REPUBLIC ACT NO.

6657 ON SOCIAL JUSTICE

Republic Act no. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, is
instituted to pursue and upheld a more equitable distribution and ownership of land,
with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological
needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the
opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through
greater productivity of agricultural lands. This agrarian reform program encourages
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities
and retention limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological,
developmental, and equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation.
With regards to social justice, this act recognizes the right of farmers,
farmworkers and landowners, as well as cooperatives and other independent farmers’
organizations through participations and provision of support to agriculture by means
of appropriation of technology and research, and adequate financial production,
marketing and other support services.

CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS,

G.R. No. 47800. December 02,
1940
FACTS:
As a consequence of the resolution by the National Traffic Commission that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along specific places at certain
times, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick-up passengers, to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Petitioner
Calalang contends that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548, which was
passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
state, constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion, and infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice. Section 1 of C.A. No.
548 reads as follows:
“SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such
rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain
provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director
of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."

ISSUE:
 Whether the rules & regulations promulgated pursuant to the provisions of C.A.
No. 548 considered were constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the said act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations.
The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means
the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex (The welfare of the people shall be the supreme law.

Discussion/s:
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of
the individual are subordinated. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be
achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. The writ of
prohibition prayed for was denied.
As early as the enactment and effective of R.A. No. 1199, the Court stated in
Alfanta vs. Noe (G.R. No. L-32362, September 19, 1973), ‘It must be observed that the
aforementioned statute has been enacted by Congress pursuant to the constitutional
mandate that the ‘promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic
security of all the people shall be the concern of the state’ and of the obligation of the
state to accord protection to labor and to regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant. x x x x.” “The statute was, therefore, designed to improve the lot of the
sharecropper by granting to him a more equitable participation in the produce of the
land which he cultivates. Viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate and
obvious legislative intent, the provisions of the law should be construed to further
their purpose of redeeming the tenant from his bondage of misery, want and
oppression arising from the onerous terms of his tenancy and to uplift his social and
financial status. As we said in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, under the established jurisprudence
of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, ‘it will be guided by
more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will
ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker.’ “
As upheld by the many provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
6657, as well as the Agrarian Reforms Laws that came before it, strives to pursue
Social Justice among farmers, farmworkers, and landowners alike, as through this
act, the State is mandated to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources of
farming.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881, ON

FISHPONDS AND PRAWN FARMS

SEC. 2. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 is hereby amended by R.A. No. 7881 to read as
follows:
“SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
“b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that said prawn farms and
fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
“In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms
deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the
actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act When the workers or tenants do not agree to this
exemption the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the
worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage
the same.
“In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law the consent of the farm workers shall no longer
be necessary’ however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.”

JAIME SANCHEZ v. ZENAIDA F. MARIN ET AL.;

GR No. 171346; 19 October 2007;
FACTS:
The subject property in question is formerly owned by David Felix, whom have
petitioner have tenancy relationship with. David then sold and transferred ownership
of the subject property to his descendants, herein respondents, whom contracted their
mother, Zenaida F. Marin as civil law lessee. Marin then contracted herein petitioner
to work on the fishpond as a contractual worker, compensated with regular salary
and share in the net profit.
After the expiration of their first contract, Marin order petitioner to vacate the
premises. Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC. The RTC favored petitioner and
have himself declared as an agricultural tenant of the subject fishpond, and shall be
entitled of security of tenure. He then filed a petition before the PARAD for the fixing of
the leasehold rentals for his use of the subject fishpond. Meanwhile, Marin filed a
complaint before the PARAD to primarily eject petitioner from the premises on the
ground of his failure to pay the rent and to make an accounting. Petitioner denied,
alleging that it was Marin’s refusal to defray the expenses of production why he failed
to harvest anything from the fishpond. The PARAD ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered that he may be maintained of peaceful possession of the fishpond.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the DARAB
upheld the PARAD decision.
 Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. The appellate
court granted, and annulled and set aside the DARAD decision on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. It also held that Section 2 of RA No. 7881 has amended Section 10 of
RA No. 6657, wherein stating that operation of a fishpond is no longer considered an
agricultural activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is not
anymore, an agricultural land. a Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid Decision, but it was denied in a Resolution dated 25 January 2006.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?

