G and M Philippines Inc. Vs Cuambot (507 SCRA 552)

3/16/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 507
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
G & M Philippines, Inc. vs. Cuambot
*
G.R. No. 162308. November 22, 2006.
G & M PHILIPPINES,
**
INC., petitioner, vs. ROMIL V.
CUAMBOT, respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; The failure of a party to produce the original
copy of the document which is in issue has been taken against such party
and has been considered as a mere “bargaining chip,” a dilatory tactic so
that such party would be granted the opportunity to adduce controverting
evidence.—We find that petitioner’s failure to submit the original copies of
the pay slips and the resignation letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its
claim that they were actually signed/penned by respondent. The failure of a
party to produce the original copy of the document which is in issue has been
taken against such party, and has even been considered as a mere “bargaining
chip,” a dilatory tactic so that such party would be granted the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence. In fact, petitioner did not even present in
evidence the original copy of the employment contract, much less a machine
copy, giving credence to respondent’s claim that he was not at all given a
copy of the employment contract after he signed it. What petitioner presented
was a mere photocopy of the OCW Info Sheet issued by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration as well as the Personal Data Sheet
which respondent filled up. It bears stressing that the original copies of all
these documents, including the employment contract, were in the possession
of petitioner, or, at the very least, petitioner’s principal.
Same; Same; Documents; Handwriting Experts; The opinions of
handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged
documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are
not binding upon the courts; Resort to these experts is not
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
** Respondent is also referred to in the records as “Rommel V. Cuambot,” “Ramil B.
Cuambot,” and “Romel B. Cuambot.” In the complaint, the position paper and the pleadings
before the CA and this Court, however, respondent signs as “Romil V. Cuambot.” He is also
referred to in his birth certificate as “Romil Villaceran Cuambot” (Records, p. 184).
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015ad2f32ae5386ab4bb003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
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VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 553
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of

handwriting.—As correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting
experts, although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of
the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the
courts. As such, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to
the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does
not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the
judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. No less
than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the
court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”
Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the
same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology, or
molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The
opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature
is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a
specialist on a highly technical issue.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Fact that respondent also filed the complaint
immediately gives more credence to his claim that he was illegally dismissed.
—That respondent also filed the complaint immediately gives more credence
to his claim that he was illegally dismissed. He arrived in the Philippines on
July 24, 1995, and immediately filed his complaint for illegal dismissal two
days later, on July 26, 1995.
Same; Labor Law; All doubts in the implementation and the
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor.—
Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation
of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, in order to give effect
to the policy of the State to “afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers,” and to
“assure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.”
554
Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Payment; The burden of

showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with
payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it.—One who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel
files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents—which will
show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of
workers have been paid—are not in the possession of the worker but in the
custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment
falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it. Only when the debtor introduces evidence that
the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor,
who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does
not extinguish the obligation. In this case, petitioner was unable to present
ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his
salaries and benefits in full.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Agripino C. Baybay III for petitioner.
Enrico L. Berbano for private respondent Romil Cuambot.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
1
of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 64744, as well as the Resolu
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (now retired), with Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arturo D. Brion concurring; Rollo, pp. 1926.
555
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 555
2
tion dated February 20, 2004 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 7, 1994, respondent Romil V. Cuambot applied for
deployment to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder with petitioner G
& M Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment

