fundamental right of parents?

Holding/Rule

Parents have the fundamental right to control the upbringing, including the education, of their
children.

Reasoning

 Liberty denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right…

 To contract
 To engage in any occupation of his choosing
 To acquire useful knowledge
 To marry
 To establish a home and bring up children
 To worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience

 This liberty may not be interfered with under the guise of protecting the public interest.

 It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,
and nearly all states make education of children compulsory.

 Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.

Before the War, it was looked upon as helpful and desirable.
 D had the right to teach, and the parents of the child had the right to engage him so to instruct
their child. These actions are within the liberty of the DPC of the 14th Amendment.

 The right is clearly infringed upon.

 The state says their interest is to foster a homogenous people with American ideals prepared
readily to understand current discussions of civic matters.

 The means adopted exceed the limitations upon the power of the state.

 Proficiency is a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age,
and experience shows that it is not injurious to the health, morals, or understanding
of an ordinary child.

Dissent
None.

Notes
Right of parents to control the upbringing of their children at issue.

13. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pierce, Governor of Oregon, et al. v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), was an early 20th-century United States Supreme Court decision striking
down an Oregon statute that required all children to attend public school. The decision significantly
expanded coverage of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to recognize personal civil liberties. The case has been cited as a precedent in more than
100 Supreme Court cases, including Roe v. Wade, and in more than 70 cases in the courts of appeals.

Facts of the case[edit]

The Sisters of the Holy Names and Hill Military Academy separately sued Walter Pierce, the governor of
Oregon, along with Isaac H. Van Winkle, the state attorney general, and Stanley Myers, district
attorney of Multnomah County (of which Portland is the county seat, and where both the Sisters and
the Academy were headquartered). The two cases, heard and decided together, were slanted along
slightly different lines. The Sisters' case alleged that:
the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive
appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a
school, the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession. (268 U.S.
510, 532).

The Sisters' case rested only secondarily on the assertion that their business would suffer based on the
law. That is, its primary allegation was that the State of Oregon was violating specific First
Amendment rights (such as the right to freely practice one's religion). Their case alleged only
secondarily that the law infringed on Fourteenth Amendment rights regarding protection of property
(namely, the school's contracts with the families).

The Hill Military Academy, on the other hand, proposed this as their only allegation:

Appellee Hill Military Academy .... owns considerable real and personal property, some useful only
for school purposes. The business and incident good will are very valuable. In order to conduct its
affairs, long time contracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers, and pupils. Appellants,
law officers of the state and county, have publicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is
valid and have declared their intention to enforce it. By reason of the statute and threat of
enforcement appellee's business is being destroyed and its property depreciated .... The Academy's
bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges that the challenged act contravenes the corporation's
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce, Governor of Oregon, et al. v. Hill Military
Academy, companion case, (268 U.S. 510, 532–533).

The schools won their case before a three-judge panel of the Oregon District Court, which granted
an injunction against the Act. The defendants appealed their case directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Court heard the case on 16 and 17 March 1925.

Arguments[edit]
The appellants' lawyers, Willis S. Moore for the state and district attorneys, and George E.
Chamberlain and Albert H. Putney, for the governor, argued that the state had an overriding interest
to oversee and control the providers of education to the children of Oregon. One of them even went so
far as to call Oregonian students "the State's children". They contended that the State's interest in
overseeing the education of citizens and future voters was so great that it overrode the parents' right
to choose a provider of education for their child, and the right of the child to influence the parent in
this decision. With respect to the appellees' claims that their loss of business infringed on Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the appellants' lawyers countered that since appellees were corporations,
not individuals, the Fourteenth Amendment did not directly apply to them. In addition, they asserted,
the revenues of a corporation were not property, and thus did not fall under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, they argued that since the law was not scheduled to take effect
until September of the following year, the suits were brought prematurely—to protect against a
possible coming danger, not to rectify a current problem.

The appellees replied that they were not contesting the right of the state to monitor their
children's education, only its right to absolute control of their choice of educational system:

No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. (268 U.S. 510, 534)

Further, they replied that although the state had a powerful interest in their children's education, the
interest was not so strong as to require the state's mandate of an educational choice of this sort.
Barring a great emergency, they claimed, the state had no right to require their children to attend, or
not to attend, any particular sort of school.

Decision[edit]
The Court deliberated for about 10 weeks before issuing their decision on 1 June 1925. The Court
unanimously upheld the lower court's decision, and the injunction against the amended Act.
Associate Justice James Clark McReynolds wrote the opinion of the Court. He stated that children
were not "the mere creature[s] of the state" (268 U.S. 510, 535), and that, by its very nature, the
traditional American understanding of the term liberty prevented the state from forcing students to
accept instruction only from public schools. He stated that this responsibility belonged to the child's
parents or guardians, and that the ability to make such a choice was a "liberty" protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment.
With respect to the discussion of whether the schools' contracts with parents constituted property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, McReynolds agreed that since the schools were corporations,
they were not technically entitled to such protections. However, he continued,

they have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with
destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and
prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss
threatened by such action. (268 U.S. 510, 535)

McReynolds also agreed that businesses are not generally entitled to protection against loss of business
subsequent to "exercise of proper power of the state" (268 U.S. 510, 535). However, citing a number of
relevant business and property law cases, he concluded that the passage of the revised Act was not
"proper power" in this sense, and constituted unlawful interference with the freedom of both schools
and families.