HELD:
Yes. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657
by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and exclusively used
for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. Section 3(c) of Republic
Act No. 6657, as amended, now defines agricultural land as land devoted to
agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. As to what constitutes an agricultural activity is
defined by Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, as the cultivation of the
soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical. By virtue of the foregoing amendments, the operation of fishponds is no
longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond
operation is no longer an agricultural land.
Even as it is recognized that the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, pursuant
to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881. The
Court, nonetheless, does not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of
Appeals that since the subject fishpond is no longer an agricultural land, it follows
then that there can be no tenurial arrangement affecting the parties in this case. And
in view of the fact that there is no agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB, then the
DARAB had no jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's case.
It bears emphasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject
fishpond and his right to security of tenure were already previously settled in the
Decision dated 20 July 1987 of the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case No. 86-8,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 11 September 1989.
Having been declared as a tenant with the right to security of tenure as provided in
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844 in relation to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1199,
the law enforced at the time of the filing of the Complaint before the RTC of Lucena
City, the petitioner has acquired a vested right over the subject fishpond, which right
or interest has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.
Therefore, even if fishponds, like the subject matter of this case, were later
excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL as expressly provided in Section 10
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881, and despite the fact
that no CLOA has been issued to the petitioner, the same cannot defeat the aforesaid
vested right already granted and acquired by the petitioner long before the passage of
Republic Act No. 7881.
Indubitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657,
the petitioner's right to tenancy and security of tenure over the subject fishpond must
still be honored. The Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the case, contrary to the declaration made by the appellate court in
its Decision.

Discussion/s:
On the issue of the status of petitioner, what is his standing in the subject property,
although he was employed as a contractual worker by Marin as evident by the
monthly regular salary, the RTC held that he was an agricultural tenant. Under R.A.
No. 3844, lands used for fishponds are governed still by R.A. No. 1199, and stated
under the said provision of the law, it shall be based on the stipulation of the parties:
Section 46 (c). The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds
and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation
between the parties.
He was clearly an agricultural tenant, as early as during the ownership of
David when he was instituted by the landholder to be a tenant of the landholding.
On the promulgation of R.A. No. 6657 then, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
covered fishponds as one of the commercial farms who shall be covered by the
compulsory acquisition:
Section 11. Commercial Farming. — Commercial farms, which are private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising,
and aquaculture including saltbeds, fishponds and prawn ponds, fruit farms,
orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber
plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and
distribution after (10) years from the effectivity of the Act. the case of new
farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial
production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year
period, the government shall initiate the steps necessary to acquire these
lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements
thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which
shall hereafter manage the said lands for the worker-beneficiaries.
If the DAR determines that the purposes for which this deferment is granted no
longer exist, such areas shall automatically be subject to redistribution.
The provisions of Section 32 of the Act, with regard to production-and income-
sharing, shall apply to commercial farms.
Consequently, pertaining to the fishponds and prawn farms, it was clearly
provided for by the amendments of the R.A. No. 7881 that the subject property, a
fishpond, is exempted from CARP taking:
Section 2 (b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided,
that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
As reiterated by DAR Administrative Order No. 03-95, Section 2 of the same law
amends Section 10 of the CARL by exempting private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds as of March 12, 1995 (Effectivity date
of R.A. No. 7881, 15 days after publication in two national newspapers of general
circulation), provided that said lands have not been distributed and no Certificate of
Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) have been issued to Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
(ARBs).
 However, an exemption to this can be seen in the Policy Statements of the same
Administrative Order, if such fishpond have already been distributed to beneficiaries
with Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), fishponds or prawn farms cannot
be exempted from compulsory taking:
B. Lands devoted to prawn or fishponds which have already been
distributed to ARBs with the corresponding CLOAs issued, being a
consummated transaction, shall no longer be exempt from coverage
under the CARP.
C. Fishponds or prawn farms which have already been subjected to the
CARL by
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or are under Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD)
or for which
Notices of Acquisition (NOA) have already been issued to the landowner under
the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme, shall be exempt from CARP coverage only
upon the consent of a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular
workers or tenants within one (1) year from March 12, 1995.
In case the said workers or tenants object to the exemption, the subject
fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker-
beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage
the same. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall extend financial
assistance to the said cooperatives or associations through its countryside loan
assistance program.
In the event that the one-year period has elapsed and the required consent has
not been obtained, the property becomes subject to CARL.
Verily, DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, expressly respects and
acknowledges the tenancy relationship that existed between the parties prior to the
amendments made to Republic Act No. 6657 by Republic Act No. 7881, that is, before
fishponds and prawn farms were exempted/excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
The aforesaid DAR Administrative Order provides:
D. Acts of harassment by landowners intended to eject or remove the
workers or tenants or the loss of their rights, benefits and privileges to which
they are entitled shall be sanctioned and dealt with under existing laws, rules
and regulations.
E. Fishpond or prawn farmworkers affected by exemption/exclusion have
the option to remain as workers or become beneficiaries in other agricultural
lands.
A worker who chooses to remain in the exempted area shall remain therein and
shall be entitled to such rights, benefits and privileges granted to farmworkers
under existing laws, decrees, and executive orders. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, a worker who chooses to become a beneficiary of agricultural land
may be awarded other lands covered by the CARP.
Indubitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657,
the petitioner’s right to tenancy and security of tenure over the subject fishpond must
still be honored.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative
rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene
the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies
and the scope of their regulations.

COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM ON LIVESTOCKS, SWINE, AND

POULTRY-RAISING

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. DELIA T. SUTTON,

ET AL.; GR NO. 162070; 19 October 2005;
FACTS:
Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to
cow and calf breeding, the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to
DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. When CARP took effect, it included to
its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included
in the definition of agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a
formal request to withdraw their offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from
the coverage of CARL.
In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption
applying the retention limits (1hectare:1head of animal) with such, some portion of
respondent's land were exempted, some portion were segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration saying that the
entire portion of the land must be exempted because it was solely devoted to cattle-
raising, their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the
constitutionality of CARL and pushing their application for exemption. The President
affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal, CA declared the DAR Administrative Order
(retention limits) null and void, favoring the respondents.

Issue:
Whether DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands
devoted to livestock raising constitutional.

Ruling:
We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the
investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal
housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities
for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as
industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner
DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports
it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their
agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform.
Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.
The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the
A.O.
clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as
early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate
which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner
DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that
respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding
cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is
the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity
of the CARL.
There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

Discussion/s:
In the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, in order to prevent landowners from
preventing their landholdings to be covered under the compulsory acquisition of the
CAR Law, landholders tried to convert their lands devoted to livestock, swine, and
poultry-raising. As held by the Court in the case, citing the ruling in Natalia Realty,
Inc. vs. DAR, said practices are not agricultural, but industrial. Thus, the intent of the
law clearly shows that lands devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry-raising are
excluded from the CAR Law. Transcripts of the deliberations on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
As argued by Justice Sarmiento in his concurring opinion, ‘No land is tilled and no
crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor landlords,
only employers and employees x x x x’. ‘Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land
nor are they "fruits of the land.” ‘
The Court explicitly held that when administrative bodies promulgates rules that are
unconstitutional, ‘despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted
with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done x x x x’. ‘Where the legislature or the executive acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void.’
In this instant case of DAR vs. Sutton, the Court made it clear that, ‘it is doctrinal
that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the
Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must
conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an
administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The
assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it
enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by
the 1987 Constitution.’
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 AND LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 474 ON
RETENTION RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS

SANTIAGO v. ORTIZ-LUIS;
G.R. No. 186184 & 186988; September 20, 2010;
FACTS:
This is a case regarding retention rights under RA. 6657 of herein respondents:
Herein respondents’ 7.1359 hectare of tenanted rice land was placed under OLT to
benefit its tenant pursuant to P.D. No. 27, which prompted them to transfer the
property to their children by means of Deed of Absolute sale. When they applied for
retention under P.D. No. 27 before the DARRO as a means to prevent the property
from being transferred to its tenants, it was denied. When Amada applied for retention
under RA. 6657 before the DARRO, it was granted, holding that she may be given
benefit of retention under RA 6657, despite the recommendation of the PARO to deny
the same considering that they still have 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands.
Farmer-beneficiaries Celestino Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez, who have been granted
of emancipation patents of portions of the property, moved for reconsideration, but
was denied. Assuming that no appeal was filed, DARRO issued a Memorandum dated
October 24, 2000 to implement its Orders. Amada then filed for the cancellation of
Celestino and Isidro’s emancipation patents. The Farmers beneficiaries failed to file an
Answer despite notice, and also to appear during the hearings of Amada’s petition,
which resulted into the cancellation of their emancipation patents. Their rather late
Answer, included in their motion for reconsideration, was denied.
On appeal before the DARAB, it ruled in their favor, ruling that the authority to
issue a certificate of retention on landholdings is exclusively with the Regional
Director, and that there was a pending appeal on the Order of Retention that was
overlooked by the DARRO, rendering the Order of Order of Retention not final. Time
went by, the appeal was still denied. However, upon motion for reconsideration, and
with a different DAR Secretary, the denial order was reversed, upon conclusion that
the 7.1358 hectares being emancipated from Juan and Amada is incomparable to
their other landholdings that bears about 178.8 hectares in total, with 88.54 hectares
which are rice and corn land.
Petitioners appealed before the Office of the President which reversed the same
decision and reinstated the order favoring Amada of her retention rights. Petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA, and the case was consolidated with the case filed by
Juan. The CA upheld the decision of the OP, but with the inclusion to substitute
Lauro and Rogelio on behalf of Celestino and Isidro.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in upholding that Amada is entitled to right of retention.

HELD:
Yes. The appellate court overlooked the existence of Letter of Instruction No. 474,
with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 11 Series of 1978 as guidelines, amending P.D.
No. 27, removing “rights of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of
more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families.”
 The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the
effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose
the area to be retained subject to legislative standards. Thus, landowners who have
not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to
new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No. 6657.
However, the limitations under Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner
who filed an application for retention under RA 6657. LOI 474 amended PD 27 by
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of
more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families.
Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of
Appeals in part anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by
LOI No. 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowner's retention rights.
It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to promulgate rules
and regulations in order to implement a statute. The power, however, is restricted
such that an administrative regulation cannot go beyond what is provided in the
legislative enactment. It must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
hence, any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of
the statute.
Given the provisions above, the Court held that Amada is not entitled to retention
rights, citing the recommendations of the PARO, it would not hurt them to surrender
the 7-hectare subject property since they have as much as 178 hectares of
landholdings, where 88 hectares of it placed under Operation Land Transfer.

Discussion/s:
Pertinent to social justice, it is clear that the intent of the Constitution is to upheld
equity among the sovereign people regardless of social classification, by compulsory
acquiring landholdings from landowners and distributing it to the landless, farmers,
farmworkers. Time and time again that the Philippine laws have demonstrated the
noble intent of the Constitution in contemplation of upholding equality and equity
among the sovereign.
It cannot be stated that the CAR Law have favored the landless, farmers, and
farmworkers, considering that the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 also protects the
Constitutionally enshrined retention rights of the landholders. Even if the landholders
were not able to be guaranteed by the retention rights under P.D. No. 27, new
retention rights were provided by R.A. No. 6657. In other words, landowners who have
not exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled for retention rights
under R.A. 6657. In this case, however, it was only apparent by the abundance of
landholdings of the landholders that the petitioners can avail themselves of the
emancipation patents of the subject property.
Although the law provides, retention rights of the landholders are subject to
exemptions. Section 6 of the R.A. No. 6657 implies only on the requisite of retention
rights on the area chosen by the landowner must be compact and contiguous,
however, the Letter of Instruction No. 474, even though released as instructions on
the execution of P.D. No. 27, was held by the Court to be in effect still with R.A. 6657.
Simplified by DAR Memorandum Circular No. 11, series 1978, provides the
implementing guidelines:
Tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less shall be covered
by Operation Land Transfer if those lands belong to the following landowners:
 a.) Landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas, whether tenanted or not, cultivated or not, and
regardless of the income derived therefrom;
b.) Landowners who own lands used for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes from which they derive an annual gross income of at
least five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos.