agency. Respondent’s application was duly processed and he later
signed a twoyear employment contract to work at the Al Waha
Workshop in Unaizah City, Gassim, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He
left the country on January 5, 1995. However, respondent did not
finish his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months
later, on July 24, 1995. On July 26, 1995, he filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for
unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and
repatriation bond, later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, actual,
exemplary and moral damages, and attorney’s fees. The complaint
was docketed as NLRCNCR Case No. 00070525295.
Respondent
3
narrated that he began working for Mohd Al
Motairi, the President and General Manager of the Al Waha
Workshop, on January 8, 1995. Along with his Filipino coworkers,
he was subjected to inhuman and unbearable working conditions, to
wit:
1. [He] was required to work from 7:00 o’clock in the morning to
10:00 o’clock in the evening everyday, except Friday, or six (6)
hours overtime work daily from the usual eight (8) working hours
per day.
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 28.
3 Also referred to in the records as “Mohamad Muthiri,” “Muhamad Muthiri” and
“Mohd Muthiri.” It appears, however, that the correct spelling is “Mohd Al Motairi,”
as this is what appears in the pay slips issued to respondent.
556
2. [He] was never paid x x x his monthly basic salary of 1,200
[Riyals] including his overtime pay for the six (6) hours
overtime work he rendered every working day during his
work in Saudi Arabia except for the amount of 100 [Riyals]
given every month for his meal allowance;
3. [He] was subjected to serious insult by respondent Muthiri
everytime he asked or demanded for his salary; and,
4. [S]ome of complainant’s letters that were sent by his family4
were not given by respondent Muthiri and/or his staff x x x.
When respondent asked Motairi for his salary, he was told that since
a huge sum had been paid to the agency for his recruitment and
deployment, he would only be paid after the said amount had
already been recovered. He was also told that his salary was only
800 Saudi Riyals (SAR) per month, in contrast to the SAR1200 that
was promised him under the contract. Motairi warned that he would
be sent home the next time he demanded for his salary. Due to his
family’s incessant letters asking for financial support, however,
respondent mustered the courage to again demand for his salaries
during the second week of July 1996. True to his word, Motairi
ordered him to pack up and leave. He was able to purchase his plane
ticket only through the contributions of his fellow Filipinos. Motairi
even accompanied him to the airport when he bought his plane
ticket. In the meantime, his wife had been making inquiries about
him.
To corroborate his claims, 5respondent submitted the following
documents: an undated letter he had written addressed to 6 the
Philippine Labor
7
Attaché in Riyadh, with Arabic translation; his
wife’s letter dated June 28, 1995 addressed to the “Gulangco
Monteverde Agency, Manila Head Office,” asking for a “favor to
help [her] husband to come home as early as
_______________
4 Records, pp. 6667.
5 Id., at p. 108.
6 Id., at p. 109.
7 Id., at p. 110.
557
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 557
8
possible;” a fax message dated July 17, 1995 from a representative
of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to a 9 counterpart in10
Riyadh, asking for assistance to locate respondent; and the reply
from the Riyadh LBP representative request
_______________
8 Id., at p. 111.
9 The letter reads:
Please request Labatt Filomeno Balbin &/or OWWA officers in Riyadh to locate MR.
ROMMEL CUAMBOT with address PO Box 16177 Unaisah City 81888 Al Waha Workshop
Sinaya St., AlGassim, K.S.A.
Mr. Cuambot, who is a relative of a Landbank OCBDstaff, wants to be repatriated
immediately because of contract substitution and nonpayment of salary since his deployment
in KSA in January 1995.
Although his family writes him regularly at the above address, Mr. Cuambot has not
received most of the letters. He told his family to use the mailing address of a friend – PO Box
90, Unaisah City K.S.A. Mr. Cuambot’s family is really worried and Mr. Cuambot himself
wants to go home even if he cannot collect his salary.
Thanks.
x x x
10 The pertinent portion of the message reads: Further, please be informed that per
faxed message of Mr. James Figueras dated 17 July 1995 re: Mr. Rommel C. Quiambot
with address at PO Box 16177 Unaizah City, Sinaya, Al Gassim, KSA, the matter has
been endorsed to the Office of the Labor Attaché with Mr. Saleh Moner as in charge of
the case.
However, due to some constraints like the place being about 400 kms. from Riyadh
city proper and the lack of contact telephone number, the case cannot be immediately
resolved since they will be relying at the mercy of the employer via mail which is
very uncertain. DOLE/OWWA is therefore requesting the relatives if they could
provide other information like telephone number of friends mentioned on PO Box 90,
also in Unaizah which will lead to immediate contact and negotiation with the
employer and communication with the OCW.
558
ing for contact numbers to facilitate communication with

respondent.
Respondent further claimed that his employer’s actuations
violated Articles 83 and 103 of the Labor Code. While he was
entitled to terminate his employment in accordance with Article 285
(b) due to the treatment he received, he did not exercise this right.
He was nevertheless illegally dismissed by his employer when he
tried to collect the salaries due him. Respondent further claimed that
the reduction of his monthly salary from SAR1,200 to SAR800 and
petitioner’s failure to furnish him a copy of the employment contract
before his departure amounted to prohibited practices under Article
34 (i) and (k) of the Labor Code.
Respondent prayed for the following relief:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant most respectfully prays