In response to the claims by the appellants that the suits were premature, attempting to prevent
rather than to rectify a problem, Justice McReynolds simply referred them to the evidence provided by
the appellees showing that the schools were already suffering falling enrollments.

Legacy[edit]
This decision marked the start of the Supreme Court's recognition that due process protected
individual liberties; specifically, the Court recognized consciously that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to entities other than individuals, and recognized the scope of liberties or rights
which it protected included personal civil liberties. Over the course of the next half century, that list
would include the right to marry, to have children, to marital privacy, to have an abortion, and others.
Because the statute struck down by Pierce was primarily intended to eliminate parochial schools,
Justice Anthony Kennedy has suggested that Pierce could have been decided on First Amendment
grounds.[3] Indeed, as mentioned, that was the primary legal argument advanced by the lawyers
representing the Sisters. However, when Pierce was decided, the First Amendment had not yet been
deemed applicable against the states. That event occurred a mere seven days later, in the case
of Gitlow v. New York.

The right of parents to control their children's education without state interference became a "cause
célèbre" following the case, and religious groups proactively defended this right from state
encroachment. R. Scott Appleby wrote in the American Journal of Education that this led to a
"remarkably liberal" education policy wherein religious schools are not subjected to state
accreditation but only to "minimal state health and safety" laws.[4]

14. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

The values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their
early and formative years have a high place in our society.

Even more markedly than in Prince case, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of
parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
children.
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is the case in which the United States Supreme Court found
that Amish children could not be placed under compulsory education past 8th grade. The parents'
fundamental right to freedom of religion outweighed the state's interest in educating its children. The
case is often cited as a basis for parents' right to educate their children outside of traditional private
or public schools.

Background of the case[edit]

Three Amish students from three different families stopped attending New Glarus High School in
the New Glarus, Wisconsin school district at the end of the eighth grade, all because of their parents'
religious beliefs. The three families were represented by Jonas Yoder (one of the fathers involved in
the case) when the case went to trial. They were convicted in the Green County Court. Each
defendant was fined the nominal sum of $5. Thereafter the Wisconsin Supreme Court found in Yoder's
favor. At this point Wisconsin appealed that ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Amish did not believe in going to court to settle disputes but instead follow the biblical command
to "turn the other cheek." Thus, the Amish are at a disadvantage when it comes to defending
themselves in courts or before legislative committees. However, a Lutheran minister, Reverend
William C. Lindholm, took an interest in Amish legal difficulties from a religious freedom perspective
and founded The National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom (partly as a result of this case) and
then provided them with legal counsel.

Under Amish church standards, higher education was deemed not only unnecessary for their simple
way of life, but also endangering to their salvation.[1] These men appealed for exemption from
compulsory education under the basis of these religious convictions. They sincerely held to the belief
that the values their children would learn at home would surpass the worldly knowledge taught in
school.[2]

The court's decision[edit]

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Yoder in its decision. Justice William O. Douglas filed a
partial dissent, but voted with the court regarding Yoder's case. Justices Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. and William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court "sustained respondents' claim that application of the compulsory
school-attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."[1]

The U.S. Supreme Court held as follows:[2]

1. States cannot force individuals to attend school when it infringes on their First Amendment
rights. In this case, the state of Wisconsin interfered with the practice of a legitimate religious
belief.
2. Not all beliefs rise to the demands of the religious clause of the First Amendment. There needs
to be evidence of true and objective religious practices, instead of an individual making his or
her standards on such matters. The Amish way of life is one of deep religious convictions that
stems from the Bible. It is determined by their religion, which involves their rejection of
worldly goods and their living in the Biblical simplicity. The modern compulsory secondary
education is in sharp conflict with their way of life.
3. With respect to the State of Wisconsin’s argument that additional modern education beyond
8th grade is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and productively in
America’s political system, the Court disagreed. It argued that the State provided no evidence
showing any great benefit to having two extra years in the public schools. Furthermore, the
Court contended that the Amish community was a very successful social unit in American
society, a self-sufficient, law-abiding member of society, which paid all of the required taxes
 and rejected any type of public welfare. The Amish children, upon leaving the public school
system, continued their education in the form of vocational training.
4. The Court found no evidence that by leaving the Amish community without two additional years
of schooling, young Amish children would become burdens on society. To the contrary, the
Court argued that they had good vocational background to rely upon. It was the State’s
mistaken assumption that Amish children were ignorant. Compulsory education after
elementary school was a recent movement that developed in the early 20th century in order to
prevent child labor and keep children of certain ages in school. The State of Wisconsin’s
arguments about compelling the school attendance were therefore less substantial.
5. Responding to Justice Douglas's dissent, the Court argued that the question before it was about
the interests of the parents to exercise free religion, and did not relate to the child's First
Amendment's rights. As such, the argument pertaining to the child's right to exercise free
religion was irrelevant in this case.

