Stat Con

Week 1

What is law as defined by STA

- Thomas’s definition of law: ‘an ordination of reason for the common good spread by the one
who is in charge of the community.’
- Balancing intellect and will. Whenever someone desires an end, reason commands what is to
be done to reach it. For Thomas law is based on community, ordered to the common
good. Making law belongs either to everyone or public personages having responsibility for
everyone. The leader is obliged to keep common good central when legislating. Corrupt
governments are directed to the private good of their leaders

Discuss hierarchy of laws (Art. 7, RA No. 386)

1987 Consti (Sovereign People)
Statues (Legislative)
IRR (Administrative)
Jurispudence (Juidicary

PHILIPPINE CONSTI
- FUNDAMENTAL law of the land
REPUBLIC ACTS
- enacted by the CONGRESS
ORDINANCES
- enacted by the LGUs

Hierarchy of courts
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
- -A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts.
- The SC is a court of last resort. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
deciding cases in the first instances. Its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist.
- a regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those
against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals
- HOWEVER, it may be disregarded if warranted by the nature and importance of the issues
raised in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations, or in cases of national
interest and of serious implications.

Court of Last Resort

Court of First Instance

Met Towns
Cities

FIRST LEVEL COURTS: Penalty less than 6 years

Inherent powers of the state
- Police Power (for PUBLIC good)
• promotion of public welfare
• most encompassing (practiced only by the government)
• properties taken are destroyed (Why? Harmful)
- Eminent Domain (for the PRIVATE OWNER of the property)
• forcibly take private property for public use in exchange of just compensation
• exercised by the legislative
- can be exercised thru private entities by means of delegation by the legislative
- Taxation (for REVENUE RAISING purposes)
• enforced proportional contribution to raise revenue to defray expenses incurred by the
government

Three branches of the gov't

- Legislative
• MAKES the law (Congress = Senate 24 + House of Rep >250)
- Judiciary
• INTERPRETS the law (SC + RTC + MTC + Shari'a Circuit Courts)
- Executive
• IMPLEMENTS the law (President + VP + Cabinet (DOH..))
Legislative process involving enactment of laws according to 1987 consti
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,
respondents.

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as
many times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed
to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an
amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised
were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared
for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of
the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need
to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account
the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable.
Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing
about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The
issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The
latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of
course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry
into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot
be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for
others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and
found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A
law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and
other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this
reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to
an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted
and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person
who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but
for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents
toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left
the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by
initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of
misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January
13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S.
Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take
another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the
fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.

RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who
have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. The regulation
of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public
(therefore not arbitrary). This regulation includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving the country’s objective of
“upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of
medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if
some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.
Facts:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some
law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive
legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of
learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been
instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a
real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred
Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of
P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of
Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The
mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680
in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one
Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him
(Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was
the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in
the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979.
To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond
which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his
obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual
obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and
Summa for collection.
Issue: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

Held:

Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly

committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may
ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City
Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that
a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other
offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.