unto this Honorable Office that the instant complaint be given due course and
that a decision be rendered in his favor and against respondents G & M
(Phils.), Inc., Alwaha (sic) Workshop and/or Muhamd (sic) Muthiri, as
follows:
(1) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant
the unpaid salaries and overtime pay in the amounts of P61,560.00
and P66,484.80, respectively, including interests, until the same will
be fully paid;
(2) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally,

complainant[’s] salary for the unexpired portion of the contract in
the amount of P184,680.00, including interests, until the same will
be fully paid;
(3) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally,
complainant[’s] actual expenses which he incurred in applying for
the job, including expenses in leaving for the job, including
expenses in leaving for Saudi Arabia and plane ticket, as well as
repatriation bond and incidental expenses in going home to the
Philippines in the amounts of P49,000.00 and P20,000.00,
respectively, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;
_______________
DOLE/OWWA will be waiting reply (Records, p. 112).
559
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 559
moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P150,000.00, including interests, until the
same will be fully paid;
for and as attorney’s fees in the amount of P68,172.48 or the
amount equivalent to 10% of the total amount of the foregoing
claims and damages 11that may be awarded by the Honorable Office
to the complainant.”
In its position paper, petitioner alleged that respondent was deployed
“for overseas work as car body builder for its Principal Golden
Wings Est. for General Services and Recruitment in Saudi Arabia
for an employment
12
period of 24 months, with a monthly salary of
US$400.00.” It insisted that respondent was religiously paid his
salaries as they fell due. After working for a little over seven
months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to
return home since there were family problems he had to 13
settle
personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter dated
July 23, 1995.
To support its claim that respondent had been paid his salaries as
they fell
14
due, petitioner submitted in evidence copies of seven
payslip authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attaché in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. Petitioner asserted that since respondent only worked
for a little over seven months and did not finish his contract, he
should pay the cost of the plane ticket. It pointed out that according
to the standard employment contract, the employer would provide

the employee with a free plane ticket for the flight home only if the
worker finishes his contract.
_______________
11 Records, pp. 7577.
12 Id., at p. 9.
13 Id., at p. 21. In January 8, 1995, the US dollarSaudi Riyal exchange rate was
1USD=SAR3.75080 (http//www.oanda.com/ convert/classic, visited October 11,

2006).
14 Rollo, pp. 4344.
560
Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips

were forged. He denied having received his salaries for the said
period, except only for the SAR100 as monthly allowance. He
pointed out that the authentication of the alleged pay slips and
resignation letter before the labor attaché in Riyadh is immaterial,
since the documents themselves were falsified.
Respondent further claimed that petitioner required him to pay a
P10,000.00 placement fee and that he had to borrow P2,000.00 from
a relative. He was then told that the amount would be considered as
an advance payment and that the balance would be deducted from
his salary. He was not, however, given any receipt. He insisted that
the employment contract which he signed indicated that he was
supposed to receive a monthly salary of SAR1,200 for working eight
hours a day, excluding overtime pay. He was repeatedly promised to
be furnished a copy of the contract and was later told that it would
be given to his wife, Minda. However, she was also given the run
around and was told that the contract had already been given to her
husband.
To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there
was a great possibility that respondent had changed his signature
while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal
upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on the
payslip was written by one and the same person is mere conjecture,
as respondent could have requested someone, i.e., the cashier, to
prepare the resignation letter for him. While it is the employer who
fills up the pay slip, respondent could have asked another employee
to prepare the resignation letter, particularly if he (respondent) did
not know how to phrase it himself. Moreover, it could not be
presumed that the payslip and resignation letter were prepared by
one and the same person, as respondent is not a handwriting expert.
Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different

signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor
Arbiter, but also in respondents’ personal documents.
561
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 561
On January 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera ruled in favor of
respondent on the following ratiocination:
“What convinced this Arbitration Branch about the unreliability of the
complainant’s signature in the payslip is the close semblance of the
handwritings in the payslips and the handwritings in the purported
handwritten resignation of the complainant. It unmistakably appears to this
Arbitration Branch that the payslips as well as the handwritten letter
resignation were prepared by one and the same person. If it were true that the
handwritten letterresignation was prepared by the complainant, it follows
that he also prepared the payslips because the handwritings in both
documents are exactly the same and identical. But [this] is quite unbelievable
that complainant himself as the payee prepared the payslips with the
corresponding entries therein in his own handwriting. Under the
circumstances, the only logical conclusion is that both the payslips and the
handwritten letterresignation were prepared and signed by one and the same
person definitely not the complainant.
With the foregoing findings and conclusions, this Arbitration Branch is
of the wellconsidered view that complainant was not paid his salaries from
January 5, 1995 up to July 23, 1995 and that he was unjustifiably dismissed
from his employment when he repeatedly demanded for his unpaid salaries.
Respondents are, therefore, liable to pay the complainant his salaries from
January 5, 1995 up to July 23, 1995 which amount to US$2,640.00 (US$400
x 6.6 mos). Further, respondents are also liable to the complainant for the
latter’s salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract up to the maximum
of three (3) months pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, which amount to
US$1,200.00. Respondents must also refund complainant’s plane fare for his
return flight. And finally, being compelled to litigate his claims, it is but just
and x x x that complainant must be awarded attorney’s fees at the rate of ten
percent (10%) of the judgment award.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the respondents to pay complainant the aggregate
sum of US$3,840.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the exchange
rate prevailing at the time of payment, and to refund complainant’s plane fare
for his return flight. Further,
562
respondents are ordered to pay complainant attorney’s fees at the rate of Ten
15
percent (10%) of the foregoing judgment award.”
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC,
alleging that the Labor Arbiter, not being a handwriting expert,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to 16lack of
jurisdiction in finding for respondent. In its Decision dated
December 9, 1997, the NLRC upheld this contention and remanded
the case “to the Arbitration Branch of origin for referral to the
government agency concerned
17
for calligraphy examination of the
questioned documents.”
The case was then reraffled to Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo
Portillo. On September 11, 1998, the parties agreed to a resetting to
enable petitioner to secure the original copies of documents from its
foreign principal. However, on December 9, 1998, the parties agreed
to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings and on the
evidence on record.
This time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
According to Labor Arbiter Portillo, aside from respondent’s bare
allegations, he failed to substantiate his claim of poor working
conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that he executed
a handwritten resignation letter is enough evidence of the fact that
he voluntarily resigned from work. Moreover, respondent failed to
submit any evidence to refute the pay slips duly signed and
authenticated by the labor attaché in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as their
probative value cannot be impugned by mere selfserving
allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral
allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits and
the documentary
18
evidence presented by employer, the latter should
prevail.
_______________
15 Records, pp. 197198.
16 Id., at pp. 318323.
17 Id., at p. 322.
18 Id., at pp. 381382.
563
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 563
Respondent appealed the decision before the NLRC, alleging that

the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness of the signature
which appears in the purported resignation letter dated July 23,
1995, as well as those that appear in the seven pay slips. He insisted
that these documents should have been endorsed to the National
Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy
examination.
The NLRC
19
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated December 27, 2000. It held that the questioned
documents could not be endorsed to the agency concerned since
mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. The records also
revealed that petitioner had communicated to the foreign employer
abroad, who sent the original copies, but there was no response from
respondent. It also stressed that during the December 9, 1998
hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; if respondent had
wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he
should have insisted that the documents be examined by a
handwriting expert of the government. Thus, respondent was
estopped from assailing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.
Unsatisfied, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via petition
for certiorari. He pointed out that he merely acceded to the
submission of the case for resolution due to the inordinate delays in
the case. Moreover, the questioned documents were within
petitioner’s control, and it was petitioner that repeatedly failed to
produce the original copies.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the
appellate court, a visual examination of the questioned signatures
would instantly reveal significant differences in the handwriting
movement, stroke, and structure, as well as the quality of lines of the
signatures; Labor Arbiter Portillo committed patent error in
examining the signatures, and it is the
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 6671.
564
decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera which must be upheld. The CA
also pointed out the initial ruling of the NLRC (Second Division)
dated December 9, 1997 which set aside the earlier decision of
Labor Arbiter De Vera included a special directive to the Arbitration
Branch of origin to endorse the questioned documents for
calligraphy examination. However, respondent Cuambot failed to
produce original copies of the documents; hence, Labor Arbiter
Portillo proceeded with the case and ruled in favor of petitioner
G.M. Phils. The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated 27 December 2000
and 12 February 2001, respectively, of the NLRC Second Division are
hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 20 February
20
1997 rendered by
Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera is hereby REINSTATED.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