Legacy of the Court's decision[edit]

The ruling is cited as a basis for allowing people to be educated outside traditional private or public
schools, such as with 聽 homeschooling.[citation needed]

Regarding the consequences for the Amish:

"Since 聽 Wisconsin v. Yoder,聽 all states must grant the Old Order Amish the right to
establish their own schools (should they choose) or to withdraw from public institutions
after completing eighth grade. In some communities Amish parents have continued to
send their children to public elementary schools even after 聽 Wisconsin v. Yoder.聽 In
most places tensions eased considerably after the Supreme Court ruling, although
certain difficulties remained for those Amish living in 聽 Nebraska."[3]

15. Ginsberg v. New York

Facts of the case

Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in
New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie” magazines.
On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr.
Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s
prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and
“Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of
nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of
sexual excitement and sexual conduct.

Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of
1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual
excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors” as that
quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of
minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what
was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty
on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Question
1. Did Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments on its face
because it restrained expression?
2. Was Section 484-h of the Penal Law unconstitutionally vague and uncertain on its face, in violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion
No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that Section 484-h did
not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on expression. Justice Brennan wrote
that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech or press. He acknowledged that the
magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg
from selling the magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or older.

Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the scope of the constitutional freedom to read
material concerned with sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a minor. He
rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section 484-h was a violation of minors’ constitutionally protected
freedoms, characterizing Section 484-h as New York’s attempt to adjust the assessment of obscenity in
terms of the sexual interests of minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in the
well-being of its children, and that this subject was within New York’s constitutional power of
regulation.

Justice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He
rejected Ginsberg’s argument that Section 484-h failed to give adequate notice of what was prohibited.
The New York Court of Appeals previously read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene
material to minors, and the Court also read a knowledge requirement into other similar state statutes.
Justice Brennan also rejected Ginsberg’s argument that the statute was impermissibly vague, as
Section 484-h expressly stated that a defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a
reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor in question.

Justice Potter Stewart concurred. He argued that while the First Amendment protected men’s
freedom to decide what they will read and listen to, government regulation could extend to settings
where a person lacked the capacity to make a choice. New York was free to determine that children
were not possessed of a full capacity for individual choice.

Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He acknowledged that the act was not
a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but disagreed that obscene
material was excluded from First Amendment protection.

Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, arguing that the majority avoided the essence of the case’s problem
by failing to define obscenity for the purposes of the censorship of material sold to minors.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the
Court ruled that material that is not obscene may nonetheless be harmful for children, and its
marketing may be regulated.

Background[edit]
Under New York Law it was illegal to willfully sell to a minor under 17 any picture which depicts nudity,
is harmful to minors and any magazine which taken as a whole is harmful to minors. Sam Ginsberg and
his wife operated Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette in Bellmore, Long Island. In it they sold
magazines including those deemed to be "girlie". He was prosecuted from two informants in which he
personally sold two 16-year-old boys the "girlie" magazines. He was tried in Nassau County District
Court and found guilty. The court had found that the pictures were harmful to minors under the law.
The Conviction was upheld by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York and was denied an
appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify two
different sets of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty. He cited Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Prince v.
Massachusetts. All where the court sided with the minors.

Opinion of the Court[edit]

Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court. The court rejected Ginsberg’s argument that New
York had deprived minors of their liberty. The court found that it was well within the state’s power to
protect minors and that just because the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be
regulated with minors.

Quality and accessibility of educational system

16. Department of Education vs. San Diego

180 SCRA 533

Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the three-flunk rule that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances
to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT
for the fourth time. He then filed in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela petition for mandamus. He
invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. Respondent judge held
that the private respondent had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether or not the admission rule by the petitioner is an arbitrary exercise of police power.

Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It isthe right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. It is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to bedoctors. The right to
quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides
that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. The decision of the respondent court is reversed,
with costs against the private respondent.

17. Non v. Judge James

II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll by the
school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the
school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the
pleadings.

The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being a
mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school.

The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred failing grades.
In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b) Their
academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct attributed to them
was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d) There was no
due investigationthat could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their choice
institution near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of Contract” theory the
contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State
of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. It is intended merely to protect
schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be construed to
mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.

The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. It provides that every student has
the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and
reasonable regulations; . . . and that “the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the
entire period he is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his right to transfer.”

18. THE SUPERINTENDENTOF CITY SCHOOLS FOR MANILA, ESTHER JUANINO, MA. LUISA QUIONES
and SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, v e r s u s MA. GRACIA AZARCON, and
MELINDA AONUEVO,Respondents.
February 11, 2008
G.R. No. 166435
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40848 and its resolution[3] denying reconsideration.