Respondents are not just exempted from retention rights by the law,
It was only righteous of the agrarian reform laws to benefit the tenants and
avert unjust enrichment on the part of the respondents in this case, being landholders
of more than 178hectares of land, to which 88-hectares is being used for agricultural
activity. Herein tenants have proven to be deserving of the awarding of the 7-hectares
as beneficiaries of the CAR Law.
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 ON COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
BENEFICIARIES

DAR vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc.;

G.R. No. 168787; September 3, 2008;
Protests regarding CARP implementation are under exclusive jurisdiction of DAR
Secretary. The petition for certiorari by Polo Coconut before CA asserting that the
PARO gravely abused his discretion in placing Polo estate under the CARP will not
prosper until all remedies under DARAB Rules have been exhausted (DAR vs. PCPCO,
564 SCRA 80).
FACTS:
PCPCI sought to convert its Polo Coconut Plantation (Polo Estate) into an ecozone
under the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). PEZA issued Resolution No.
98-320 favorably recommending the conversion of the Polo Estate.
PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands into mixed residential,
commercial and industrial lands with the municipal government of Tanjay. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Tanjay adopted Resolution No. 344 granting PCPCI’s
application. When Tanjay became a city, its Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted
Resolution No. 16 approving Tanjay’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance where PCPCI’s real properties, including the Polo estate, were reclassified
as mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands.
The DAR notified PCPCI that 394.9-hectares of the Polo estate had been placed under
the CARP and would be acquired by the government. A new certificate of title was
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Aggrieved, PCPCI filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals asserting that
the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the
CARP. It argued that the Polo estate should not be subjected to the CARP because
Resolution No. 16 had already designated it as mixed residential, commercial and
industrial land. Moreover, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified to receive land
under the CARP.
In its February 16, 2005 decision, the CA found that the Polo estate was no longer
agricultural land when the DAR placed it under the CARP in view of Resolution No.
16. Furthermore, petitionersbeneficiaries were not qualified beneficiaries as they were
not tenants of PCPCI.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner-beneficiaries are qualified and entitled of awards.

HELD:
The Court held that they are not in jurisdiction to determine the issue at hand, for
the reason that under the CARP, only the DAR Secretary can determine who shall be
the CARP beneficiaries. Under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, the CARL provides:
Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same baranggay, or
in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
 (a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the abovementioned beneficiaries and
(g) others directly working on the land.
xxx xxx xxx
A basic qualification of a beneficiary is his willingness, aptitude and ability to
cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a
system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any
beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended
to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall
submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the
[Presidential Agrarian Reform Council].
Although this provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP,
determining whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves the administrative
implementation of the program, and only the DAR Secretary can identify and select
CARP beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot substitute their judgment unless there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Discussion/s:
It was only proper for the Court to divest itself to determine whether the
petitionerbeneficiaries are qualified. Other than what was enumerated by Section 22
of R.A. No. 6657, there is also the premise of whether the petitioner-beneficiaries are
‘landless residents of the same baranggay, or in the absence thereof, landless
residents of the same municipality’.
However, it was of the Court’s determination of whether there should have been
exhaustion of speedy alternative before PCPCI should resort to the Court of Appeals. It
was clear that ‘recourse to court action will not prosper until all remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level. Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure (DARAB Rules) provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or Board shall
have no jurisdiction over matters involving the implementation of RA 6657
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988
and other related agrarian laws enunciated by pertinent rules and
administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his
issuances to wit:
3.1. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under
the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of [certificates of
land ownership award] and [emancipation patents], including protests or
oppositions thereto and petitioners for lifting of such coverage;
3.2. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer/beneficiaries;
 The PCPCI should have first filed before the DARAB, a protest or opposition
questioning the propriety of subjecting the Polo estate to the CARP. Neither did it
assail the eligibility of petitioners-beneficiaries before the DAR Secretary. There were
available administrative remedies under the DARAB Rules but PCPCI did not avail of
them. Should PCPCI filed a contest first before the DARAB, it would have ruled on the
qualifications of the petitioner-beneficiaries.