21
which the CA denied
for lack of merit in its Resolution dated February 20, 2004.
Hence, the present petition, where petitioner claims that—
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A MATTER OF

LAW IN HOLDING THAT LABOR ARBITER ENRICO PORTILLO
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE HELD THAT THE
SIGNATURES APPEARING ON THE
22
QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
ARE THOSE OF THE PETITIONER.
Petitioner points out that most of the signatures which Labor Arbiter
De Vera used as standards for comparison with the signatures
appearing on the questioned documents were those in the pleadings
filed by the respondent long after the questioned documents had
been supposedly signed by him. It claims that respondent affixed his
signatures on the pleadings
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 2526.
21 Id., at p. 28.
22 Id., at p. 11.
565
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 565
in question and intentionally made them different from his true
signature so that he could later on conveniently impugn their
authenticity. Petitioner claims that “had Labor Arbiter De Vera taken
pains in considering these circumstances, he could have determined
that respondent may have actually intentionally given a different
name and slightly changed his signature in his application, which
name and signature he used when he signed the questioned letter of
resignation and payslips, only to conveniently disown the 23
same
when he came back to the country to file the present case.” Thus,
according to petitioner, the CA clearly committed a palpable error of
law when it reversed the ruling of the NLRC, which in turn affirmed
Labor Arbiter Portillo’s decision.
For his part, respondent contends that petitioner’s arguments

were already raised in the pleadings filed before Labor Arbiter De
Vera which had already been passed upon squarely in the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision of January 30, 1997.
The determinative issues in this case are essentially factual in
nature—(a) whether the signatures of respondent in the payslips are
mere forgeries, and (b) whether respondent executed the resignation
letter. Generally, it is not our function to review findings of fact.
However, in case of a divergence in the findings and conclusions of
the NLRC on the one hand, and those of the Labor Arbiter and the
CA on the other, the Court may examine the evidence presented by
the parties to determine whether or not the employee 24was illegally
dismissed or voluntarily resigned from employment. The instant
case thus falls within the exception.
We have carefully examined the evidence on record and find that
the petition must fail.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 13.
24 See Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company, 458 Phil. 401, 409; 411
SCRA 512, 518 (2003).
566
25
In its Decision dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC had ordered the
case remanded to the Labor Arbiter precisely so that the questioned
documents purportedly signed/executed by respondent could be
subjected to calligraphy examination by experts. It is precisely
where a judgment or ruling fails to make findings of fact that the
case may be remanded to the lower tribunal to enable it to determine
26
them. However, instead of referring the questioned documents to
the NBI or the PNP as mandated by the Commission’s ruling, Labor
Arbiter Portillo proceeded to rule in favor of petitioner, concluding
that respondent’s signatures were not forged, and as such,
respondent’s separation from employment was purely voluntary. In
fine, then, the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion when he
ruled in favor of petitioner without abiding by the Commission’s
directive.
We note, however, that a remand of the case at this juncture
would only result in unnecessary delay, especially considering that
this case has been pending since 1995. Indeed, it is this Court’s duty
to settle, whenever possible, the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, 27
“leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.” Hence, the case shall be fully resolved on its merits.
We find that petitioner’s failure to submit the original copies of