Respondents Ma. Gracia Azarcon and Melinda Anouevo, public school teachers assigned at General M.
Hizon Elementary School (GMHES) in Tondo, Manila, joined the unauthorized mass action of public
school teachers held from September 17 to 19, 1990.

On September 20, 1990, then Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)[4] Secretary Isidro
Cario filed various charges[5] against those teachers who participated in the aforementioned mass
action. Respondents were among those charged and placed under preventive suspension.[6] They were
later found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and were consequently
dismissed.[7]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed their dismissal to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) which,
however, dismissed their appeal for lack of merit.[8]

Respondents elevated the MSPB decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In its August 3, 1993
resolution,[9] the CSC agreed that respondents acted without due regard to the adverse consequences
of their actions which necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice
of the students.[10] It, however, modified the penalty to six months suspension without pay. The CSC
took into consideration the period of time respondents were out of work and ordered their automatic
reinstatement to their former positions without back salaries.[11]

On the strength of the October 3, 1993 CSC resolution, respondents requested petitioner Dr. Erlinda G.
Lolarga, superintendent of city schools for Manila (superintendent), to reinstate them at GMHES.[12]
On November 22, 1993, petitioner superintendent informed her co-petitioner Ma. Luisa Quinoes,
GMHES principal, that respondents [could] no longer be assigned any teaching loads because all
teaching positions in GMHES [had] been filled.[13] For this reason, respondent Azarcon was assigned to
A. Lacson Elementary School (ALES)[14] while respondent Anouevo was transferred to Plaridel
Elementary School (PES).[15] Despite their respective transfers, respondents retained their permanent
status and grade/subject assignment.[16]

However, respondents refused to accept their new assignments. They instead moved for the
implementation of the August 3, 1993 CSC resolution in the CSC. They also insisted on reporting at
GMHES while their motion was pending.[17] Since respondent Azarcon did not report to her new
station, petitioner Esther Juanino, ALES principal, considered her absent without official leave
beginning December 16, 1993.[18]

On January 18, 1994, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO)[19] against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155.[20] The RTC
issued a TRO on January 21, 1994.[21] After hearing, however, it denied respondents' application for a
writ of preliminary injunction in an order dated February 15, 1994.[22] Respondents moved for the
reconsideration of that order.

On October 20, 1994, the CSC, acting on respondents' motion for implementation, ordered the
immediate reinstatement of respondents as teachers at GMHES.[23] It ordered Director Nilo P. Rosas of
the DECS National Capital Region, the schools superintendent of Manila and the GMHES principal to
reinstate respondents at GMHES without prejudice to any future assignment to other schools should
the exigencies of the service so require.[24]

Petitioner superintendent informed the CSC that, although respondents had been reinstated as public
school teachers, there was, however, no vacancy in GMHES. Thus, they were assigned to schools that
lacked teachers (ALES and PES respectively). In consideration of these facts, the superintendent
inquired if the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution had been substantially complied with.[25]
On November 20, 1995, the CSC, through commissioner Thelma Gaminde, responded to the
superintendent's query. It opined that because respondents had been receiving their salaries since
November 30, 1993, they were deemed reinstated and were presumed to have been discharging their
functions as teachers.[26]
Consequently, on February 28, 1996, the RTC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration (of its
February 15, 1994 order). According to the trial court, the November 20, 1995 CSC letter rendered
respondents' motion moot and academic.[27]

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the February 15, 1994 and
February 28, 1996 orders of the RTC.[28]

On June 17, 2004, the appellate court granted respondents' petition. It found that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. The October 20, 1994 CSC resolution
unequivocally ordered the reinstatement of respondents at GMHES.[29] Thus, they should first be
reinstated at GMHES before they could be transferred to another station.[30] Accordingly, the CA
granted respondents' petition. It set aside the February 15, 1994 and February 28, 1996 orders of the
RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondents to their former positions in GMHES without
prejudice to any future reassignment to other schools as may be directed according to the policies and
rules of the DECS.[31]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Thus, this petition.

Petitioners assert that they substantially complied with the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution when they
reinstated respondents as public school teachers albeit in different stations.[32] The nature of
respondents' appointments allowed reassignment to any station within the City of Manila.[33]

We agree with petitioners.

Section 6 of The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (RA 4670) provides:

Section 6. Consent for Transfer-- Transportation Expenses. Except for cause and as herein otherwise
provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another.
Where the exigencies of service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such
transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher
concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools or the Director of
Vocational Education, as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon, his transfer
shall be held in abeyance; Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made three months
before any national or local elections.

Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the Government if his
transfer is finally approved. (emphasis supplied)

For a transfer or reassignment of a public school teacher to be valid, the following requisites must be
satisfied:

1. the transfer or reassignment was undertaken pursuant to the exigencies of service;

2. the school superintendent previously notified the teacher concerned of his/her transfer or
reassignment;
3. the teacher concerned was informed of the reason or reasons for his/her transfer and
4. that the transfer was not made three months before a national or local election.

With regard to the first requisite, in Department of Education v. CA,[34] we held that the appointment
of teachers does not refer to any particular station or school.[35] They are not entitled to stay
permanently in one station[36] because their assignments are subject to the exigencies of the service.

The exigencies of the service, as mentioned in Section 6 of RA 4670, should be viewed in the light of
Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution which provides:

Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels
and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

The accessibility of quality education determines the exigencies of the service. Thus, assignments
undertaken for purposes of improving the educational system and/or making education more
accessible are valid.

In this instance, respondents' six-month suspension meant that their students would have had no
teachers for the duration of their suspension. Hence, other teachers had to be assigned to take
over.[37] When respondents requested their reinstatement in the last quarter of 1993 (which was the
middle of the school year),[38] there was in truth no vacancy in GMHES.

Because there was no vacancy in GMHES, respondents were reinstated as public school teachers but
were assigned to schools where there were vacancies (particularly ALES and PES). Petitioners
therefore not only implemented the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution but also addressed the lack of
teachers in ALES and PES. Petitioners' solution was correct, commonsensical, valid and constitutional.
Their collective acts were geared towards ensuring the accessibility of quality education to the pupils
concerned.

On the second and third requisites, because respondents were able to extensively and exhaustively
question the legality of their transfers, they were clearly apprised not only of their respective
transfers but also the reasons therefor.

With regard the fourth requisite, respondents were effectively transferred on November 22, 1994.[39]
The nearest national elections to that date were on May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995 while the most
proximate local election was on May 9, 1994. Respondents were clearly not transferred within three
months before any national or local election.

All things considered, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its February 15, 1994
and February 28, 1996 orders. The October 20, 1994 CSC resolution qualifiedly ordered respondents'
reinstatement at GMHES[40] (i.e., without prejudice to future reassignment as the exigencies of the
service may require[41]). Thus, respondents' reinstatement as public school teachers, despite the
change of station, substantially complied with the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 2004 decision and November 22, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40848 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the February 15, 1994 and February 28, 1996 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
155 are REINSTATED.
Section 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions.

(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be
owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity
participation in all educational institutions.

The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.

No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise
more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided
by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner
provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to
such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.

(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.

19. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. YMCA G.R. No. 124043 October 14, 1998
Panganiban, J.

Doctrine:

– Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or
personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the
accomplishment of its objectives.

– A claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based. Thus, it must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a
language too clear to be mistaken. Verba legis non est recedendum — where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

– The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient
to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. It must prove with substantial evidence that
(1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it
seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes.
– The Court cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it
would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court, given its limited
constitutional authority, cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative
belongs to the political departments of government.
Facts:
Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives.

YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants
and canteen operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an
assessment to private respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the
assessment. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

Issue:
Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA subject to income tax

Held:
Yes. Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of their
properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC.

Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal,
is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of
its objectives.

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in
interpretation in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should
be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed
exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken”
(Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
117359, p. 15 July 23, 1998).

Verba legis non est recedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable
regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that it “is a
non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income.” This is
without merit since the exemption provided lies on the payment of property tax, and not on the
income tax on the rentals of its property. The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the above provision, it must prove with
substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational
institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes. Unfortunately for respondent, the Court noted that not a
scintilla of evidence was submitted to prove that it met the said requisites.
The Court appreciates the nobility of respondent’s cause. However, the Court’s power and function
are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to
suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the
realm of legislation. The Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on
the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of
government.

Section 5. (1) xxx

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

(3) xxx

(4) xxx

(5) xxx

Academic Freedom

20. THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON. DANIEL ALFONSO

FACTS:
-Petitioners BME, the government agency which supervises and regulates the country’s medical
colleges, Sec. Quisimbing, chairman of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports prayed for a
writ of certiorari to nullify the order of herein Respondent Judge Alfonso in Civil case No. 1385
restraining the enforcement of Pet. Order of closure of Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine
Foundation Inc (the college). -The college was founded on 1981 for the purpose of producing
physicians who will emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes of health. -However, because of
the unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao, the college was established in Antipolo, Rizal,
given a temporary permit to operate instead of the originally proposed location in Zamboanga City.
Antipolo was adopted as its permanent site and the name was changed to Rizal College of Medicine. -In
1985, DECS & BME authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all Medical
Schools in the Philippines. -The report showed that the college fell very much short of the minimum
standards set for medical schools. Further, the team of inspectors cited the ff. Grounds among others:
(a)the College was not fulfilling its purpose due inappropriate location (b)lack of university affiliation
for balance humanistic and scientific education (c) absence of philosophy based hospitals for student’s
training (d)more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach full time -The school disputed these
findings as biased and discriminatory and requested BME to send another team of doctors for
re-evaluation. 2nd team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the
school. -There were third and fourth evaluations but the college failed both and was rendered
inadequate in all aspects. -The DECS recommended the college for closure but somehow the college
succeeded to have the Board form yet another team of inspectors but although the findings show that
there were major efforts to improve the college, it is still rendered inadequate and recommended for
closure w/ provisions to disperse its students to other medical schools. -Mr. Victor Sumulong(chairman
of BOT), upon learning the same proposed a gradual phase-out so as not to dislocate the students and
minimized financial losses
– ALLOWED to operate until May 1989. -The college appealed the decision to the OP, but the
Executive Secretary found no reason to disturb the contested decision
– AFFIRMED! -The college filed civil case No. 1385 applying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation
– APPROVED! (by Judge Alfonso holding that there were no evidence supporting the findings in the
June 18, 1988 report, and that contrary to the findings, the laboratory and library areas were big
enough and operations in the base hospital was going smoothly.) -Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WON Judge Alfonso acted with grave abuse of discretion in substituting his judgment to for the
members/evaluators. YES! It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory
power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government;
involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass
judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if
not finality, by the courts.