the pay slips and the resignation letter raises doubts as to the
veracity of its claim that they were actually signed/ penned by
respondent. The failure of a party to produce the
_______________
25 The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision is Set Aside. The entire records of the instant
case is remanded to the Arbitration Branch of Origin for endorsement to the proper agency(ies)
concern[ed] for caligraphy (sic) examination of the questioned documents (Rollo, p. 52).
26 Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., G.R. No. 157752, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 529,
542.
27 Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 350 Phil. 35, 71; 286 SCRA
401, 434 (1998).
567
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 567
original copy of the document which is in issue has been taken
against such party, and has even been considered as a mere
“bargaining chip,” a dilatory tactic so that such party would
28
be
granted the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence. In fact,
petitioner did not even present in evidence the original copy of the
employment contract, much less a machine copy, giving credence to
respondent’s claim that he was not at all given a copy of the
employment contract after he signed it. What petitioner
29
presented
was a mere photocopy of the OCW Info Sheet issued by the
Philippine Overseas 30 Employment Administration as well as the
Personal Data Sheet which respondent filled up. It bears stressing
that the original copies of all these documents, including the
employment contract, were in the possession of petitioner, or, at the
very least, petitioner’s principal.
Moreover, as correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of
handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged
documents because of the technical procedure
31
involved in the
analysis, are not binding upon the courts. As such, resort to these
experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the
comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge
must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in 32 order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison
of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as
_______________
28 See Magdayao v. People, G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 677, 687.
29 Records, p. 87.
30 Rollo, p. 72.
31 Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 432 Phil. 895, 907; 383 SCRA
326, 335 (2002).
32 Id.
568
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved
to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” Indeed, the
authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same
sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology,
or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical
nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a
questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge 33
than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
34
Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter and the
handwritten pay slips will readily show that they were written by
only one person. A mere layman will immediately notice that the
strokes and letters in the documents are very similar, if not identical,
to one another. It is also quite apparent from a comparison of the
signatures in the pay slips that they are inconsistent, irregular, with
uneven and faltering strokes.
_______________
33 Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158015, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 141,
146.
34 The full text of the resignation letter reads:
MR. MOHD AL MOTAIRI
AL WAHA WORKSHOP
UNAIZAH CITY, GASSIM, KSA
SIR,
I AM ROMMEL V. CUAMBOT, A FILIPINO, WOULD LIKE TO RESIGN FROM MY
EMPLOYMENT AND HEREBY WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM ALL MY CLAIMS AGAINST
MY EMPLOYER & THE AGENCY W/C DEPLOY ME.
I JUST RECEIVED BAD NEWS FROM THE PHILS. SAYING THAT I SHOULD GO
HOME DUE TO FAMILY PROBLEMS W/C NEED TO BE SOLVED BY MYSELF W/C
URGED ME TO GO HOME.
HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND MY SITUATION.
RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
(Sgd.)
ROMMEL V. CUAMBOT
WORKER (Records, p. 21)
569
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 569
We also find it unbelievable that after having waited for so long to
be deployed to Saudi Arabia and with the hopes of opportunity to
earn a better living within his reach, respondent would just suddenly
decide to abandon his work and go home due to “family problems.”
At the very least, respondent could have at least specified the reason
or elaborated on the details of such an urgent matter so as not to
jeopardize future employment opportunities.
That respondent also filed the complaint immediately gives more
credence to his claim that he was illegally dismissed. He arrived in
the Philippines on July 24, 1995, and immediately filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal two days later, on July 26, 1995.
We are not impervious of petitioner’s claim that respondent could
have asked another person to execute the resignation letter for him.
However, petitioner failed to present even an affidavit from a
representative of its foreign principal in order to support this
allegation.
Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the35
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor,
in order to give effect to the policy of the State to “afford protection
to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers,” and to “assure the rights of workers to self
organization, collective bargaining, 36
security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.” We reiterate the following
pronouncement 37
in Nicario v. National Labor Relations
Commission:
“It is a wellsettled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must
be tilted in favor of the
_______________
35 LABOR CODE, Art. 4.
36 LABOR CODE, Art. 3.
37 G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 619, 626627.
570
latter. It is a timehonored rule that in controversies between a laborer
and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the
former’s favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number
of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and protection of labor.”
Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.
The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents—which will show
that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims
of workers have been paid—are not in the possession of the worker
but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the38
rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.
Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has
been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor, who is then
under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not
39
extinguish the obligation. In this case, petitioner was unable to
present ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had
received all his salaries and benefits in full.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP No. 64744 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
_______________
38 Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 706, 716; 331 SCRA
686, 695 (2000).
39 G & M (Phil.), Inc. v. Batomalaque, G.R. No. 151849, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA
111, 118.
571
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 571
Soriano vs. Marcelo
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), YnaresSantiago, Austria
Martinez and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in

the implementation and interpretation of its provisions shall be
resolved in favor of labor. (Asian Transmission Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 478 [2004])
——o0o——
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3/16/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 507

mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of

Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Payment; The burden of

& M Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment

ing for contact numbers to facilitate communication with

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant most respectfully prays

(2) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally,

to the standard employment contract, the employer would provide

1USD=SAR3.75080 (http//www.oanda.com/ convert/classic, visited October 11,

Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips

Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different

Respondent appealed the decision before the NLRC, alleging that

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A MATTER OF

For his part, respondent contends that petitioner’s arguments

We find that petitioner’s failure to submit the original copies of

38 Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 706, 716; 331 SCRA

Note.—Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in

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