There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.

(2) WON NMCS ORDER No. 5

has been violated? NO! It was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein
snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last
evaluation. The subsequent evaluations are merely to confirm the facts of the 1st evaluation in 1985.
Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit grant of opportunity for the college to comply with certain
requirements, the lapse of over three years must be deemed as substantial compliance with the relied
provision.

(3) WON the college was denied due process of law? NO! It holds no water, as the record clearly shows
that the College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but
remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact,
admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its
letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of
bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and
re-evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a
reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to be
heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to
be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable
reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the
petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this
Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial
Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as
here ruled, it has not that power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted
and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of
preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 1385.

21. Capitol Medical Centre vs. CA

 FACTS: The teachers and students of CMC declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take examinations.
Petitioner, upon proper procedure and effort, decided to close the school effective at the end of the first
semester of school year due to aggravated rift and disturbance on the peace of the hospital and fearful of
possible action by hostile students which might endanger the safety and lives of the patients in the hospital.

ISSUE: Did the respondents have a legal right to reopen the school and to be readmitted therein?

HELD: closing down of a medical school; striking students and faculty –Once a student is accepted for
enrollment in a given course, the school may not expel him or refuse re-enroll him until he completes his course
except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline; There is no contract that the
school shall remain open for the entire duration of his course; The contract between the college and a student
who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester is for the entire semester only and not the entire course; The
law does not require a school to see a student through the completion of his course. If the school closes or is
closed by proper authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of action for breach of contract
against the school

22. Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee

Facts:
1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology;
2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-1976
respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from
re-admission in their school reason in the letter: Petitioner’s frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of
slowing down the progress of the class.

3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their
decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School

4. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate
studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties,
but that she would have to fulfil their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree
later in Theology — which would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of
Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more.

5. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester

Issue:

Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing petitioner to continue
studying or not?

Held:

Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner cannot compel the mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty
to admit the petitioner. That respondent Fr. Lambino and Loyola School of Technology has the discretion whether
to admit the petitioner or not. Factors that were considered are academic standards, personality traits, character
orientation and nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.

23. Lupangco vs. CA

Issue: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter.

Commission lawfully prohibit the examines from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or
the like three (3) days before the date of the examination?

Facts:

Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions to Examines," to all who will take the
licensure examinations in accountancy.

“No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.”

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules
and Regulations of the Commission. “

Oct 16, 196, petitioners et al, filed an injuction suit against PRC, in the RTC

RTC Held: that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and
giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

PRC to CA – Appeal

CA HELD: RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105,
stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are
co-equal bodies.

“That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial
Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each
other's acts. 3”

Lupangco to SC:

SC HELD: RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing
its resolution.

RE: Reso 105:

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any
ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the
three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in
the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized
to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom
to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means
freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others,
as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be
most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe
would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public
accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this
juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims
and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to
the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them
of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing
themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological
make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt
officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed
out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses
should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate
means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force
and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

24. University of San Carlos vs CA

The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a
university to confer a degree with honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university
to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages.

Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners University of
San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII,
Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce,
major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary
credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, and accordingly, defendants

University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A. Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff,
Jennifer C. Lee, the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in accounting, with cum
laude honors (sic), retroactive to March 28, 1982, and to execute and deliver to plaintiff all the
necessary school credentials evidencing her graduation with such honors; and said defendants
are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum
of P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginning July 22,
1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees. The
counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs against defendants. 2

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09368.
In a decision dated May 28, 1987, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 3

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Resolution of the appellate court dated July 7,
1987. 4

Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof-

(a) A university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any student
who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for such
honors; and
 (b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay excessive moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is not justified by the facts and circumstances of this case and disregards the
many decisions of this Honorable Court setting reasonable standards and limits in the award of
such damages. (P. 2, petition; p. 12, rollo)

Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during the first
semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of
"I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.

The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she
had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in her new course.
As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the
College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall
academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors.

So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in
Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade average. She wrote a
similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this
letter was referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS.

In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the university
policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors;
that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed
to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed
because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which
became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three
failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her
disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement but she did not ask
for a reconsideration.

On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the USC Registrar'
requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar 7 referred her letter to the MECS and the
request for change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in
Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and
Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).

On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that the change of the
grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting class record required, so he wrote to
MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of the class record. 9

On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated with the degree
of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.

On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that
she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in abeyance pending
compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11

On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records, reported he could not
produce the same. 12 Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro
asking for the revocation of the change of grades of private respondent. 13 The request was denied as there was
no positive proof of fraud. 14

It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in
the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of
these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested parties advise
on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements. Therein it is provided, among
others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written
permission of his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or
removal within the period announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it
automatically becomes final. 16 A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a
student from receiving honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units per semester
but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors.
18
Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements.
19

Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound to comply
therewith.

It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her final grades of "5's" in
Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When her request was
denied by the university, she did not ask for a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982
when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking her failing grades
be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the MECS and the request was approved on March
22,1982.

However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from "IC" TO "1.9"
was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was required the same could not be
produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the
grade of incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so that it became final according to
the rules.

By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture
122 and Architecture 123 was without the written permission of her parents or guardian. Indeed, it is unusual
that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in this case, should still be allowed to withdraw from such subject.
Withdrawal from subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term examination 20 much less after a failing grade
in the subject has been received.

The change of grades of private respondent is thus open to question. Obviously, private respondent employed
undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacle
to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim that the change of grades of the private respondent was
attended with fraud is not entirely misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors
demanded of them by the private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she
had one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her failing grades. This she accomplished
thru the back door.

Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound discretion of the
petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors. The Court finds that
petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the honors sought by private respondent under
the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of
honors.

Private respondent not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought, her claim for
damages must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent court of May 28, 1987 and its
resolution of July 7, 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

25. Reyes vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court’s decision, which
affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered them and the other defendants therein
to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela
Cruz.
Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga.
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that
Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of
the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.
Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and
defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the
case, moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and
non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable

Held:

No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The
Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions
which do not obtain in the instant case.

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is
not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court
cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

26. Miriam College vs CA

FACTS:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the
College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper
that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required
to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of
doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue.
Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary
sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

ISSUE:
WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

RULING:
The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing
sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and
attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the
freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of
the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles
they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide th e
cases filed against respondent students.

27. UP Board of Regents vs CA

FACTS:
Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She
already completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was
allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the
CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for
graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University
Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging
that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.
RTC dismissed Celine’s petition. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON THE CA ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT
BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

RULING:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is
nothing new. The 1935 Constitution35 and the 1973 Constitution36 likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely,
for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia vs. Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide
sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and
who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or
withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a
student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that
the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April
24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. 38 It has the power
confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. 39 If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on
error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted
without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has
conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon
an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It
should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as an educational
institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to
it that this freedom is not jeopardized.40

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members
from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private respondent's doctorate was based on documents on record
including her admission that she committed the offense.
28. Tan vs CA

FACTS:

Sometime in 1986 private respondent Grace Christian High School applied for a tuition-fee increase of
15% and was granted provisional authority by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) to
impose such increase. Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian,
allegedly alarmed by what they perceived to be the deterioration –– despite the periodic fee increases –
– in academic standards and physical facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School
Parents-Teachers Association ("Association"). Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group of
parents lobbied with the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the enrolment, a
number of parents, among them petitioners refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn
refused to receive these parents' payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase)
tuition fee for that semester. The school refused to enrol these students. The above is the first case GR
90063, Yap Chin Fah vs. CA, while being considered on appeal by CA and later dismissed by SC, the
proceedings were also going on another with the same issue, which had been filed by Vonette C. Luy
and her father Vicente Luy and assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989.

The Luy petition alleged:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [T]hat during the school year 1989-1990 appellants unjustifiably refused to admit her in the
High School Department, despite the fact that she was given a reservation slip which she was
instructed to fill up and "return not later than April 15, 1989 together with report card for this
year." Before April 15, 1989, she submitted the reservation slip to the school principal, but the
principal informed her that she would no longer be admitted because her father was very vocal
against certain school policies and activities. As the school principal refused to allow her to
enroll in the High School Department, her father wrote a letter complaint dated April 7, 1989
to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The Department indorsed the
letter to the school for immediate comment and/or appropriate action (Exhibits "E" and "D").
In reply, the lawyer of the school wrote the DECS to reiterate the school's decision not to
enroll Vonette Luy in its High School Department (Exhibit "E"). (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

The school and herein petitioners Julia and James Tan opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction on the grounds that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . (a) the right of a student to enroll in a private school is not absolute; (b) Vonette C. Luy failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies; and (c) there is no clear legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.

RTC granted the petition of Luy and ordered the school to admit petitioners’ children in high school. Grace Christian defied orders,
hence, herein petitioner Julia Tan as principal and James Tan as administrative consultant, was convicted for indirect contempt. CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
WON Grace Christian is correct not to enroll private petitioner’s children.

RULING:

The respondent Court of Appeals should have been aware that in the related case (G.R. No. 90063), we
had already set aside the writ of preliminary injunction similar to the writ from which emanated the
contempt order directing that the petitioners be imprisoned and made to pay fines. If this Court had
already found a preliminary injunction invalid and sustained the school's position that there was no
unmistakable and indubitable right to enroll the petitioners' children, any lower court's decision to the
contrary is not only unenforceable and ineffective, but certainly cannot be the basis for a contempt
order.

The instant case is a case of forum shopping.

It is true that private schools –– not unlike public utilities and other private corporations whose businesses impinge on the public
interest –– are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State (Const., Art. XIV [4] [1]). At the same time, however,
private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This right to establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations extends as well to parents and parent-teacher associations, as
parents are under a social and moral (if not legal obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools. In
the instant case, since petitioners have failed to comply with the conditions and prerequisites for admission, i.e., registration within
the prescribed dates, payment of duly-approved tuition fees, and compliance with school rules and regulations, Grace Christian
cannot be regarded as having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to re-enroll petitioners' children.

Where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have
deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of the student body and of the faculty and
management as a whole, and of the children of the parents affected, require the affected children to be enrolled elsewhere. The
maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of
this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioners' children and to reintegrate them to the student body. It may even be
argued that petitioners' children have been innocent victims in a deplorable confrontation between some parents and respondent
School, but the situation here finds some analogy in labor cases where, because of pre-existing and supervening strained relations,
reinstatement is not always a feasible solution.

29. Tangonan vs Pano

FACTS:
Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to admit her for the academic year
1976-1977. She had been previously provisionally admitted the previous schoolyear, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried
to take the course again in another school, but she was refused admission bec. she tried to bribe the dean of the school. When she
tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied admission. She brought the matter on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit petitioner.

RULING:
No. Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet. is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c involves the exercise of discretion
not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of
Regulations of Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing
enrollment of a student. Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol
enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8 (2) Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except
of rational methods by w/c truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or
college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the over-riding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.

30. PTA vs Metrobank

FACTS:

Sometime in 2001, the spouses Denivin Ilagan and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan) applied for and were granted a loan by the
[Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.] in the amount of x x x (P4,790,000.00) [secured by] x x x a Real Estate Mortgage over the parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title with Nos. 300203, 285299, 278042, 300181, 300184, 300191, 300194, and 300202,
respectively.

Upon default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted with [Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.] being the highest bidder x x x and
for which a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.

During the period of redemption, the respondent Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession was
subsequently approved by the Court.

[On June 30, 2005], the St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9793 against the respondent Bank and the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac which the Court dismissed.
St. Mathew Christian Academy is practically owned by the mortgagors, spouses Denivin and Josefina Ilagan. Firstly, the lease to St.
Mathew by the Ilagans, as lessor, was for a period of one year from the execution of the lease contract in 1998. Therefore, the lease
should have expired in 1999. However, since the lease continued after 1999, the lease is now with a definite period, or monthly, since
the payment of lease rental is monthly. (Articles 1670 and 1687, Civil Code). Therefore, the lease expires at the end of each month.
Secondly, the lease was not registered and annotated at the back of the title, and therefore, not binding on third persons. (Article
1648, Civil Code) Thirdly, the spouses are the owners or practically the owners of St. Mathew. Even if it has a separate personality,
nevertheless, "piercing the veil of corporate entity" is resorted to for the spouses should not be allowed to commit fraud under the
separate entity/personality of St. Mathew.

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, herein petitioners Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) of St. Mathew
Christian Academy (SMCA) filed a Motion for Leave to file Petition in Intervention. The trial court ruled that petitioners’
intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession. Thus, it directed that the writ be
implemented by placing respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) in physical possession of the property.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner-students’ right to quality education and academic freedom was violated by the Trial Court’s Writ of Possession
Order.

RULING:

The trial court’s Order did not violate the petitioner-students’ right to quality education and academic freedom.

We disagree with petitioners’ assertion that the students’ right to quality education and academic freedom was
violated. The constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels24 is directed to the State and not to the school.25 On this basis, the petitioner-students cannot prevent the
MBTC from acquiring possession of the school premises by virtue of a validly issued writ of possession.

There is likewise no violation of the so-called academic freedom. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution
mandates "that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." Academic freedom did
not go beyond the concept of freedom of intellectual inquiry,26 which includes the freedom of professionally
qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence
subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and
established in these disciplines. It also pertains to the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them - the grant being given to institutions of higher learning - free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.27 In
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,28 we held that:

[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the 'institutions of higher learning' as the recipients of this boon. It
would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. x x x It is the business of a university to provide
that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which
there prevail the 'four essential freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.

In this case, except for their bare allegation that "if the school will be ejected because of the writ of possession, the students will
necessarily be ejected also"29 and "thereby their learning process and other educational activities shall have been disrupted", 30
petitioners miserably failed to show the relevance of the right to quality education and academic freedom to their case or how they
were violated by the Order granting the writ of possession to the winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

-FIN-